THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 203806, February 10, 2020
MUNICIPALITY OF FAMY, LAGUNA, PETITIONER, v. MUNICIPALITY OF SINILOAN, LAGUNA, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, this Court shall not intervene in the trial court's exercise of discretion in injunctive matters.1
For this Court's resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari2 challenging the Decision3 and Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's Orders5 granting the Municipality of Siniloan, Laguna's application for a writ of preliminary injunction and subsequently denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Municipality of Famy, Laguna.6
Both municipalities of Famy and Siniloan are public corporations existing under Philippine law.7
Over a century ago, Famy was incorporated into Siniloan through Act No. 939, series of 1903. However, through Executive Order No. 72, series of 1909, Famy was separated and became another entity. This eventually led to a boundary dispute between the now different municipalities over two (2) barangays, Kapatalan and Liyang. To resolve the dispute, the Provincial Board of Laguna (Provincial Board) rendered its March 26, 1962 Decision ruling that Siniloan had jurisdiction over the barangays.8
Much later, in 2001, when an elementary school in Famy was transferred to Barangay Kapatalan, it was considered under Famy's jurisdiction. Its barangay officials were also elected and declared under Famy's authority.9
These prompted then Siniloan Vice Mayor Robe1io J. Acoba to write to Provincial Legal Officer Antonio Relova (Relova), seeking the implementation of the Provincial Board's March 26, 1962 Decision. Eventually, and upon Relova's advice, Siniloan filed a Petition to Revive Judgment before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna (Sangguniang Panlalawigan).10
Opposing Siniloan's Petition, Famy submitted a copy of an earlier July 4, 1942 Decision rendered by the Provincial Board, where it had granted Famy jurisdiction over the disputed barangays.11
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan sustained Famy's position. In its Resolution No. 498, series of 2005, it found that the March 26, 1962 Decision could not be executed because it did not specify the metes and bounds of the municipalities' territories. It noted that placing the barangays under Siniloan's jurisdiction significantly reduced Famy's population and land area to a point that went below the law's requirements. Additionally, Siniloan was found to have abandoned its claim over Barangay Kapatalan when it ceased its internal revenue allotment to the barangay.12
Siniloan moved for reconsideration, but its Motion was denied in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's Resolution No. 88, series of 2006.13
Thus, Siniloan filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, with a prayer that a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction be issued. Accordingly, the trial Court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting both parties from exercising authority over the barangays.14
On February 20, 2008, the Regional Trial Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from implementing its Resolutions No. 498 and 88.15
The dispositive portion of the Order read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction of petitioner is GRANTED.In its August 1, 2008 Order,17 the Regional Trial Court denied Famy's subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
Let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction issue to restrain the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and Governor Teresita S. Lazaro and all persons acting for and in their behalf, from implementing Resolution No. 498, S-2005 and Resolution No. 88, S-2006 pending resolution of this petition, or until further orders from this Court. Likewise, respondent Municipality of Famy, Laguna and all persons acting for and its (sic) behalf are enjoined from further intruding into the territorial jurisdiction of petitioner Municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, particularly in Barangays Kapatalan and Liyang, and from further introducing whatever improvements thereon, while this petition is pending and until further orders from this Court.
Petitioner is hereby directed to post a bond amounting to One Hundred Thousand (Php100,000.00) Pesos, to answer for whatever damages which the Respondent Municipality of Famy, Laguna, may suffer or sustain by reason of the injunction. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall not be issued without payment of the bond herein fixed.
SO ORDERED.16
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Orders, dated February 20, 2008 and August 1, 2008, of the Public Respondent Regional Trial Court of Siniloan, Laguna, Branch 33, in Civil Case No. S-1013, are hereby AFFIRMED.Famy's Motion for Reconsideration was also denied in the Court of Appeals' October 11, 2012 Resolution.27
SO ORDERED.26 (Emphasis in the original)
SECTION 1. Preliminary Injunction Defined; Classes. - A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. (Emphasis supplied)Otherwise stated, a writ of preliminary injunction is:
... an ancillary and interlocutory order issued as a result of an impartial determination of the context of both parties. It entails a procedure for the judge to assess whether the reliefs prayed for by the complainant will be rendered moot simply as a result of the parties' having to go through the full requirements of a case being fully heard on its merits.49 (Emphasis supplied)Preliminary injunction may either be prohibitory, when it bars an act, or mandatory, when it requires the performance of a particular act. As an interlocutory order, it is a provisional remedy,50 temporary in nature.51 It is ancillary, an incident adjunct to a main action.52
SECTION 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:Jurisprudence provides that the following must be proven for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Courts are given wide discretion in granting a writ of preliminary injunction. However, this discretion is with limit and must be exercised with great caution.55 In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, this Court shall not intervene in their exercise of discretion in injunctive matters.56 In Ong Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals,57 this Court defined grave abuse of discretion as:
(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse; (2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and (4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.54
... the "arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or a capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law."58Injunction should not be issued "if there is no clear legal right materially and substantially breached from a prima facie evaluation of the evidence of the complainant."59
It is crystal clear that at the hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, mere prima facie evidence is needed to establish the applicant's rights or interests in the subject matter of the main action. It is not required that the applicant should conclusively show that there was a violation of his rights as this issue will still be fully litigated in the main case. Thus, an applicant for a writ is required only to show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.61 (Emphasis in the original)Spouses Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank,62 this Court explained that litigants applying for injunctive relief must exhibit their "present and unmistakable right to be protected; that the facts against which injunction is directed violate such right; and there is a special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damages."63
First. It is not disputed that petitioner, before and after the Decision of March 26, 1962 was rendered by the Provincial Board of Laguna, has continuously exercised its dominion over Barangays Kapatalan and Liyang. In fact, based on the said 1962 Decision, criminal cases involving residents of the two barangays were heard and tried before the Justice of the Peace of Siniloan. Then, real properties in said barangays were tax declared in Siniloan (Exhibits S to X, including their submarkings). The residents of the two barangays are registered voters of Siniloan and that all government infrastructure projects such as school buildings ([Exhibit] Q), barangay halls, health or puericulture centers and barangay roads were constructed with Siniloan as the recognized territorial jurisdiction.A perusal of the records reveals that respondent sufficiently alleged and substantiated its clear legal right sought to be protected through the writ of preliminary injunction. Respondent, who had in its favor a March 26, 1962 Decision declaring its jurisdiction over the barangays, stood to suffer irreparable injury through the Sangguniang Panlalawiigan Resolutions. It exhibited that since the ruling was issued, it had exercised jurisdiction over Barangays Kapatalan ang Liyang on adjudication of criminal cases, payment of real property taxes, and construction of infrastructure projects. Further, it posited that it was bound to lose a portion of its internal revenue allotment, pending the disposition of its case.
Second. It has been also shown that taxes for certain real properties located in Barangay Kapatalan and Liyang were and are being paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Siniloan. While it is true that there are other properties in Kapatalan and Liyang registered in respondent Famy and taxes therefor being paid thereat (Exhibits "2" to "3-P"), the same shall not be adversely affected should the writ be issued simply because the writ shall respect the status quo. The same applies to the present set up of the barangay officials in both the petitioner and respondent Famy.
Third. The Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan contained in the assailed Resolution No. 498, S-2005, and Resolution No. 88, S-2006, shall have a bearing in the computation of the Internal Revenue Allotment of both petitioner and respondent Famy. There will obviously be a considerable reduction of the IRA of petitioner should the questioned Resolutions be [implemented].64
| Very truly yours, |
(SGD) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG III | |
Division Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
1Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of Samut, 491 Phil. 458 (2005) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
2Rollo, pp. 7-36.
3 Id. at 37-51. The August 22, 2011 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 105671 was penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam (now a retired member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Jane Aurora C. Lantion of the Special Eleventh Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.
4 Id. at 52-57. The October 11, 2012 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 105671 was penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam and concurred in by Associate Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Jane Aurora C. Lantion of the Former Special Eleventh Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
5 Id. at 97-105. The February 20, 2008 and August 1, 2008 Orders in Civil Case No. S-1013 were penned by Acting Presiding Judge Agripino G. Morga of Branch 33, Regional Trial Court of Siniloan, Laguna.
6 Id. at 38.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 38-39.
11 Id. at 40.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 40-41.
15 Id. at 97-103.
16 Id. at 103.
17 Id. at 104-105.
18 Id. at 58-96.
19 Id. at 42.
20 Id. at 43 and 68.
21 Id. at 43-44.
22 Id. at 48.
23 Id. at 37-51.
24 Id. at 48-49.
25 Id. at 50.
26 Id. at 51.
27 Id. at 52-57.
28 Id. at 7-36. Petitioner initially moved to extend time to file its Petition, (rollo, pp. 3-5) which was granted in this Court's December 10, 2012 Resolution.
29 Id. at 355.
30 Id. at 376-398. On March 22, 2013, respondent filed a Notice of Entry of Appearance with Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment (rollo, pp. 362-365) and on April 3, 2013, a Second Motion for Extension of Time (rollo, pp. 372-375). These were granted in this Court's July 10, 2013 Resolution.
31 Id. at 413-414.
32 Id. at 415-431.
33 Id. at 432-432-A.
34 Id. at 433-480.
35 Id. at 493-516.
36 Id. at 486. In the same Resolution, this Court granted respondent's Motion for Extension to file its Memorandum.
37 Id. at 518. This Court also granted respondent's second Motion for Extension.
38 Id. at 440.
39 Id. at 441.
40 Id. at 443.
41 Id. at 450.
42 Id. at 454.
43 Id. at 452.
44 Id. at 456.
45 Id. at 459.
46 Id. at 501.
47 Id. at 502-503.
48 Id. at 508-511.
49Bicol Medical Center v. Botor, 819 Phil. 447, 457 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division] citing Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising Ventures Corp., 799 Phil. 47, 66 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
50Raymundo v. Court of Appeals, 288 Phil. 344, 349 (1992) [Per J. Nocon, Second Division].
51Dungog v. Court of Appeals, 455 Phil. 675, 685 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
52Raymundo v. Court of Appeals, 288 Phil. 344, 349 (1992) [Per J. Nocon, Second Division].
53Dungog v. Court of Appeals, 455 Phil. 675, 685 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
54Bicol Medical Center v. Botor, 819 Phil. 447, 458 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division] citing St. James College of Parañaque v. Equitable PCI Bank, 641 Phil. 452, 466 (2010) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., First Division]. See also Biñan Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 439 Phil. 688, 703-704 (2002) [Per J. Corona, Third Division] and Hutchison Ports Philippines, Ltd. v. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, 393 Phil. 843, 859 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
55Spouses Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank, 545 Phil. 138, 160 (2007) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Third Division].
56Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of Samut, 491 Phil. 458 (2005) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
57 752 Phil. 15 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
58 Id. at 24 citing Lagua v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, 689 Phil. 452 (2012) [Per J. Sereno, Second Division].
59Bicol Medical Center v. Botor, 819 Phil. 447, 457 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
60 Id.
61Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising Ventures Corporation, 799 Phil. 47, 64 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] citing Republic v. Evangelista, 504 Phil. 115, 123 (2005) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
62 545 Phil. 138 (2007) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Third Division].
63 Id. at 160.
64Rollo, p. 102.
65Dungog v. Court of Appeals, 455 Phil. 675, 685 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
66Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of Samut, 491 Phil. 458, 472 (2005) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division] citing PEZA v. Vianzon, 319 Phil. 186 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].