THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 227777, June 15, 2020
OMAR VILLARBA, PETITIONER, V. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
A formal amendment does not change the crime charged or affect the accused's theory or defense. It adds nothing crucial for a conviction as to deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet the new information. When an amendment only rectifies something that was already included in the original information, it is but a formal amendment. A second arraignment, therefore, is no longer necessary.1
Moreover, the information need not reproduce the law verbatim in alleging the acts or omissions that constitute the offense. If its language is understood, the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against the accused stands unviolated.2
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assailing the Decision4 and Resolution5 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed Omar Villarba's (Villarba) conviction6 for the violation of Republic Act No. 8049, otherwise known as the Anti-Hazing Act of 1995.
Villarba was among the members7 of the Junior Order of Kalantiao, a fraternity based in the Central Philippine University in Iloilo City,8 who were all charged in 2003 with violating the Anti-Hazing Act for their acts against Wilson Dordas III (Dordas).
The accusatory portion of the original Information reads: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
That on or about the 15th day of September 2001, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, members and officers of the Junior Order of Kalantiao, a fraternity, conspiring and confederating with each other, working together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally subject one Wilson Dordas to hazing or initiation by placing Wilson Dordas, the recruit, in some embarrassing or humiliating situation such as forcing him to do physical activity or subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury which resulted to his confinement and operation and prevented him from engaging in his habitual work for more than ninety (90) days.All the accused were arraigned under the original Information, and they accordingly pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.10 Subsequently, the Information was amended11 by adding the suffix 'III' to the name 'Wilson Dordas' to correct his name. Pre-trial and trial ensued without arraignment on the amended Information.12
CONTRARY TO LAW.9 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:The trial court held that the prosecution provided a clear account of the hazing through the credible testimony of Dordas, who identified all the accused and pinpointed their specific acts.24 It gave little faith to the accused, whose defense of denial was not substantiated by evidence, and whose testimonies were conflicting on significant points.25 It further observed that none of them fully accounted for the activities prior to the final rites, intentionally evading the topic instead.26
1. Finding accused OMAR VILLARBA [and co-accused] Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Republic Act No. 8049 and sentencing them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as minimum to Twelve (12) Years as maximum.
. . . .
4. Ordering accused OMAR VILLARBA [and co-accused] to jointly and severally pay private complainant Wilson Dordas III the sum of Seventy Seven Thousand Three Hundred Five Pesos and Forty-Four Centavos (P77,305.44) as compensatory damages;
5. Ordering accused OMAR VILLARBA [and co-accused] to jointly and severally pay private complainant Wilson Dordas III the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), as moral damages for the pain and suffering they inflicted upon said complainant;
. . . .
7. Ordering accused OMAR VILLARBA [and the other accused] to jointly and severally pay private complainant Wilson Dordas III the sum of One Hundred Two Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Pesos (P102,280.00[)] as attorney's fees and expenses for litigation.
SO ORDERED.23cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 16 (sic) November 2006 rendered by Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo finding the accused-appellants Omar Villarba and [co-accused] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Republic Act No. 8049 and sentencing them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years as maximum is hereby SUSTAINED and AFFIRMED.To the Court of Appeals, the element of initiation activities as a prerequisite for admission to the fraternity was not an essential part of the Information. Instead, the essential element was the "infliction of physical or psychological suffering or injury which resulted from the hazing or initiation rites of the recruit, neophyte or applicant."34 Since initiation activities are required for membership in the fraternity, they already formed part of the definition of hazing, the Court of Appeals explained. In any case, the omission did "not make the accused ignorant of the crime they were being charged with, and what defenses they needed to prepare for trial."35
Upon finality, let the entire records of this case be remanded to the court a quo for the execution of the judgment.
Costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.33 (Emphasis in the original)
Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying him of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. The importance of arraignment is based on the constitutional right of the accused to be informed. . . . It is only imperative that he is thus made fully aware of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the imputed crime.63 (Citations omitted)Arraignment is equally important in rules on amendments of the information. Rule 110, Section 14 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.Under this rule, any amendment—be it formal or substantial—may be made without leave of court before the arraignment. Once the arraignment is conducted, however, formal amendments may be made but only if there is leave of court and if such amendment does not prejudice the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment, on the other hand, is no longer allowed unless it "is beneficial to the accused."64
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This however, we hastily clarify, pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense different from that charged in the original complaint or information; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense: and do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission of the offense.As held in jurisprudence, the following are merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations only affecting the range of the imposable penalty; (2) amendments that do not change the offense originally charged; (3) allegations that will not alter the prosecution's theory as to surprise the accused and affect their form of defense; (4) amendments that do not prejudice an accused's substantial rights; and (5) amendments that only address the vagueness in the information but does not "introduce new and material facts" and those which "merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged."66
We further stress that an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules, does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form. The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused was arraigned the first time. The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably come as a surprise to the accused simply because the amendment did not charge a new offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution.65 (Emphasis supplied)
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.69 (Citation omitted)Here, petitioner argues that the inclusion of the suffix 'III' to the name of Dordas in the Information was a substantial amendment, which should have warranted a second arraignment. This Court disagrees.
A concomitant component of this stage of the proceedings is that the Information should provide the accused with fair notice of the accusations made against him, so that he will be able to make an intelligent plea and prepare a defense. Moreover, the Information must provide some means of ensuring that the crime for which the accused is brought to trial is in fact one for which he was charged, rather than some alternative crime seized upon by the prosecution in light of subsequently discovered evidence. Likewise, it must indicate just what crime or crimes an accused is being tried for, in order to avoid subsequent attempts to retry him for the same crime or crimes. In other words, the Information must permit the accused to prepare his defense, ensure that he is prosecuted only on the basis of facts presented, enable him to plead jeopardy against a later prosecution, and inform the court of the facts alleged so that it can determine the sufficiency of the charge.Factual allegations that constitute the offense are substantial matters. Moreover, an accused's right to question a conviction based on facts not alleged in the Information cannot be waived.79 Thus, even if the prosecution satisfies the burden of proof, but if the offense is not charged or necessarily included in the information, conviction cannot ensue: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Oftentimes, this is achieved when the Information alleges the material elements of the crime charged. If the Information fails to comply with this basic standard, it would be quashed on the ground that it fails to charge an offense....78 (Citations omitted)
The allegations of facts constituting the offense charged are substantial matters and an accused's right to question his conviction based on facts not alleged in the information cannot be waived. No matter how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted of any offense unless it is charged in the information on which he is tried or is necessarily included therein. To convict him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights.80 (Citations omitted)The allegations in the information are vital because they determine "the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused[.]"81 They are given more weight than a prosecutor's designation of the offense in the caption. In Quimvel v. People:82
Indeed, the Court has consistently put more premium on the facts embodied in the Information as constituting the offense rather than on the designation of the offense in the caption. In fact, an investigating prosecutor is not required to be absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its formal name in the law. What determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the Information or Complaint, not the caption or preamble thereof nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, being conclusions of law. It then behooves this Court to place the text of the Information under scrutiny.83 (Citation omitted)Nevertheless, the wording of the information does not need to be a verbatim reproduction of the law in alleging the acts or omissions that constitute the offense. Rule 110, Section 9 of the Rules of Court is clear that the information does not need to use the exact language of the statute: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.Hence, to successfully state the acts or omissions that constitute the offense, they must be "'described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged.' Furthermore, '[t]he use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient."84
That on or about the 15th day of September 2001, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the abovenamed accused, members and officers of the Junior Order of Kalantiao, a fraternity, conspiring and confederating with each other, working together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally subject one Wilson Dordas III to hazing or initiation by placing Wilson Dordas III, the recruit, in some embarrassing or humiliating situation such as forcing him to do physical activity or subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury which resulted to his confinement and operation and prevented him from engaging in his habitual work for more than ninety (90) days.88 (Emphasis supplied)The lack of the phrase "prerequisite to admission" does not make the Information invalid. Even with its absence, the alleged facts, which include the controlling words 'fraternity,' 'initiation,' 'hazing,' and 'recruit, ' would have reasonably informed petitioner of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. . . . The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial. Significantly, the appellant never claimed that he was deprived of his right to be fully apprised of the nature of the charges against him because of the style or form adopted in the Information.92 (Citations omitted)The assailed Information here sufficiently enables a layperson to understand the crime charged. There is no ambiguity in the allegations that prevented petitioner to prepare his defense. As long as this purpose is attained, the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation is satisfied.
For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. The appellant has miserably failed to convince us that we must depart from this rule.96 (Citations omitted)The trial court's findings on witness credibility are binding upon this Court, unless substantial facts were shown to have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted. In People v. Daramay, Jr. :97
Time and time again, this Court has said that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by a trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand; and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under examination. Its findings on such matters are binding and conclusive on appellate courts unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted...98 (Citation omitted)The rule will hold sway in this case as well. Without a showing that the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals have overlooked or misinterpreted the victim's testimony, this Court sees no reason to overturn their factual findings.
The lower courts deemed Dordas's testimony as direct and straightforward. He identified petitioner during trial and clearly narrated the acts that petitioner and the other accused had done to him.ATTY[.] MARANON:
Mr. Dordas, last December 8, 2003, you testified before the Honorable Court that you are blindfolded and guided to the elevated portion of the big cottage and thereafter, they held your both two hands [sic] and you were boxed and hit on the right portion of your body. My question now is: After you were hit, can you please tell us what happened next?
xxx
After you have struggled and said you tried to free yourself from the hold of three persons holding your hands, can you please tell us what happened next?
WITNESS:
I was able to remove my blindfold.
ATTY. MARANON:
Because you were able to remove ... your blindfold, can you please tell us whether you were able to identify those persons who were holding your hands?
WITNESS:
When I faced front again somebody suddenly boxed me.
ATTY[.] MARANON:
And were [you] able to identify who was that person who boxed you?
WITNESS:
Yes sir.
ATTY. MARANON:
Who was he?
WITNESS:
Omar Villarba.
ATTY. MARANON:
Were you hit?
WITNESS:
Yes sir.
ATTY. MARANON:
Where?
WITNESS:
Here at my stomach.101cralawlawlibrary
Needless to state, the crime of hazing is shrouded in secrecy. Fraternities and sororities, especially the Greek organizations, are secretive in nature and their members are reluctant to give any information regarding initiation rites. The silence is only broken after someone has been injured so severely that medical attention is required. It is only at this point that the secret is revealed and the activities become public....104 (Citations omitted)Against Dordas's candid testimony, petitioner's defense of denial utterly fails. This Court has settled that "mere denial ... is inherently a weak defense and constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters."105 Petitioner's denial is no exception.
Endnotes:
1Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular, G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018, [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
2Quimvel v. People, 808 Phil. 889, 920 (2017) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
3Rollo, pp. 15-29.
4 Id. at 31-45. The Decision dated December 21, 2012 was penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos and concurred in by Associate Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Pedro B. Corales of the Eighteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu City.
5 Id. at 57-60. The Resolution dated August 30, 2016 was penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Ingles and concurred in by Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maximo and Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap of the Special Former Eighteenth Division of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City.
6 Id. at 119-169. The Decision dated November 14, 2006 in Crim. Case No. 02-56194 was penned by Judge Victor E. Gelvezon of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 36.
7 Id. at 119. The other accused were Vincent Eiben Gonzales, Rasty Jones Sumagaysay, Lorly Totica, Emily Garcia, Sergio Cercado, Jr., Edrel Tojoy, Oliver Montejo, Donnaline Locsin, May Andres, Paul Andre Margarico, Marie Hope Talabucon, Nehru Sanico, Joann Malunda, Wesley Corvera, Keith Piamonte, Vincent Serafin Singian, Hennie Bandojo, Christy Alejaga, Chester Roy Rogan, Roma Aspero, and Rogen Magno.
8 Id. at 121.
9 Id. at 170.
10 Id. at 120.
11 Id. at 119-120.
12 Id. at 120.
13 Id. at 121.
14 Id. at 122.
15 Id. at 122-123.
16 Id. at 124-125.
17 Id. at 125-127.
18 Id. at 127-129.
19 Id. at 129-130.
20 Id. at 134.
21 Id. at 134-135.
22 Id. at 119-169.
23 Id. at 167-169.
24 Id. at 152.
25 Id. at 147.
26 Id. at 150.
27 Id. at 158-160.
28 Id. at 164.
29 Id. at 38.
30 Id. at 38-39.
31 Id. at 39.
32 Id. at 31-45.
33 Id. at 44-45.
34 Id. at 40.
35 Id. at 40-41.
36 Id. at 41.
37 Id. at 42.
38 Id. at 44.
39 Id. at 57-60.
40 Id. at 15-29.
41 Id. at 21-A-22.
42 Id. at 22.
43 Id. at 22-24.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 26.
46 Id. at 24-26.
47 Id. at 82-91.
48 Id. at 84-85.
49 Id. at 85-86.
50 Id. at 86.
51 Id. at 86-87.
52 Id. at 87.
53 Id. at 100-110.
54 Id. at 101-102.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 102.
57 Id. at 103.
58 Id. at 104.
59 CONST., art. III, sec. 14(2) provides:
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
60Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular, G.R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018, [PerJ. Leonen, Third Division].
61Kummer v. People, 717 Phil. 670, 687 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
62 717 Phil. 670 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
63 Id. at 687.
64Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, 544 Phil. 237, 249 (2007) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Third Division].
65Kummer v. People, 717 Phil. 670, 687-688 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
66Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, 544 Phil. 237, 249 (2007) [Per J. Calleja, Sr., Third Division] citing Matalam v. Sandiganbayan, 495 Phil. 664 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
67 Id.
68 544 Phil. 237 (2007) [Per J. Calleja, Sr., Third Division].
69 Id. at 249-250.
70Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular, G. R. No. 186403, September 5, 2018, [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
71 CONST., art III, sec. 14 provides:
SECTION 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
72People v. Bayabos, 754 Phil. 90, 103-104 (2015) [Per C.J. Sereno, First Division].
73 526 Phil. 480 (2006) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
74 Id. at 496-497.
75 Id. at 496 citing U.S. v. Karelsen, 3 PhiI. 226 (1904) [Per J. Johnson, En Banc].
76 RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, sec. 6 provides:
SECTION 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
77 766 Phil. 75 (2015) [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
78 Id. at 104-105.
79David v. People, 767 Phil. 519, 532 (2015) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
80Andaya v. People, 526 Phil. 480, 497 (2006) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
81Quimvel v. People, 808 PhiI. 889, 913 (2017) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
82 808 Phil. 889 (2017) [Per J. Velasco, Jr.. En Banc].
83 Id. at 913.
84 Id. at 920 citing Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan, 600 Phil. 475 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc] and Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, 444 Phil. 499, 522 (2003) [Per J. Calleja, Sr., En Banc].
85Rollo, p. 26.
86 Id. at 102.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 119-120.
89Quimvel v. People, 808 Phil. 889, 920 (2017) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
90Rollo, p. 41.
91 424 Phil. 482 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, Third Division].
92 Id. at 497.
93Miranda v. Sandiganbayan, 502 Phil. 423, 444-445 (2005) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
94People v. Corpuz, 812 Phil. 62, 88 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] citing People v. Badilla, 749 Phil. 809, 820 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
95 328 Phil. 505 (1996) [Per J. Davide, Jr. En Banc].
96 Id. at 530-531.
97 431 Phil. 715 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
98 Id. at 727.
99 Id. at 102-104.
100Rollo, p. 44.
101 Id. at 43-44.
102PeopIe v. Ponsaran, 426 Phil. 836, 847 (2002) (Per J. Puno, First Division].
103 762 Phil. 630 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
104 Id. at 679.
105People v. Buclao, 736 Phil. 325, 339 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division] citing People v. Alvero, 386 Phil. 181, 200 (2000) [Per Curiam, En Banc].chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary