A.C. No. 10306 - FATIMA S. INGRAM, PETITIONER, V. ATTY. JOSE Q. LORICA IV, RESPONDENT,
Before Us is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Fatima S.
Ingram (complainant) against Atty. Jose Q. Lorica IV (respondent).
Facts
The records show that on August 4, 2004, the spouses Victor Ferdinand B.
Blanco and Rizza O. Blanco (spouses Blanco) executed a promissory note
2 in favor of the spouses John Ingram and complainant (collectively,
spouses Ingram). The promissory note was notarized by respondent.
3When the spouses Blanco defaulted in payment, the spouses Ingram instituted the following actions:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrarya) Criminal Case No. 13757 for Estafa, which was dismissed for want of
probable cause, the case being purely civil in nature and not criminal;
b) Criminal Case Nos. 21381 and 21382 for violation of Batas Pambama Bilang 22; and,
c) Civil Case No. U-8268 for collection of sum of money with damages.4
The spouses Blanco then engaged the legal services of respondent to
represent them in the foregoing cases.
5The instant controversy arose when
respondent, as counsel of the spouses Blanco, filed an Answer
6 to the
civil complaint, wherein the validity of the promissory note was raised
as an issue. Paragraph 3 thereof alleged that the execution of the
subject promissory note was attended with coercion, threats,
intimidation and the like,
viz.:3. That paragraphs 3 and 4 are DENIED, the truth of the matter being that
there should be an accounting to be made by both parties to arrive at an actual obligation of herein defendants. The rest of the allegations are likewise DENIED for lack of knowledge and information sufficient to
form a belief thereon. The execution of the alleged promissory
note was without due regard to the defendants' pleas at the time as they were subjected to coercion, threats, intimidation and the like, thus
defendant Victor Ferdinand Blanco was forced to sign the
same[.] xxx7cralawlawlibrary
Along the same line, the pre-trial brief
8 filed by respondent in behalf of the spouses Blanco stated, among others:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary5. Whether or not plaintiffs were made aware of the financial situation
[of] herein defendants and requested the restructuring of their
agreement so as for them to be able to settle their obligation unto the
plaintiffs but the latter denied such request and instead, sent coercive and threatening communications unto the defendants, who were
forced to execute the subject promissory notef.[.]9cralawlawlibrary
The spouses Ingram were thus prompted to move for the disqualification of
the respondent to act as counsel for the spouses Blanco in Civil Case
No. U-8268.
10Thereafter, complainant filed the instant complaint for disbarment,
11 docketed as CBD Case
No 06-1863. Complainant posits that respondent, as the person who
notarized the promissory note, is estopped from assailing the validity
thereof inasmuch as he certified that the maker thereof acknowledged
before him that the instrument is the latter's own free will and
voluntary act and deed. Complainant also filed an administrative case,
docketed as Administrative Case No. U-22.1, for the revocation of
respondent's notarial appointment before the office of the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Urdaneta City.
12Later, in her position
paper
13 in this
disbarment case, complainant likewise accused respondent of committing
acts of dishonesty and deceit. According to the complainant, paragraph
2(d) of the promissory note provides:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryd) Any and all payments
should be made in Australian Currency as described in paragraphs 1 and 2 and as such, the exchange rate will not affect the aforecited payment.
Should it become necessary to bank any of the cheques for collection, we shall be held liable for any difference between the current rate at the time of banking and the current rate of P38.00 per Australian Dollar as used in the drawing of cheques.14
To assail the above stipulation,
respondent cited Article 1250 of the Civil Code in his clients' Answer
in Civil Case No. U-8268 in the following manner:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary14. That relative to the stipulation on the exchange rate on the subject
promissory note, it is but imperative that the pertinent provisions of
Article 1250 of the Civil Code of the Philippines be noted herein, to
wit:
In case of an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the
currency stipulated should supervene, the value of the currency at the
time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of [the]
payment[.]15cralawlawlibrary
Similarly, in the Pre-Trial Brief he prepared for the spouses Blanco, he stated:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryII. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
x x x x
6. Whether or not it is but imperative that the pertinent provisions of
Article 1250 of the Civil Code of the Philippines be noted relative to
the stipulation on the exchange rate on the subject promissory note,
that is, "In case of an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the
currency stipulated should supervene, the value of the currency at the
time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of [the]
payment[.]"16
Meanwhile, Article 1250 of the Civil Code in its entirety reads:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryArticle 1250. In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency
stipulated should supervene, the value of the currency at the time of
the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of the payment,
unless there is an agreement to the contrary.
According to the complainant, respondent intentionally and deliberately omitted
the phrase
"unless there is an agreement to the
contrary,'"' in an attempt to put in issue the stipulated
exchange rate in the promissory note and to mislead the complainant as
to the complete thought provided in Article 1250 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, in his Verified Answer
17 to the disbarment complaint, the respondent
claims that it was only at the time when he prepared the Answer in Civil Case No. U-8268 that he learned that the spouses Ingram employed
coercion, threats and intimidation upon his clients before, during and
after the execution of the promissory note. He attached copies of: the
Police Blotter
18 dated March 1, 2005, stating that the spouses Ingram "allegedly
threatened [Mr. Blanco] to be killed, putting him into great fear and
mental anguish;" the document denominated as "Chronological Events of Grave Threats issued by Sps. John and Fatima Ingram against Victor
Blanco"
19 listing the alleged incidents from November 21, 2004 to February 28,
2005, when the spouses Ingram threatened the lives of the spouses
Blanco; and, the Police Blotter
20 dated August 13, 2005, stating that the
complainant allegedly threatened to drive his business bankrupt and
remarked in an angry voice
"umalis kayudtan ta awan ti kiiarta
da ditan." According to respondent, he committed no dishonesty in the preparation of the answer in the civil case and simply relied in good faith on the narration of facts of his clients. As a lawyer, he
deemed it imperative to raise the foregoing defenses in order to protect his clients' interest. He likewise asserts that, in any case, he had
already withdrawn his appearance from the civil case with the conformity of the spouses Blanco.
Findings and RecommendationIn a Report and Recommendation
21 dated 3 August 2009, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found that respondent did
not commit a violation when he represented the spouses Blanco in Civil
Case No. U-8268 and assailed the validity of the promissory note that he himself notarized. He opined that complainant cannot validly invoke the doctrine of estoppel against respondent, since the latter had no
knowledge of the alleged threat, coercion and intimidation when he
notarized the promissory note, and since complainant failed to show that she relied on the respondent's notarial acknowledgment before dealing
with the spouses Blanco.
22Nonetheless, the Investigating
Commissioner found that respondent violated Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) when he omitted the phrase
"unless there is an agreement to the contrary''' in citing Article 1250
of the Civil Code because the phrase would weaken his clients'
case.
23 Thus,
Commissioner recommended as follows:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryPREMISES
CONSIDERED, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, there
being substantial evidence to show that respondent Jose Q. Lorica IV
knowingly misrepresented Article 1250 of the Civil Code, it is
recommended that he be warned that the commission of the same act in the future [will] be dealt with more severely.
Respectfully submitted.24cralawlawlibrary
In Resolution No. XX-2011-300
25 dated December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors found respondent guilty of glaring conflict of interest and
thus, resolved to reverse the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner,
viz.:RESOLVED to
REVERSE as it is hereby unanimously REVERSED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding
Respondent's [sic] guilty of glaring conflict of interest, Atty. Jose Q. Lorica IV is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years and Revocation of his Notarial Commission if presently
existing and SUSPENDED from being commissioned as a notary public for a
period of five (5) years.26
Feeling aggrieved, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.
27On June 21, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XX-2013-736,
28 denying respondent's motion for reconsideration, but
modifying the penalty imposed,
viz.:RESOLVED
to unanimously DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out
and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2011-300 dated
December 10, 2011 is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification, instead Atty.
Jose Q. Lorica IV is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year, and his "Notarial Commission REVOKED immediately. Further, he
is DISQUALIFIED from re-appointment as Notary Public for two (2) years.
Ruling
The Court deviates with the finding of the IBP Board of Governors. Rule 15.03 of the CPR reads:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryCanon 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his clients.
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
Jurisprudence has provided three tests
in determining whether a violation of the above rule is present in a
given case. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an
issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose
that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer's argument for one
client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other
client, there is a violation of the rule. Another test of inconsistency
of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent
the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is
whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use
against a former client any confidential information acquired through
their connection or previous employment.
29At first glance, it would indeed
appear that respondent is guilty of glaring conflict of interest under
the first test. By handling the defense of the spouses Blanco in Civil
Case No. U-8268 and raising for them the defense that the execution of
the promissory note that he himself notarized was attended by coercion,
threats and intimidation, respondent clearly took up a position that was inconsistent with his own attestation in the notarial acknowledgment
thereof that the instrument was Mr. Blanco's own free will and voluntary act and deed.
However, the rule on conflict of interests
presupposes a lawyer-client relationship. This is because the purpose of the rule is precisely to protect the fiduciary nature of the ties
between an attorney and his client.
30 The relationship between a lawyer and his/her
client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and
confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client's most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between
them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound
to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer's duty in this regard
is to avoid representing conflicting interests.
31Conversely, a lawyer may not be precluded from accepting and representing other clients on the
ground of conflict of interests, if the lawyer-client relationship does
not exist in favor of a party in the first place.
32 Suffice it to state, the
proscription against representing conflicting interests finds no
application, unless it serves the foregoing purpose.
In this
case, the record is devoid of any allegation, much less proof, that a
lawyer-client relationship exists between respondent and the spouses
Ingram. An attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer
acquiesces or voluntarily permits the consultation of a person, who in
respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a
view of obtaining professional advice or assistance.
33 Here, respondent's
mere act of notarizing the subject promissory note and nothing more,
hardly gave rise to an attorney-client relationship between the notary
public and the payees of the said note, the spouses Ingram. There is, in fact, no showing that respondent and the spouses Ingram ever dealt with each other, as it was only the spouses Blanco, as the makers and
signatories of the instrument, who appeared before him to acknowledge
their execution thereof. For this reason, We hold that the respondent
did not violate the rule on conflict of interests.
The foregoing
notwithstanding, respondent is far from being scot-free. There is
definitely something amiss with his actuation, such that while it may
not come within the purview of "conflict of interest" as contemplated in this jurisdiction, a "conflict" in the general sense of the word, is
extant. To reiterate, respondent clearly took up inconsistent positions
when, on one hand, he attested in the notarial acknowledgment of the
promissory note that the instrument was Mr. Blanco's own free will and
voluntary act and deed, while on the other hand, he assailed the due
execution thereof by putting up the defenses of coercion, threats and
intimidation allegedly employed by the spouses Ingram that forced the
spouses Blanco to execute the same.
It must be underscored that
notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a
public document, making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity.
34 Thus, respondent's attempt to nullify the
promissory note on the ground that it was not duly executed, defeated
the very purpose of his own notarial act. By his conduct, he made a
clear mockery of the integrity of a notary public and degraded the
function of notarization.
Time and again, We have held that
notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine. It is
invested with substantive public interest for its function is to convert a private document into a public document, thus rendering a notarial
document entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely
upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a
private instrument.
35 Hence, a notary public cannot simply disavow
the contents of his notarial acknowledgment, otherwise, the confidence
of the public in the integrity of public instruments and the integrity
of the notarial practice and the legal profession, in general, would be
undermined.
In this light, respondent should be held liable for
his indiscretion not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. His
disavowal of the contents of his notarial acknowledgment—which, in good
taste, he is called upon to honor and uphold; and which the public
should be able to rely upon—constitutes a violation of his obligation
under Canon 7 of the CPR, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all
times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
Considering, however, that respondent's infraction does not amount to representation of conflicting interests, which deserves a more severe penalty, and
considering, furthermore, that respondent eventually withdrew as counsel of the spouses Blanco, We deem the penalty of suspension for a period
of six months from the practice of law to be commensurate with the
extent of respondent's violation. Nonetheless, We sustain the IBP Board
of Governor's imposition of the penalties of immediate revocation of his Notarial Commission and disqualification from being commissioned as a
notary public for a period of two years.
Finally, We adopt the
finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent is guilty of
misquoting Article 1250 of the Civil Code when he omitted the phrase
"unless there is an agreement to the contrary,"'' in
citing the said provision. Indeed, while the evidence on record fell
short in establishing that the omission was an "act of lying or
cheating" that would constitute a "dishonest act," it clearly
contravened Rule 10.02 of the CPR, which provides:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryRule 10.02. A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel,
or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
For this infraction, respondent deserves to be admonished.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Jose Q. Lorica IV is hereby found GUILTY of
violation of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
which he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months. He is likewise meted the penalties of immediate
REVOCATION of his Notarial Commission if presently existing and
DISQUALIFICATION from being commissioned as a Notary
Public for a period of two (2) years. He is likewise hereby found
GUILTY of violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for which he is hereby
ADMONISHED. The penalties herein imposed come with
a
STERN WARNING that the repetition of similar
violations will be dealt with even more severely.
Let copies of
this Decision be attached to the personal records of respondent as
attorney, and be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts throughout the
country.
SO ORDERED.Leonen, J., (Chairperson), Gesmundo, Carandang, Zalameda, and
Gaerlan, JJ. concur.
February 2, 2020
N O T I C E O F J U D G M E N T
Sirs / Mesdames:
Please take notice that on
September 9, 2020 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the
original of which was received by this Office on February 2, 2020 at
2:00 p.m.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG III
Division Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
1Rollo,pp. 13-22.
2 Id. at 28-29. 35-36.
3 Id. at 36.
4 Id. at 23-26.
5 Id. at 10.
6 Id. at 39-46.
7 Id. at 39.
8 Id. at 44-46.
9 Id. ai 44.
10 Id. at 47-50.
11 Id. at 9-12.
12 Id. at 75-76.
13 Id. at 90-103.
14 Id. at 28.
15 Id. at 41.
16 Id. at 44.
17 Id. at 73-78.
18 Id. at 84.
19 Id. at 86.
20 Id. at 85.
21 Id. at 187-194.
22 Id. at 90-91.
23 Id. at 192-193.
24 Id. at 194.
25 Id. at 186.
27 Id. at 195-202.
28 Id. at 276-277.
29Aninon v.
Atty. Sabitscma, Jr., 685 Phil. 322. 327 (2012).
30Jimenez v.
Ally. Francisco, 749 Phil. 55 1, 570 (2014).
31 Id. at 572-573.
32 Id. at 570.
33Virgo v, Atty. Amorin. 597 Phil. 182, 191 (2009).
34Atty.
Angeles, Jr. v. Atly. Bagay, 749 Phil. I 14, 123 (2014).
35Fabay v.
Any. Resuena, 719 Phil. 151, 158 (2016).chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary