EN BANC
G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019
LEILA M. DE LIMA, PETITIONER, v. PRESIDENT RODRIGO R. DUTERTE, RESPONDENT.
R E S O L U T I O N
BERSAMIN, C.J.:
By petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data petitioner Senator Leila M. de Lima (Sen. De Lima) seeks to enjoin respondent Rodrigo Roa Duterte, the incumbent Chief Executive of the Philippines, from committing acts allegedly violative of her right to life, liberty and security.
At the core of the controversy is the inquiry on the application, scope and extent of the principle of presidential immunity from suit. The question concerns the immunity of the President from suit while he remains in office.
Yet, prior to the consideration and resolution of the controversy, a preliminary matter of substance must be considered and resolved. May the petition prosper because the incumbent President of the Philippines has been named herein as the sole respondent?
- The August 11, 2016 public statement of President Duterte threatening to destroy Sen. De Lima. The statement reads: "I know I'm the favorite whipping boy of the NGOs and the human rights stalwarts. But I have a special ano kaya no. She is a government official. One day soon I will – bitiwan ko yan in public and I will have to destroy her in public."2 Incidentally, in the same event, President Duterte insinuated that with the help of another country, he was keeping surveillance of her. "Akala nila na hindi rin ako nakikinig sa kanila. So while all the time they were also listening to what I've done, I've also been busy, and with the help of another country, listening to them;"3
- The statement uttered in a briefing at the NAIA Terminal 3, Pasay City in August 17, 2016 wherein President Duterte named Sen. De Lima as the government official he referred to earlier and at the same time accused her of living an immoral life by having a romantic affair with her driver, a married man, and of being involved in illegal drugs. "There's one crusading lady, whose even herself led a very immoral life, taking his (sic) driver as her lover... Paramour niya ang driver nya naging hooked rin sa drugs because of the close association. You know, when you are an immoral, dirty woman, the driver was married. So you live with the driver, its concubinage."4
- The statements that described her as an immoral woman;5 that publicized her intimate and personal life,6 starting from her new boyfriend to her sexual escapades;7 that told of her being involved in illegal drugs as well as in activities that included her construction of a house for her driver/lover with financing from drug-money;8 and
- The statements that threatened her ("De Lima, you are finished")9 and demeaned her womanhood and humanity.10 "If I were De Lima, ladies and gentlemen, I'll hang myself. Your life has been, hindi lang life, the innermost of your core as a female is being serialized everyday. Dapat kang mag-resign. You resign.11 and "De Lima better hang yourself ... Hindi ka na nahiya sa sarili mo. Any other woman would have slashed her throat. You? Baka akala mo artista ka. Mga artistang x-rated paglabas sa, pagkatapos ng shooting, nakangiti ...".12
WHEREFORE, the petitioner respectfully prays the Honorable Court that judgment be rendered:
[1] Granting a Writ of Habeas Data –
- Enjoining respondent and any of his representatives, agents, assigns, officers, or employees from collecting information about petitioner's private life outside the realm of legitimate public concern;
- Disclosing to the petitioner the name of the foreign country who, according to respondent, "helped him" listen in on petitioner, the manner and means by which he listened in on petitioner, and the sources of his information or where the data about petitioner's private life and alleged private affairs came from;
- Ordering the deletion, destruction or rectification of such data or information; and
- Enjoining the respondent from making public statements that (i) malign her as a woman and degrade her dignity as a human being; (ii) sexually discriminate against her; (iii) describe or publicize her alleged sexual conduct; (iv) constitute psychological violence against her; and (v) otherwise violate her rights or are contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, and/or public interest; and
[2] Conceding unto petitioner such further and other reliefs this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.19
The maxim has actually stood for four different propositions at various points in English legal history. The first is that the King is literally above the law and cannot do wrong by definition; this understanding of the maxim reached its zenith in the 7th century under the banner of the "divine right of Kings". A second meaning is that even if the King's actions are not lawful by definition, there is no remedy for royal wrong doing through ordinary legal channels; one might term this a "procedural" or "remedial" understanding of the maxim. A third meaning, which actually represents the true historical origin of the maxim, is that the King has no power or capacity to do wrong; this was literally the case with Henry III, who assumed the Kingship while in his minority. A fourth meaning is precisely the opposite of the first: it means that the King is eminently capable of doing wrong but cannot do so lawfully. One can meaningfully combine this understanding with the second "procedural', understanding to yield a legal regime in which royal acts can meaningfully be described as unlawful but are not subject to remedies by the ordinary law courts. In such a scheme, however, subordinates who follow the King's orders may act at their peril.30
All of this background information was available to the Founding Fathers. Blackstone's Commentaries summarized and explained the legal doctrines concerning government accountability. The Commentaries make several substantive references to the doctrine 'that the king can do no wrong'. Blackstone begins his comprehensive discussion of the King's Prerogative explaining that 'one of the principal bulwarks of civil liberty' was the limitation of the king's prerogative.
What is an English subject to do "in case the crown should invade their rights, either by private injuries or public oppressions?" The English common law, suggests Blackstone, provides remedies in both cases. As for private injuries his answer is double: first, there [sic] is a remedy is the petition of right, and while it is only as 'a matter of grace' that the king provides the compensation requested, he is mostly to permit this charity; second, Blackstone cites Locke to the effect that the King is unlikely to inflict much damage personally, and immunizing him is a fair price to pay for the benefits of the regime.
As for 'public oppression': in most cases the answer is clear – "a king cannot misuse his power, without advice of evil counsellors, and the assistance of wicked ministers, these men may be examined and punished." Such persons could be indicted or impeached by Parliament 'that no man shall dare to assist the crown in contradiction to the laws of the land. But it is at the same time a maxim in those laws, that the king himself can do no wrong' because simply stated, there is no redress against the king. The results are less clear in the most severe cases 'as tend to dissolve the constitution, and subvert the fundamentals of government,' where the branches of government are in clear dispute.
Speaking specifically of the king[']s political capacity Blackstone famously stated that the law ascribes to the king 'absolute perfection' –The king can do no wrong. Which ancient and fundamental maxim is not to be understood, as if everything transacted by the government was of course just and lawful, but means only two things.
First, that whatever is exceptionable in the conduct of public affairs is not be imputed to the king, nor is her answerable for it personally to his people: for this doctrine would totally destroy the constitutional independence of the crown which is necessary for the balance of power ... in our compounded constitution. And secondly, it means that the prerogative of the crown extends not to do any injury it is created for the benefit of the people, and therefore cannot be exerted to their prejudice.
The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but ever of thinking wrong: he can never mean to do an improper thing: in him is no folly or weakness." [Citations Omitted]
The language may seem archaic, the terms technical, and the fictions it described mystical. Yet the Commentaries represented the better part of the Founding Generations' legal education and they were quite fluent in Blackstonian.33
[i]f upon any principle, the president could be construed to stand exempt from the general provisions of the constitution, it would be because his duties as chief magistrate demand whole time for national objects. But it is apparent that this demand is not unremitting; and if it should exist at the time when his attendance on a court is required, it would be shown on the return of the subpoena, and would rather constitute a reason for not obeying the process of the court than a reason against its being issued ... It cannot be denied that to issue a subpoena: to a person filling the exalted position of the chief magistrate is a duty which would be dispensed with more cheerfully than it would be performed; but a duty, the court can have no choice in the case ... The guard furnished to this high officer, to protect him from being harassed by vexatious and unnecessary subpoena, is to be looked for in the conduct of a court after those subpoenas have issued; not in any circumstance which is to precede their being issued.39
Section 15. The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
x x x Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.56
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity suit provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of immunity he might be spending all of his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?
FR. BERNAS: The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit.
MR. SUAREZ: So, there is no need to express it here.
FR. BERNAS: There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and do add other things.
MR. SUAREZ: On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.60
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance of distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.63
x x x It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.64
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 6; 47-49.
2 Id. at 6.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 7, Media Briefing at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Terminal 3 in Pasay City last August 17, 2016.
5 Id. at 7-10
6 Id. at 6-7.
7 Id. at 11. In his September 22, 2016 speech, President Duterte was quoted to have said: "Ngayon hanggang ngayon kita mo. De Lima, she was seven years chairman of the Human Rights. Binibira niya aka, hindi pina-file ang kaso. As Secretary of Justice, she was building a name at my expense para ma-popular. So what now? Tignan mo, she was not only screwing her driver, she was screwing the nation... Yan yung pinaka sinasabi ko kay De Lima "you better hang yourself" kasi nandito nasa mga kamay ko yung – sinabit na nila, tiningnan ko na. So all the while, because of her propensity for sex – ayon... Ngayon lang aka nakakita ng babae na lumabas sa buong social media nakangiti parang huang. ... kung nanay ko 'yan barilin ko.
8 Id. at 8.
9 Id. at 9.
10 Id. at 11-12.
11 Id. at 10.
12 Id. at 11-12.
13 Id. at 8.
14 Id. at. 6.
15 G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011, 660 SCRA 84.
16 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
17 Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
18Magna Carta of Women.
19 Id. at 21.
20 Id. at 105.
21 G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
22Rollo, p. 178.
23 16 Phil. 534 (1910).
24 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
25 G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452.
26 G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 545.
27 Seidman, Guy I., The Origins of Accountability: Everything I Know about the Sovereigns' Immunity, I Learned from King Henry III Saint Louis University Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 2, Winter 2004/2005.
28 Id.
29See also Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001 353 SCRA 452; and Agabin, P., Presidential Immunity And All The Kings Men: The Law Of Privilege As A Defense To Actions For Damages, 62 Phil. L.J. 113 (1987).
30 Seidman, op. cit., supra note 27, at 5.
31 Id. at at 44; 54.
32 Id. at 54. As Seidman puts it. "if the King is in error, the guilt lies only with the Minister who ought to have enlightened him, and this minister even if approved by the King, deserves the impeachment formerly reserved for traitors."
33 Id. at 96-98..
34 Biegon, B. Presidential Immunity in Civil Actions: An Analysis Based upon Text, History and Blackstone's Commentaries. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 4 (May 1996), p. 679.
35 Stein, T. Nixon v. Fitzgerald: Presidential Immunity as a Constitutional Imperative. Catholic University of Law Review, Vol. 32, Issue 3, Spring 1983. 32 Cath U.L. Rev. 759 (1983).
36 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
37 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
38 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) cited in Biegon, B. Presidential Immunity in Civil Actions: An Analysis Based upon Text, History and Blackstone's Commentaries. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 4 (May 1996).
39 Biegon, B. supra note 34, at 708-709.
40 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
41 Orenstein, A., Presidential Immunity from Civil Liability, Nixon v. Fitzgerald. Cornell Law Review, Vol. 68, Issue 2, Article 7, January 1983 68 Cornell L. Rev. 236 (1983), pp. 23-238; citing Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
42 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
43 Orenstein, supra at 240.
44 420 U.S. 308. (1975).
45 Orenstein, supra at 241.
46 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
47 Stein, supra at 766.
48 457 U.S. 731, 750 (1982).
49 "The Senators and Representatives... shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place."
50 Amar, A. R., & Katyal, N.K., Executive Privileges and Immunities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases. Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108, No. 3 (January 1995, p. 708.
51 16 Phil. 534 (1910).
52 G.R. No.L-76180, October 24, 1986, 145 SCRA 160.
53 Id. at 162.
54 G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452.
55 G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
56 Id. at 224-225.
57 G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010, 613 SCRA 233.
58 G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 312.
59David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra, at 224.
60 Records of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Vol. II, Records, p. 423, July 29, 1986 (R.C.C. No. 42).
61 Supra note 57.
62Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, 82827, 83979, November 14, 1988, 167 SCRA 393.
63 Id. at 399.
64David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 59, at 224-225.
65Soliven v. Makasiar, supra note 62, at 399.66Pascual v. Beltran, G.R. No. 129318, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 545, 558-559.
LEONEN, J.:
Presidential immunity from suit only extends to civil, criminal, and administrative liability. A proceeding for the issuance of a writ of habeas data, as in this case, does not determine any such liability. The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data1 only requires courts to ascertain the accountability and responsibility of the public official or employee. Thus, the President cannot invoke immunity from suit in a petition for such writ.
However, the proper respondent in a habeas data case for pronouncements made by the President in his official capacity is the Executive Secretary, following the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Aquino III.2 This is in accord with the doctrine that the president should not be impleaded in any suit during his or her incumbency, as recently reiterated in Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III.3
In Aguinaldo, this Court held:
[T]he Court finds it proper to drop President Aquino as respondent taking into account that when this Petition was filed on May 17, 2016, he was still then the incumbent President who enjoyed immunity from suit. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved in the system of government of this country, even though not expressly reserved in the 1987 Constitution. The President is granted the privilege of immunity from suit "to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention." It is sufficient that former Executive Secretary Ochoa is named as respondent herein as he was then the head of the [Office of the President] and was in-charge of releasing presidential appointments, including those to the Judiciary.4
a. The August 11, 2016 public statement of President Duterte threatening to destroy Senator De Lima. The statement reads: "I know I'm the favorite whipping boy of the NGOs and the human rights stalwarts. But I have a special ano kaya no. She is a government official. One day soon I will: – bitiwan ko yan in public and I will have to destroy her in public." Incidentally, in the same event, President Duterte insinuated that with the help of another country, he was keeping surveillance of her. "Akala nila na hindi rin ako nakikinig sa kanila. So while all the time they were also listening to what I've done, I've also been busy, and with the help of another country, listening to them;"
b. The statement uttered in a briefing at the NAIA Terminal 3, Pasay City in August 17, 2016 wherein President Duterte named Sen. De Lima as the government official he referred to earlier and at the same time accused her of living an immoral life by having a romantic affair with her driver, a married man, and of being involved in illegal drugs. "There's one crusading lady, whose even herself led a very immoral life, taking his (sic) driver as her lover... Paramour niya ang driver nya naging hooked rin sa drugs because of the close association. You know, when you are an immoral, dirty woman, the driver was married. So you live with the driver, it[']s concubinage."
c. The statements that described her as an immoral woman; that publicized her intimate and personal life, starting from her new boyfriend to her sexual escapades; that told of her being involved in illegal drugs as well as in activities that included her construction of a house for her driver/lover with financing from drug-money; and
d. The statements that threatened her ("De Lima, you are finished") and demeaned her womanhood and humanity. "If I were De Lima, ladies and gentlemen, I'll hang myself. Your life has been, hindi lang life, the innermost of your core as a female is being serialized everyday. Dapat kang mag-resign. You resign. and "De Lima better hang yourself... Hindi ka na nahiya sa sarili mo. Any other woman would have slashed her throat. You? Baka akala mo artista ka. Mga artistang x-rated paglabas sa, pagkatapos ng shooting, nakangiti...".7
WHEREFORE, the petitioner respectfully prays the Honorable Court that judgment be rendered:
[1] Granting a Writ of Habeas Data –
- Enjoining respondent and any of his representatives, agents, assigns, officers, or employees from collecting information about petitioner's private life outside the realm of legitimate public concern;
- Disclosing to the petitioner the name of the foreign country who, according to respondent, "helped him" listen in on petitioner, the manner and means by which he listened in on petitioner, and the sources of his information or where the data about petitioner's private life and alleged private affairs came from;
- Ordering the deletion, destruction or rectification of such data or information; and
- Enjoining the respondent from making public statements that (i) malign her as a woman and degrade her dignity as a human being; (ii) sexually discriminate against her; (iii) describe or publicize her alleged sexual conduct; (iv) constitute psychological violence against her; and (v) otherwise violate her rights or are contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, and/or public interest; and
[2] Conceding unto petitioner such further and other reliefs this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.9
[T]he guard, furnished to [the President] to protect him from being harassed by vexatious and unnecessary subpoenas, is to be looked for in the conduct of a [district] court after those subpoenas have issued; not in any circumstance which is to precede their being issued.16
In this court there was no pretension by the attorney for the defendant (plaintiff below) that the action was not against the Governor General as Governor-General, and the others as well, in their official capacity. In fact, when an inquiry was made of the attorney for the defense concerning his theory, his reply was simply that the acts of the Governor-General, being illegal, were not performed in his official capacity.18 (Emphasis in the original)
It may be argued, however, that the present action is one to recover damages against the Governor and the others mentioned in the cause, for the illegal acts performed by them, and not an action for the purpose of in any way controlling or restraining or interfering with their political or discretionary duties. No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal manner what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the Governor-General had authority, under the law, to deport or expel the defendants, and the circumstances justifying the deportation and the method of carrying it out are left to him, then he can not be held liable in damages for the exercise of this power. Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in any manner, for the purpose of controlling or interfering with the exercise of the political powers vested in the chief executive authority of the Government, then it must follow that the courts can not intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages for the exercise of this authority....
....
If it be true that the Government of the Philippine Islands is a government invested with "all the military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands until otherwise provided by Congress" and that the Governor-General is invested with certain important political duties and powers, in the exercise of which he may use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his superiors in his political character and to his own conscience, and the judicial department of the Government is without authority to interfere in the control of such powers, for any purpose, then it must follow that the courts can not take jurisdiction in any case against him which has for its purpose the declaration that such acts are illegal and that he is, in consequence, liable for damages. To allow such an action would, in the most effective way possible, subject the executive and political departments of the Government to the absolute control of the judiciary. Of course, it will be observed that we are here treating only with the political and purely executive duties in dealing with the political rights of aliens. The conclusions herein reached should not be extended to cases where vested rights are involved That question must be left for future consideration.19 (Emphasis in the original)
In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only from civil claims but also from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of the President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not only the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity defense syndrome).20
SECTION 15. The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this Constitution.21
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification."22
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.26
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege (sic) mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the san1e footing as any other trespasser.
Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. It declared as a state policy that "(t)he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption." It ordained that "(p)ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." It set the rule that "(t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel." It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court. It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "(i)nvestigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy. These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.28 (Emphasis in the original)
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.30 (Citations omitted)
SECTION 1. Habeas Data. — The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one's right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person's right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack, of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.32
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual's right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as "a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person. Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of a person's right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.34
It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As we held in Razon v. Tagitis:It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.37 (Emphasis in the original)
It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he [or she] can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he [or she] be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him [or her] to fully attend to the performance of his [or her] official duties and functions.40
The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.42
SECTION 6. Petition. — A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain:(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.44
SECTION 15. Summary Hearing. —The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
SECTION 16. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data or information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied.
Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officer as may be designated by the court, justice or judge within five (5) work days.
SECTION 17. Return of Service. — The officer who executed the final judgment shall, within three (3) days from its enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full statement of the proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the database or information, or documents and articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the petitioner and the respondent.
The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and complied with by the respondent, as well as all objections of the parties regarding the manner and regularity of the service of the writ.
SECTION 18. Hearing on Officers Return. — The court shall set the return for hearing with due notice to the parties and act accordingly.
SECTION 19. Appeal. — Any party may appeal from the judgment or final order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) work days from the date of notice of the judgment or final order.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as habeas corpus and amparo cases.46
Petitioners first take issue on the President's purported lack of immunity from suit during her term of office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure. The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so:Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government....
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners' protected rights.49
In denying respondents' prayer that President Arroyo be dropped as party-respondent, the RTC held that a petition for a writ of amparo is not "by any stretch of imagination a niggling[,] vexing or annoying court case" from which she should be shielded. The RTC ruled that said petition is nothing more than a tool to aid the president to guarantee that laws on human rights are devotedly and staunchly carried out. It added that those who complain against naming the president as party-respondent are only those who "either do not understand what the Writ of Amparo is all about or who do not want to aid Her Excellency in her duty to supervise and control the machinery of government."51 (Citations omitted)
As to the matter of dropping President Arroyo as party-respondent, though not raised in the petitions, we hold that the trial court clearly erred in holding that presidential immunity cannot be properly invoked in an amparo proceeding. As president, then President Arroyo was enjoying immunity from suit when the petition for a writ of amparo was filed. Moreover, the petition is bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners' protected rights.52 (Citation omitted)
In the present case, the filing of the Petitions during the incumbency of former President Arroyo should not be a reason for according her presidential immunity. Thus, it would be legally imprecise to dismiss the present case as against former President Arroyo on account of presidential immunity from suit. Rather, the dismissal should be on a finding that petitioners in G.R. No. 186050 failed to make allegations or adduce evidence to show her responsibility or accountability for violation of or threat to Balao's right to life, liberty and security.53
ARTICLE II
Declaration of Principles and State Policies
SECTION 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
....
SECTION 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.58
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Endnotes:
1 A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC (2008).
2 801 Phil. 492 (2016) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
3 G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019, [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
4 Id. at 521 citing Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 686 Phil. 536, 552 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, En Banc]; Soliven v. Makasiar, 249 Phil. 394, 400 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; and Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, 553 Phil. 331 (2007) [Per J. Azeuna, En Banc].
5 Ponencia, p. 1.
6 Id. at 2.
7 Id. at 2-3.
8 Id. at 3-4.
9 Id. at 4-5.
10 Id. at 5.
11 Id. at 6.
12 Id. at 22.
13See Footnote 105 of Estrada v. Desierto, 406 Phil. 1, 71-72 (2001) [Per J. Puno, En Banc] citing R.J. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REV. 303 (1959).
14 Id.
15 25 Fed. Cas. 55 (1807).
16United Stated v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) citing United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 55 (1807).
17 16 Phil. 534 (1910) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc].
18 Id. at 557-558.
19 Id. at 578-580.
20Estrada v. Desierto, 406 Phil. 1, 73 (2001) [Per J. Puno, En Banc] citing Pacifico A. Agabin, Presidential Immunity And All the King's Men: The Law Of Privilege As A Defense To Actions For Damages, 62 PHIL. L.J. 113 (1987).
21 CONST. (1973), art. VII, sec. 15.
22Estrada v. Desierto, 406 Phil. 1, 73-74 (2001) [Per J. Puno, En Banc] citing Records of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Vol. II, Records, p. 423, July 29, 1986.
23 229 Phil. 185 (1986) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
24 Id. at 187.
25 249 Phil. 394 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
26 Id. at 400.
27 406 Phil. 1 (2001) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
28 Id. at 75-78 citing Wallace v. Board of Education, 280 Ala. 635, 197 So 2d 428 (1967); U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L ed 1039 (1974); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 73 L ed. 349, 102 S Ct. 2690 (1982); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997); CONST., art. XI, sec. 1; CONST., art. II, sec. 27; CONST., art. XI, sec. 15; CONST., art. XI, sec. 4; CONST., art. XI, sec. 13(1); and CONST., art. XI, sec. 14.
29 522 Phil. 705 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
30 Id. at 763-764.
31 646 Phil. 497 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].
32 Id. at 503-504 citing Tapuz v. Del Rosario, 577 Phil. 636 (2008) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
33Gamboa v. Chan, 691 Phil. 602, 616 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, En Banc] citing Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 644 Phil. 480 (2010) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
34Vivares v. St. Theresa's College, 744 Phil. 451, 463 (2014) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division] citing Andres Guadamuz, Habeas Data and the European Data Protection Directive, THE JOURNAL OF INFORMATION, LAW AND TECHNOLOGY (2001), as cited in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno's speech, The Common Right to Privacy (2008); Gamboa v. Chan, 691 Phil. 602 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, En Banc]; and Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 644 Phil. 480 (2010) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].
35In Re: Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 676 Phil. 84, 103 (2011) [Per J. Sereno, En Banc].
36 676 Phil. 84 (2011) [Per J. Sereno, En Banc].
37 Id. at 105-106 citing Razon v. Tagitis, 621 Phil. 536 (2009) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
38 RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA, sees. 20-22 provide:
SECTION 20. Institution of Separate Actions. — The filing of a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.
SECTION 21. Consolidation. — When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action. After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in the petition.
SECTION 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. — When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved party by motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of habeas data.
39See In Re: Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 676 Phil. 84 (2011) [Per J. Sereno, En Banc].
40David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 764 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
41 589 Phil. 1 (2008) [Per C.J. Puno, En Banc].
42 Id. at 41 citing Deliberations of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, August 10, 2007; August 24, 2007; August 31, 2007; and September 20, 2008.
43 RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA, sec. 7.
44 RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA, sec. 6.
45Secretary of Defense v. Manalo, 589 Phil. 1, 41 (2008) [Per C.J. Puno, En Banc].
46 RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO, secs. 15-19.
47 Ponencia, pp. 16-17.
48 627 Phil. 37 (2010) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
49 Id. at 62-63 citing David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 763-764 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval- Gutierrez, En Banc].
50 678 Phil. 532 (2011) [Per J. Villarama, Jr. En Banc].
51 Id. at 557.
52 Id. at 570.
53 J. Sereno, Dissenting Opinion in Batao v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 678 Phil. 532, 587 (2011) [Per J. Villarama, Jr. En Banc].
54 RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA, sec. 10.
55See Aguinaldo v. Aquino III, 801 Phil. 492 (2016) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].
56Soliven v. Makasiar, 249 Phil. 394, 400 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
57Estrada v. Desierto, 406 Phil. 1, 76 (2001) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
58 CONST., art. II, sees. 1 and 27.
REYES, A., JR., J.:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.2
It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As we held in Razon v. Tagitis:It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.
Thus, in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision found respondents in G.R. No. 191805 — with the exception of Calog, Palacpac or Harry – to be accountable for the violations of Rodriguez's right to life, liberty and security committed by the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with respect to former President Arroyo on account of her presidential immunity from suit. Rodriguez contends, though, that she should remain a respondent in this case to enable the courts to determine whether she is responsible or accountable therefor. In this regard, it must be clarified that the Court of Appeals' rationale for dropping her from the list of respondents no longer stands since her presidential immunity is limited only to her incumbency.6 (Citations omitted, emphasis and underscoring ours)
SEC. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner.
The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of government offices. (Emphasis ours)
In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus (extraordinary writs), direct recourse to this Court is proper only to seek resolution of questions of law. Save for the single specific instance provided by the Constitution under Section 18, Article VII, cases the resolution of which depends on the determination of questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the Court because we are not a trier of facts. We are not equipped, either by structure or rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance; these are the primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory agencies. This is the raison d'etre behind the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It operates as a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus on the more fundamental tasks assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a brightline rule which cannot be brushed aside by an invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional dimension of the issue or cause raised.8
Thus, although this Court, the CA, and the RTC have concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, parties are directed, as a rule, to file their petitions before the lower-ranked court. Failure to comply is sufficient cause for the dismissal of the petition.9
Section 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, "[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party." In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.15 (Emphasis and underlining supplied)
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.17
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were promulgated to ensure the protection of the people's rights to life, liberty and security. The rules on these writs were issued in light of the alarming prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007, and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data on 2 February 2008.
x x x x
Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person's right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. As an independent and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy – especially the right to informational privacy – the proceedings for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does not entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to the database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or information contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or rectification.19 (Emphasis ours and citations omitted)
The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly all forms of communication. It protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as well as political causes, and is not confined to any particular field of human interest. The protection covers myriad matters of public interest or concern embracing all issues, about which information is needed or appropriate, so as to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period. The constitutional protection assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech and free press for religious, political, economic, scientific, news, or informational ends, inasmuch as the Constitution's basic guarantee offreedom to advocate ideas is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority.23
It is correct to conclude that those who enter government service are subjected to a different degree of limitation on their freedom to speak their mind; however, it is not tantamount to the relinquishment of their constitutional right of expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of their employment. Unarguably, a citizen who accepts public employment "must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom." But there are some rights and freedoms so fundamental to liberty that they cannot be bargained away in a contract for public employment. It is the Court's responsibility to ensure that citizens are not deprived of these fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government.25
Endnotes:
1 522 Phil. 705 (2006).
2 Id. at 795.
3 676 Phil. 84 (2011).
4 Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid and concurred in by Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Florito S. Macalino; rollo (G.R. No. 191805), pp. 29-74;
5In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in Favor of Rodriguez, supra note 3.
6 Id. at 105-106.
7 G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10Vivares, et al. v. St. Theresa's College, et al., 744 Phil. 451, 463 (2014).
11The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, January 22, 2008.
12Vivares, et al. v. St. Theresa's College, et al., supra note 10.
13 Id.
14 745 Phil. 196 (2014).
15 Id. at 201.
16 721 Phil. 772 (2013).
17 Id. at 787.
18 Supra note 3.
19 Id. at 102-103.
20Rollo, pp. 121-152.
21Sabellina v. Buray, et al., 768 Phil. 224, 238 (2015).
22 569 Phil. 155 (2008).
23 Id. at 198.
24 760 Phil. 254 (2015).
25 Id. at 279.