FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 227605, December 05, 2019
IN RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE BETWEEN MINURO* TAKAHASHI AND JULIET RENDORA MORAÑA, JULIET RENDORA MORAÑA, PETITIONER, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
"A"Petition for Recognition of Foreign Decree of Divorce "B"Compliance dated January 5, 2013 "C"Letter addressed to the Office of the Solicitor General "D"Letter to the Public Prosecutor "E"OSG's Notice of Appearance and deputation letter "F"Order dated January 24, 2013 "G"Affidavit of Publication "H"April 29, 2013 issue of Hataw newspaper "I"May 6, 2013 issue of Hataw newspaper "J"Marriage Contract "K"Printout of the Divorce Law of Japan and its English translation "L"Divorce Report dated May 22, 2012 and its English translation "M"Certificate of All Matters and its English translation "N"Letter Request dated July 9, 2013 addressed to the Japanese Embassy "O"Letter Request dated August 4, 2012 addressed to the Japanese Embassy "P"Petitioner's Judicial Affidavit "Q"Photocopy of petitioner's passport
Article 26. x x xUnder the second paragraph of Article 26, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.14
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. x x xRacho v. Tanaka19 further enunciated that the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals. Verily, therefore, even. though it was petitioner herself or jointly with her husband who applied for and obtained the divorce decree in this case, the same may be recognized in our jurisdiction. So must it be.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would d1epart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et al.:The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absu1rd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. x x x Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. x x x
x x x Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. x x x
x x x In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites of the equal protection clause. Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
x x x there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in (an) alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. x x x it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions. x x x it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are of rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. x x x
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may, therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. (Emphasis supplied)
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, declined to consider the Divorce Report as the Divorce Decree itself. According to the trial court, the Divorce Report was "limited to the report of the divorce granted to the parties."21 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals held that the Divorce Report "cannot be considered as act of an official body or tribunal as would constitute the divorce decree contemplated by the Rules."22
Husband Wife NameMINORU TAKAHASHI JULIET MORAÑA TAKAHASHI Date of BirthSeptember 13, 1975 July 26, 1978 Address
(Registered Address)82-2 Oaza Managura, Ekiya-cho, Fukuyama City 1-13-15-403 Minato Machi, Fukuyama City Name of Householder:
Tadashi TakahashiName of Householder:
Juliet Moraña Takahashi Permanent Domicile
(For foreigner, write only the Nationality)82-2 Oaza Managura, Ekiya-cho, Fukuyama City, Hiroshima Prefecture
Head of family
Minoru TakahashiNationality of Wife
Republic of the Philippines Name of Parents and the RelationshipFather of Husband: Tadashi Takahashi
Mother: Tomoe
Relationship: Second SonFather of Wife: Cesar Moraña, Jr.
Mother: Zosima Moraña
Relationship: Daughter Type of divorce:____Divorce by Agreement ____Settlement ____Arranged on ____Mediation Date: ____Approval of Request ____Date: ____Arbitration Date: ____Court Decision ____Date:
More, petitioner submitted below a duly authenticated copy of the Divorce Certificate24 issued by the Japanese government.25 The fact alone that the document was submitted to the trial court without anyone identifying it on the stand or making a formal offer thereof in evidence does not call for dismissal of the petition.
[Date of Divorce] May 22, 2012 Divorce[Name of Spouse] Juliet Moraña Takahashi [Nationality of Spouse] Republic of the Philippines
Section 19. Classes of Documents. - For the purpose of their presentation (in) evidence, documents are either public or private. Public documents are:Finally, the Court has, time and again, held that the court's primary duty is to dispense justice; and procedural rules are designed to secure and not to override substantial justice. On several occasions, the Court relaxed procedural rules to advance substantial justice.28 More so here because what is involved is a matter affecting the lives of petitioner and her children; the case is meritorious; the belated issuance of the Divorce Certificate was not due to petitioner's fault; and the relaxation of the rules here will not prejudice the State.29
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;xxx xxx xxx
Section 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.Here, what petitioner offered in evidence were mere printouts of pertinent portions of the Japanese law on divorce and its English translation.32 There was no proof at all that these printouts reflected the existing law on divorce in Japan and its correct English translation. Indeed, our rules require more than a printout from a website to prove a foreign law. In Racho,33 the Japanese law on divorce was duly proved through a copy of the English Version of the Civil Code of Japan translated under the authorization of the Ministry of Justice and the Code of Translation Committee. At any rate, considering that the fact of divorce was duly proved in this case, the higher interest of substantial justice compels that petitioner be afforded the chance to properly prove the Japanese law on divorce, with the end view that petitioner may be eventually freed from a marriage in which she is the only remaining party. In Manalo,34 the Court, too, did not dismiss the case, but simply remanded it to the trial court for reception of evidence pertaining to the existence of the Japanese law on divorce.x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x xSince the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Endnotes:
* Sometimes referred to as "Minoru" in some parts of the Rollo.
1Rollo, pp. 8-25.
2 Penned by now retired Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and concurred in by now Supreme Court Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda and Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales, id. at 104-112.
3Id. at 122-123.
4Id. at 10, 47, and 105.
5Id. at 10, 43, 47, and 105.
6Id. at 48, and 105.
7 Penned by Presiding Judge Roberto P. Quiroz, id. at 63-72.
8Id. at 81-83.
9Id. at 73-80.
10 Penned by now retired Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and concurred in by now Supreme Court Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda and Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales, id. at 104-112.
11Id. at 113-120.
12Id. at 122-123.
13Id. at 139-142.
14Doreen Grace Parilla Medina v. Michiyuki Koike, 791 Phil. 645, 651 (2016).
15Republic of the Philippines v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018.
16 G.R. No. 186571, 642 Phil. 420, 432 (2010).
17 G.R. No. 138322, 418 Phil. 723, 725 (2001).
18 Supra note 15.
19 G.R. No. 199515, June 25, 2018.
20Rollo, pp. 34-35.
21Id. at 67
22Id. at 108.
23Id. at 39-40.
24Id. at 51.
25Id. at 52-53.
26 Supra note 15.
27Rollo, p. 101.
28 See Dr. Joseph L. Malixi, et al. v. Dr. Glory V Baltazar, G.R. No. 208224, November 22, 2017, 846 SCRA 244, 260.
29 See Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla, 482 Phil. 903, 915 (2004).
30 Supra note 15.
31Id.
32Rollo, pp. 32-33.
33 Supra note 19.
34 Supra note 15.
35 Supra note 19.
CAGUIOA, J.:
I concur in the result.
However, I submit, as I did in the case of Republic v. Manalo1 (Manalo), that Article 26(2) of the Family Code had been crafted to serve as an exception to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code. This exception is narrow, and intended only to address the unfair situation that results when a foreign national obtains a divorce decree against a Filipino citizen, leaving the latter stuck in a marriage without a spouse.2
As I stated in my Dissenting Opinion in Manalo:
x x x [R]ather than serving as bases for the blanket recognition of foreign divorce decrees in the Philippines, I believe that the Court's rulings in [Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.3], [Republic v. Orbecido III4] and [Dacasin v. Dacasin5] merely clarify the parameters for the application of the nationality principle found in Article 15 of the Civil Code, and the exception thereto found in Article 26(2) [of] the Family Code. These parameters may be summarized as follows:Petitioner Juliet Rendora Moraña is a Filipino citizen seeking recognition of the divorce decree issued upon a joint application filed with her Japanese husband Minuro Takahashi, before the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City, Japan.
- Owing to the nationality principle, all Filipino citizens are covered by the prohibition against absolute divorce. As a consequence of such prohibition, a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen cannot be enforced in the Philippines. To allow otherwise would be to permit a Filipino citizen to invoke foreign law to evade an express prohibition under Philippine law,
- Nevertheless, the effects of a divorce decree obtained by a foreign national may be extended to the Filipino spouse, provided the latter is able to prove (i) the issuance of the divorce decree, and (ii) the personal law of the foreign spouse allowing such divorce. This exception, found under Article 26(2) of the Family Code, respects the binding effect of the divorce decree on the foreign national, and merely recognizes the residual effect of such decree on the Filipino spouse.6 (Emphasis and underscoring omitted)
Endnotes:
1 G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018, 862 SCRA 580.
2 Id. at 638.
3 223 Phil. 357 (1985).
4 509 Phil. 108 (2005).
5 625 Phil. 494 (2010).
6Republic v. Manalo, supra note 1, at 641.
7 See Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 4, at 115.