SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 232888, August 14, 2019
JULIETA T. VERZONILLA, PETITIONER, v. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENT.
R E S O L U T I O N
CAGUIOA, J.:*
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated October 28, 2016 (Assailed Decision) and Resolution3 dated July 6, 2017 (Assailed Resolution) of the Court of Appeals (CA) Special Tenth Division and Former Special Tenth Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 134846.
1. Assist the Special Operations Officer V in conducting seminars, training and [dry runs] on disaster preparedness and first aid techniques relative to rescue and relief operations.Pursuant to a Memorandum dated June 29, 2012, Reynaldo attended the training "on the use of the Rapid Earthquake Damage Assessment System (REDAS) software" on July 1-6, 2012 in Tagaytay City. Prior to this, he attended several other seminars.5
2. Assist the immediate supervisor in enhancing public awareness on disaster preparedness through tri-media information campaign.
3. Conduct hazard, vulnerability, and risk assessment within the city.
4. Attend meetings, seminars, and trainings on disaster prevention and preparedness.
5. Render fieldwork in times of urgent need and coordinate with other government agencies/offices.4
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DENIED. The appealed Decision dated August 7, 2013 by the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. GM-19162-0705-13 is hereby AFFIRMED.Julieta filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in the Assailed Resolution. Hence, the present recourse.
SO ORDERED.18
18. CARDIO-VASCULAR DISEASES. Any of the following conditions:It is well to recall that the first law on workmen's compensation, Act No. 3428, worked upon the presumption of compensability which means that if the injury or disease arose out of and in the course of employment, it was presumed that the claim for compensation fell within the provisions of the law. PD 626 abandoned this presumption.25 Hence, for the sickness and resulting disability or death to be compensable, the claimant has the burden of proof to show, by substantial evidence, that the conditions for compensability is met.26a. If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his/her work.
b. The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.
c. If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac impairment during the performance of his/her work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship subject to the following conditions:1. If a person is a known hypertensive, it must be proven that his hypertension was controlled and that he was compliant with treatment.d. A history of substance abuse must be totally ruled out. (Emphasis supplied)
2. If a person is not known to be hypertensive during his employment, his previous health examinations must show normal results in all of the following, but not limited to: blood pressure, chest X-ray, electrocardiogram (ECG)/treadmill exam, CBC and urynalysis.
x x x Mr. Verzonilla comes (sic) from Manila as his death certificate would show. He therefore had to travel in perhaps about two (2) hours or more including traffic, to get to Tagaytay. Starting July 1, he started attending that day-long seminar. It cannot be denied that seminars, especially one for earthquake assessment, would also involve some physical activities. Then on the 4th day, Mr. Verzonilla and company went to at least five (5) different places in Tagaytay for the use of the [Global Positioning System (GPS)] system. Inclusive of travel, this activity lasted for at least two and a half hours (2 1/2 hours). Thereafter, he continued on with attending the lectures for that day until 7:30 p.m. [a]nd then this was followed by a program which lasted at least until 10:00 [p.m.] Not long after, he suffered a cardiac arrest and at 1:25 a.m. of July 5, 2012, he died. His death occurred in less than x x x 24 hours since his last strenuous activities in that seminar.The CA, in affirming the ECC decision denying the claim of Julieta, ruled out paragraph (c), item 18 of the ECC Board Resolution, thus:
And prior to this particular seminar, Mr. Verzonilla was also made to attend a Seminar on Partnership Build for Disaster, Risk Reduction and Management Climate Change also in Tagaytay City which lasted from June 18-20, 2012.28
Here, though it was shown that Reynaldo was diagnosed to be hypertensive, it also appears that his last consultation with Dr. Alonso was on December 22, 2003. There was no evidence adduced to show that his hypertension was controlled and that he was compliant with the treatment given, if any.29Moreover, the CA pronounced that "although cardiovascular disease is a listed occupational disease, its compensability, nonetheless, requires compliance with all [the] conditions set forth in the rules,"30 giving the impression that Julieta is bound to prove the concurrence of ALL of the conditions in item number 18. This is mistaken. A simple reading of the law shows that a claimant is required to prove merely the existence of "any" of the conditions mentioned in the subject item, hence, only at least one thereof.
x x x the case of GSIS v. Vicencio x x x particularly states:In sum, the Court is convinced that Julieta was able to adduce substantial evidence to support her claims for compensation benefits in relation to her late husband's death.
It is well-settled that the degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workman's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of a claimant's illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment contributed, even if to a small degree, to the development of the disease.36 (Emphasis supplied)
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the Workmens Compensation Act. Despite such abandonment, however, the present law has not ceased to be an employees' compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances.38 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Assailed Decision dated October 28, 2016 and Resolution dated July 6, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 134846 are REVERSED. The respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is hereby ordered to award death benefits due petitioner in relation to the death of Reynaldo I. Verzonilla. The award of death benefits shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of extrajudicial demand until finality of this Decision and the total amount thereof as of the finality of this Decision shall earn 6% interest per annum from such date until full payment.
Endnotes:
* Designated Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2688 dated July 30, 2019.
1Rollo, pp. 9-32.
2 Id. at 34-40; Penned by Jssociate Justice Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles with Associate Justices Florito S. Macalino and Leoncia R. Dimagiba concurring.
3 Id. at 43-44.
4 Id. at 72.
5 Including the following:
September 19-23, 2011 - PH-US Balikatan 2012 CPX Initial Planning Conference and the Actual Exercise February 28-29, 2012 - Bahn Communications, Inc. eGIS Planning and Kick-off Workshop March 21-23, 2012 - ASEAN Training Course on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) March 8, 2012 - Info Bahn Communications, Inc. eGIS Orientation (Capability Building Training) March 27-29, 2012 - PH-US Balikatan 2012 - Unilateral Exercise April 16-27, 2012 - PH-US Balikatan 2012 CPX May 16-18, 2012 - 3-Day Training of Trainers (TOT): Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management System June 8, 2012 - ER Hardcore Core Concepts of the Basics June 18-20, 2012 - Forum on Partnership Building for DRRM & CCA July 1-6, 2012 - Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction into Local Development Planning Process through the Provision and Training on the Use of REDAS Software. (Id. at 75-76) June 18, 19 and 20, 2012 - DILG Forum on Partnership Build for Disaster, Risk Reduction and Management and Climate Change in Tagaytay City (Id. at 11-12)
6 Id. at 98.
7 Id. at 101.
8 FURTHER AMENDING CERTAIN ARTICLES OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442 ENTITLED "LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES," dated December 27, 1974.
9Rollo, p. 96.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 97.
12 Id. at 59-62.
13 Id. at 61.
14 Id. at 38.
15 Id. at 39.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 40.
19 Id. at 19-20.
20 Id. at 20.
21 Id. at 27-28.
22 Id. at 23-26.
23 Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, Rule III, Section 1 (b).
24GSIS v. Raoet, 623 Phil. 690, 698-699 (2009); see also GSIS v. Vicencio, 606 Phil. 120, 125-126 (2009) and GSIS v. Capacite, 744 Phil. 170, 176 (2014).
25GSIS v. Cuanang, 414 Phil. 727, 738 (2004).
26 See Gatus v. SSS, 655 Phil. 550, 558 (2011).
27Rollo, pp. 22-23.
28 Id. at 25.
29 Id. at 39.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 72.
32 Id. at 25.
33GSIS v. Raoet, supra note 24 at 703.
34 Id.
35 Supra note 24.
36 Id. at 177-178.
37 See GSIS v. Vicencio, supra note 24 at 126.
38Castor-Garupa v. ECC, 521 Phil. 311, 321 (2006).