EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-20-2578 (Formerly A.M. No. 19-11-268-RTC) , January 28, 2020
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, v. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSELITO C. VILLAROSA, FORMERLY OF BRANCH 66, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MAKATI CITY, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
1. The court failed to transfer the following commercial cases, which have not yet reached the trial stage, to Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, after Branch 66 was relieved of its designation as a Special Commercial Court, in violation of the Court's Resolution dated 08 July 2014 in A.M. No. 03-3-03-SC, which was received by the court on 18 July 2014, directing Branch 66 to transfer all commercial cases to Branch 137, except those cases in the trial stage and those already submitted for decision:
Case No. Title Nature Date Filed Last Action Taken/
Remarks 1 11-1059 Pinoycare Health
Systems, Inc., et
al. vs. Rex
Redentor Berdes,
et al. Intra-Corporate
Controversies vs.
under RA 8799 25 Oct. 2011 Order dated 13 March
2015 requiring the
plaintiffs to file comment/opposition to the: (a) court-appointed rehabilitation receiver's
motion to confirm the
engagement of the
auditing firm Salvio-
Leonida Panganiban & Co.; and (b) defendants' motion to terminate the JDR proceedings[.]
2 2 12-189 Optimax Int'l. Corp. vs.
Beccomax
Property and
Development
Corp., et. al. Derivative Suit
of a
Stockholder 05 March 2012 order dated 12 May
2015 resetting the JDR proceedings to 23 June 2015[.] 3 12-851 Asia Special
Situations M3 P2
(SPV-MC) vs.
John Huang, et
al. Derivative Suit 13 [Sept.]
2012 Order dated 07 May
2015 resetting the JDR proceedings to 08 June 2015.
Based on the Notice of Hearing dated 06 [Sept.] 2013 of Atty. John Ivan B. Tablizo, Clerk of Court, Branch 66, this case was transferred to
Branch 149 for JDR
proceedings.
However, in [the] Order] dated 11 Oct. 2013 of this case was returned to Branch 66 stating that the "JDR proceeding of
the instant case should
be conducted by the
court where the same
was raffled." 4 13-245 Franklin Financial
Consultancy
Phils., Inc. vs.
Borough
Financing Corp. Infringement
under the
Intellectual
Property Code 08 March
2013 Order dated 28 April 2015
submitting the motion for
summary judgment for
resolution[.]
On 14 Aug. 2014, a Notice
was issued for the
continuation of marking of
exhibits before the Branch
Clerk of Court on 01
[Sept.] 2014[.] 5 13-538 Planters
Environmental
Solutions, Inc. vs. Compliant
Solutions Corp., et
al. Unfair
Competition 09 May
2013 Order dated 13 May 2015
of Judge Cesar Untalan of
Branch 149 resetting the
JDR proceedings to 22
July 2015[.] 6 13-951 Burgundy
Corporate Tower
Office Owners
Association vs.
Wilfredo Serafica,
et al. Intra-Corporate
Controversies 06 Aug.
2013 Order dated 24 June 2015
of Judge Untalan resetting
the JDR proceedings to 05
Aug. 2015[.] 7 13-1202 Angping &
Associates -
Securities, Inc. vs.
Peak Condominium
Corp., et al. Declaration of
Nullity of
Resolution for
Capital Call
Contribution for
Peak
Rehabilitation
Project 10 Oct. 2013 Receipt on 03 March 2015 of the Mediator's Report returning the case to the court for failure of the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement. 8 14-324 Victoria Murphy,
et al. vs. Greenbelt
Park Place
Condominium[,]
et al. Declaration of
Nullity of
General
Assembly Annual Meeting 21 March
2014 Order dated 4 Nov. 2014
denying the: (a) motion,
for reconsideration of the
Order dated 12 May 2014
granting petitioners'
motion to admit the
amended petition; and (b)
motion to cite respondent
Liza Villavicencio in
contempt of court[.]
The case has not yet been
referred to the PMC for
mediation[.]
2. The court transferred cases to Branch 149 for Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) proceedings in violation of the Consolidated and Revised Guidelines to Implement the Expanded Coverage of Court-Annexes Mediation (CAM) and Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR),2 which provides that "the judge to whom the case has been originally raffled, or the JDR judge, shall preside over the first stage of the judicial proceedings, [i.e.], from the filing of a complaint to the conduct of CAM and JDR during the pre-trial stage."3 For example:
Case No. Title Nature Date Filed Date of Notice
of Setting the
JDR Before
Judge Cesar
O. Untalan of
Branch 149,
RTC, Makati
City Date of
Termination
of JDR1 09-216 Pioneer Insurance
& Surety Corp. vs.
Sulpicio Lines,
Inc., et al. Damages14 April
200911 Nov. 2009 03 Dec.
20092 09-264 Philam Insurance
Co., Inc. vs. RCL Container Lines, et al. Damages24
March
200905 Feb. 2010 11 Nov.
20103 09-524 Pioneer Insurance
& Surety Corp. vs.
Albert Y. Pingoy, et al. Damages17 June
200910 March 2010 08 April
20104 13-245 Franklin Financial
Consultancy
Phils. Inc . vs.
Borough
Financial Corp. Infringement
under the Intellectual
Property Code08
March
201307 Oct.
2013 14 Nov. 20135 13-538 Planters
Environmental
Solutions, Inc. vs.
Complaint
Solutions Corp., et al. Unfair Competition09 May
201302 June 2014 (Still ongoing
-Order dated
13 May 2015)
of Judge
Untalan,
Proceedings
to 22 July
2015[.])6 13-951 Burgundy Corporate Tower
Office Owners
Association vs.
Wilfredo Serafica,
et al. Intra-Corporate Controversies06 Aug. 2013 Order dated 18
June 2014 of
Judge Joselito
C. Villarosa,
referring the
case for JDR to
Branch 149
pursuant to par. IV of A.M. No.
04-01-12-SC-
PHILJA -
stating that
"the JDR of
commercial
disputes shall
be conducted
by the pairing
judge of the
commercial
court[.]" (Still ongoing
- Order dated
24 April 2015
resetting the
JDR to 5 Aug.
2015[.])
3. In Civil Case No. 13-792, titled MD.M Logistics Phils., Inc. vs. Unli Logistics, Inc., for Breach of Contract, etc., the court rendered a Decision on 18 May 2015 without ruling on the Formal Offer of Exhibits of the plaintiffs filed on 11 December 2014, in violation of Section 5(g), Ru1e 30 of the Rules of Court, which essentially provides that "(u)pon admission of the evidence that the case shall be deemed submitted for decision, unless the court directs the parties to argue or to submit their respective memoranda or any further pleading." In essence, the admission of evidence is a condition sine qua non for submitting the case for decision.
4. In Civil Case No. 09-524, titled Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corp. vs. Albert Y Pingoy, et al., for Damages, the court issued an Order dated 30 November 2010 granting plaintiff's motion for consolidation of the case with Civil Case No. CEB-34790 (Mactan Aviation Technology Center, Inc. vs. Capt. Lyubert Laguda, et al), which was pending before Branch 10, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City. Defendant Pingoy filed a motion for reconsideration of the 30 November 2010 Order, but the court did not take any action thereon. Subsequent events in the case show that the consolidation was never effected owing probably to its impracticality, if not impropriety. Section 1, Rule 31, of the Ru1es of Court provides that "(w)hen actions involving questions of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." Obviously, this provision contemplates a situation where two or more actions are pending before the same court, which may be the subject of consolidation, and does not apply to actions which are pending in separate jurisdictions. Thus, the 30 November 2010 Order consolidating Civil Case No. 09-524, which is pending in Branch 66, RTC, Makati City, with a case pending in Branch 10, RTC, Cebu City contravenes said procedural rule.
5. In Civil Case No. 11-1059, titled Pinoycare Health Systems, Inc., et al. vs. Rex Redentor Berdes, et al., after submitting the application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) for resolution on 15 December 2011, the court issued an Order dated OS January 2012 resolving the application for TRO and enjoining defendants from dissolving Pinoycare Health Systems, Inc. "until further orders" in order to maintain the status quo, prevent irreparable injury to plaintiff, and so as not to render nugatory the proceedings before the court. In the same Order, the court set the hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction on 16 January 2012. By using the phrase "until further orders" to indicate the period of effectivity of the TRO, the court caused such period to become indefinite, thereby violating Section 5, Rule 58, Rules of Court and Administrative Circular No. 20-95, which provide that in no case shall the total period of effectivity of the TRO exceed twenty (20) days.
6. In SP M-7574, titled Metro Rail Transit Corp., et al. vs. Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), the court issued [ex parte] an Order on 30 January 2014, barely two (2) hours after it received the case record from the Office of the Clerk of Court, restraining for a period of twenty (20) days the DOTC, its officials, employees, agents or any person acting on their behalf, from performing any and all acts related in any manner to its procurement of additional Light Rail Vehicles (LRVs) for the MRT3, in violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8975.4 Section 3 of R.A. No. 8975 provides:No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the government's direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
[x x x x]
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2 hereof[.]
x x x x
Section 2 defines national government projects as all current and future national government infrastructure, engineering works, and service contracts, including projects undertaken by government-owned and-controlled corporations, all projects covered by R.A. No. 6957, as Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law, and other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of equipment and materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation, maintenance, improvement, repair, and rehabilitation, regardless of the source of funding.
Undeniably, the act, which was the subject of the 30 January 2014 TRO involved a government project covered by the prohibition under R.A. No. 8975 imposed upon all courts, except the Supreme Court, against the issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction.5 (Emphases in the original)
(a) [T]he agreement between Judge Ethel Mercado Gutay of Branch 137 and Judge Selma P. Alaras in the presence of Atty. John Ivan B. Tablizo and Atty. Neil Duenas that all commercial cases which commenced trial in whatever stage [including conduct of hearing on TRO/Injunction] shall remain in Branch 66;2. As to the transfer of cases for judicial dispute resolution (JDR) to Branch 149 - Judge Villarosa averred that the transfer of cases to Branch 149 was brought about because Branch 149 was the lone commercial court that has jurisdiction over the said cases and that it has been a practice to refer commercial cases to Branch 149 whenever JDR failed. Because of this, it was not entirely his fault to follow such practice.7
(b) [T]he pagination of numerous volumes of case folders is a tedious process and takes time to accomplish. [He claimed that], it takes about two (2) to three (3) days to paginate a four (4)-volume case before it can be forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle; and
(c) [T]he failure of the Executive Judge and the OCA to react to his letter informing them of the agreement mentioned above. [He pointed out] that had he been informed [about] any infirmity in the retention of the cases, he would have acted accordingly [with the order of the OCA. Moreover,] except for Case Nos. 13-538 and 13-951 which were undergoing JDR before Branch 149, the six (6) other commercial cases subject of this administrative matter were transferred to Branch 137 on 27 and 28 May 2015, or after the conduct of the judicial audit, pursuant to A.M. No. 03-3-03-SC.6
Furthermore, we are left at a quandary as to why Judge Villarosa granted the motion for consolidation if he will eventually hear the case pending in his sala independently.
SEC. 1. Consolidation. - When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence. Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, docs not warrant administrative sanction, the same applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Such, however, is not the case with Judge Mislang. Where the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, failure to know it or to act as if one docs not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A judge is presumed to have acted with regularity and good faith in the performance of judicial functions. But a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable provisions of a statute, as well as Supreme Court circulars enjoining their strict compliance, upends this presumption and subjects the magistrate to corresponding administrative sanctions.Anent the imposition of the proper penalty on Judge Villarosa, Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that a serious charge, such as Gross Ignorance of the Law, may be punishable by: (a) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned and controlled corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (b) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three, but not exceeding six months; or (c) a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence requires no less. Thus, unfamiliarity with the rules is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules must be at the palm of his hand: When a judge displays utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he betrays the confidence of the public in the courts. Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judges owe it to the public to be knowledgeable, hence, they are expected to have more than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules; they must know them by heart. When the inefficiency springs from a failure to recognize such a basic and elemental rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his functions, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and the prestigious title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both cases, the judge's dismissal will be in order.
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 1-2.
2 Approved by the Court En banc in its Resolution dated January 11, 2011 in A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA.
3 Unless otherwise agreed upon as provided by law; the JDR proceedings in areas where only one court is designated as commercial/intellectual property/environmental court shall be conducted by another judge through raffle and not by the judge of the special court.
4 An Act to Ensure the Expeditious Implementation and Completion of Government Infrastructure Projects by Prohibiting Lower Courts from Issuing Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions, Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for other Purposes.
5 Rollo, pp. 3-9.
6 Id. at 10.
7 Id. at 10-11.
8 Id. at 11.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at. 11-12.
12 Id. at 1-17.
13 Id. at 15, citing Recto v. Hon. Trocino, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508, November 7, 2017, 844 SCRA 157, 179.
14 Rollo, p. 15.
15 Id.
16 791 Phil. 219, 227-228 (2016).
17 A.M. No. RTJ-18-2520, October 9, 2018.
18 Report on the Financial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Tagum City, Davao del Norte, 720 Phil. 23, 55 (2013).