SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 241557, December 11, 2019
FERNANDO N. FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, J. JR., J.:
Subject to review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court at the instance of petitioner Fernando N. Fernandez (Fernandez) are the Decision1 dated February 15, 2017 and the Resolution2 dated August 17, 2018 in CA-G.R. CR No. 38074, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for Frustrated Murder committed against private respondent Noel C. Garino (Garino) under the Decision3 rendered on April 27, 2015 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Criminal Case No. 11-1667.
WHEREFORE, this court finds [FERNANDEZ], guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER defined and penalized under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as the minimum period to SIXTEEN (16) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as the maximum period.Fernandez filed a Notice of Appeal on September 17, 2015 which was given due course by the CA in an Order dated October 20, 2015.14 The CA, however, denied Fernandez's appeal for lack of merit, and affirmed with modification Fernandez's conviction as meted out by the RTC, to wit:
Accused is also ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as temperate damages and the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. The accused is also ordered to pay the Costs of this Suit.
SO ORDERED.13
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. However, the Decision dated 27 April 2015 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that the dispositive portion of which shall read as follows:Fernandez's Motion for Reconsideration was denied, prompting recourse to the Supreme Court. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.16x x x xSO ORDERED.15 (Emphasis in the original)
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused FERNANDO N. FERNANDEZ, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER defined and penalized under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as the minimum period to SIXTEEN (16) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as the maximum period.
Accused is also ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages, the amount of P40,000.00 as moral damages, and the amount of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. The accused is also ordered to pay the costs of this suit.
The accused is likewise ORDERED to pay legal interest on all damages awarded in this case at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid.
x x x x
Requiring proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt necessarily means that mere suspicion of the guilt of the accused, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against him. It further means that the courts should duly consider every evidence favoring him, and that in the process the courts should persistently insist that accusation is not synonymous with guilt; hence, every circumstance favoring his innocence should be fully taken into account. That is what we must be [sic] do herein, for he is entitled to nothing less.The RTC and the CA are one in their findings that Fernandez is the actual perpetrator of the crime against Garino, based in major part on the latter's testimony, which was found as clear, straightforward, and believable. As a general rule, the Court is obliged to rely on the observations of the trial court, as the latter had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. It has since become imperative that the evaluation of testimonial evidence by the trial court be accorded great respect by the Court; for it can be expected that said determination is based on reasonable discretion as to which testimony IS acceptable and which witness is worthy of belief.35
Without the proof of his guilt being beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused herein was not overcome. His acquittal should follow, for, as we have emphatically reminded in Patula v. People:[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution's duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.34 (Citations omitted)
However, Garino's alluded justification only draws further attention to yet another questionable facet in Garino's testimony, which was Fernandez's apparent point-blank miss even when he was less than two meters away from Garino when he presumably shot the latter. The Court finds it unlikely that Fernandez, or any other individual, would miss at almost point-blank range. This, especially by Fernandez who is a former police officer and who would have considerable skill in both aiming and shooting a firearm. The rapidity of the events unfolding would even go against Garino's attestation that he was able to identify his assailant. Logically, Garino would not stick around to take a closer look at his assailant with his life in danger, especially at that close a distance. In fact, it is a strange assumption that Garino would even be able to run away at all, considering the depth of the wound inflicted on him, by his own account. It is incredulous that, if Fernandez intended to kill Garino, the former would allow Garino to stagger away instead of finishing the job or even attempting to flee from the scene of the crime.
Prosecutor Paolo Talban: Q: Could you enlighten us, Mr. Witness, could you tell us your exact position at the time you were fired upon by the accused? A: My back was turned to the accused. Q: Assume, Mr. Witness, the place where you are now seating as a point of reference, could you tell us from what direction did the accused come from? A: If this is the jeep, he came from the back portion of the jeep. Q: And approximately, how far away were you from the accused when he emerged from his house and fired at you? A: One and a half arms[-]length, sir.37 (Emphasis omitted)
TSNThere was no explanation as to why Garino could not identify his companion. The Court finds that this omission without explanation casts doubt on the narration of events from the part of Garino. To note, Garino also failed to explain why he and his "companion" were there in the middle of the night, inside a jeepney, property of someone else, and, by Garino's own admission, right outside another's property. The logical explanation then is that either Garino was doing something worthy of suspicion to which he was trying to cover up the same, or his companion did not exist, which would create doubt as to the veracity of his testimony.
04 July 2012
Witness: Noel Garino
Page 8
x x x x
PROS. TALBAN:
On that given time and date, what were you doing?
WITNESS:
I met a friend during that time and we were inside the jeep.
PROS. TALBAN:
And could you give is [sic] the name of that friend of yours? Page 9
WITNESS:
I don't know the name sir.38
Generally, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and does not have to be proven. Proof of the same, however, becomes relevant and essential when, as in this case, the identity of the assailant is in question. In People v. Vidad, the Court said:In the case at bar, there is no indication that Fernandez and Garino knew each other beforehand, and as mentioned, it seems to be a matter of mere convenience that Garino zeroed in on Fernandez as the culprit only after a conversation with Barcenas. There was also no plausible reason for Fernandez to risk his safety and life in shooting Garino, especially with a possible witness in tow. If Fernandez wanted to end Garino's life, it would also be strange that he would not run after Garino and finish the job, as Garino would certainly have been hobbled as a result of the wound.It is true that it is not indispensable to conviction for murder that the particular motive for taking the life of a human being shall be established at the trial, and that in general when the commission of a crime is clearly proven, conviction may and should follow even where the reason for its commission is unknown; but in many criminal cases, one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motive which tempted the mind to indulge in the criminal act.40 (Citations omitted)
The trial court and the [CA] are one in rejecting as weak Webb's alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webb's alibi cannot stand against Alfaro's positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of this, to the lower courts, Webb's denial and alibi were fabricated.The tale of this case's tape is that the prosecution relied solely on Garino's testimony that Fernandez was the one who shot him. Aside from his positive identification, which the Court finds too unconvincing, no legitimate and convincing evidence was offered to prove the veracity of the events as Garino alleges. With this, Fernandez's justification of alibi finds stronger ground, and the Court is thus obliged to favor it while taking into absolute consideration the promise that reasonable doubt is sufficient to acquit an accused individual of the crime.
But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangman's noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?
There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accused's claim that he did not do it.42
Conviction in criminal cases demands proof beyond reasonable doubt. While this does not require absolute certainty, it calls for moral certainty. It is the degree of proof that appeals to a magistrate's conscience:
An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.44 (Emphasis supplied)Our laws proscribe the conviction of the accused if doubt taints the circumstances of the crime. And, for good reason. A man's life and liberty are not aspects to be trifled with, which is why only the most exacting standard is required in order to find a person criminally liable. In this case, more than just reasonable doubt is attendant to the circumstances of the crime alleged. While the Court does not deny that Garino indeed suffered a grievous injury, the Court does heavily question if Fernandez was the one who inflicted it. This doubt is enough to sway the mind of the Court and acquit Fernandez.
Endnotes:
1 Penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda (now a Member of this Court), with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Pedro B. Corales concurring; rollo, pp. 31-46.
2 Id. at 48-49.
3 Rendered by Presiding Judge Maximo M. De Leon; id. at 50-55.
4 Id. at 33.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 33-34.
7 Id. at 37.
8 Id. at 33.
9 Id. at 35.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 50-55.
13 Id. at 54-55.
14 Id. at 35.
15 CA Decision dated February 15, 2017; id. at 45.
16 Id. at 3-29.
17 Id. at 11.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 12.
20 Id. at 15.
21 385 Phil. 849 (2000).
22Rollo, p. 17.
23 Id. at 19.
24 Id. at 19-20.
25 Id. at 22.
26 Id. at 66-95.
27 Id. at 76.
28 Id. at 80-81.
29 Id. at 77-78.
(Direct examination of private complainant) Prosecutor Paolo Talban Q: You said that you were inside the jeep and the jeep was parked in front of the house of the accused? A: Yes, sir. Q: What were you doing at that time? A: We were walking inside the jeep and then, there was a dog barking. Q: What transpired next after that? A: After that, sir, someone went out of the gate and we hear gunshot. I and my companion tried to run away. I alighted from the jeep and I was able to see the person. Q: To your recollection, did you recognize the identity of the person? A: Fernando Fernandez, sir. Q: You mentioned the name Fernando Fernandez. If the accused or that person is inside the courtroom, will you be able to identify him? A: Yes, sir. Court: Point to him. Witness: He is there, sir. Court: Witness pointed to a man who answered to the name of...(to the accused) what is your name? Accused: Fernando Fernandez, sir. (Emphasis omitted)
30 Id. at 78.
(Cross examination of private complainant) Atty. Rufino V. Mijares, counsel for petitioner: Q: From your testimony, you testified as if you knew the accused very well. A: Yes, sir. I came to know him in the salon. Q: And despite of that [sic], you were not able to identify the respondent when you were in the hospital? A: I knew him through a friend. Q: So, you really don't know the accused? A: I know him, sir. x x x x Q: The police went to you at the hospital and you were interviewed and you were asked about the incident? A: Yes, sir. Q: And that interview was put in writing in the blotter of the police, is that correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: I am showing to you this police blotter, is this the one you are referring to? A: Yes, sir. (Emphasis omitted)
31 Id. at 84-85.
32 Id. at 85.
33 808 Phil. 455 (2017).
34 Id. at 468-469.
35People v. Amarela, G.R. Nos. 225642-43, January 17, 2018, 852 SCRA 54, 68-69.
36People v. De Guzman, 690 Phil. 701, 709 (2012).
37Rollo, pp. 82-83.
38 Id. at 99-100.
39 690 Phil. 701 (2012).
40 Id. at 716-717.
41 652 Phil. 512 (2010).
42 Id. at 581.
43 G.R. No. 209342, October 4, 2017, 842 SCRA 97.
44 Id. at 140-141.