FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 231120, January 15, 2020
RADAMES F. HERRERA, PETITIONER, v. NOEL P. MAGO, SIMEON B. VILLACRUSIS, AND JOSE R. ASIS, JR., RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
1) | Decision1 dated October 24, 2016, affirming petitioner's liability for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and the penalty of dismissal and accessory penalties imposed on him; and |
2) | Resolution2 dated April 7, 2017, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. |
WHEREFORE, finding substantial evidence, respondent RADAMES F. HERRERA, is found administratively liable for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its accessory penalties including cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leaves, perpetual disqualification to hold public office and bar from taking civil service examinations pursuant to Section 10, Rule III, Administrative Order No. 07 as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, in relation to Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6770.Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Office of the Ombudsman denied under Joint Order dated January 18, 2016.17
In the event that the penalty of dismissal can no longer be enforced due to respondent's separation from the service, the same shall be converted into a fine in the amount equivalent to respondent's salary for one (1) year payable to the Office of the Ombudsman and may be deductible from respondent's retirement benefits, accrued leave credits, or any receivable from their office.
The Honorable Secretary, Depat1ment of the Interior and Local Government is hereby directed to implement this DECISION immediately upon receipt thereof pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 (Ombudsman Rules of Procedure) in relation to Memorandum Circular No. 1 Series of 2005 dated 11 April 2006 and to promptly (notify) this Office of the action taken hereon.
SO ORDERED.16
We now come to the main issue of the controversy-the legality of disciplining an elective municipal official for a wrongful act committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office.The condonation doctrine had been considered as good law since then until November 10, 2015 when the Court promulgated Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals,28 thus:
In the absence of any precedent in this jurisdiction, we have resorted to American authorities. We found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to & divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct. The weight of authority, however, seems to incline to the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe."Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected, or appointed." (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex rel. Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs. Shutler, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553. As held in Conant vs. Brogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 332, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553-"The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people." (Emphasis supplied)
Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation that the courts would be depriving the electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by which a particular constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective official's administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate's will has been abdicated.In Office of the Ombudsman v. Vergara,29 the Court clarified that administrative cases against elective officials instituted prior to Carpio Morales are still covered by the condonation doctrine, thus:
Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when reelecting a local official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule. Besides, it is contrary to human experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the public. Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes. At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown. As observed in Walsh v. City Council of Trenton decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court:
Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his removal for acts done in a preceding term of office are reasoned out on the theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe to that theory because condonation, implying as it does forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the absence of knowledge there can be no condonation. One cannot forgive something of which one has no knowledge.
That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by - the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. xxx
The above ruling, however, was explicit in its pronouncement that the abandonment of the doctrine of condonation is prospective in application, hence, the same doctrine is still applicable in cases that transpired prior to the ruling of this Court in Carpio Morales v. CA and Jejomar Binay, Jr. Thus:Yet, in Crebello v. Ombudsman,30 it was underscored that the prospective application of Carpio-Morales should be reckoned from April 12, 2016 because that was the date on which this Court had acted upon and denied with finality the motion for clarification/motion for partial reconsideration thereon.It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council:Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected. The landmark case on this matter is People v. Jabinal, wherein it was ruled:Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.
[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA, it was further elaborated:[P]ursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional.Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from hindsight and rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while it is truly perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren of legal anchorage was able to endure in our jurisprudence for a considerable length of time, this Court, under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and now abandons the condonation doctrine.
Considering that the present case was instituted prior to the above-cited ruling of this Court, the doctrine of condonation may still be applied. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner's hand in the questioned transaction is unassailable. He admitted that he had requested Municipal Accountant Leonilo Pajarin to prepare the payroll for the RATA differential despite the fact that they were no longer connected with the Sangguniang Bayan. He also went to the Office of the Municipal Accountant to follow up his request for the release of the RATA differentials of the four former Councilors. Moreover, despite knowledge of the Municipal Officers' unanimous opinion that the former Councilors were not entitled to RATA differentials for the period of January to June 2013 and their refusal to sign the necessary documents therefor, petitioner still approved for payment the Disbursement Voucher No. 1002014030061. He was, in fact, the sole signatory approving the release of the amount of P76,800.00 representing the total salary differentials of the four former Councilors.32Petitioner was shown to have willfully violated the law or disregarded established rules when he facilitated, pursued, and even forced the release of the RATA differential to persons who were not legally entitled to receive them. This constitutes grave misconduct.
Endnotes:
1 Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Leoncia R. Dimagiba and Jhosep Y. Lopez, all members of Fifteenth Division, rollo, pp. 29-42.
2Id. at 44-45.
3 The Local Government Code.
4Rollo, p. 30.
5Id. at 30-31.
6Id. at 31.
7Id.
8Id. at 31-32.
9Id. at 32.
10Id. at 32-33.
11Id. at 33.
12Id. at 34.
13Id. at 34.
14Id. at 35.
15Id.
16Id. at 35-36.
17Id. at 36.
18Id. at 35-36.
19Id. at 38.
20 See Local Government Code: Section 344. Certification, and Approval of Vouchers. - No money shall be disbursed unless the local budget officer certifies to the existence of appropriation that has been legally made for the purpose, the local accountant has obligated said appropriation, and the local treasurer certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose. Vouchers and payrolls shall be certified to and approved by the head of the department or office who has administrative control of the fund concerned, as to validity, propriety, and legality of the claim involved. Except in cases of disbursements involving regularly recurring administrative expenses such as payrolls for regular or permanent employees, expenses for light, water, telephone and telegraph services, remittances to government creditor agencies such as GSIS, SSS, LOP, DBP, National Printing Office, Procurement Service of the DBM and others, approval of the disbursement voucher by the local chief executive himself shall be required whenever local funds are disbursed.
In cases of special or trust funds, disbursements shall be approved by the administrator of the fund.
ln case of temporary absence or incapacity of the department head or chief of office, the officer next-in-rank shall automatically perform his function and he shall be fully responsible therefor.
21Rollo, pp. 38-39.
22Id. at 40.
23Id. at 41.
24Id. at 44-45.
25Id. at 3-21.
26Id. at 61.
27 106 Phil. 466, 471-472 (1959).
28 772 Phil. 672, 773-775 (2015).
29 G.R. No. 216871, December 06, 2017, 848 SCRA 151, 171-173.
30 G.R. No. 232325, April 10, 2019.
31Fajardo v. Corral, 813 Phil. 149, 158 (2017).
32Rollo, p. 39.
33 Section 50. Penalty for the Most Serious Offense. - If the respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more charges or counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.
34 Section 49. Manner of Imposition. - When applicable, the imposition of the penalty may be made in accordance with the manner provided herein below:xxx
c. The maximum of the penalty shall be imposed where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present.xxx
35Office of the Ombudsman, FIO v. Faller, 786 Phil. 467, 483 (2016).
36Sabio v. FIO, G.R. No. 229882, February 13, 2018, 855 SCRA 293, 305.
37Miranda v. CSC, G.R. No. 213502, February 18, 2019.