SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 212895, November 27, 2019
FLUOR DANIEL, INC. PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, v. FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC., RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, A., JR., J.:
The present petition for review1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court dated August 1, 2014 assails the Resolutions dated February 24, 20142 and June 3, 20143 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 133922, which denied Fluor Daniel, Inc. - Philippines' (FDIP) Motion for Additional Time to File Petition for Certiorari.
The facts are as follows:
On April 26, 2000, the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) issued a Notice of Award4 in CIAC Case No. 42-98, which was captioned "Fluor Daniel, Inc. - Phils., Claimant, versus Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI), Respondent." Attached to the Notice of Award was a Decision5 ordering FEPI to pay FDIP the amount of P13,579,599.57, plus interest.
The matter was then raised before the appellate courts. The CIAC decision was affirmed by the CA on December 21, 2001, and by this Court on June 18, 2008. Said judgment attained fmality on April 17, 2009 upon the issuance of an Entry of Judgment6 by this Court. Perforce, the CIAC issued a writ of execution. FEPI offered real properties as satisfaction for the judgment debt, but FDIP refused, on the ground that it is a foreign-owned corporation which cannot own real property in this jurisdiction. After further investigation, FDIP discovered that FEPI owned shares of stock in another corporation, Fi-lEstate Industrial Park, Inc. (FEIP). The existence of these shares was relayed to the sheriff, and they were garnished in July 2012. On December 7, 2012, the shares were auctioned and awarded to FDIP as the highest bidder.
However, FDIP subsequently discovered that FEIP had ceased operations, thereby rendering its shares worthless. FDIP, thus, decided not to pay the sheriffs commission, and as such, the corresponding certificate of sale was not executed. Deeming the award unsatisfied, FDIP filed with the CIAC a Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution dated July 24, 2013, which the CIAC denied in an Order dated December 6, 2013. On December 27, 2013, FDIP filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 27, 2014, the CIAC issued a Declaration reiterating the denial of FDIP's motion for an alias writ of execution.7 Nevertheless, on February 10, 2014, FDIP filed its Motion for Additional Time to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA, requesting for an additional period of 15 days, or until February 25, 2014, within which to file a petition for certiorari. FDIP filed its petition for certiorari dated February 19, 2014.
On February 24, 2014, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution,8 ruling that there was no showing of exceptional and meritorious circumstances that would enable the appellate court to exercise its discretion to grant an extension of time to file a petition for certiorari. The appellate court further held that if FDIP's case was really highly meritorious, it should have promptly utilized the 60-day reglementary period to conduct its investigation into FEPI's assets. The CA also noted that there was no showing that FDIP filed a motion for reconsideration of the CIAC's Order dated December 6, 2013 and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As a result, the CA, in a Resolution dated February 28, 2014, simply considered FDIP's petition for certiorari as noted.
FDIP filed a motion for reconsideration on March 20, 2014.
On June 3, 2014, the CA issued he second assailed Resolution9 denying FDIP's motion for reconsideration. The appellate court found no merit in the motion and reiterated the findings it made in the first assailed resolution.
FDIP now seeks redress before this Court, arguing that the appellate court erred in rejecting its Motion for Additional Time to File Petition for Certiorari. FDIP asserts that there are exceptional circumstances warranting the grant of additional time to file a petition for certiorari. First, FDIP had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy from the CIAC's Order dated December 6, 2013, since a motion for reconsideration was prohibited under the CIAC Rules. Second, FDIP will suffer manifest injustice as it will no longer have any recourse from the failed execution of the arbitral award that it had obtained more than ten years ago. Third, FDIP needed additional time to conduct its investigation into FEPI's properties since the latter was forcing FDIP to receive payment in a form that it cannot hold. Fourth, FDIP needed more time to find other suitable assets of FEPI, so that FDIP may determine if it would be worth the trouble of getting back to court. It was only after the conduct of such investigation that FDIP was able to determine that the only way to legally recover the award due to it was through another litigation of the matter before the courts; but by that time, FDIP as left with no choice but to ask for additional time to seek the proper remedy before the proper court.
In its Comment/Opposition,10 FEPI disputes FDIP's claim that its case was exceptional and meritorious enough to warrant the exercise of the CA's discretion to grant an extension of time to file a petition for certiorari. FEPI asserts that, as the CA held, FDIP should have promptly utilized the 60-day reglementary period in conducting its investigation into the merits of continuing the litigation of the matter. FEPI, likewise, asserts that FDIP showed grave disregard for procedural rules by filing both a motion for reconsideration before the CIAC and petition for certiorari before the CA. FDIP had no one to blame but itself hen it bought the allegedly worthless shares because it failed to observe due diligence in ascertaining the true value of the FEIP shares, since the principle of caveat emptor applies with equal force to auction sales. Lastly, FEPI gues that the resort to an alias writ of execution was correctly rejected by the CIAC, as FDIP cannot prevent the consummation of the auction sale by refusing to pay the sheriffs fees and costs.
The essential issue in this petition is whether or not the CA erred in denying FDIP's Motion for Additional Time to File Petition for Certiorari.
What seems to be a "conflict" is actually more apparent than real. A reading of the foregoing rulings leads to the simple conclusion that Laguna Metts Corporation involves a strict application of the general rule that petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. Domdom, on the other hand, relaxed the rule and allowed an extension of the sixty (60)-day period subject to the Court's sound discretion.Following this rule, the Court has relaxed the 60-day requirement in the following instances: when the assailed decision was contradictory to the evidence presented;21 in a motion for consolidation of several criminal cases, when the relief sought would be more in keeping with law and equity, and to facilitate a speedy trial, considering that there was substantial identity in the informations filed and the witnesses to e presented;22 where paramount public interest necessitated that the dispute involving the operation of a major power plant be resolved on the merits;23 where the case involved the expropriation of private property to build a major highway and no undue prejudice or delay will be caused to either party in admitting the petition;24 and when the appellate court had already granted an extension but later reversed itself.25 Furthermore, in Castells, et al. v. Saudi Arabian Airlines,26 the Court enumerated the following instances when the period to file a petition for certiorari may be extended:
x x x x
Note that Labao explicitly recognized the general rule that the sixty (60)-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is non-extendible, only that there are certain exceptional circumstances, which may call for its non-observance. x x x
In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the reason behind the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was to prevent the use or abuse of the remedy of petition for certiorari in order to delay a case or even defeat the ends f justice. We thus deleted the clause that allowed an extension of the period to file a Rule 65 petition for compelling reasons. Instead, we deemed the 60-day period to file as reasonable and sufficient time for a p to mull over the case and to prepare a petition that asserts grave abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was specifically set and limited in or er to avoid any unreasonable delay in the dispensation of justice, a delay that could violate the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case. x x x.
Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that the deletion of the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC did not, ipso facto, make the filing of a motion for extension to file a Rule 65 petition absolutely prohibited We held in Domdom that if absolute proscription were intended, the delete portion could have just simply been reworded to specifically prohibit an extension of tin1e to file such petition. Thus, because of the lack of an express prohibition, we held that motions for extension may be allowed, subject to this Court's sound discretion, and only under exceptional and meritorious cases.
x x x x
To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as applied in Laguna Metts Corporation the general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed within sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. Under exceptional circumstances, however, and subject to the sound discretion of the Court, said period may be extended pursuant to Domdom, Labao and Mid-Islands Power cases.20 (Citations omitted)
(1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion · by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.27 (Citation omitted and underscoring ours)Given the law, the Court recapitulates the material facts. The assailed CIAC order was issued on December 6, 2013. FDIP's motion for reconsideration was filed on December 27, 2013. The CIAC reiterated the denial in its Declaration dated January 27, 2014. FDIP filed its Motion for Additional Time to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA on February 10, 2014; and its petition for certiorari was dated February 19, 2014.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all the parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. For, it is far better to dispose of a case on the merits which is a primordial end rather than on a technicality, if it be the case that may result in injustice.29 (Underscoring ours)
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 12-30.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, with Associate Justices Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela concurring; id. at 38-41.
3 Id. at 43-44.
4 Id. at 45.
5 Id. at 46-91.
6 Id. at 92.
7 Comment/Opposition of FEPI, id. at 170-171.
8 Id. at 38-41.
9 Id. at 43-44.
10 Id. at 159-176.
11 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Section 4.
12 435 Phil. 83 (2002).
13 Id. at 91.
14 Id.
15 611 Phil. 530 (2009).
16 627 Phil. 341 (2010).
17 649 Phil. 213 (2010)
18 683 Phil. 325 (2012).
19 693 Phil. 145 (2012).
20 Id. at 154-157.
21Bacarra v. NLRC, 510 Phil. 353, 359 (2005).
22Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, et al., supra note 16, at 348-349.
23Mid-Islands Power Generation Corp. v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra note 18, at 337-338.
24Rep. of the Phils. v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc., supra note 19, at 157.
25Castells, et al. v. Saudi Arabian Airlines, 716 Phil. 667 (2013).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 673-674.
28 510 Phil. 353 (2005).
29 Id. at 361.