SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 219157, August 14, 2019
ZENAIDA E. SILVER AND NELSON SALCEDO, PETITIONERS, v. JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY, IN HER CAPACITY AS JUDGE DESIGNATE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, 11TH JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 11, DAVAO CITY, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, LORETO HAO, KENNETH HAO, ATTY. AMADO L. CANTOS, ZENAIDA TALATTAD AND MAUREEN ELLA M. MACASINDIL, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
1) | Decision1 dated August 14, 2014, sustaining the trial court's finding of probable cause for violation of RA 65392 or the "Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972" against petitioners Zenaida Silver and Nelson Salcedo; and |
2) | Resolution3 dated June 2, 2015, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. |
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolutions are MODIFIED. The City Prosecutor of Davao City is hereby directed to file the corresponding criminal informations (8 counts) against respondents Zenaida Silver, Nelson, Salcedo, Paul Henson Egca, Edward Salcedo, Robert Gloria, Richard Ramos, Rodrigo Tampos, and Sheriff Abe C. Andres for violation of Republic Act No. 6539 before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, and to report to this Office the action taken therein within five (5) days from receipt hereof.The eight (8) Informations were raffled to RTC-Branch 14, Davao City and warrants of arrest were issued. The prosecution, though, subsequently withdrew the Informations in view of its subsequent findings on reinvestigation that no probable cause existed against the accused. Branch 14 granted the motion to withdraw and dismissed the case.24
SO ORDERED.23
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and it appearing from the investigation conducted that the crime of Violation of Section 2 of R.A. 6539, otherwise known as Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, has been committed and that there is probability that accused ZENAIDA SILVER, SPO4 NELSON SALCEDO, ROBERTO BOBONG GLORIA, EDWARD SALCEDO, RICHARD RAMOS, RODRIGO TAMPOS and PAUL HENSON EGCA alias NONOY have committed the same, let warrant for their arrest be issued. As to accused ABE C. ANDRES the Prosecution is directed to submit additional evidence which will establish probable cause for the arrest of the accused or evidence that will engender a well-founded belief that said accused conspired with the other accused in committing the offense charged.Petitioners Zenaida Silver and SPO4 Nelson Salcedo sought to reconsider but it was denied under Joint Order28 dated September 14, 2012.
SO ORDERED.27
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, he judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issuance must be resolved by the court wit in thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.Probable cause for the purpose of issuing a Warrant of arrest pertains to facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average person weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibration of our technical rules of evidence of which his or her knowledge may be nil. Rather, the person relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable persons have an abundance. Thus, the standard used for issuance of a warrant of arrest is less stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. So long as the evidence presented shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court judge has sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest against him or her.37x x x
Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.In sum, the judge must (I) personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Note that supporting documents include but are not limited to affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge to make his determination of probable cause.
Under existing laws, warrants of arrest may be issued (1) by the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs) except those in the National Capital Region, Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) in cases falling within their exclusive original jurisdiction; in cases covered by the rule on summary procedure where the accused fails to appear when required; and in cases filed with them which are cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs); and (2) by the Metropolitan Trial Courts in the National Capital Region (MeTCs-NCR) and the RTCs in cases filed with them after appropriate preliminary investigations conducted by officers authorized to do so other than judges of MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs.
As to the first, a warrant can issue only if the judge is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses, in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
As to the second, this Court held in Soliven vs. Makasiar that the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and the witnesses, but[f]ollowing established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.Sound policy supports this procedure, "otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts." It must be emphasized that judges must not rely solely on the report or resolution of the fiscal (now prosecutor); they must evaluate the report and the supporting documents. In this sense, the aforementioned requirement has modified paragraph 4(a) of Circular No. 12 issued by this Court on 30 June 1987 prescribing the Guidelines on Issuance of Warrants of Arrest under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provided in part as follows:4. In satisfying himself of the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge, following established doctrine and procedure, may either:This requirement of evaluation not only of the report or certification of the fiscal but also of the supporting documents was further explained in People vs. Inting, where this Court specified what the documents may consist of, viz., the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination of probable cause. Thus:
(a) Rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause whether or not the case is cognizable only by the Regional Trial Court and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. x x xWe emphasize the important features of the constitutional mandate that "x x x no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge x x x" (Article III, Section 2, Constitution).In adverting to a statement in People vs. Delgado that the judge may rely on the resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to file the information by the same token that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation in the issuance of the warrant of arrest, this Court stressed in Lim vs. Felix that
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to male the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certificate on which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.Reliance on the COMELEC resolution or the Prosecutor's certification presupposes that the records of either the COMELEC or the Prosecutor have been submitted to the Judge and he relies on the certification or resolution because the records of the investigation sustain the recommendation. The warrant issues not :on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it.And noting that judges still suffer from the inertia of decisions and practice under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, this Court found it necessary to restate the rule "in greater detail and hopefully clearer terms." It then proceeded to do so, thus:We reiterate the ruling in Soliven vs. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as it commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.This Court then set aside for being null and void the challenged order of respondent Judge Felix directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest against petitioners Lim, et al., solely on the basis of the prosecutor's certification in the informations that there existed probable cause "without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause."
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of, each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief as or detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever, necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.
In Allado vs. Diokno, this Court also ruled that "before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof."x x x
The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the proposition that the investigating prosecutor's certification in an information or his resolution which is made the basis for the filing of the information, or both, would suffice in the judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In Webb, this Court assumed that since the respondent Judges had before them not only the 26-page resolution of the investigating panel but also the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and even the counter-affidavits of the respondents, they (judges) made personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case. (Emphasis supplied)
A careful reading of the motion for reconsideration and the opposition filed against it leads this court to conclude that the matters raised in the instant motion are clearly defenses which the accused need to prove in the course of the trial. As it is, the court still needs to conduct a thorough hearing in order to be convinced that indeed the matters raised are true and would really exculpate the accused in this case. The documents found on record and which were submitted with the motion for reconsideration need to be properly testified to, identified and offered as evidence so that this Court can make a definitive finding as to its truthfulness and as to whether such facts will really support the claim of the accused that they could not be held liable for the instant charges of carnapping.41Verily, both Judges Belo and Daray personally examined the eight (8) Informations filed by the prosecution, the relevant DOJ resolutions on the existence of probable cause against petitioners et al., the previous order of RTC-Branch 14, Davao City issuing warrants o(arrest on petitioners et al., the prosecution's ex-parte manifestation for issuance of warrants of arrest and petitioners et al.'s opposition thereto, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of Order datedApril28, 2011, the prosecution's opposition, petitioners' reply, private respondents' rejoinder, and the parties' iespective position papers. Based thereon, they independently concluded that there was probable cause to issue warrants of arrest on petitioners et al., in compliance with the directive of Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this score, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:
A close examination of the assailed Orders shows that Judge Bela made a personal determination of the existence of the probable cause by examining not only the prosecutor's report but also the supporting evidence, documents and pleadings attached thereto. Notably, prior to the issuance of the April 28, 2011 Order by Judge Belo, the court a quo conducted a hearing specifically for determination of probable cause to issue warrant of arrest against Silver, Salcedo and their companions. In the said hearing, the parties were given opportunity to present their respective evidence and supporting documents. Thereafter, the parties were required to submit their respective pleadings in support of their positions.Section 2 of RA 6539, as amended defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain.44
Similarly in the September 14, 2012 Joint Order of respondent Judge Daray, she also mentioned that she carefully evaluated the pleadings of the parties consisting of the motion for reconsideration, the opposition to motion for reconsideration, Reply, Rejoinder, and the respective position papers in issuing the assailed Order. Clearly, the assailed Orders were arrived at after an independent assessment and careful scrutiny of all the documents, pleadings and affidavits submitted by the parties.42
x x x
Records show that the ownership of the said, motor vehicles remains dubious. While Silver anchored her ownership or the basis of the award given to her by the BOC where she emerged as the highest bidder, respondents on the other hand are asserting owner hip thereof pursuant to a certificate of registration issued by the Land Transportation Authority (LTO) (sic) in their names. In Amante v. Serwelas, the Supreme Court has held that between one who is armed with a certificate of registration clearly establishing his ownership and another whose claims is supported only by unconvincing allegations, we do not hesitate to rule for the former.
Hence, respondent Judge and Judge Bela' before her, cannot be faulted in finding probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest of petitioners as it took into consideration the observation of the DOJ that certificate of registration covering the subject vehicles are issued by the LTO in the name of respondents, there is, therefore, a strong presumption of ownership in their favor vis-a-vis petitioner Silver. We note further that the motor vehicles were subject of a replevin case at the time they were taken out by the petitioners from the premises where they were kept for safekeeping. Hence, at that time, the ownership of the vehicles is yet to be determined by the court. We therefore find no error in the observation of respondent Judge Daray that the arguments raised by petitioners in the pleadings are defenses which need to be proved in the course of the trial. As it is, the court still needs to conduct a thorough hearing in order to be convinced that indeed the matters raised are true and would really exculpate the petitioners for the offense charged.43
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. - When required pursuant to the second paragraph of section 1 of this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court may be conducted by either the judge or the prosecutor. When conducted by the prosecutor, the procedure for the issuance of a warrant or arrest by the judge shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this section. When the investigation is conducted by the judge himself, he shall follow the procedure provided in section 3 of this Rule; If the findings and recommendations are affirmed by the provincial or city prosecutor, or by the Ombudsman or his deputy, and the corresponding information is filed, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. However, without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest if he finds after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching question and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. (emphasis supplied)ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated August 14, 2014 and Resolution dated June 2, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 05161-MIN, AFFIRMED.
So must it be.
Endnotes:
1 Penned by Associate Justice Pablito A. Perez with the concurrence of Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a member of this Court), all members of the Twenty-Second Division, rollo, pp. 221-233.
2 AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING.
3Rollo, pp. 242-243.
4Id. at 37.
5Id. at 37-38.
6Id. at 38-39.
7Id. at 39-40.
8Id. at 222-223.
9Id. at 40-42.
10Id. at 44.
11Id. at 45-46.
12Id. at 46-47.
13Id. at 47-48.
14Id. at 48.
15Id. at 49.
16Id. at 52-54.
17Id. at 64-65.
18Id. at 223.
19Id.
20Id. at 80-89.
21 This resolution resolved the petitions for review of the resolutions of the City Prosecutor of Davao City in: (1) I.S. No. 05-K-6388 suspending the preliminary investigation or the complaint filed by Loreto Hao, Kenneth Hao, and Atty. Amado Cantos against respondents Zenaida Silver, Sheriff Abe C. Andres, Atty. Oswaldo Macadangdang, SPO4 Nelson Salcedo, Paul Henson Egca, Edward Salcedo, Robert Gloria, Richard Ramos and Rodrigo Tampos for carnapping under R.A. No. 6539, and (2) I.S. No. 05-L-7463 and 05-L-7464 dismissing the complaint for carnapping and theft filed by Zenaida Talattad and Maureen Ella M. Macasindil, also against the above-named respondents, including Nonoy Abelardo, rollo, pp. 97-106.
22 Paul Henson Egca, Edward Salcedo, Robert Gloria, Richard Ramos, Rodrigo Tampos, and Sheriff Abe C. Andres.
23Rollo, p. 105.
24Id. at 224.
25Id. at 129-134.
26Id. at 151-154.
27Id. at 153-154.
28Id. at 176-178.
29Id. at 229.
30Id. at 232.
31Id.
32Id. at 234-239.
33Id. at 5-32.
34Id. at 319-336.
35Id. at 393-402.
36Id. at 292-307.
37De Joya v. Marquez, 516 Phil. 717, 721 (2016).
38Fenix v. Court of Appeals, 789 Phil. 391, 405 (2016).
39Hao v. People, 743 Phil. 204, 213 (2014).
40 324 Phil. 568, 602-609 (1996).
41Rollo, p. 177.
42Id. at 230-231.
43Id. at 232.
44People v. Bustinera, 475 Phil. 190, 203 (2004).
45Rollo, p. 132.
46Amante v. Serwelas, 508 Phil. 344, 349 (2005).
47De Joya v. Marquez, 516 Phil. 717, 722 (2006).