EN BANC
G.R. No. 242257, October 15, 2019
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO OF VIVIAN A. SANCHEZ.
VIVIAN A. SANCHEZ, PETITIONER, v. PSUPT. MARC ANTHONY D. DARROCA, CHIEF OF POLICE, SAN JOSE MUNICIPAL POLICE STATION; PSSUPT. LEO IRWIN D. AGPANGAN, PROVINCIAL DIRECTOR, PNP-ANTIQUE; PCSUPT. JOHN C. BULALACAO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, PNP-REGION VI, AND MEMBERS OF THE PNP UNDER THEIR AUTHORITY, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
In determining whether a petition for a writ of amparo should be granted, judges, as impartial inquisitors, must assure themselves that there is no actual or future threat to the petitioner's life, security, or liberty. Indeed, pursuing rebels is a legitimate law enforcement objective, but the zeal with which our law enforcement officers clamp down on persons of interest or their loved ones must be bound by the fundamental rights of persons.
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Vivian A. Sanchez (Sanchez), assailing the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, which denied her Petition for a writ of amparo.
On August 16, 2018, Sanchez learned that her estranged husband, Eldie Labinghisa (Labinghisa), was among the seven (7) alleged members of the New People's Army who were gunned down by the Philippine National Police in Barangay Atabay, San Jose, Antique.3
Upon discovering that the corpses were sent to St. Peter's Funeral Home, Sanchez went there to verify the news of her husband's death. At the funeral home, however, the police officers stationed there took photos of her without her permission. Fearing what the officers had done, she left without being able to see or identify her husband's body.4
A few hours after Sanchez had returned from the funeral home, Police Officer 2 Nerissa A. De la Cruz (PO2 Dela Cruz), a close friend of hers, informed her that her photo was being circulated at the police station. The officer urged her to tell the investigating officers her husband's name, otherwise, they would go after her.5 PO2 De la Cruz also warned her to voluntarily cooperate with the investigating officers, or they might suspect her and put her under surveillance.6
The following day, Sanchez went back to the funeral home, where she was confronted by three (3) police officers who threatened to apprehend and charge her with obstruction of justice if she refused to answer their questions. Again fearing for her safety, Sanchez hurried home without confirming the identity of her husband's body.7
Later that day, two (2) police officers went to Sanchez's house and showed her a photo of a cadaver. She confirmed the dead body as Labinghisa.8
In the following days, Sanchez noticed the frequent drive-bys of a police car in front of her house and a vehicle that tailed her and her family when they went to Iloilo to attend her husband's wake.9 She also noticed someone shadowing her when she was outside her house, causing her to fear for her and her children's safety.10
This fear was shared by her 15-year-old daughter, Scarlet Labinghisa, who attested that the constant police presence caused her anxiety as she worried for her mother's security:
... (On that same night, after dinner and while we were watching TV, I saw a patrol car pass by our house twice that me and my younger sister was puzzled and I began to feel nervous. We hurriedly closed our gate and doors. Starting that night, I already had trouble sleeping);On August 24, 2018, Sanchez filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Antique a Petition for Writ of Amparo12 against Police Superintendent Marc Anthony D. Darroca (Police Superintendent Darroca), Police Senior Superintendent Leo Irwin D. Agpangan, Police Chief Superintendent John C. Bulalacao, and the police officers under their authority.
....
... (On August 17, 2018, around 3:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, I woke up feeling tired and nervous, but I continued preparing for school when I saw a vehicle passing our house several times but I just did not mind it. Around 6:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, while were (sic) waiting for our ride to school, a patrol car passed in front of us, we hurriedly went inside our house and observed what they will do);
....
... (While we were on our way to Dalipe, I saw a vehicle following our ride but we continuedon (sic), then when we were already on our way to Iloilo, the same vehicle was still following us);
....
... (From that time, I always feel anxious for our security particularly that of my mother because what will happen to me and my sister if she will be gone, so my mother decided to seek help to ensure our security)[.]11
WHEREFORE, in consonance with Section 6 of A.M. No. 07-9-12- SC, also known as The Rule on the Writ of Amparo, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued, as follows:In their Verified Return,17 the police officers denied violating or threatening to violate Sanchez and her family's right to life, liberty, and security.18 They stressed that Sanchez's allegations were grounded on "baseless assumptions, hearsay, mistaken belief, speculations, impressions[,] and feelings[.]"19
1) ORDERING the RESPONDENTS to file their verified written RETURN within seventy-two (72) hours after the service of this writ, together with supporting affidavits, which shall, among other things, contain the following: a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission; b) The steps or action taken by the respondents to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission; c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondents pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party; 2) ORDERING the holding of a SUMMARY HEARING of the petition on September 04, 2018 [Tuesday] at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon in the Session Hall of RTC Branch 12, Office of the Executive Judge, Hall of Justice, San Jose, Antique, and DIRECTING the parties to personally appear thereat; and 3) GRANTING a TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER prohibiting the respondents from going within a radius of one kilometer from the petitioner and her children, and to REFRAIN the respondents from the conduct of surveillance to the petitioner and her children.
RELATIVE TO THE FOREGOING, Mr. ELMER B. ESCAÑO, Branch Sheriff, under the supervision of ATTY. MA. B.G. CANDIDA D. RIVERO, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of this Court, is hereby directed to PERSONALLY SERVE with DISPATCH this WRIT to the respondents herein mentioned, together with a copy of the Petition and its annexes.
Let copies of this WRIT be forthwith furnished to Branch Sheriff Elmer B. Escaño, Atty. Ma. BG Rivero, Atty. LV Jo T. Escartin and Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara and petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez, and let a separate copy hereof together with a copy of the verified petition be served personally upon all the respondents.
SO ORDERED.16 (Emphasis in the original)
Furthermore, there was scarcity of any specific allegations that the public respondents had participated, authorized or at least sanctioned the perceived threat to the petitioner's right to life, liberty and security, and the evidence adduced thus far, does not inspire a sensible and judicious conclusion that a privilege of the Writ of Amparo is justified. The petition consists merely of the petitioner and her daughter's bare allegation of monitoring and surveillance made by the police, sans any corroborative evidence to support that she was purposely singled out with the intention to inflict harm, injury or damage, which thereby threatened her security or a possible allusion to or insinuation of extra-legal killing or enforced disappearance. The court, at this point, cannot make an enlightened deduction that it was really the respondents who are responsible for the alleged monitoring and surveillance, as no tangible evidence was presented to prove such fact. Assuming arguendo, that she and her daughters were indeed tailed and monitored by the PNP, the petitioner failed to offer any justification for the said act, except her relationship with the deceased Eldie Labinghisa and the latter's involvement with the New People's Army, which rationale, at the very least, is likely a mistaken belief.23The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Decision read:
DISPOSING THEREBY, the petitioner has not sufficiently proven her instant Petition by substantial evidence.Thus, Sanchez filed her Petition for Review on Certiorari.25 Before this Court, petitioner contends that she was able to prove with substantial evidence that she and her children were under constant police surveillance and monitoring, which constitutes a clear violation of their right to life, liberty, and security. She also insists that the police officers' unauthorized taking and distribution of her photo was likewise a violation of her right to privacy, which has caused her great fear and anxiety.26
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Privilege of the Writ of Amparo is hereby DENIED. Necessarily, the Temporary Protection Order previously issued is LIFTED.
Let copies of this Decision be separately furnished to Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, Atty. LV Jo. T. Escartin, Atty. Connie T. Alian, Atty. Troy Warren A. Cayanan, petitioner Vivian A. Sanchez, and respondents PSupt. Mark Anthony D. Darroca, PSSupt. Leo Irwin D. Agpangan and PCSupt. John C. Bulalacao.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis in the original)
SECTION 18. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (Emphasis supplied)In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,38 this Court explains that the remedy of a writ of amparo, being a summary proceeding, requires only substantial evidence to provide rapid judicial relief to the petitioner.39 More than a mere scintilla, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might determine as adequate to support a conclusion.40 In Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations,41 this Court further defines substantial evidence as "such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred."42
At this point, we need not go into another full discussion of the justifications supporting an evidentiary standard specific to the Writ of Amparo. Suffice it to say that we continue to adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires, with some adjustments for flexibility in considering the evidence presented. When we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence) may be admitted as the circumstances of the case may require, we did not thereby dispense with the substantial evidence rule; we merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility of evidence, maintaining all the time the standards of reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation. This, we did, by considering the totality of the obtaining situation and the consistency of the hearsay evidence with the other available evidence in the case.46 (Emphasis in the original)The totality of petitioner's evidence undoubtedly showed that she became a person of interest after she had first visited the funeral home, where her photo was taken. PO2 De la Cruz tried to downplay the situation by claiming that petitioner's photo was not "posted" in the police station, but she likewise did not deny telling petitioner that she saw petitioner's photo at the police station.47 Whether petitioner's photo was actually posted and distributed at the police station or was just taken for future reference, the taking of the photo bolsters petitioner's claims that she was being monitored by the police.
The rule contained in section 26 (d) of Rule 123 is an old one. Courts and text-writers on the subject have assigned as reasons therefor the following: First, identity of interest; second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and, fourth, because where a want of domestic [tranquility] exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. This has been said in the case of Cargill vs. State (220 Pac., 61, 6a; 25 Okl. Cr., 314; 35 A. L. R., 133), thus:Therefore, the overriding consideration in the State's support of marriage is the recognition of its status as an inviolable social institution, with the State implicitly acknowledging the importance of unfettered communication between the spouses."The reasons given by law text-writers and courts why neither a husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other have been stated thus: First, identity of interests; second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and, fourth, because, where a want of domestic tranquillity exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. (70 C.J., 119.)"56
10. As regards the tinted vehicle with plate number ALL 5385 who the petitioner alleged to have followed her and her daughters to Iloilo City, I categorically state that I have no knowledge about it; Moreover, I have no knowledge about the alleged call the petitioner received on August 22, 2018 nor I did (sic) order any of my men to follow her or her children[.]72However, his denial is not the lawful defense required in a Verified Return, but a merely general denial, which is proscribed in Section 973 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Further, he failed to show that he observed extraordinary diligence in performing his duty, a required by Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
SECTION 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.Petitioner and her daughter categorically stated that police cars have driven by their house with alarming regularity after petitioner had identified her husband's body. To this, respondent Police Superintendent Darroca only issued a blanket denial that he did not direct his officers to tail or monitor petitioner and her family. He did not present affidavits from his police officers to support his claim. Further, petitioner's report of being tailed by a vehicle only merited a perfunctory request from the police to the Land Transportation Office. The police, which had better resources to perform the investigation, should have done more to follow up her request. Their failure to exert the extraordinary diligence expected of them hints at a motive against petitioner and her family.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability. (Emphasis supplied)
In its return, the CIDG only attached passive certificates issued by its operating divisions to the effect that Pablo was not being detained by any of them. Said certifications were severely inadequate. It is almost needless to characterize the certifications as non-compliant with the requirement for a detailed return. As such, the certifications amounted to a general denial on the part of the CIDG. The quoted rule requires the verified written return of the CIDG to be accompanied by supporting affidavits. Such affidavits, which could be those of the persons tasked by the CIDG and other agencies like the NBI and probably the Land Transportation Office (LTO) to collaborate in the investigation of the abduction of Pablo, would have specified and described the efforts expended in the search for Pablo, if such search was really conducted, and would have reported the progress of the investigation of the definite leads given in the Perez's sinumpaang salaysay on the abduction itself.75 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)The proceedings for the issuance of writs of amparo are extraordinary. They are significant not only in terms of final relief. In determining whether the petition must be granted, judges act as impartial inquisitors seeking to assure themselves that there is no actual or future threat to the life or liberty of petitioners. In a way, courts hearing writs of amparo assist in ferreting out the truth by providing an antidote to the naturally intimidating atmosphere of police investigations, especially involving communist and other rebels against the government.
Very truly yours, (SGD) EDGAR O. ARICHETA Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 10-34.
2 Id. at 169-187. The Decision, in Spl. Pro. No. 2018-08-1070 and promulgated on September 13, 2018, was penned by Executive Judge Francisco S. Guzman.
3 Id. at 36.
4Id.
5 Id. at 36, 86, and 89.
6 Id. at 90 and 155-156.
7Id. at 36-37.
8 Id. at 37.
9 Id. at 42.
10 Id. at 37 and 42.
11 Id. at 45-46.
12 Id. at 35-40. Irwin was sometimes spelled as Erwin.
13 Id. at 37.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 52-55. The Regional Trial Court Order was penned by Executive Judge Francisco S. Guzman.
16 Id. at 54-55.
17 Id. at 56-78.
18 Id. at 60-61.
19 Id. at 60.
20 Id. at 170, RTC Decision.
21 Id. at 169-187.
22 Id. at 185-186.
23 Id. at 186-187.
24 Id. at 187.
25 Id. at 10-34.
26 Id. at 23-24.
27 Id. at 191.
28 Id. at 199-212.
29 Id. at 205-206.
30 Id. at 207-208.
31 Id. at 208-209.
32 Id. at 216.
33 Id. at 218-220.
34 Id. at 218.
35 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5 provides:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
36De Lima v. Gatdula, 704 Phil. 235, 243 (2013) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].
37 RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO, sec. 17 provides:
SECTION 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability.
38 589 Phil. 1 (2008) [Per C.J. Puno, En Banc].
39 Id. at 41.
40Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642 (1940) [Per J. Laurel, En Banc].
41 179 Phil. 109 (1979) [Per J. Antonio, Second Division].
42 Id. at 114.
43Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 626 Phil. 581, 592 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
44 626 Phil. 581 (2010) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
45 Id. at 592.
46 Id.
47Rollo, pp. 155-156.
48 Chito Chavez, DILG: Revival of Anti-Subversion Law urgent, critical, inevitable, MANILA BULLETIN, August 15, 2019, <https://news.mb.com.ph/2019/08/15/dilg-revival-of-anti-subversion-law-urgent-critical-inevitable/<https://news.mb.com.ph/2019/08/15/dilg-revival-of-anti-subversion-law-urgent-critical-inevitable/> (last accessed on August 21, 2019).
49Rollo, pp. 107-108.
50 FAMILY CODE, art. 1 provides:
ARTICLE 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
51 CONST., art. XV, sec. 2 provides:
SECTION 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
52 CONST., art. XV, sec. 1, provides:
SECTION 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
53 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 22, provides:
SECTION 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. - During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants.
54 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 24(a), provides:
SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants[.]
55 78 Phil. 693 (1947) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].
56 Id. at 703.
57 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 25 provides:
SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege. - No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
58Ordoño v. Daquigan, 159 Phil. 323, 326 (1975) [Per J. Aquino, En Banc] citing Cargill v. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314.
59People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 693, 704 (1947) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].
60 CONST., art. III, sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
61 CONST., art. III, sec. 2 provides:
SECTION. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
62 CONST., art. III, sec. 3(1) provides:
SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
63 CIVIL CODE, art. 26 provides:
ARTICLE 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
64 Philippine National Police Manual: Ethical Doctrine Manual, <https://proarmm.pnp.gov.ph/downloads/EthicalDoctrine.pdf> (last accessed on August 30, 2019).
65 Pl1ilippine National Police Manual: Ethical Doctrine Manual, ch. III, sec. 2.9 provides:
2.9 Respect for Human Rights - In the performance of duty, PNP members shall respect and protect human dignity and uphold the human rights of all persons. No member shall inflict, instigate or tolerate extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and shall not invoke superior orders or exceptional circumstances such as a state-of-war, a threat to national security, internal political instability or any public emergency as a justification for committing such human rights violations.
66 Philippine National Police Manual: Ethical Doctrine Manual, ch. III, sec. 3.2 provides:
3.2 Judicious Use of Authority - PNP members shall exercise proper and legitimate use of authority in the performance of duty.
67 Philippine National Police Manual: Ethical Doctrine Manual, ch. I, sec. 2 provides:
Section 2. Declaration of Policy
All members of the Philippine National Police shall abide, adhere to and internalize the provisions of this Ethical Doctrine. Towards this end, a truly professionalized and dedicated law enforcer shall be developed in promoting peace and order, ensuring public safety and enhancing community participation guided by the principle that a public office is a public trust and that all public servants must, at all times, be accountable to the people. They shall serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, morality, loyalty and efficiency with due respect to human rights and dignity as hallmark of a democratic society. They shall, at all times, support and uphold the Constitution, bear faithful allegiance to the Constitution, bear faithful allegiance to the legitimate government, respect the duly constituted authority and be loyal to the police service.
68Rollo, p. 184, RTC Decision.
69Rollo, p. 63.
70 Id. at 107-111.
71 Id. at 56-78.
72 Id. at 109.
73 RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO, sec. 9 provides:
SECTION 9. Return; Contents. - Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following:
(a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission;
(b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission;
(c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party; and
(d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions that have been or will still be taken:
1. to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
2. to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;
3. to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;
4. to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;
5. to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and
6. to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the prosecution of the case.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.
74 G.R. No. 181796, November 7, 2017, 844 SCRA 183 [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
75 Id. at 203-204.
HERNANDO, J.:
I dissent.
Section 1 of The Rule on the Writ of Amparo clearly states the purpose and coverage of such a writ:
Sec. 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.The Court further expounds in Ladaga v. Mapagu1 that:
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It plays the preventive role of breaking the expectation of impunity in the commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, as well as the curative role of facilitating the subsequent punishment of the perpetrators. In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, the Court has previously held that the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary character, it is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable certainty.The Rule on the Writ of Amparo also provides that for the court to render judgment granting the privilege of the writ, the petitioner must be able to discharge the burden of proving the allegations in the petition by the standard of proof required, that is, substantial evidence.2 Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.3
"Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.In Navia v. Pardico,12 the Court identified the elements constituting enforced disappearance, to wit:
From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that constitute it:Pursuant to the first element of enforced disappearance, Sanchez did not allege, much less prove, that she had been arrested, detained, or abducted by any of the respondents or people acting under their authority. There is likewise absolute lack of allegations and proof of government participation in such arrest, detention, or abduction. While Sanchez might have been interrogated by police officers during her second visit to St. Peter's on August 17, 2018, she was still able to eventually leave and go home that same day. There appears to be no other instance when Sanchez or her daughters had been actually deprived of their liberty. Even until the hearing of her Petition, Sanchez apparently could still freely travel from one place to another. Sanchez's basic allegation was only that she and her daughters were afraid to leave their house and engage in their daily activities because of the purported surveillance and monitoring. Yet, their mere apprehensions, without any other substantiating evidence, do not qualify as a threat that will justify issuance of the writ.As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.13
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and, (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
That PO2 Dela Cruz testified in respondents' favor weighs heavily and adversely against Sanchez. While PO2 Dela Cruz affirmed in open court that she had informed Sanchez that the latter's picture was taken at St. Peter's and that the latter might be monitored, she also clarified that it was in connection with the investigation of the police as regards the remaining unidentified body among the seven fatalities from the PNP-NPA encounter on August 15, 2018.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. ALCANTARA: Q Madam witness, there was an exchange of text messages from August 15, 2018 until August 22, 2018 between you and the petitioner? A Yes, sir. xxxx Q xxx [Y]ou have an idea that [Sanchez] is being monitored? A Based on...? Q Based on your testimony, these are the text messages? A Based on her allegation, sir, I am not very sure if the person alleged who is conducting monitoring is a member of the police station, sir. Q So it is also true that her picture is being posted in the police stations, according to your text? A No, sir. Q So you deny your text messages? A A picture of Vivian was taken when she went to the funeral parlor of St. Peter but her picture was not posted at the Municipal police station, sir. Q So, let's be dear, who is monitoring the petitioner? A I do not have any idea because based on her she was being monitored but I was not sure if that was the members of the Philippine National Police. Q But in your text messages, it appears that you are the one xxx informing her that she [was] being monitored, in your text message? A Yes, sir. Q So, how did you come to know that she was being monitored because that was the contents [sic] of your text messages? A She [was] about to be monitored, sir. Q How did you know that? A Because she will not disclose the real name of her husband that is why there is a possibility that she will be monitored, Sir. Q So there is a possibility that the police force of Antique would monitor her because she would not reveal the name of her husband, correct? A Yes, sir.16 (Emphases supplied.)
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.Extraordinary diligence as required and contemplated in this provision is more than the diligence expected of a good father of a family. Section 9 (d) of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is thus relevant:
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability. (Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 9. Return; Contents. - Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things, contain the following:Respondents exercised this extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duty and proved the same. The averments in their Verified Return and attached Affidavits,18 bolstered by PSupt. Darroca's testimony in open court, that they had expended and would continue to expend extraordinary diligence in acting on Sanchez's allegations, are adequate defenses. They had respectively issued the orders to their subordinates to validate if there was any threat against Sanchez and not to deliberately and intentionally come within one kilometer radius of Sanchez and her children pursuant to the TPO issued by the RTC. PSSupt. Agpangan further ordered the Police Chief of the Hamtic MPS to validate the alleged visit of its police intelligence personnel and the passing-by of its police patrol car at Sanchez's house, as well as the Officer-in-Charge of the San Jose MPS to verify with the Land Transportation Office the ownership of the tinted car with plate number ALL 5385 which purportedly followed Sanchez and her children around. To this effect, a Vehicle Verification Request to the Land Transportation Office was likewise submitted by the defense before the RTC to prove that respondents attempted to trace the said tinted vehicle alleged to have tailed Sanchez and her children outside their home.19 It bears reiterating that PO2 Dela Cruz's corroborative statements in open court confirmed that Sanchez was in fact not under any surveillance and that there was no clear evidence that the police was plotting against her life, liberty, or security.
(a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission;
(b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission;
(c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party; and
(d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions that have been or will still be taken:
i. to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
ii. to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;
iii. to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;
iv. to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;
v. to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and
vi. to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.
The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the prosecution of the case.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 22. Disqualiflcation by reason of marriage. - During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants.However, there was no indication in the records that Sanchez or any of her children were being made to testify against Labinghisa. It is a long stretch to claim that respondents' alleged surveillance of Sanchez and her children is tantamount to making them act as witnesses against Labinghisa, which is a State incursion into their privileged wife-husband and children-father relationships and thus correctible by a writ of amparo.
Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;
xxxx
Section 25. Parental and filial privilege.·- No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
Section 1. Evidence defined. - Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. (Emphasis supplied.)Plainly, the alleged acts committed by public respondents against Sanchez and her children transgressing upon their purported privileges were committed out of court. Hence, the rules on evidence should not apply here.
In Bautista v. Dannug-Salucon,24 the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals granting Atty. Maria Catherine Dannug-Salucon's petition for a writ of amparo that had been backed up by circumstantial evidence and uncorroborated testimonies. Dannug-Salucon, a founding member of the National Union of People's Lawyers in Isabela and a human rights lawyer representing political prisoners and suspected members of the NPA, alleged that, per information of her clients and employees, the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) had tagged her as a Red Lawyer and were conducting surveillance on her activities and routine. Numerous incidents transpired leading to the filing of the amparo case: her paralegal, also an activist and human rights defender, was fatally gunned down; one of her clients who was a civilian asset for. the PNP Intelligence Section told her that the AFP was tracking her and had included her name on the military's Watch List of socalled terrorist supporters; her confidential informant was cornered by three military operatives who interrogated him regarding the purpose of his visit to Dannug-Salucon's office; different individuals appearing to be soldiers had even approached and questioned the vendors in front of her office as to their observations on Dannug-Salucon's schedule; members of the Criminal Investigation Detection Group and soldiers visited her office with no clearly declared purpose; her driver had been tailed by an unidentified motorcycle rider; and a known civilian asset of the Military Intelligence Group (MIG) in Isabela informed her that she was being watched by the MIG. She also tried reporting the incidents to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Isabela but received no positive report identifying the individuals behind the alleged surveillance. In granting the writ, the Court held that the combination of all the foregoing incidents had adequately established that "the threats to her right to life, liberty and security were neither imaginary nor contrived, but real and probable.No factual circumstances run in common between the present case and the aforecited ones, and all these jurisprudential precepts granting exception to indirect proof do not apply here.
Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,25 a case cited and heavily relied upon by Sanchez, involved a petition for a writ of amparo by Mary Jean Tagitis, the wife of a consultant for the Islamic Development Bank who suddenly disappeared and reportedly fell under custody of police intelligence operatives and was being held against his will in an attempt of the police to implicate him with the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah. Colleagues of her husband reported his disappearance to the local police authorities but to no avail. Tagitis thereafter filed complaints with the PNP in Cotabato and Jolo seeking help to find her husband. Her efforts, however, yielded no positive results and she was even chided by the police that her husband was not missing but was on a rendezvous with another woman. It was ruled therein that cases of enforced disappearances pose "evidentiary difficulties compel the Court to adopt standards appropriate and responsive to the circumstances, without transgressing the due process requirements that underlie every proceeding,"26 and that even hearsay testimony may be considered by the amparo court provided such testimony can lead to conclusions consistent with the admissible evidence adduced.27 Finding that Tagitis properly pleaded the ultimate facts of her husband's enforced disappearance and the totality of the circumstances met the requirements of substantial evidence, the Court deemed sufficient the hearsay evidence presented by Tagitis.
Endnotes:
1 698 Phil 525.
2 Sec. 18. Judgment. - The court shall render within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for decision If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
3Republic v. Cayanan, G.R. No. 181796, November 7, 2017, 844 SCRA 183.
4 621 Phil. 536 (2009).
5Id. at 613.
6Id. at 616.
7Id.
8Id.
9 G.R. No. 221862, January 23, 2018.
10Mamba v. Bueno, 805 Phil. 359, 377 (2017).
11 Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity.
12 688 Phil. 266 (2012).
13Id. at 279-280.
14Rollo, p. 125.
15Id. at 127.
16Id. at 150-156.
17 TSN, September 4, 2018, pp. 33-35, id. at 144-146.
18 Their statements in their Verified Return (rollo, pp. 63-73) and correlative Affidavits, all averred in compliance with Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and affirmed in open court, should suffice:PSCUPT JOHN C BULALACAO19 Per testimony of PSupt. Darroca, id. at 149.
Attached to this Return as ANNEX "2" is the Affidavit of PSCUPT BULALACAO, attesting that:xxxx
6. In compliance with Section 9 of the Rule and Order of the Court, the following are my actions to be undertaken, to wit:
As regards the alleged threat and acts committed by PNP members to the person of the petitioner, Vivian A Sanchez, and to her children, Scarlet S. Labinghisa and Star S. Labinghisa and as compliance to the Writ of Amparo issued by Ron. Judge Francisco S. Guzman, Executive Judge, RTC 12, San Jose, I have to undertake the following:
- To direct PSSUPT LEO ERWIN D AGPANGAN, Provincial Director of Antique Police Provincial Office to validate if there is any record with any office of any alleged threat against the petitioner;
- To direct all personnel of Police Regional Office 6 not to deliberately and intentionally come within one kilometer radius from the petitioner xxx and to her children xxx until further advise [sic] pursuant to the order of the court issuing the Temporary Protection Order; but such order must not be understood to mean that the police personnel are prevented from performing their regular functions and duties maintaining peace and order in their respective areas of responsibilities and such order must not be prejudicial to the safety and well-being of the rest of the citizens in the community;
xxxx
PSSUPT LEO IRWIN D. AGPANGAN
Attached to this Return as ANNEX "3" is the Affidavit of PSSUPT AGPANGAN, attesting that:xxxx
5. In compliance with Section 9 of the Rule, as regards the alleged threat and acts committed by PNP members to .the person of the petitioner, Vivian A Sanchez, and to her children, Scarlet S. Labinghisa and Star S. Labinghisa and as compliance to the Writ of Amparo issued by Ron. Judge Francisco S. Guzman, Executive Judge, RTC 12, San Jose, I have undertaken and will undertake the following:6. To direct all personnel of the Antique PPO not to deliberately and intentionally come within one kilometer radius from the petitioner xxx and to her children xxx until further advise [sic] pursuant to the order of the court issuing the Temporary Protection Order; but such order must not be understood to mean that the police personnel are prevented from performing their regular functions and duties maintaining peace and order in their respective areas of responsibilities and such order must not be prejudicial to the safety and well-being of the rest of the citizens in the community;
- Directed PSUPT MARK ANTHONY D DARROCA, Officer-in Charge of the San Jose MPS to validate the alleged threat if there is any against the petitioner.
- To direct the Chief of Police of the Hamtic MPS to validate the alleged: 1) meeting between Vivian A Sanchez and an alleged intel personnel in the house of the former; 2) the alleged passing-by house of the petitioner of the patrol car of the Hamtic MPS;
- To direct the OIC San Jose Mtmicipal Police Station to verify with the Land Transportation Office (LTO) the alleged tinted car with plate number ALL 5385.
PSUPT. MARK ANTHONY D. DARROCA
Attached to this Return as ANNEX "3" is the Affidavit of PSSUPT AGPANGAN
attesting that:xxxx
13. As regards the alleged threat and acts committed by PNP members to the person of the petitioner, Vivian A Sanchez, and to her children, Scarlet S. Labinghisa and Star S. Labinghisa and as compliance to the Writ of Amparo issued by Hon. Judge Francisco S. Guzman, Executive Judge, RTC 12, San Jose, I have ordered my men not to not to [sic] come within one kilometer radius from the petitioner xxx and to her children xxx until further advise [sic] pursuant to the order of the court issuing the Temporary Protection Order; but such order must not be understood to mean that the police personnel are prevented from performing their regular functions and duties maintaining peace and order in their respective areas of responsibilities and such order must not be prejudicial to the safety and well-being of the rest of the citizens in the community.
20Id. at 144-146.
21 Sanchez made the following allegations per her Petition for Writ of Amparo, par. 8, p. 2 thereof, id. at 36, as reiterated in her present Petition for Review on Certiorari, par. 8, p. 4 thereof, id. at 13:"The next day, Petitioner went back to St. Peter's Funeral Home to confirm again her husband's body, however three (3) police officers began interrogating her and even threatened to arrest and charge her with obstruction of justice when she refused to answer. xxx"22 Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders (1981).
23 Per Republic v. Cayanan, supra note 3.
24 G.R. No. 221862, January 23, 2018.
25Supra note 4.
26Id. at 613.
27Id. at 616.
28 Supra note 4.
29Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 627 Phil. 37, 73-74 (2010).