FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 224076, July 28, 2020
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. SUSAN DATUIN, EVELYN DAYOT, SKYLON REALTY CORPORATION, SYSTEMATIC REALTY INCORPORATED, BAGUIO PINES TOWER CORPORATION, GOLD LAND REALTY CORPORATION, GOOD HARVEST REALTY CORPORATION, PARKLAND REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
On March 12, 1992, for unknown reasons, the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas issued Transfer Certificates of Title for the six (6) lots in the names of Susan Datuin and Evelyn Dayot only. TCT Nos. TP 834, TP 835, TP 836, TP 837, and TP 838 in the name of Susan Datuin, and TCT No. TP 833 in the name of Evelyn Dayot.10
OCTP-921 Lucia Dizon OCT P-922 Amorando Dizon OCT P-923 Susan Datuin OCT P-924 Consolacion Dizon OCT P-925 Ruben Dizon OCT P-926 Consolacion Degollacion
On September 18, 2003, the DENR verified that the land covered by SWO 04-001510-D on which OCTs 921 to 926 were issued, was not reflected in the projection map. The area covered by OCTs 921 to 926 overlapped with Lot 360, Psd-40891 covered by FLA No. 4718. Nathaniel Abad, Chief of the DENR-Projection Section formalized these findings in his Memorandum12 addressed to Conlu, viz.: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
TP1937 Skylon Realty Corporation TP1938 Systemic Realty Incorporated TP 1939 Parkland Realty & Development Corporation TP 1950 Baguio Pines Tower Corporation TP 1951 Goldland Realty Corporation TP 1952 Good Harvest Realty Corporation
Evaluation and observation of the technical description transcribed in the title covering S[WO] 04-001510 [-D] is exactly identical to Lot 0360, Psd 40891 and the total area of the six (6) lots covering the said plan S [WO] 04-001510-D are TWO HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT THOUSAND AND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX (298,686) SQUARE METERS while Lot 360, Psd-10890 is TWO HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT [THOUSAND AND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT] (298,688) SQUARE METERS and resulting to similar polygon as appeared.On September 25, 2003, the DENR issued a certification to Conlu that SWO 04-001510-D was not on its official file.13 On September 12, 2006, the DENR made second verification which yielded the same results.14
Plotting also of plan S[WO] 04-001510-D, Lots 1 to 6 overlapped (with) Lot 360, Psd-40891 when plotted using their respective lines.
Therefore, findings show that the area covered by Fishpond Lease Agreement (FLA) No. 4718, Lot 360, Psd- 40891 in the name of Prudencia V. Conlu is the same area covered by plan SWO 04-001510-D.
On January 25, 1968, Degollacion filed an Agricultural Sales Application No. (III-l) 502 involving a parcel of land with an area of 29.8688 hectares at Barrio Calumbayan, Municipality of Calatagan, Batangas.24On March 5, 2012, Baguio Pines and Systemic personally served petitioner a Request for Admission of facts including the genuineness and authenticity of the attached documents thereto. Petitioner, however, failed to respond to the Request for Admission.31
On May 14, 1969, the Bureau of Forestry declared that the area was within the unclassified public forest of Calatagan. Since the area was no longer needed for forest purposes, it was certified as such and released as alienable or disposable.25
The Chief of the Land Management Division of the Bureau of Lands directed the District Land Officer to convert Degollacion's Sales Application (III-l) 502 to Sales (Fishpond) Application.26
In a Memorandum dated December 5, 1972, then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources ordered the Director of Lands to continue the processing of pending sales (fishpond) applications prior to the effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 43 dated November 9, 1972.27
In 1987, OCTs P-921 to P-926 were issued to Lucia Dizon, Amorando Dizon, Susan Datuin, Consolacion Dizon, Ruben Dizon and Consolacion Degollacion.28
Subsequently, Datuin sold these six (6) lots to Skylon Realty Corporation, Systemic Realty Incorporated, Parkland Realty & Development Corporation, Baguio Pines Tower Corporation, Goldland Realty Corporation and Good Harvest Realty Corporation.29 Thereafter, TCTs were issued to respondents.30cralawlawlibrary
RULE 41 - Section 2. Modes of appeal. —Here, the Republic did not avail of the remedy of ordinary appeal but resorted to Rule 65 via a special civil action for certiorari, thus: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where law on these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
RULE 65 - Section 1. Petition for Certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.To justify its availment of Rule 65, the Republic cited the trial court's violation of its right to due process amounting to grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.53cralawlawlibrary
SECTION 1. Request for Admission.— At any time after issues have been joined, a party may file and serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuineness of any material and relevant document described in and exhibited with the request or of the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact set forth in the request. Copies of the documents shall be delivered with the request unless copies have already been furnished.A request for admission seeks to obtain admissions from the adverse party regarding the genuineness of relevant documents or relevant matters to enable a party to discover the evidence of the adverse side and facilitate an amicable settlement of the case to expedite the trial of the same.57 The key word is to expedite proceedings, hence, it should seek to clarify vague allegations of the opposing party and should not be a mere reiteration of allegations in the pleadings.
SECTION 2. Implied Admission.— Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters, xxx
Clearly, what respondents sought for admission referred to the very subject matter of the complaint, hence, beyond the context of Rule 26. As held in Concrete Aggregates Corporation v. Court of Appeals,90 it is a delaying tactic and unjustified maneuvering, nay illogical if not preposterous, thus: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Respondents' Answer dated March 30, 2011 Request for Admission dated March 5, 2012 Affirmative Allegations and Defenses xxxxxx 17. On January 25, 1968, Consolacion D. Degollacion, the predecessor-in-interest of defendants Baguio Pines and Systemic, filed Agricultural Sales Application No. (III-1) 502 involving a parcel of land with an area of 29.8688 hectares located at Barrio Barrio Calumbayan, Municipality of Calatagan, Province of Batangas.58 xxxa) That, Ms. Consolacion D. Degollacion is among the predecessors-in-interest of defendants Baguio Pines and Systemic.59
b) That, by date of January 25, 1968, Ms. Consolacion D. Degollacion, filed Agricultural Sales Application No. (Ill-1) 502 involving a parcel of land with an area of 29.8688 hectares located at Barrio Calumbayan, Municipality of Calatagan, Province of Batangas.60
18. Pursuant to the provisions of the Public Land Act, Agricultural Sales Application No. (Ill-1) 502 was addressed to the Director of the Bureau of Lands, an attached agency of the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.61 Xxx c) That, pursuant to the provisions of the Public Land Act, Agricultural Sales Application No. (III-1) 502 was addressed to the Director of the Bureau of Lands, an attached agency of the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources.62 19. In a letter dated June 4, 1968, Mrs. Degollacion wrote the then Bureau of Forestry specifically requesting for the classification and release of the subject parcels of land as alienable and disposable,63 xxx d) That, by ( ) date of June 4, 1968, Ms. Degollacion wrote the Bureau of Forestry specifically requesting for the classification and release of the subject parcels of land as alienable and disposable.64 20. In a letter dated May 14, 1969, the Bureau of Forestry, through its Assistant Director J.L. Utleg replied to the letter-request of Mrs. Degollacion, pertinently stating in categorical terms that "the tracts of land, containing an aggregate area of 79.360 hectares, situated in Barrio Calabuyan, Calatagan, Batangas... desired to be released for agricultural purposes by Dr. Consolacion D. Degollacion, et al. of Malabon, Rizal are within the unclassified public forest of Calatagan, Batangas per B.F. control Map for Batangas. However, since the areas (the 79.360 hectares shown on Batangas PMD No. 104) are found no longer needed for forest purposes, the same are thus hereby certified as such and released as Alienable and Disposable for disposition under the Public Land Act.65 xxxe) That, by letter dated May 14, 1969, the Bureau of Forestry, through its Assistant Director J.L. Utleg decreed that the subject parcels of land "are found no longer needed for forest purposes, [and that] the same are thus [thereby] certified as such and released as (alienable or disposable) for disposition under the Public Land Act, as amended.66 21. On February 3, 1970, the Chief of the Land Management Division of the Bureau of Lands directed the District Land Officer to convert Sales Application No. (III-1) 502 to Sales (Fishpond) Application.67 xxx f) That, on February 3, 1970, the Chief of the Land Management Division of the Bureau of Lands directed the District Land Officer to convert Sales Application No. (III-1) 502 to Sales (Fishpond) Application.68 22. Thereafter, the Director of Lands duly endorsed the said application to all the concerned agencies for their respective comments and recommendations.69 xxx g) That, thereafter, the Director of Lands duly endorsed the said application to all the concerned agencies for their respective comments and recommendations.70 xxx xxx24. In a reply to a similar request for advice, the then Department of Public Works and Communications stated that "[t]he lands subject of this case is suitable for the purpose to which it will be devoted," and recommended that "that the land be disposed of through sale or lease.71 " xxx h) That, the then Department of Public Works and Communications stated that the lands subject of this case was "suitable for the purpose to which it will be devoted," and that "[i]t is recommended that the land be disposed of through sale or lease.72 " 25. In a Certification dated May 20, 1970, the Mayor of the Municipality of Calatagan, Batangas likewise certified that "the lands applied for by MRS. ZENAIDA D. SIOSON, MRS. ADELAIDA D. REYES, MRS. CONCOLACION D. DEGOLLACION and MR. ANTONINO DIZON will not be needed by the Municipal Government of Calatagan now or in the future."73 xxx i) That, in a Certification dated May 20, 1970, the municipality of Calatagan likewise certified that the parcels of land subject of Ms. Degollacion's application was "not needed by the Municipal Government of Calatagan now or in the future.74 " 26. In a Memorandum dated December 5, 1972, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources directed the Director of Lands to continue the processing of all pending sales (fishpond) applications filed prior to the effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 43 dated November 9, 1972.75 xxx j) That, on December 5, 1972, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources categorically directed the Director of Lands to continue the processing of all pending sales (fishpond) applications filed prior to the effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 43 dated November 9, 1972.76 xxx xxx32. Plaintiff admits that OCT Nos. P-925 and P-21 were issued as early as 1987.77 xxx k) That, the patents were thereafter issued in 1987.78 xxx xxx34. The predecessors in interest of defendants Baguio Pines and Systemic occupied and possessed the subject lands as of 1968.79 xxx 1) That, at the latest, the predecessors in interest of defendants Baguio Pines and Systemic occupied and possessed the subject lands as of 1968.80 35. Herein defendants purchased the subject parcels of land from defendant Susan Datuin. At the time of purchase, the said parcels of land were registered in the name of defendant Datuin as shown by TCT Nos. TP-834 and TP-835 and there was no encumbrance, annotation or notice of any kind appearing on said titles that would indicate that said titles were flawed in any way. Relying on the integrity of said titles and the pertinent provisions of the Property Registration Decree, herein m) That, defendants Baguio Pines and Systemic have themselves possessed the subject land as early as August 1996.81
n) That, plaintiff has accepted since August 1996 and it continues to accept realty tax payments for the subject parcels of land from both defendants Baguio Pines and Systemic.82
defendants paid value for the subject lands and caused their registration in their names. o) That, defendants Baguio Pines and Systemic purchased the subject parcels of land from defendant Datuin.83
p) That, at the time of purchase, the said parcels of land were registered in the name of defendant Datuin as shown by TCT Nos. TP-834 and TP-835.84
q) That, defendants Baguio Pines and Systemic rightfully relied on the titles registered under the name of defendant Datuin.85
xxx xxx
Cross-claim
40. Defendant Baguio Pines purchased the land now registered in its name under TCT NO. TP 1950 from defendant Susan Datuin on August 15, 1996 and paid the latter the amount of Seven Million Four Hundred Sixty-Seven Thousand and One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P7,467,150.00).86 xxx s) That, defendants Baguio Pines paid the amount of P 7,467,150.00 to defendant Datuin as and by way of consideration for the purchase of land covered by TCT No. TP-835.87 41. Defendant Systemic also purchased the land now registered in its name under TCT No. TP 1938 from defendant Susan Datuin on August 2, 1996 and paid the latter the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00).88 xxx t) Defendant Systemic paid the amount of P5,000,000.00 to defendant Datuin as and by way of consideration for the purchase of land covered by TCT No. TP-834.89xxx xxx
The Request for Admission of petitioner does not fall under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. As we held in Po v. Court of Appeals and Briboneria v. Court of Appeals, Rule 26 as a mode of discovery contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a pleading. That is its primary function. It does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings, xxxVerily, petitioner need not reply to respondents' request for admission because as stated, the facts requested to be admitted are already the subject of the parties' respective pleadings by which the issues had already been joined.
As we held in Po v. CA, petitioner's request constitutes an utter redundancy and a useless, pointless process which the respondent should not be subjected to. In the first place, what the petitioner seeks to be admitted by private respondent is the very subject matter of the complaint. In effect, petitioner would want private respondent to deny her allegations in her verified Complaint and admit the allegations in the Answer of petitioner {Manifestation and Reply to Request for Admission). Plainly, this is illogical if not preposterous.
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, therefore, private respondent need not reply to the Request for Admission because her Complaint itself controverts the matters set forth in the Answer of petitioner which were merely reproduced in the request. In Uy Chao v. De la Rama Steamship we observed that the purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts and genuineness of documents is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.91cralawlawlibrary
SECTION 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.Summary judgment may be validly rendered when these twin elements are present: (a) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.93
SECTION 2. Summary judgment for defending party. — A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
SECTION 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. — The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
But apart from opposing defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff Garcia asked the trial court to declare Narciso in default for not filing an answer, altogether disregarding the suspension of the running of the period for filing such an answer during the pendency of the motion to dismiss that she filed in the case. Consequently, when the trial court granted Garcia's prayer and simultaneously denied Narciso's motion to dismiss and declared her in default, it committed serious error. Narciso was not yet in default when the trial court denied her motion to dismiss. She still had at least five days within which to file her answer to the complaint.To repeat, the trial court, thus, gravely abused its discretion when it issued its: (a) Order dated September 3, 2013 in Civil Case No. 4929, ordaining that as a result of the Republic's failure to respond to the Request for Admission, it was deemed to have impliedly admitted the material facts as well as the genuineness and due execution of several documents subject of the Request for Admission, granting respondents' motion for summary judgment based on these alleged admissions, and rendering summary judgment against the Republic; and (b) denying the Republic's subsequent motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the aforesaid orders are nullified.
What is more, Narciso had the right to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order denying her motion to dismiss. No rule prohibits the filing of such a motion for reconsideration. Only after the trial court shall have denied it does Narciso become bound to file her answer to Garcia's complaint. And only if she did not do so was Garcia entitled to have her declared in default. Unfortunately, the CA failed to see this point.102 (emphasis supplied)
Endnotes:
1 Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr with the concurrences of Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Florito S. Macalino.
2Rollo, pp. 34-37.
3Id at 50-51.
4Id. at 16; See also Complaint dated May 4, 2010, id. at 103-116.
5 121 Phil. 1052-1057(1965).
6Rollo, 103-116.
7Id at 106.
8Id at 107.
9Id at 107-108.
10Id. at 108; See also Annexes "F" to "F-5" of the Petition for Review, id at 73-91.
11Id at 108.
12Id. at 109.
13Id at 110.
14Id at 111.
15Id
16 Supra note 5.
17 In Republic v. Ayala y Cia (Id.), the Court affirmed the CFI Decision declaring Lot 360 as part of navigable waters, or parts of the sea, beach and foreshores of the beach, thus, not capable of registration.
18Rollo, p. 112.
19Id at 196.
20Id at 198.
21Id
22Id at 122-135.
23Id at 131.
24Id at 126-127.
25Id at 127.
26Id.
27Id at 128-129.
28Id at 129.
29Id
30Id
31Id at 201.
32Id. at 137-145.
33 SECTION 2. Implied Admission. — Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters. (Rides of Court, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as Amended, April 8, 1997).
34Rollo,p. 198.
35Id. at 202.
36Id. at 147-149.
37 See Opposition dated April 24, 2013; id. at 150-155.
38Id at 156-159.
39 Penned by Judge Rolando F. Silang, id. at 161-164.
40Id. at 165-173.
41Id. at 178-195.
42Id. at 196-203.
43Id. AUd.
45 CA rollo, pp. 2-17.
46 See Motion to Dismiss dated March 24, 2014; id. at 286-296.
47Rollo, pp. 34-37.
48Id. at 38.
49 See Petition for Review dated May 17, 2016; id. at 1 1-24.
50 See Respondents' Comment dated November 22, 2016; id. at 253-269.
51Id. at 196-203.
52Spouses Navarro v. Rural Bank of Tarlac, Inc., 790 Phil. 1-15 (2016).
53 Rules of Court, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended, April 8, 1997.
54 260 Phil. 31-37(1990).
55 594 Phil. 451,458(2008).
56 655 Phil. 25, 36 (2011).
57 See Duque v. Court of Appeals, et al., 433 Phil. 33, 44 (2002).
58Rollo, p. 126.
59Id. at 198.
60Id.
61Id. at 127.
62Id at 198.
63Id at 127.
64Id at 198.
65Id. at 127.
66Id. at 198.
67Id at 127.
68Id. at 198.
69Id at 128.
70Id. at 198.
71Id. at 128.
72Id. at 198.
73Id. at 128.
74Id. at 198.
75Id. at 128-129.
76Id at 200.
77Id. at 130.
78Id. at 200.
79Id. at 131.
80Id. at 200.
81Id
82Id
83Id.
84Id.
85Id.
85Id. at 132.
87Id. at 200.
88Id. at 132.
89Id. at 200.
90 334 Phil. 77, 80 (1997); citing Po v. Court of Appeals, 247 Phil. 637-640 (1988), Briboneria v. Court of Appeals, 290-A Phil. 396-409 (1992), and Uy Chao v. De la Rama Steamship Co. Inc., 116 Phil. 392-397 (1962).
91 Italics and emphasis supplied.
92 G.R. No. 226130, February 19, 2018, 856 SCRA 97, 103.
93Puyat v. Zabarte, 405 Phil. 413, 426-427 (2001).
94 Supra note 54.
95 See Complaint dated May 4, 2010; rol/o, pp. 103-116
96 See Answer dated March 30, 2011; id. at 122-135.
97Loreno v. Estenzo, 165 Phil. 610, 615 (1976), citing Singleton v. Phil. Trust, 99 Phil. 91-99 (1956).
98 CA rollo, pp. 190-197.
99Id. at 169-177.
100 CA rollo, pp. 142-150.
101 699 Phil. 236-241 (2012).
102Id.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary