FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 236498, September 16, 2020
TRANS-GLOBAL MARITIME AGENCY, INC. AND/OR GOODWOOD SHIP MANAGEMENT, PTE., LTD., AND/OR ROBERT F. ESTANIEL, PETITIONERS, V. MAGNO T. UTANES, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
LOPEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated April 21, 2017, and Resolution2 dated January 3, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that upheld the findings of the labor tribunals and declared Magno T. Utanes (Utanes) entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITSHere, Utanes' willful concealment of vital information in his PEME disqualifies him from claiming disability benefits. The Court on many occasions disqualified seafarers from claiming disability benefits on account of fraudulent misrepresentation arising from their concealment of a preexisting medical condition.26 This case is not an exception. For knowingly concealing his history of coronary artery disease during the PEME, Utanes committed fraudulent misrepresentation which unconditionally bars his right to receive any disability compensation from petitioners.27x x x x
E. A seafarer who knowingly conceals a pre-existing illness or condition in the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) shall be liable for misrepresentation and shall be disqualified from any compensation and benefits. This is likewise a just cause for termination of employment and imposition of appropriate administrative sactions.
Records do not show that any of these conditions were met. Utanes failed to present sufficient evidence to show how his working conditions contributed to or aggravated his illness. The general statements in his Position Paper — u[i]n the performance of Complainant's principal duty and responsibility, he was always exposed to the harsh condition and the perils at sea. He was also under severe stress while being away from his family and suffering from over fatigue while doing his duties and responsibilities on board the vessel due to long hours of work" — were not validated by any written document or other proof given. Neither was any expert medical opinion presented regarding the cause of his condition.a. If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by an unusual strain by reasons of the nature of his work
b. The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship
c. If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship
d. If a person is a known hypertensive or diabetic, he should show compliance with prescribed maintenance medications and doctor- recommended lifestyle changes. The employer shall provide a workplace conducive for such compliance in accordance with Section 1(A) paragraph 5.
e. In a patient not known to have hypertension or diabetes, as indicated on his last PEME.
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risk described therein;We further enunciated: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
In this case, Utanes suffered from coronary artery disease, a cardiovascular illness under item 11 of Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC. The mentioned provision enumerates the conditions which must be met to show that the seafarer's work involve the risk of contracting the disease. Again, none of these conditions are present in this case; no proof of the required conditions was submitted by Utanes to demonstrate that his illness is work-related and, therefore, compensable. Thus, Utanes failed to discharge his burden to prove the risks involved in his work, that his illness was contracted as a result of his exposure to the risks within the period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it, and that he was not notoriously negligent.31 All told, Utanes is not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.In effect, the table of illnesses and the corresponding nature of employment in Section 32-A only provide the list of occupational illnesses. It does not exempt a seafarer from providing proof of the conditions under the first paragraph of Section 32-A in order for the occupational illness/es complained of to be considered as work-related and, therefore, compensable.
Further, x x x to determine the amount of compensation, the seafarer must show the resulting disability following as guide the schedule listed in Section 32.x x x x
More importantly, the rule applies that whoever claims entitlement to benefits provided by law should establish his right thereto by substantial evidence which is more than a mere scintilla; it is real and substantial, and not merely apparent. Further, while in compensation proceedings in particular, the test of proof is merely probability and not ultimate degree of certainty, the conclusion of the courts must still be based on real evidence and not just inference and speculations.30 (Citations omitted.)
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 59-73; penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Elihu A. Ybanez and Carmelita Salandanan Manahan.
2 Id. at 74-75; penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon, with the concurrence of Associate
Justices Justice Elihu A. Ybanez and Carmelita Salandanan Manahan.
3 Id. at 101-118; penned by Labor Arbiter Thomas T. Que, Jr.The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Complainant to have suffered total and permanent disability and, correspondingly, holding all the Respondents jointly and severally liable to pay Complainant his permanent disability compensation and sickness allowance in the respective amount of US $96,909 and $2,588, plus attorney's fees equal to 10% of the total judgment awards.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. Id. at 117-118.
4Id. at 119-126. Petitioners' appeal was resolved by the NLRC in its Resolution dated July 29, 2016, to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryWHEREFORE, premised on all the foregoing considerations, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION deleting the award of sickness allowance.5Id. at 127-128. In the NLRC's Resolution dated September 30, 2016, Trans-GlobaPs motion for reconsideration was disposed of as follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Consequently, respondents are jointly and solidarily ordered to pay complainant Magno T. Utanes permanent disability benefits and attorney's fees in the Philippine Peso exchange rate of US$96,909.00 and US$9,690.00 at the time of payment respectively.
The claims for sickness allowance and damages are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. Id. at 126.After a careful consideration of the arguments and discussion raised by respondents in their Partial Motion for Reconsideration, We find no compelling justification or valid reason to modify, alter, much less reverse, the Resolution sought to be reconsidered.6Supra note 1.
ACCORDINGLY, let the instant Partial Motion for Reconsideration be, as it is hereby, DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution of this Commission dated July 29, 2016 STANDS undisturbed. No further motion of similar nature shall be entertained. SO ORDERED. Id. at 128.
7Supra note 2.
8Rollo, pp. 76-88.
9Id. at 33-51.
10Id. at 128-162.
11Deocariza v. Fleet Management Services Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 229955, July 23, 2018, 873 SCRA 397, 406, citing Leoncio v. MSTMarine Services (Phils.), Inc., 822 Phil. 494, 504 (2017).
12Id., citing Maersk Filipinos Crewing, Inc. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 184256, January 18, 2017, 814 SCRA 428, 442.
13Id., citing Manila Shipmanagement & Manning, Inc., el al. v. Aninang, 824 Phil. 916, 925 (2018); enumerating the following as exceptions: 1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; 2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; 3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; 4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; 6) when in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; 7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; 8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs, are disputed by the respondent; 10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or 1 1) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
14 See Deocariza v. Fleet Management Services Philippines, Inc., et al., supra note 11.
15 Formerly Articles 191 to 193 of the LABOR CODE.
16 2010 POEA-SEC, Definition of Terms, Item No. 11 (a) and (b).
17 817 Phil. 84(2017).
18 740 Phil. 175(2014).
19 728 Phil. 244(2014).
20 715 Phil. 454(2013).
21Vetyard Terminals & Shipping Services, Inc., et al, v. Snares, 728 Phil. 527, 534 (2014), citing Escarcha v. Leonis Navigation Co., Inc., and/or World Marine Panama, S.A., 637 Phil. 418, 433 (2010).
22Philman Marine Agency, Inc., et al. v. Cabanban, supra note 20 at 480.
23 Id., citing Francisco v. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. and/or Mendoza, et al., 650 Phil. 200, 206 (2010).
24 See Vetyard Terminals & Shipping Services, Inc., et al. v. Suarez, supra note 21.
25Status Maritime Corporation, et al. v. Sps. Delalamon, supra note 18 at 195, citing Magsaysay Maritime Corp., et al. v. National Labor Relations Commission (2nd Division), et al., 630 Phil. 352, 367 (2010).
26Lerona v. Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 210955, August 14, 2019, citing Ayungo v. Beamko Shipmanagement Corp., et al, supra note 19; Philman Marine Agency, Inc., et al. v. Cabanban, supra note 20; Status Maritime Corporation, et al. v. Sps. Delalamon, supra note 18.
27 Id.
28Philman Marine Agency, Inc., et al. v. Cabanban, supra note 20.
29 G.R. No. 238578, June 8, 2020.
30Id.
31Id.
32Panganiban v. Tara Trading Shipmanagement Inc., et al., 647 Phil. 675, 691 (2010).