SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 204052-53, March 11, 2020
HEIRS OF AURIO T. CASIÑO, SR., NAMELY, PATRICIA T. CASIÑO, ESTHER C. MOSQUEDA, EVANGELINE C. RIVERA, GLORY C. MAG-ABO, AURIO T. CASIÑO, JR., MARITES C. RAMOS, ALLAN T. CASIÑO, GENESON T. CASIÑO, AND ALBERT T. CASIÑO, PETITIONERS, v. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, MALAYBALAY BRANCH, BUKIDNON AND GREEN RIVER GOLD, INC., REPRESENTED BY URIEL G. BORJA, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
HERNANDO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the February 16, 2012 Decision1 and October 11, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01367-MIN & CA-G.R. SP No. 01949-MlN.
The facts of the case as summarized by the CA are as follows:
On December 28, 1975, spouses Baldomero and Leonarda Casiño (Spouses Casiño) obtained a loan from [the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)] in the amount of [One Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos] (P130,000.00), secured by a real estate mortgage over three parcels of land situated within the municipalities of Valencia and Lantapan, Bukidnon, respectively covered by Original Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos. P-372 and P-1652, and Tax Declaration (TD) No. 01915.
After [Spouses Casiño] failed to settle their loan obligation, [DBP] caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on March 24, 1977. In the auction sale, [DBP] made the winning bid, and was issued a Sheriff Certificate of Sale dated July 17, 1977. The [said] certificate of sale was subsequently registered with the Register of Deeds of Bukidnon on September 16, 1977.
Upon failure of the [Spouses Casiño] to redeem the properties within the prescribed redemption period, [DBP] finally caused the consolidation of the title of the properties in its name. Consequently, OCT Nos. P-372 and P-1652 were cancelled and were replaced by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-13478 and T-13479. Similarly, [TD] No. 01915 was cancelled, and was replaced by TD No. 06596.3
Baldomero later filed a complaint against [DBP] for annulment of real estate mortgage and foreclosure proceedings, quieting of title, redemption, and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC Br. 8) Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, docketed as Civil Case No. 1465.
After due proceedings, the RTC Br. 8 rendered a decision dated August 3, 1990 dismissing the complaint. Baldomero appealed the dismissal, but this Court affirmed in toto the assailed decision [issued on May 30, 1995]. Unperturbed, Baldomero went to this Court via [P]etition for [R]eview on [C]ertiorari, but it was denied in a Resolution dated 10 July 1996.4
Meanwile, Baldomero executed a document denominated as Kasabotan dated 25 April 1994, where he relinquished to his son, Aurio [T. Casiño (Aurio)], all his rights over the three properties, including the land at Sitio Kibulay, Barrio Cawayan, Municipality of Lantapan, consisting of an area of one hundred twenty (120) hectares. On the other hand, on January 13, 1997, [DBP] sold the Kibulay property in favor of Green River Gold, Inc. (Green River).
Subsequently, on February 20, 1997, [DBP] and Green River, [the latter] in its capacity as intervenor, filed before the RTC Br. 8 an ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession [over the Kibulay property]. x x x [A] writ of possession was [eventually] issued [by the RTC Br. 8 in favor of DBP and Green River, however] the court sheriff was unable to enforce [the same due to alleged threats of several armed men employed by Aurio].
On March 20, 1997 Aurio filed with the RTC Br. 8 an affidavit of third-party claim, alleging that he is the owner and possessor of the [Kibulay property] parcel of land [subject of the writ of possession earlier issued by the RTC Br. 8).
The following day, on March 21, 1997, Aurio filed [the instant complaint for quieting of title with the Regional Trial Court Branch 10 in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon (RTC Br. 10), alleging, among other things,] that he is the true, lawful, and absolute owner of [a certain property situated in Bukidnon].
In [response, DBP filed an a nswer arguing that Aurio's complaint is already barred by res judicata, as the former already has ownership over the subject property through an extrajudicial foreclosure sale held as valid in a decision dated August 3, 1990, and affirmed by the CA and even this Court. Moreover, DBP argued] that the complaint is defective for failure to implead Green River, a real party-in-interest, to which it later sold the [subject] property in litigation.
On May 9, 1997, Green River filed an answer-in-intervention, adopting substantially the affirmative defenses raised by [DBP] in its answer, among others: (a) the complaint states no cause of action; (b) it is barred by laches and prescription; (c) the [RTC Br. 10] has no jurisdiction to review the decree of the RTC Br. 8, a co-equal court, in issuing a writ of possession; and (d) the complaint is bereft of factual and legal consideration.
[In the] meantime, [DBP] and Green River filed anew, in Civil Case No. 1465, an ex-parte petition for an alias writ of possession, which the RTC Br. 8 granted on December 3, 2001. Aurio, [at] this time already deceased and represented by his heirs, moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied.
[Ruling of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 10 in Civil Case No. 2685-97)
[On July 4, 2006, the RTC Br. 10 rendered a Judgment, which declared that the subject property being claimed by Aurio] is different from that being claimed by [DBP) and Green River. [It also held] that the Decision in Civil Case No. 1465 is not binding on Aurio or his heirs because they were not parties to [the said case. The RTC Br. 10 also] directed Green River to vacate the premises [of the subject property] and not to disturb Aurio's possession of the [same. Attorney's fees and litigation expenses were also ordered to be paid jointly and solidarity by DBP and Green River to Aurio].
[DBP] and Green River separately filed their [own] motions for reconsideration, while Aurio, [who died pending proceedings and was now represented by his heirs], filed a motion for execution of judgment pending appeal. [The RTC Br. 10] denied the motions for reconsideration and granted the motion for execution pending appeal [in an Order dated January 4, 2007].
Aggrieved, [DBP] and Green River [filed] separate appeals [with the CA, which were eventually consolidated.] [DBP also filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, asserting that the RTC Br. 10, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it issued the Order dated January 4, 2007 granting Aurio's motion for execution pending appeal.]5
1) | Whether or not the [Court of Appeals] erred in its opening statement of facts in that instead of stating the fact of the main case, which is on appeal, quieting of title Civil Case No. 2685-97 filed by the plaintiffs-appellees, the Honorable Court of Appeals centered its attention to December 28, 1975, about a loan which is alien to and foreign to the main case. It is as if the said case is the one subject o appeal; |
2) | Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that tax declarations are not evidence of ownership and that plaintiffs appellees have no cause of action; |
3) | Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that res judicata has set in this case; and |
4) | Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in granting [the] Motion for Execution pending appeal.10 |
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, plaintiff's Complaint and/or Amended Complaint is hereby ordered DISMISSED. The counter-claim of defendants DBP and spouses Juanito and Leontina Lavina are also DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.16
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, affirming, in toto, the Decision of the Court a quo appealed from. With costs against Appellant.
SO ORDERED.17
The elements of res judicata are:
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition or the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be as between the first and second action identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.22
Q: Alright, look again the survey conducted by Wenefredo Agripo, what are the boundaries there?
A: The boundaries there, on the North is by Public Land, on the East by Cawayan Creek, on the South, by Manupale River and on the West by Kibulay Creek.
Q: And these boundaries exist?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: And this is identified as Lot No. 2528, correct?
A: Unnumbered lot.
Q: Do you know Geodetic Engr. Ricarte Abriol?
A: Yes, I knew him.
Q: Now by the way Engr. Sario, you stated earlier that you gave notices to the parties and that you verified the records from the DENR?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: Before you went to the area?
A: Yes Sir.
Q:Did you come across a survey done by Engr. Ricarte Abriol, do you have that?
A: None.
Q: Then what did you do, what records did you verify? I will show you the record which is already marked and presented by DBP and the Intervenor. This Exhibit "14," [is] this record must be there in the DENR dated 1996?
A: As far as I know, this sketch prepared by Engr. Ricarte Abriol, this was a plan prepared by Ricarte Abriol but the same found in the records of the Cadastral survey.
Q: And this lot really exists in the name of Baldomero Casiño?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: The person who mortgaged to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: And this is Lot No. 2528?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: Mentioned also in the order of the Hon. Court, designating the Office of the DENR to conduct the survey?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: And this is identical to the survey which you have shown to me done by Wenefredo Agripo?
A: This is basically a portion.
Q: Yes, but the boundaries are the same?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: And the area is the same?
A: Yes Sir.28
Although the parties involved in the two cases are not exactly the same, there is substantially an identity of parties for purposes of res judicata. The fundamental rule is that for res judicata to apply, only substantial, not absolute, identity of parties is required. In fact, there is identity of parties not only where the parties are the same but also those in privity with them, as between their successor-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and in the same capacity, or where there is substantial identity of parties. In the present case, Aurio is not only an heir of his father Baldomero, who instituted the first quieting of title case; Aurio is also considered a successor-in-interest by title of Baldomero by virtue of the conveyance of the subject property through the Kasabotan dated April 25, 1994.30
There is identity of parties not only when the parties in the cases are the same, but also between those in privity with them, such as between their successors-in-interest. Absolute identity of parties is not required, and where a shared identity of interest is shown by the identity of relief sought by one person in a prior case and the second person in a subsequent case, such was deemed sufficient.
Private respondents in this case, as successors-in-interest of Marcelo and Angelina Bustamante, who initiated the first case that was ultimately decided by this Court as Republic v. Guerrero, have a community of interest with the latter and, thus, meet the [test] of identity of parties. Private respondents are bound by the previous ruling under the criterion of "privity of interest." They have no more right to reopen an already terminated case.32
Whenever there is cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, plaintiffs Complaint and/or Amended Complaint is hereby ordered DISMISSED. The counter-claim of defendants DBP and spouses Juanito and Leontina Lavina are also DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.40
(1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation — republicae ut sit litium; and (2) the hardship on the individual of being vexed twice for the same cause — nemo debet bis vexari er eadem causa.
A conflicting doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and dereliction of individuals and prefer the regalement of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.44
Similarly, petitioner's tax declaration issued under his name is not even persuasive evidence of his claimed ownership over the land in dispute. A tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership. It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. Because it does not by itself give title, it is of little value in proving one's ownership. x x x48
x x x At any rate, petitioner anchors his claim merely on the survey plan prepared upon his request and the tax declaration that was unilaterally made out in his name. These documents do not conclusively demonstrate "title" over the subject property. A survey plan is nothing more than a paper containing a statement of courses, distances, and quantity of land, and refers only to a delineation of possession. It is not conclusive as to ownership, nor is it considered a conveyance or a mode of acquiring ownership. The same thing goes with TD No. 06532 in Aurio's name. It is settled that a tax declaration is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership, and is not, by itself, a conclusive evidence of ownership. Because a tax declaration does not give title, it is only of little value in proving one's ownership. On the whole, Aurio's tax declaration under his name lends no evidentiary support to his claimed ownership over the land in dispute. Besides, the gaping gap in the land areas pictured in the tax declaration and in the commissioner's report is much too glaring to ignore. TD No. 06532 states that Aurio's property has an area of 163.3817 hectares while the commissioned Geodetic Engineer's Survey Report shows that the land area is 192.700 hectares. Notably, there is an apparent discrepancy of 29.3183 hectares. x x x49
The writ of certiorari is not issued to correct every error that may have been committed by lower courts and tribunals. It is a remedy specifically to keep lower courts and tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction. In our judicial system, the writ is issued to prevent lower courts and tribunals from committing grave abuse of discretion in excess of their jurisdiction. x x x51
x x x The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. x x x53
SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. –
(a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. – On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
In now declaring that the execution pending appeal was unsupported by sufficient grounds, the Court restates the rule that the trial court's discretion in allowing execution pending appeal must be strictly construed. Its grant must be firmly grounded on the existence of "good reasons," which consist of compelling circumstances that justify immediate execution lest the judgment becomes illusory. "The circumstances must be superior, outweighing the injury or damages that might result should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons would make of execution pending appeal, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, a tool of oppression and inequity."55
The sufficiency of "good reasons" depends upon the circumstances of the case and the parties thereto. Conditions that are personal to one party, for example, may be insufficient to justify an execution pending appeal that would affect all parties to the case and the property that is the subject thereof. Thus, in Florendo, et al. v. Paramount Insurance Corp., the Court ruled that the execution pending appeal, which was supposedly justified by the old age and life-threatening ailments of merely one of several parties to the case, was unsupported by special reasons. As the Court sustained the CA's reversal of the execution, it explained:The Florendos point out that Rosario is already in her old age and suffers from life threatening ailments. But the trial court has allowed execution pending appeal for all of the Florendos, not just for Rosario whose share in the subject lands had not been established. No claim is made that the rest of the Florendos are old and ailing. Consequently, the execution pending appeal was indiscreet and too sweeping. All the lands could be sold for P42,000,000, the value mentioned in the petition, and distributed to all the Florendos for their enjoyment with no sufficient assurance that they all will and can return such sum in case the CA reverses, as it has in fact done, the RTC decision. Moreover, it is unclear how much of the proceeds of the sale of the lands Rosario needed for her old age.58
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 39-54; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello and concurred in by Associate Justices Carmelita Salandanan Manahan and Pedro B. Corales.
2 Id. at 60-67; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello and concurred in by Associate Justices Renato C. Francisco and Ma. Luisa Quizano Padilla.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 42.
5 Id. at 41-45.
6 Id. at 53.
7 Id.
8 CA rollo (CA-G.R. CV No. 01367-MlN), pp. 491-504.
9Rollo, pp. 60-67.
10 Id. at 15-16.
11 CA rollo (CA G.R. CV No. 01367-MIN), pp. 83-89.
12 Records, pp. 123-138.
13 Id. at 139.
14 See CA Decision, rollo, pp. 40-54 at 41.
15 Id.
16 CA rollo (CA-G.R. CV No. 01367-MIN), pp. 88-89.
17 Records, p. 137.
18 Id. at 139.
19 See rollo, of G.R. No. 121340, Casiño, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, p. 197.
20Spouses Torres v. Medina, 629 Phil. 101, 110 (2010).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23Rollo, pp. 22-23.
24 Id.
25 Records, p. 2.
26 CA rollo (SP. No. 01944-MIN), p. 52.
27 Id.
28 TSN, February 17, 2005, pp. 38-41.
29Rollo, p. 51; CA Decision, p. 13.
30 Id.
31 759 Phil. 99 (2015).
32 Id. at 113 citing Republic v. Guerrero, 520 Phil. 296 (2006).
33Rollo, pp. 51-52.
34Spouses Torres v. Medina, supra note 20 at 112.
35Mananquil v. Moico, 699 Phil. 120 (2012).
36 Id. at 127.
37 Records, pp. 116-122.
38 Id. at 119.
39 Id. at 120.
40 CA rollo (CA-G.R. CV No. 01367-MIN), pp. 88-89.
41Spouses Torres v. Medina, supra note 20 at 113.
42 Id.
43 545 Phil. 92 (2007).
44 Id. at 109.
45Mananquil v. Moico, see note 35.
46 350 Phil. 544 (1998).
47 Id. at 557.
48 Id. at 558.
49Rollo, pp. 48-49.
50 812 Phil. 166 (2017).
51 Id. at 171.
52 667 Phil. 474 (2011).
53 Id.
54 805 Phil. 167 (2017).
55 Id. at 201 citing Florendo v. Paramount Insurance Corp., 624 Phil. 373, 381 (2010).
56 G.R. No. 156257, October 8, 2003 (unsigned resolution).
57 CA rollo (SP No. 01949-MIN), pp. 211-212.
58Abenion v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, supra note 54 at 201-202.
59 Barroso v. Judge Omelio, 771 Phil. 199, 207 (2015).