FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 209797, September 08, 2020
FROILAN L. HONG, PETITIONER, V. ILUMINADO ARAGON, MA. ELENA ARAGON, SUSAN RAMOS, HENRY TAN, MARILOU VILLAMOR, TERESITA TAN, HAROLD MANLAPAZ, FELIPA ROSOS, ROSITA IGNACIO, EDUARDO MATIAS, ROMEO GREGORIO, RONILO DINO, MINDA GONZALES, RICO VILLA, ELENITA ALVIAR, GUIA CABLE, EDGAR VALENTIN, GENEROSA ZALETA, FEDERICO ZALETA, ROSEMARY VALENTIN, DR. EDGARDO CUADRO, GRACE CUADRO, CARMELA MANALO, FE GRIJALDO, RUBEN RESIDE, ANTONIO ALDEA, CAROLINA SHEY, BERNARDITA SALAZAR, SHERWIN CASTELLTORT AND ABRAHAM SANTOS. RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, J. JR., J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 27, 2013 and Resolution3 dated October 30, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 118660 affirming the Order4 dated March 22, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215 (RTC-Branch 215) and the Order5 dated December 20, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 (RTC-Branch 105).
21 January 2002Out of the 34 members, 28 of them filed joint complaint-affidavits for libel against petitioner before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, in February 2002.13
THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED TO BE SPREADING LIES, EVIL NONSENSE AND FALSEHOODS AGAINST SIS. TECHIE AND THE LORD'S FLOCK, CAUSING DIVISION IN THE COMMUNITY; HAVE VIOLATED THE COMMUNITY'S WAY OF LIFE AS STATED IN THE SHEMA; NOT IN GOOD STANDING.
THEY ARE EXPELLED FROM THE CONGREGRATION. xxx spreading evil nonsense ... he will not receive the brothers.
Expelling them from the church (3 John 9:10)
x x x x
CURSE FOR DISOBEDIENCE. . . all these curses shall come upon you and overwhelm you. . . SICKNESS and DEFEAT; OPPRESSION; EXILE; FRUITLESS LABORS; INVASION AND SIEGE; PLAGUES. (Deut. 28:15 & ft)
BRO. FROILAN HONG Director for Administration12cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that the resolution of this Office dated August 1, 2008 be set aside and in lieu thereof a new one is rendered dismissing the Libel charges against herein respondent Froilan L. Hong. The Trial Prosecutor assigned in these cases is hereby directed to file the necessary Motion to Withdraw Information/s filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 215.Correspondingly, a Motion to Withdraw Information20 dated October 22, 2009 was filed by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the prosecution is hereby Denied for lack of merit.A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, which was denied in an Order24 dated December 20, 2010. The case was transferred to RTC-Branch 105, following the inhibition of the trial judge in RTC-Branch 215. The RTC-Branch 105 reiterated that the elements of the crime of libel are present in this case so as to deny the Motion to Withdraw the Information.
SO ORDERED.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The December 20, 2010 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the March 22, 2010 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215, in Criminal Case No. Q-08-154446 is hereby AFFIRMED.Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution26 dated October 30, 2013.
SO ORDERED.
In resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw the information filed by the public prosecutor (on his own initiative or pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of Justice), either for insufficiency of evidence in the possession of the prosecutor or for lack of probable cause, the trial court should not merely rely on the findings of the public prosecutor or of the Secretary of Justice that no crime had been committed or that the evidence in the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction of the accused. To do so is to surrender a power constitutionally vested in the Judiciary to the Executive.29cralawlawlibraryThus, the court has the duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the same.30 In granting or denying a motion to withdraw an information, the court must conduct a cautious and independent evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution and must be convinced that the merits of the case warrant either the dismissal or continuation of the action.31
x x x xThe Order dated December 20, 2010: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The imputation of "x x x spreading lies, evil nonsense and falsehood against Sis. Techie and the Lord's Flock, x x x" allegedly ascribes on Private Complainants a vice or defect. The said imputations of vice or defect were published when they were posted on the bulletin board. The identity of the person defamed were clearly established as the names of the Private Complainants were also posted on the bulletin board. Finally, the Private Complainants added that malice in law is presumed in a defamatory imputation and proof thereof is not required.
There is no question that the imputed defect or vice were libelous, the same were published and the person defamed were categorically identified, x x x
x x x xPetitioner's contention that the trial courts "completely ignored" the findings of the public prosecutor is utterly baseless. To highlight, the trial courts are bound to make an independent evaluation of the evidence presented. To entirely uphold the findings of the public prosecutor is to surrender the trial courts' discretion, duty, and jurisdiction.
After going over the assailed order, and evaluating the information and the documents attached thereto, this Court maintains the denial of the motion to withdraw information. There is no dispute as to the existence of the three elements of libel to wit: 1) the assailed notice imputes that private complainants committed reprehensible acts of spreading lies, evil nonsense and falsehood against Sis. Techie and the Lord's Flock which tends to dishonor or discredit their persons 2) the persons defamed were categorically identified; 3) there is publication because the defamatory notice was communicated to third persons, other than persons defamed and to whom the statements refer.
On the basis of the foregoing, this Court is convinced that there is probable cause or sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial to establish the element of malice. The truth or falsity of the claim that the notice was made by the accused in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty need to rest upon positive evidence, both documentary and testimonial, upon which a definite finding may be made, x x x In other words, the prosecution has still to prove each and every element of libel, malice, being one, and for the defense to rebut the presumption of malice.
There is nc question that the imputed vice or defect were libelous, the same were published and the person defamed was categorically identified. The only issue for determination is whether the same were made privately or officially as to be qualifiedly privileged under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. Evidence must be adduce (sic) to prove that the acts of the accused complained of constitutes a true report and part of his duties and responsibilities as Director for Administration of the Lord's Fleck Cathoiic Ministry, x x xThe Order dated December 20, 2010: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
After gou,g over the assailed order, and evaluating the information and the documents attached thereto, this Court maintains the denial of the motion to withdraw information. There is no dispute as to the existence of the three elements of libel x x xA reading of the above-cited Orders show that the trial courts merely identified that there exists probable cause against petitioner. There was no declaration as to his guilt or innocence. The Orders ultimately reiterate the need to present additional evidence for the proper disposition of the case, underlining the necessity of determining all the elements of the crime allegedly committed. Interestingly, the Order dated December 20, 2010 demanded the prosecution to prove each element, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus; sharing the view of Branch 215, the only issue to determine is whether or r.ol the defamatory statements contained in the notice were made privately or officially that falls within the purview of a qualifiedly privileged communication under Article 354 (No. 1) of the Revised Penal Code, or more importantly, whether or not the defamatory statements were published with malice.
x x x xWhat the trial courts measured was the probability that petitioner committed the crime as charged based on his alleged acts complained of. It does not mean absolute certainty so as to foreclose further review and examination of the case when trial ensues, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In other words, the prosecution has still to prove each and every element of libel, malice, being one, and for the defense to rebut the presumption of malice.
x x x x
The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.32cralawlawlibraryVerily, a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed, and that it was committed by the accused.33 To properly determine such 'likelihood,' it is inescapable that the elements of the crime would be briefly examined.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:On this note, the case of Disini v. Secretary of Justice34 explained the import of this provision in stating that the burden of proof rests upon the accused to overcome the presumption of malice: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
- A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
- A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
[W]here the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed statement. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.35cralawlawlibraryOn the issue of the alleged violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial and prompt disposition of a case, we chiefly discuss the differences and similarities between them.
What may constitute a reasonable time to resolve a proceeding is not determined by "mere mathematical reckoning." It requires consideration of a number of factors, including the time required to investigate the complaint, to file the information, to conduct an arraignment, the application for bail, pre-trial, trial proper, and the submission of the case for decision Unforeseen circumstances, such as unavoidable postponements or force majeure, must also be taken into account.Notably, these factors would find significance if the fact of delay was already established. This may be proved by reference to laws which provide for the time periods in the disposition of cases. Only when delay is ascertained would the prosecution be charged with the burden of proving that there was no violation of the right to speedy trial or the right to speedy disposition of cases. Otherwise, the burden of proof lies with the defense.
The complexity of the issues presented by the case must be considered in determining whether the period necessary for its resolution is reasonable. In Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan this Court found that "the long delay in resolving the preliminary investigation could not be justified on the basis of the records." In Binay v. Sandiganbayan, this Court considered "the complexity of the cases (not run-of-the-mill variety) and the conduct of the parties' lawyers" to determine whether the delay is justifiable. When the case is simple and the evidence is straightforward, it is possible that delay may occur even within the given periods. Defense, however, still has the burden to prove that the case could have been resolved even before the lapse of the period before the delay could be considered inordinate.41 (citations omitted)
SEC. 3. Procedure.-The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner: x x x xIt is, thus, clear that the burden is shifted to the prosecution. Following Cagang, to discharge the same, the prosecution must demonstrate: "first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay."42
(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 3-45.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Melchor Q.C. Sadang, with Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Francliito N. Diamante, concurring; id. at 51-62.
3 Id. at 64-65.
4 Penned by Judge Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla; id. at 182-184.
5 Penned by Judge Rosa Samson Tatad; id. at 228-230.
6 Id. at 5:
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 53.
13 Id. at 54.
14 Id. at 101-103.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 116-138.
18 Id. at 120-138.
19 Id. at 147-148.
20 Id. at 149.
21 Id. at 151-167.
22 Id. at 166-181.
23 Supra note 4.
24 Supra note 5.
25 Supra note 2.
26 Supra note 3.
27 Id. at 296-313.
28Personal Collection Direct Selling, Inc. v. Carandang, G.R. No. 206958, November 8, 2017.
29Junio v. Cacatian-Bellran, 724 Phil. 1, 10-11 (2014).
30Jose v. Suarez, 714 Phil. 310, 3 19 (2013).
31 Supra note 3.
32Marasigan v. Fuentes, 116 Phil. 574 (2016).
33Callo-Claridad v. Esteban, 707 Phil. 172, 185 (2013).
34 727 Phil. 28(2014).
35 Id. at 1!3.
36Cagang v Samiiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458, and 210141-42, July 3 I, 2018.
37 Section 14.
x x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. Koweven after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable,
x x x x
38 SEC. (6. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
39Remulla v. Sandiganbayan, 808 Phil. 739 (2017).
40 Id.
41Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 36.
42 Id.
43 See Escobar v. People, G.R. Nos. 228349, 228353 & 229895-96, September 19, 2018, citing Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, 714 Phil. 55, 65 (2013).chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary