THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 226358, October 09, 2019
CLARET SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY, PETITIONER, v. MADELYN I. SINDAY, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora1 recognized that the Civil Code and the Labor Code allow the execution of fixed-term employment contracts. However, in cases where periods are imposed to prevent an employee from acquiring security of tenure, such contracts must be disregarded for being contrary to public policy and morals. Brent's application is limited to cases where the employer and the employee are more or less on an equal footing when they enter into the contract.2
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assailing the Decision4 and Resolution5 of the Court of Appeals, which ruled that respondent Madelyn I. Sinday (Sinday) was a regular employee and was illegally dismissed.
Claret School of Quezon City (Claret) is an educational institution located on Mahinhin Street, UP Village, Quezon City.6 Sinday is the wife of Wencil Sinday, one (1) of Claret's longtime drivers. Their children are scholars of Claret.7
On February 18, 2014, Sinday filed her Complaint for illegal dismissal against the school.8
Sinday narrated that in April 2010, Claret engaged her as a releasing clerk in its book sale, tasking her with the inventory and release of books to Claret's students.9
Afterwards, in July 2010, Sinday worked as a filing clerk at Claret's Human Resources Department, where she updated employees' files, delivered memoranda different departments, and assisted in school programs.10 In April 2011, she was posted back as a releasing clerk. She held this position until July 14, 2011.11
Before her job as releasing clerk expired, Sinday applied for work at one (1) of Claret's departments, Claret Technical-Vocational Training Center (Claretech), which taught vocational and technical skills to underprivileged students. On July 15, 2011, she started her new work as secretary, preparing materials, assisting in the delivery of correspondence to other departments, and encoding and filing documents, among other tasks.12
Sinday claimed that Fr. Renato B. Manubag (Fr. Manubag), the institution director of Claretech, signed a January 10, 2013 letter, approving the request of Head of Operations Timmy Bernaldez and Program Coordinator Rosario Butaran13 to classify her as a regular employee.14 She was classified under the hon-teaching or non-academic school employees.15
On February 20, 2013, Claret paid Sinday P19,458.00 representing the salary differential from June 1, 2012 to February 1, 2013.16
However, in May 2013, Claret asked Sinday to sign a Probationary Employment Contract covering the period of January 16, 2013 to July 15, 2013. When the contract expired, Sinday asked Leticia Perez, the Human Resources head of Claret, regarding her employment status, but she was told that her tenure would expire on July 31, 2013 because of the change in school administration. Sinday also spoke to her supervisor, Rosario Butaran, and the latter told her that her dismissal was due to cost-cutting, particularly the need to reduce the employees from three (3) to two (2).17
Desperate for work, Sinday continued to work for Claret and was employed on August 1, 2013 as a substitute teacher aide at Claret's Child Study Center.18 When the permanent teacher aide returned on October 25, 2013, Sinday stopped working for Claret.19
Sinday repeatedly pleaded to be reinstated at least as a checker at the school's water station, but Claret denied her request.20
Thus, Sinday filed her Complaint, claiming that she had been a regular employee as she performed various jobs that were usually necessary and desirable in the usual business of Claret.21
On the other hand, Claret denied Sinday's claims averring that she was merely a part-time fixed-term contractual employee whom the school accommodated because her husband was its longtime driver.22 It also argued that Sinday was well aware of her fixed-term employment as confirmed by her application letters and biodata, which showed her employment's duration.23
Moreover, Claret claimed that Sinday's position at Claretech was not a plantilla position because the department was only at its experimental stage, merely relying on donations and the school's marketing research fund. When Claretech began incurring deficits, the clerical functions were allegedly absorbed by the administrator's functions, dissolving Sinday's position.24
Claret also pointed, out that Sinday did not regularly work for eight (8) hours a day, five (5) days a week, her services being required only as needed. It further maintained that while Fr. Manubag indeed decided to classify her as regular employee, the decision was nonetheless revoked later due to Claretech's financial difficulties.25
Claret also claimed that Sinday reportedly stole the school's relief goods intended for typhoon victims. The school supposedly let the incident slide, citing the security agency's failure to immediately investigate the incident and the impending expiration of Sinday's employment.26
In a September 11, 2014 Decision,27 the Labor Arbiter found that Sinday was illegally dismissed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding complainant Madelyn I. Sinday to have been illegally dismissed.
Accordingly, respondent Claret School of Quezon City is directed to reinstate complainant to her former position or a substantially equivalent designation and to pay complainant backwages which is provisionally computed in the sum of One Hundred Sixteen Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Eight Pesos and 8/100 (P116,268.08) as well as attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total judgment award.
The reinstatement aspect is immediately executory and respondent school is directed to submit a report of compliance within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the decision.
SO ORDERED.28 (Emphasis in the original)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision dated September 11, 2014 is REVERSED. The complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.37 (Emphasis in the original)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The National Labor Relations Commission's Decision dated 14 January 2015 and its Resolution dated 04 May 2015 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Labor Arbiter's decision dated 11 September 2014 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. This Court finds petitioner as (sic) illegally dismissed and hereby orders respondent school to pay petitioner the following:
1) Backwages; 2) Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in the amount of one month pay for every year of service; 3) Emergency Cost of Living Allowance (ECOLA); 4) 13th month pay; 5) Legal interest of 12% per annum on the total monetary awards computed from date of illegal dismissal until finality of judgment and 6% per annum from finality of judgment until their full satisfaction; and 6) Costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.46 (Emphasis in the original)
When a decision of the Court of Appeals under a Rule 65 petition is brought to this court by way of a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be decided upon. As held in Meralco Industrial v. National Labor Relations Commission:This Court is not a trier of facts. Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are completely devoid of support from the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a gross misapprehension of facts. Besides, factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive upon the parties and binding on this Court.83
ARTICLE 295. [280] Regular and casual employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.
On the one hand, there is the gradual and progressive elimination of references to term or fixed-period employment in the Labor Code, ...
....
There is, on the other hand. the Civil Code, which has always recognized, and continues to recognize, the validity and propriety of contracts and obligations with a fixed or definite period, and imposes no restraints on the freedom of the parties to fix the duration of a contract, whatever its object, be it specie, goods or services, except the general admonition against stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Under the Civil Code, therefore, and as a general proposition, fixed-term employment contracts are not limited, as they are under the present Labor Code, to those by nature seasonal or for specific projects with pre-determined dates of completion; they also include those to which the parties by free choice have assigned a specific date of termination.
....
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the development of legislation culminating in the present Article 280 [now Article 295] of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written or oral agreement conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely to circumvent security of tenure. It should have no application to instances where a fixed period of employment was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over the latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would be made to apply to purposes other than those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its effects and apt to lead to absurd unintended consequences.88 (Citations omitted)
(1) When the parties have knowingly and '!voluntarily agreed upon a fixed period of employment "without any force, duress[,] or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent";89 or
(2) When "it satisfactorily appears that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms"90 with the employer not having exercised any moral dominance over the employee.91
The reason for this is evident: when a prospective employee, on account of special skills or market forces, is in a position to make demands upon the prospective employer, such prospective employee needs less protection than the ordinary worker. Lesser limitations on the parties' freedom of contract are thus required for the protection of the employee....
....
To recall, it is doctrinally entrenched that in illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving with clear, accurate, consistent, and convincing evidence that the dismissal was valid. It is therefore the employer which must satisfactorily show that it was not in a dominant position of advantage in dealing with its prospective employee.93 (Citation omitted)
A stipulation in an agreement can be ignored as and when it is utilized to deprive the employee of his security of tenure. The sheer inequality that characterizes employer-employee relations, where the scales generally tip against the employee, often scarcely provides him real and better options.95 (Citation omitted)
Some familiar examples may be cited of employment contracts which may be neither for seasonal work nor for specific projects, but to which a fixed term is an essential and natural appurtenance: overseas employment contracts, for one, to which, whatever the nature of the engagement, the concept of regular employment with all that it implies does not appear ever to have been applied, Article 280 of the Labor Code notwithstanding; also appointments to the positions of dean, assistant dean, college secretary, principal, and other administrative offices in educational institutions, which are by practice or tradition rotated among the faculty members, and where fixed terms are a necessity without which no reasonable rotation would be possible. Similarly, despite the provisions of Article 280, Policy Instructions No. 8 of the Minister of Labor implicitly recognize that certain company officials may be elected for what would amount to fixed periods, at the expiration of which they would have to stand down, in providing that these officials," . . . may lose their jobs as president, executive vice-president or vice-president, etc. because the stockholders or the board of directors for one reason or another did not reelect them."97 (Citation omitted)
ARTICLE 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strike and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
ARTICLE 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
The repeated rehiring of respondent workers and the continuing need for their services clearly attest to the necessity or desirability of their services in the regular conduct of the business or trade of petitioner company. The Court of Appeals has found each of respondents to have worked for at least one year with petitioner company. While this Court, in Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora, has upheld the legality of a fixed-term employment, it has done so, however, with a stern admonition that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the period has been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, then it should be struck down as being contrary to law. morals, good customs, public order and public policy. The pernicious practice of having employees, workers and laborers, engaged for a fixed period of few months, short of the normal six-month probationary period of employment, and, thereafter, to be hired on a day-to-day basis, mocks the law. Any obvious circumvention of the law cannot be countenanced.112 (Citation omitted)
ARTICLE 294. [279] Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. (Emphasis supplied)
Endnotes:
* Additional member per raffle dated September 18, 2019.
1 260 Phil. 747 (1990) [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc].
2GMA Network, Inc. v. Pabriga, 722 Phil. 161 (2013) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, Third Division].
3Rollo, pp. 3-47.
4 Id. at 49-61. The Decision dated March 30, 2016 in CA-G.R. SP No. 141183 was penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting, and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla of the Second Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
5 Id. at 63-64. The Resolution dated July 26, 2016 in CA-G.R. SP No. 141183 was penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting, and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla of the Second Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
6 Id. at 5.
7 Id. at 7 and 9.
8 Id. at 89.
9 Id. at 84.
10 Id. at 84-85.
11 Id. at 85.
12 Id. at 85 and 189.
13 Id. at 405. Timmy was at times spelled Timme in the rollo.
14 Id. at 85.
15 Id. at 69.
16 Id. at 85.
17 Id. at 90.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 89.
20 Id. at 69.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 89.
23 Id. at 70.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 70.
26 Id. at 88.
27 Id. at 84-96. The Decision was penned by Labor Arbiter Joanne G. Hernandez-Lazo.
28 Id. at 95-96.
29 Id. at 91.
30 Id. at 86.
31 Id. at 91.
32 Id. at 92.
33 Id. at 92-93.
34 Id. at 92.
35 Id. at 94.
36 Id. at 67-76. The Decision was penned by Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles, and concurred in by Commissioners Perlita B. Velasco and Romeo L. Go of the First Division of the National Labor Relations Commission, Quezon City.
37 Id. at 75.
38 Id. at 73.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 74.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 75.
43 Id. at 78-79. The Resolution was penned by Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles and concurred in by Commissioner Romeo L. Go of the First Division, National Labor Relations Commission, Quezon City.
44 Id. at 54.
45 Id. at 49-61.
46 Id. at 60-61.
47 Id. at 56.
48 Id. at 57.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 57-58.
51 Id. at 58.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 63-64.
54 Id. at 3-47.
55 Id. at 545.
56 Id. at 546-554.
57 Id. at 555.
58 Id. at 556-576.
59 Id. at 37.
60 Id. at 7 and 25.
61 Id. at 25.
62 Id. at 25-26.
63 Id. at 27-28.
64 Id. at 28-29.
65 Id. at 29.
66 Id. at 24.
67 Id. at 161. It is stated in the other parts of the rollo that Sinday started working in 2010.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 21.
70 Id. at 20-21 and 168-169.
71 Id. at 11.
72 Id. at 30-34.
73 Id. at 548.
74 Id. at 549.
75 Id. at 550.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 550-551.
79 Id. at 556-557.
80 Id. at 272.
81 749 Phil. 388 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
82 Id. at 415.
83 Id. at 415-416 citing Meralco v. National Labor Relations Commission, 572 Phil. 94, 117 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
84 770 Phil. 654 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
85 Id. at 664.
86 Id.
87 LABOR CODE, art 295.
88 260 Phil. 747, 760-763 (1990) [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc].
89 Id. at 763.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 722 Phil. 161 (2013) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
93 Id. at 178-179.
94 451 Phil. 243 (2003) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].
95 Id. at 253.
96Price v. Innodata Philippines. Inc., 588 Phil. 568 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
97Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, 260 Phil. 747, 761 (1900) [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc],
98Fuji-Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, 749 Phil. 388, 429 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
99GMA Network, Inc. v. Pabriga. 722 Phil. 161 (2013) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, Third Division].
100 347 Phil. 434 (1997) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First Division]
101 680 Phil. 696 (2012) [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
102GMA Network, Inc. v. Pabriga, 722 Phil. 161, 178 (2013) [Per J. Leonardo-De-Castro, Third Division].
103Magsalin v. National Organization of Working Men, 451 Phil. 254, 262 (2003) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].
104 Id. at 262.
105Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, 260 Phil. 747, 757 (1990) [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc].
106Rollo, pp. 168-169.
107Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, 749 Phil. 388, 435 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
108 Id.
109 Id. at 438. See also Samonte v. La Salle Greenhills, Inc., 780 Phil. 778 (2016) [Per J. Perez, Third Division] and Magsalin v. National Organization of Working Men, 451 Phil. 254 (2003) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].
110 Id.
111 451 Phil. 254 (2003) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].
112 Id. at 262.
113E. Ganzon, Inc. v. Ando, Jr., 806 Phil. 58 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
114 553 Phil. 108 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
115 Id.
116Stanley Fine Furniture v. Gallano, 748 Phil. 624 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
117Golden Ace Builders v. Talde, 634 Phil. 364, 371 (2010) [Per J. Carpio Morales, First Division].
118 Id.
119 Id.