FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 232677, June 08, 2020
MENANDRO A. SOSMEÑA, PETITIONER, v. BENIGNO M. BONAFE, JIMMY A. ESCOBAR, JOEL M. GOMEZ, and HECTOR B. PANGILINAN, RESPONDENTS.
D E C IS I O N
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, were able to establish that it could not have been possible for them to commit the imputed crimes, both during the investigation by the Prosecutor and during the trial of this case. No hint of inconsistency was ever found in their statements and testimonies. They have been consistent in their respective stories to the letter. This only leads to one conclusion, that is, that they are telling the truth.The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision read:
Defendant, and his witnesses, presented testimonies which are contrary to each other. Defendant Sosmeña testified that the Plaintiffs are the employees of Plettac Roeder, not Expo Logistics, while Majid Sattar testified that the Plaintiffs are employees of Defendant in Expo Logistics. The Defendant testified that he was frustrated with the recommendation of the police as to the crime that can be charged, yet it took him almost four months to file the cases against Plaintiffs with additional charges at that. He also testified that he knew that Resolutions of dismissal by the Prosecutors are not final and that it may be re-filed at another time, as one of the reasons, for failure to take recourse against the adverse Resolution, the other being that he was too busy to take care of it. Yet, to date, no such re-filing was ever made by the said Defendant against the Plaintiffs. The inconsistencies found in the different testimonies, if considered individually, are unsubstantial, but taken collectively show a pattern, that is of lies and fabrication. Fact is he had his opportunity to prove his charges against the Plaintiffs with the Pasay Prosecutor's Office, but he blew it there. Now he is trying to prove those very same charges in the present case. His explanation that the case was tried long after the occurrence of the incident because he was too busy at that time is simply unacceptable. He also used this excuse in failing to file a reply or even to re-file the case as he allegedly intended to do. He even alleged that he consulted a lawyer prior to filing the case against the Plaintiffs, yet he did not make it credible enough to provide the name of the lawyer whom he consulted.
The Court finds from the evidence that indeed, malice attended the filing of the criminal case against the Plaintiffs. This constitutes a violation of one of the most basic precepts of civil law. Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that "Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith." It was also said that the "Statutory basis for an action for moral damages, due to malicious prosecution can be found in Articles 19, 2176 and 2219 of the Civil Code" *Madera vs. Heirs of Salvador Lopez, G.R. No. 37105, February 10, 1981). Indeed, the malicious prosecution gives right to an action for moral damages, herein Plaintiffs having established that the filing of the case was attended by bad faith on the part of the Defendant. Since the Plaintiffs were able to establish that they are entitled to Moral Damages, Article 2234 justifies the award of exemplary damages. The award of attorney's fees is also proper under the circumstances pursuant to Article 2208 (1) tempered pursuant to the principle of quantum meruit.13 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant ordering the latter to pay:
- Moral Damages in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00);
- Exemplary damages in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00);
- Attorney's Fees in the amount of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) SO ORDERED.14
There is no question that the resolution of the case hinges on the question of whether Menandro is guilty of malice and bad faith in instituting the malicious mischief case, if it is not so, then there is no ground to hold it liable for malicious prosecution. It is evident in this case that bad faith attended the filing of the malicious mischief case against the plaintiffs. Jesus Limbo, the security guard in charge of the [of] PTC Grounds who was presented by Menandro as witness, attested that the alleged incident that led to Menandro's filing of malicious mischief case indeed took place and the plaintiffs were in fact the ones responsible for the acts. Suspiciously, however, the disturbance was not recorded in the Security Guard's Log Book raising doubt on the credibility of the witness.
What further militates against the claim of Menandro that his action was not motivated by sinister design to vex plaintiffs, but only by a well-founded anxiety to protect his rights, was the uncontroverted fact that it took him three months before initiating the action. If in fact the acts committed by plaintiffs, if not timely averted, would have caused damage to the company amounting to millions of pesos, logic dictates that Menandro, as the Managing Director, would have lost no time in prosecuting the action to vindicate its rights and to prevent similar occurrence in the future. Unfortunately, however, he dragged the filing of the case which was suggestive of the existence of legal malice.17 (Emphasis supplied)
The Office of the City Prosecutor found no probable cause to indict respondents for malicious mischief and theft because petitioner was only motivated by ill will in filing the criminal complaints against them. The trial court and the Court of Appeals shared this assessment of petitioner's evidence and further rejected his evidence for lacking credibility.
- Petitioner always blamed Benigno for the crash of air conditioners at the tent pavilions after petitioner had found out that Benigno was spying against petitioner on behalf of Abdul.
- Benigno was eventually forced to resign from Expo Logistics in September 2001.
- Petitioner's nephew once berated Hector and his co-workers for stopping work when it was raining. Hector and his co-workers went home and never reported back for work.
- Petitioner called Jimmy's attention about his and his co-workers' slow work, which came to a head on October 7, 2001 when he cursed them. He and his co-workers refused to return to work thereafter
- Petitioner threatened to have respondents arrested;
- Joel corroborated the occurrence of the foregoing events.
- Respondents memorialized petitioner's harsh treatment of them in their respective affidavits.
- Petitioner took four months to file the criminal complaints for malicious mischief and theft against respondents. 25
In this jurisdiction, the term "malicious prosecution" has been defined as "an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein." While generally associated with unfounded criminal actions, the term has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause.Malicious prosecution does not only pertain to criminal prosecutions but also to any other legal proceeding such as a preliminary investigation.27
This Court, in Drilon v. Court of Appeals, elucidated, viz.:The term malicious prosecution has been defined in various ways. In American jurisdiction, it is defined as:This Court has drawn the four elements that must be shown to concur to recover damages for malicious prosecution. Therefore, for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement; (2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice - an improper or a sinister motive. The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless.(Emphasis supplied)
"One begun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained (Eustace v. Dechter, 28 Cal. App. 2d. 706, 83 P. 2d. 525). Instituted with intention of injuring defendant and without probable cause, and which terminates in favor of the person prosecuted. For this injury an action on the case lies, called the action of malicious prosecution (Hicks v. Brantley, 29 S.E. 459, 102 Ga. 264; Eggett v. Allen, 96 N.W. 803, 119 Wis. 625)."
In Philippine jurisdiction, it has been defined as:
"An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury (Cabasaa n v. Anota, 14169-R, November 19, 1956)."
The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations and on damages particularly Articles 19, 20, 21 , 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8). To constitute malicious prosecution, however, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.
While we commiserate with the mental and emotional tribulations suffered by private respondents Atty. Deguma and Atty. Pagtanac as a result of TIONGCO's unfounded accusations, we find that the amount of moral and exemplary damages granted them, though not enriching, still excessive. Moral damages must be understood to be in concepts of grants which are not punitive or corrective in nature calculated to compensate the claimant for injury suffered. Exemplary damages, for their part, serve as deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions. Both are in the category of an award designed to compensate claimants for actual injury and are not meant to enrich complainant at the expense of defendants. Further, in instances where no actual damages are adjudicated, the Supreme Court may reduce moral and exemplary damages.We therefore reduce the amounts of damages awarded jointly to respondents. The award of moral damages is reduced to P30,000.00, exemplary damages to P20,000.00, and attorney's fees to P10,000.00.
Using these case law as guideline, the amount of P300,000 moral damages and P100,000 exemplary damages granted to Atty. Deguma should be reduced to P100,000 and P50,000, respectively. The award of P100,000 moral damages and P50,000 exemplary damages granted to Atty. Pagtanac should likewise be reduced to P50,000 and P10,000, respectively. We observe however, as equitable under the circumstances, the amounts of moral and exemplary damages granted to private respondents Major Carmelo and Yared.
Endnotes:
1 Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a member of this Court) with the concurrence of Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Jhosep Y. Lopez, all members of the Twelfth Division, rollo, pp. 27-28.
2 Complaint dated August 28, 2002, rollo, pp. 60-64.
3Id. a t 60-61 .
4Id.
5Id.
6Id.
7Id. at 62.
8Id.
9 Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and i n the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
10Rollo, pp. 63-64.
11 Answer with Counterclaim dated November 12, 2002, id. at 66-69.
12 Penned by Judge Marino M. dela Cruz, Jr., id. at 34-59.
13Id. at 56-59.
14Id. at 58-59.
15Id. at 96-111.
16Id. at 114-123.
17Id. at 31-32.
18Id. at 10-23.
19Id. at 175-183.
20 See Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 169 (2016).
21Gatan v. Vinarao, G.R. No. 205912, October 18, 2017.
22 Supra note 20.
23 Supra note 20: "Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals bind this court. Although jurisprudence has provided several exceptions to these rules, exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so this court may evaluate and review the facts of the case. In any event, even in such cases, this court retains full discretion on whether to review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals."
24Id.
25Rollo, pp. 37-41.
26 544 Phil. 349, 364 (2007).
27Yasoña v. De Ramos, 483 Phil. 162, 168 (2004): "The principal question to be resolved is whether the filing of the criminal complaint for estafa by petitioners against respondents constituted malicious prosecution. In this jurisdiction, the term 'malicious prosecution' has been defined as 'an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein.' To constitute 'malicious prosecution,' there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex or humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution."
28 Rule 133, Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. - In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
29 742 Phil. 320 (2014).
30 367 Phil. 493, 504 (1999).
31 G.R. No. L-50473, January 21, 1985.
32 375 Phil. 978, 994-995 (1999).