THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 214326, July 06, 2020
ALASTAIR JOHN KANE, PETITIONER, V. PATRICIA ROGGENKAMP, RESPONDENT,
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
An acquittal from a charge of physical violence against women and their children is not a bar to the filing of a civil action for damages for physical injuries under Article 33 of the Civil Code if an acquittal was due to reasonable doubt, without any declaration that the facts upon which the offense arises are nonexistent.
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Alastair John Kane, assailing the Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Order4 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City, dismissing Patricia Roggenkamp's Complaint for Damages against Alastair John Kane. The Complaint, which was based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, was dismissed on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction.
Alastair John Kane (Alastair John) and Patricia Roggenkamp (Patricia) are Australian citizens.5 They met in January 2004 in Brisbane, Australia, and became lovers immediately.6
Patricia decided to put up a business in the Philippines, and eventually travelled with Alastair John to Manila. They settled in a condominium unit located in Paranaque City supposedly owned by Patricia.7
On March 30, 2006, an Information for violation of Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004 was filed against Alastair John, with Patricia as the private complainant. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-0413, was then raffled to Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City.8
According to Patricia, she and Alastair John attended a party hosted by her son, Ashley Richard Cayzer (Ashley Richard) on November 30, 2004. The next day, December 1, 2004, after they had just arrived at their residence at about 1:00 a.m., Patricia confronted Alastair John for allegedly looking at the underwear of other female guests at the party. Ignoring Patricia, Alastair John went on to lie down on the bed. Patricia then sat on a nearby chair.9
Alastair John, angered by Patricia's remarks, allegedly approached Patricia, lifted her off the chair, and dropped her on the floor. Patricia further claimed that Alastair John punched her in the head, dragged her by the hair to the bed, and pushed her head against the pillow. Patricia fought back and, when she had the chance, ran to the bathroom and locked herself inside.10
The next day, on December 2, 2004, Patricia's son, Ashley Richard, visited his mother and saw her lying in bed in pain. Alastair John told Ashley Richard that his mother had too much liquor the night of the party and, when they arrived home, Alastair John tried to carry her to the bed. Unfortunately, he accidently dropped her on the floor because the bed, which allegedly had wheels, moved.11
Ashley Richard then brought Patricia to the San Juan de Dios Hospital where she was prescribed painkillers for 12 days. After the trip to the hospital, Patricia went home to Alastair John. Their situation went back to being peaceful, and they even went on vacation from December 26, 2004 to January l,2005.12
On January 6, 2005, or merely five (5) days after, Alastair John allegedly verbally abused Patricia. He then left the next day, taking Patricia's car with him, as well as the keys to their Paranaque residence and another condominium unit in Pasig City where he stayed. Patricia, accompanied by her driver, went to the Pasig condominium unit and recovered possession of her car.13
On February 4, 2005, Patricia finally reported the incidents to the police. She explained that, prior to the December 1, 2004 incident, there were already prior incidents of abuse committed against her by Alastair John. After preliminary investigation, probable cause for violation of Republic Act 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was found against Alastair John.14
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Paranaque City acquitted Alastair John on the ground of reasonable doubt.15 The Paranaque trial court was of the opinion that Alastair John's account of the events—that he accidentally dropped Patricia on the floor while he was carrying her— was "in accord with human experience[,]”16 while that of Patricia's was not. It further said that "if [Patricia] was really a victim of violence or abuse, she should have told the same to her son [Ashley Richard], especially because the latter, according to her, is a lawyer."17 The Paranaque trial court more particularly said: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court noted that there was a heated altercation between the private complainant and the accused after they came from the birthday party of the former's son on December 1, 2004. Kane was accused of looking and peeping at the girls during the party. The Court is inclined to give credence to the version of the accused. The same is in accord with human experience. On the other hand[,] the version of Patricia is not in accord with human experience. She claimed that she was grabbed by the hair, hit her head and chest, neck, pelvic area and shoulder but the clinical abstract does not indicate any signs of physical violence. This court finds it unnatural why Patricia declared to the doctor that she accidentally fell on a marble floor. This is her same declaration to her son, Ashley. If she was really a victim of violence or abuse, she should have told the same to her son, especially because the latter, according to her, is a lawyer. This court is also surprised why she did not leave the accused if it is true that he manhandled her. She could easily do those things because her relationship with the accused was that only of lovers and there was no marriage to protect and family to save. To reiterate, the version of Mr. Kane is shown by the parties' actuations after the date alleged in the information. They even celebrated Christmas in a beach resort with friends and with the accused playing Santa [Claus]. Noteworthy is the filing of the case almost one year after the alleged incident and after the parties started to have issues on property.18Thereafter, Patricia filed a Complaint for Damages based on Article 33 of the Civil Code before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, praying for actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Patricia argued that the right of action provided in Article 33 in cases of physical injuries is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action earlier commenced against Alastair John.20
WHEREFORE, due to reasonable doubt, the accused, ALASTAIR JOHN KANE, is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime [of] violation of Sec. 5(a) of R.A. 9262, penalized by Sec. 6 (a) of the said Act.SO ORDERED.19 (Emphasis in the original)
"The motion is unimpressive.With his Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, Alastair John filed his Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Patricia, her Reply. Issues were joined and the case was set for pre-trial.28
"While it is true that accused's (herein defendant) guilt in the criminal case had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt by the trial court in Paraiiaque City, the decision however did not state in clear and [unjequivocal terms that he did not commit the offense charged. Hence, impliedly the trial court of Paraiiaque acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt[,] then the instant civil complaint must proceed. Civil liability arising from criminal and civil liability arising from Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 quasi-delict for contract (Art. 31) are entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action that may be brought by injured party (International Flavors and Fragrances, Inc. vs. Argon, 364 SCRA. 792)[.]
"Even if the guilt of the accused has not been [satisfactorily] established, he is not exempted from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 33 of the Civil Code where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission.
The civil liability is not extinguished where acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (Manantan vs. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 387).
"An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex deli[c]to, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of felony, e.g. culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 32 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Article 32 and 34, and culpa aqiiilkma under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an independent and distinct criminal action (Article 33, Civil Code). Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender (separately and simultaneously) subject, however, to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes (Cando, Jr. v. Isip, G.R. No. 133978, November 12, 2002). However, a separate civil action based on subsidiary liability cannot be instituted during the pendency of the criminal case (Remedial Law, Herrera).
"Likewise, the ground of improper venue cannot be sustained. It was clarified by plaintiff that when she testified on May 22, 2007 and May 13, 2008 she considered herself a resident of Paraiiaque, however, in November 2008 and subsequently thereafter[,] she stayed at the condominium unit of her friend in. . . Mandaluyong City. In other words, at the time of the filing of the complaint on November 29, 2008 she was already residing in Mandaluyong City[.| Clearly, plaintiff for purposes of this instant case is a resident of Mandaluyong City”27 (Emphasis in the original)
A closer look at the records of the instant case filed by plaintiff would show that this court has no jurisdiction over the instant case.Patricia filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied in a November 19, 2010 Order.35
The instant case which is for damages was also the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 06-413 litigated in another court, the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City, Branch 260 wherein a Decision rendered by the said court acquitting the accused, the herein defendant.
Although the motion to dismiss filed by defendants on the grounds that the instant complaint is barred by prior judgment and improper venue was already denied for lack of merit in an Order dated 20 April 2009, the undersigned acting presiding judge deemed it proper to take a closer look at the records extant to the instant case considering that proceeding to the initial trial will just be a waste of time and any proceedings taken by the court will only be a nullity if the court has no jurisdiction because of the principle of res judicata.
Verily, the evaluation made by the RTC, Branch 260, Paranaque City of the criminal case giving credence to the version of the accused, which the Court perceived to be in accord with human experience, and pointing to factual circumstances and explaining why the version of Patricia is not in accord with human experience, is a clear showing that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
With the decision rendered by the RTC Branch 260, Paranaque City involving the same cause of action and relief sought, and identity [of] parties, this court perceives that the filing of the instant case in this jurisdiction constituted forum shopping. . . .
Considering that the RTC, Branch 260, Paranaque City has already taken cognizance of the case involving the same cause of action and identity of parties, and has in fact rendered a decision which has attained finality, this court therefore has no jurisdiction to try the same action.34cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Orders dated June 8, 2010 and November 19, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 214 in Civil Case No. MC08-3871 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 214 is DIRECTED to reinstate Civil Case No. MC08-3871, to continue with the proceedings and to resolve the same with deliberate dispatch.Alastair John then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in the September 3, 2014 Resolution.42
SO ORDERED.41 (Emphasis in the original)
ARTICLE 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.Article 33 is explicit that in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries., the civil action is "entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action" and shall "proceed independently of the criminal prosecution." Accordingly, Article 33 "contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case."59 Even the quantum of proof required—preponderance of evidence, as opposed to the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases—is different, confirming that the civil action under Article 33 is independent of the criminal action.
Further, "defamation," "fraud," and "physical injuries," as used in Article 33, are to be understood in their ordinary sense. Specifically, the "physical injuries" contemplated in Article 33 is bodily injury, not the "physical injuries" referred to in the Revised Penal Code. As first explained in Carandang v. Santiago:63RULE 111Prosecution of Civil Action
SECTION 3. When Civil Action May Proceed Independently. — In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
[Article 33] uses the words "defamation", ''fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article — some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law, and this recommendation must have been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death.64cralawlawlibraryMadeja v. Caro65 reiterates that "physical injuries" in Article 33 means bodily injury.
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. — The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:Section 5 enumerates the various "acts of violence against women and their children," generally defined as: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm[.]
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.66Paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of Section 5 specifically refer to acts of "physical violence," which, under the law, includes "acts that include bodily or physical harm[.]"
It is essential to indicate whether the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Without such declaration, it must be presumed that the acquittal was due to reasonable doubt, and the accused is civilly liable ex delicto. Thus, the general rule shall apply: every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.67RULE 120
Judgment
....
SECTION 2. Contents of the Judgment. — If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Emphasis supplied)
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.73 (Citations omitted)Like in Mcmantan, nowhere in the decision of the Parafiaque trial court in the criminal case does it state that the act or omission from which civil liability might arise did not exist. On the contrary, the trial court was unequivocal that petitioner was acquitted due to reasonable doubt:
WHEREFORE, due to reasonable doubt, the accused, ALASTAIR JOHN KANE, is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime [of] violation of Sec[.] 5(a) of R.A. 9262, penalized by Sec[.] 6 (a) of the said Act.Having been acquitted due to reasonable doubt, petitioner is not exempt from civil liability. This is true even if his guilt was not satisfactorily established.
SO ORDERED.74 (Emphasis supplied)
Res judicata "literally means 'a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; [or] a thing or matter settled by judgment.'" Res jiidicata "lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit."It is settled that a decision acquitting the accused is not res judicata on the independent civil action, even if the latter action arises from the same act or omission on which the criminal action was based.
Res judicata has two (2) aspects. The first is bar by prior judgment that precludes the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The second aspect is conclusiveness of judgment, which states that "issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action."
The elements of res judicata are:
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be as between the first and second action identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action[.]76 (Citations omitted; emphasis in the original)
. . . remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual80 (Citation omitted; emphasis in the original)The defense of res judicata was likewise raised but nonetheless rejected in Lim v. Kou Co Ping.81 The case involved withdrawal authorities issued by a cement corporation, thereby allowing holders of the instrument to withdraw cement bags from the corporation's cement plant. Kou Co Ping had earlier bought withdrawal authorities, which he subsequently sold to Lily Lim. When Lim failed to withdraw cement bags covered by the withdrawal authorities, she sued Kou Co Ping for estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender — (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries").Applying the foregoing, petitioner's acquittal in the case for violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 9262 is not res judicata on the action for damages under Article 33 of the Civil Code. One of the elements of res judicata is the identity of causes of action, with "cause of action" being the "act or omission by which a party violates a right of another."83
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares that "the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist."
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicala. As explained in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip:
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on cirtpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against [the offender] did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by [the offended party] arose from the same act or omission of [the offender], they are, however, based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.82 (Citations omitted; emphasis in the original)
by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action[.]86 (Citation omitted)To determine whether there is forum shopping, it is necessary to ascertain "whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another[.]"87 The test is "whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought."88
N O T I C E O F J U D G M E N T
Endnotes:
* On wellness leave.
1Rollo, pp. 3-20.
2 Id. at 22-33. The March 25, 2014 Decision was penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz and was concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid (Chairperson) and Romeo F. Barza of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.
3 Id. at 35-36. The September 3, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 96341 was penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz and was concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid (Chairperson) and Romeo F. Barza of the Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.
4 Id. at 64-65, Comment. The Order was issued by Acting Presiding Judge Ofelia Calo in Civil Case No. MC 08-3871.
5Rollo, p. 22. Court of Appeals Decision.
6 Id. at 92, Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief; and 1 13, Brief for the Defendant-Appellee.
7 Id. at 23. Court of Appeals Decision.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id
15 Id.
16 Id. at 7. As cited in the Petition for Review on Certiorari.
17 Id. at 98. As cited in the Plaintiff-Appellant 's Brief.
18 Id at 7-8. As cited in the Petition for Review on Certiorari.
19 Id. at 30. As cited in the Court of Appeals Decision.
20 Id. at 24.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 7-8.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 62, Comment. Then Presiding Judge Edwin D. Sorongon is now an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
26Rollo pp. 62-64. Comment.
27 Id. at 63-64. As cited in the Comment.
28 Id. at 24. Court of Appeals Decision.
29 Id. at 64. As cited in the Comment.
30 Id. at 24. Court of Appeals Decision.
31 Id. at 65. As cited in the Comment.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 90-91. As cited in the Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief. See also Rollo, pp. 6—66, Comment.
35 Id. at 22. Court of Appeals Decision.
36 Id. at 22-33.
37 Id. at 26-27.
38 Id. at 28.
39 Id. at 29.
40 Id. at 31.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 35-36.
43 Id. at 3-20.
44 Id. at 61-83.
45 Id. at 156-170.
46 Id. at 11.
47 Id. at 11-13.
48 Id. at 6-10.
49 Id. at 10-11.
50 Id. at 38-39. TSN dated May 22, 2007.
51 Id. at 13-15.
52 Id. at 76.
53 Id. at 73-78.
54 Id. at 73.
55 Id. at 74-78.
56 Id. at 71-73; and 77-78.
57 Id. at 78.
58 Id. at 78-79.
59Azucena v. Poienciano, 115 Phil. 465, 469 (1962) [Per J. Makalintal, En Banc].
60See Dulay v. Court of Appeals. 313 Phil. 8 (1995) [Per J. Bidin, Second Division].
61See Madeja v. Caw, 211 Phil. 469 (1983) [Per .1. Abaci Santos, Second Division]; and Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94 (1955) [Per J. Labrador, First Division].
62See Azucena v. Poienciano, 115 Phil. 465 (1962) [PerJ. Makalintal, En Banc].
63 97 Phil. 94(1955) [Per J. Labrador, First Division],
64 Id. at 96-97.
65 211 Phil. 469, 472^173 (1983) [Per J. Abad Santos, Second Division].
66 Republic Act No. 9262 (2004), sec. 3 (a).
67 REV. PEN. CODE, art. 100.
68 403 Phil. 298(2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
69 Id. at 305
70 Id. at 304
71 Id. at 309
72 Id. .
71 Id. at 308-309.
74Rollo, p. 30. Court of Appeals Decision.
75 750 Phil. 599 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
76 Id. at 617-618.
77 440 Phil. 29 (2002) [Per J. Ynarcs-Santiago, First Division].
78 Id. at 33.
79 Id. at 39.
80 Id. at 40.
81 693 Phil. 286 (2012) [Per .1. Del Castillo, First Division].
82 Id. at 298-300.
83 RUI.ES OF COURT, Rule 2, sec. 2.
84Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People of the Philippines, 471 Phil. 415, 431 (2004) [Per J.
Panganiban, First Division].
85Cancio v. Isip, 440 Phil. 29, 40 (2002) [Per J. Ynarcs-Santiago, First Division].
86Top Rate Construction & General Services, Inc. v. Paxton Development Corporation, 457 Phil. 740,
747-748 (2003) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
87Yap v. Chua, 687 Phil. 392, 400 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, Second Division].
88 Id. citing Young v. Keng Seng, 446 Phil. 823, 833 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
89Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. v. Chiongbian, 738 Phil. 773, 796 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division] citing Yap v. Chua, 687 Phil 392 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, Second Division].
90 Id. at 796 citing Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. v. Gernale, 601 Phil. 66, 78 (2009) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
91 Nocum v. Tan, 507 Phil. 620, 626 (2005) [Per .1. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
92 RULES OF COURT, Rule 4, sec. 1.
93 RULES OF COURT, Rule 4, sec. 2.
94Rollo, p. 37.
95 Id. at 15.
96 Id. at 78.
97 Id. at 79.
98 Id. at 7.
99 Id.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary