EN BANC
A.C. No. 9426, August 25, 2020
CORAZON KANG IGNACIO, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. MONTE P. IGNACIO, RESPONDENT.
A.C. NO. 11988
JANINA B. DE LA CRUZ AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF CORAZON KANG IGNACIO, COMPLAINANT VS. ATTY. MONTE P. IGNACIO RESPONDENT
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental Illness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.33cralawlawlibraryFOR THESE REASONS, the Court finds Atty. Monte P. Ignacio GUILTY of gross immorality in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of five years.
Very truly yours, (SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
* On leave.
1Rollo (G.R. No. 9426), pp. 1-3.
2Id. at 16 & 18.
3Rollo (G.R. No. 11988), pp. 12-13.
4Id. at 14.
5Id. at 20.
6Rollo (G.R. No. 9426), pp. 3-5.
7 Mat 16-18.
8Rollo (G.R. No. 11988), p. 18.
9Id. at 87-96.
10Id. at 85-86.
11 CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
12 Rule 1.01. — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
13 CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.
14 Rule 7.03. — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
15Panagsagan v. Panagsagan, A.C. No. 7733, October 1, 2019, citing Advincula v. Advincula, A.C. No. 9226, June 14, 2016, 793 SCRA 236, 247.
16AAA v. De Los Reyes, A.C. Nos. 10021 & 10022, September 18, 2018, 880 SCRA 268, 281.
17Valdez v. Atty. Dabon, 113 Phil. 109, 121 (2015).
18 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law for grossly immoral conduct.
19 101 Phil. 313(1957).
20 376 Phil. 336 (1999). In this case, we disbarred the respondent lawyer for contracting another marriage while the first marriage was still subsisting. The Court ruled that it "need not delve into the question of whether or not respondent did contract a bigamous marriage, a matter which x x x [was then] pending with the xxx [lower court]. It is enough that the records of this administrative case sufficiently substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner xxx [and] the IBP Board of Governors, x x x."
21 690 Phil. 381 (2012). In this case, the respondent attorney failed to dispute the authenticity or impugn the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts presented by the complainant to prove that respondent married three different women. Further, the respondent did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage in his petitions to annul the second and third marriages. We ruled that "[respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity." We disbarred Atty. Tabalingcos for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.
22 724 Phil. 141 (2014). In this case, we disbarred the respondent lawyer for contracting a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage, on the basis of the certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts submitted by the complainant.
23 755 Phil. 297 (2015). In this case, we also disbarred the respondent for entering into a second marriage despite knowing fully well that his previous marriage still subsisted. We held that contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
24Sps. Salgado v. Anson, 791 Phil. 481 (2016). See RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Section 44.
25Rollo (G.R. No. 11988), p. 19.
26Zaguirre v. Atty. Castillo, 446 Phil. 861 (2003). In this case, we ruled that granting arguendo that complainant entered into a relationship with the respondent knowing full well his marital status, still it does not absolve him of gross immorality for what is in question in a case like this is his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. It is not dependent whether or not the other party knowingly engaged in an immoral relationship with him.
27Rollo (G.R. No. 9426), p. 108.
28 See Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648 (2000).
29 See Toledo v. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768 (1963); Paras v. Atty. Paras, 397 Phil. 462 (2000); and Zaguirre v. Atty. Castillo, supra.
30Advincula v. Atty. Macabata, 546 Phil. 431 (2007).
31AAA v. De Los Reves. supra.
32Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, 631 Phil. 139 (2010).
31 Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, 390 Phil. I. 10 (200C). cuing Adez Realty. Inc. v. CA, 321 Phil. 556 (1995) and Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan. 221 SCR A 132 (April 7, 1993).
Endnotes:
LEONEN, J.:
I concur with the ponencia. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines' recommended penalty of disbarment1 was rightly modified. A suspension of five (5) years is sufficient for the erring lawyer here, he having demonstrated candor in admitting his transgression.
Disbarment should be imposed sparingly, upon a clear showing of misconduct that "seriously affect[s] the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar."2
In my concurring and dissenting opinion3 in Anonymous Complaint v. Judge Dagala,4 I opined that disbarment should be imposed "for those who commit indiscretions that (a) are repeated, (b) result in permanent rearrangements that cause extraordinary difficulties on existing legitimate relationships, or (c) are prima facie shown to have violated the law":
I appreciate the ponente's acknowledgment that "immorality only becomes a valid ground for sanctioning members of the Judiciary when the questioned act challenges his or her capacity to dispense justice." This affirms this Court's principle that our jurisdiction over acts of lawyers and judges is confined to those that may affect the people's confidence in the Rule of Law. There can be no immorality committed when there are no victims who complain. And even when they do, it must be shown that they were directly damaged by the immoral acts and their rights violated. A judge having children with women not his wife, in itself, does not affect his ability to dispense justice. What it does is offend this country's predominantly religious sensibilities.Here, the ponencia found respondent Atty. Monte P. Ignacio (Atty. Ignacio) guilty of gross immorality and imposed upon him a five-yej/ suspension from the practice of law.6 It cited two (2) reasons: first, h admitted bigamous marriage with the complainant; and second, his "reproachable conduct when he engaged in extra-marital affairs and sired children with different women other than his lawful wife."7
We should not accept the stereotype that all women, because they are victims, are weak and cannot address patriarchy by themselves. The danger of the State's over-patronage through its stereotype of victims will be far reaching. It intrudes into the autonomy of those who already found their voice and may have forgiven.
The highest penalty should be reserved for those who commit indiscretions that (a) are repeated, (b) result in permanent rearrangements that cause extraordinary difficulties on existing legitimate relationships, or (c) are prima facie shown to have violated the law. The negligence or utter lack of callousness of spouses who commit indiscretions as shown by their inability to ask for forgiveness, their concealment of the act from their legitimate relationships, or their lack of support for the children born out of wedlock should be aggravating and considered for the penalty to be imposed.5 (Citations omitted)
In a number of administrative cases involving illicit sexual relations and gross immorality, this Court imposed upon the erring lawyers various penalties ranging from suspension to disbarment, depending on the circumstances. In De Leon v. Pedreña, we suspended the respondent from the practice of law for two years for rubbing complainant's leg with his hand, putting complainant's hand on his crotch area, and pressing his finger on complainant's private part. In Tumbaga v. Teoxon, the respondent was suspended for three years from the practice of law for committing gross immorality by maintaining an extramarital affair with complainant. This Court, in Zaguirre v. Castillo, meted the penalty of indefinite suspension on Atty. Castillo when he had an illicit relationship with a woman not his wife and sired a child with her, whom he later on refused to recognize and support. In Dantes v. Dantes, the respondent was disbarred when he engaged in illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to complainant. We also ruled in Arnobit v. Arnobit, that respondent's act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit and have children with another woman constitutes grossly immoral conduct, for which respondent was disbarred. Likewise, in Delos Reyes v. Aznar, we disbarred respondent, Chairman of the College of Medicine, for his acts of enticing the complainant, who was then a student in the said college, to have carnal knowledge with him under the threat that she would fail in all of her subjects if she refused respondent.In this case, Atty. Ignacio does not dispute the allegation that he has contracted two marriages, one in 1978 and another in 1985.9 In fact, as the ponencia noted, he "exhibited candor in admitting his transgression."10
In Ventura v. Samson, this Court has reminded that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should not be imposed where a lesser penalty may accomplish the desired goal of disciplining an erring lawyer. In the present case, however, respondent Atty. De Los Reyes's actions show that he lacks the degree of morality required of him as a member of the legal profession, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment. Respondent Atty. De Los Reyes is disbarred for his gross misbehavior, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law.8 (Citations omitted)
Upon a review of the record, We are convinced that respondent Dionisio Ramos is guilty of grossly immoral conduct which warrants proper action from this Court. His own declarations in his affidavit corroborate this imputation of immorality. Thus, in his affidavit subscribed before Asst. Fiscal Primitivo Penaranda of Manila on Feb. 22, 1967, respondent frankly admitted having carnal relations with complainant for several times. What is more, respondent claimed that he was threatened and forced by complainant's brothers to celebrate the marriage dated June 18, 1980, but in the same breath, he admitted having carnal affair with complainant after the celebration of the marriage. Worse still, respondent misrepresented his civil status as "single", courted complainant, proposed marriage to her — knowing his legal impediments to marry complainant, respondent's motives were clearly and grossly immoral — won her confidence and married her while his first marriage to his present wife still validly subsists.This case is similar. Here, Atty. Ignacio, like Atty. Ramos, contracted a subsequent marriage while his first marriage was subsisting, and while he was already a lawyer. With Atty. Ignacio having shown candor in owning up to his behavior, he deserves to be suspended, but only for five years.
Respondent, however, submits that having been acquitted by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI, of the charge of bigamy, the immorality charges filed against him in this disbarment case should be dismissed. The acquittal of respondent Ramos upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases.
In the light of the foregoing, the court finds that respondent committed a grossly immoral act, as found both by the Solicitor General and this Court's Legal Officer-Investigator, and as recommended by the Solicitor General, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, for gross immorality, and an additional one (1) year for his willful disregard of a lawful order against his using an unauthorized name, in serious disrespect of this Court.13 (Citations omitted)
(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN Associate Justice |
Endnotes:
1 Ponencia, p. 3.
2Advincula v. Macubata, 546 Phil. 431, 447 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
3 J. Leonen, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Anonymous Complaint v. Dagala, 814 Phi!. 103, 136-15t> (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
4 814 Phil. 103 (2017) [Per Curiam, En Banc]
5 Id. at 155.
6 Ponencia, p. 5.
7 Id. at 4.
8AAA v. De Los Reyes, A.C. Nos. 10021-22, September 18, 2018, [Per Curiam, En Banc],
9 Ponencia, p. 4.
10 Id. at 5.
11 Id. at 4-5.
12 194 Phil. 1 (1981) [Per J. De Castro, Second Division].
13 Id. at 7-9.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary