EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2486 [Formerly A.M. No. 17-02-45-RTC], September 08, 2020
RE: INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE ALLEGED EXTORTION ACTIVITIES OF PRESIDING JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., BRANCH 4, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BUTUAN CITY, AGUSAN DEL NORTE
R E S O L U T I O N
HERNANDO, J.:
In this Motion for Reconsideration, the Court is presented with the opportunity to revisit and re-assess from another perspective its earlier pronouncements that the death of a respondent in an administrative case, which is a form of cessation from public service, pending its final resolution, does not automatically cause the dismissal of the proceeding.
In the assailed September 3, 2019 Decision, the Majority declared that: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Death of the respondent judge during the pendency of his administrative case shall not terminate the proceedings against him, much less absolve him, or cause the dismissal of the complaint if the investigation was completed prior to his demise. If death intervenes before he has been dismissed from service, the appropriate penalty is forfeiture of all retirement and other benefits, except accrued leaves.1cralawlawlibraryTo recap, a complaint was filed against Judge Abul, then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Agusan Del Norte, alleging that he extorted large amounts of money ranging from P200,000.00 to P300,000.00 from the detainees of the Provincial Jail of Agusan in exchange for their release from prison or the dismissal of their criminal cases. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted an investigation after it received a letter from Rev. Father Antoni A. Saniel exposing Judge Abul's alleged illegal activities. During its investigation, the OCA confirmed thai Judge Abul indeed engaged in extortion activities, a grave misconduct constituting a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and recommended that Judge Abul be fined the amount of P500,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement gratuity.2
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:Based on the aforementioned provision, the death of the accused extinguishes his/her personal criminal liability. Additionally, the pecuniary penalties of the accused will only be extinguished if he/she dies before final judgment is rendered. If the standard for criminal cases wherein the quantum of proof is proof beyond reasonable doubt, then a lower standard for administrative proceedings such as the case at bench should be applied, since the quantum of proof therein is only substantial evidence.17
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; xxx16cralawlawlibrary
In Baikong Akang Camsa vs. Judge Aurelio Rendon,34 this Court, citing previous cases, discussed the different implications and effects of the death of a respondent while an administrative complaint is still pending with the Court, viz.:Considering these cases, it is undeniable that in spite of the death or retirement of the respondents while their administrative cases were pending, only the penalty of fine or deduction from their benefits was eventually imposed upon them. More importantly, some complaints were actually dismissed in view of the respondents' deaths. Furthermore, the respondents' retirement or death/survivorship benefits were not at all automatically forfeited. Evidently, the Court exercised its sound discretion in the imposition of penalties based on the prevailing circumstantial landscape.
In Hermosa vs. Paraiso,35 the respondent, a branch clerk of court of the then Court of First Instance of Masbate, was charged with irregularities while in office. The matter was referred to an Investigating Judge considering that there were persons mentioned in the complaint who had been questioned. The Investigating Judge, in his report of 18 August 1973, recommended that the respondent be exonerated of the charges for lack of sufficient evidence. On 01 August 1974, while the case was pending before the Court, the respondent died. The Court, nevertheless, resolved the case so that the respondent's heirs might not be deprived of any retirement benefits due to them and ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of substantial evidence.
In Mahozca vs. Judge Domagas,36 the respondent judge, who was charged with gross ignorance of the law for having erroneously granted a demurrer to evidence, died while the case was being evaluated by the OCA for appropriate action. The Court, on the basis of what appeared on record, no factual matter being in serious dispute that would require a formal investigation, resolved to impose a fine of P5,000.00 on the respondent judge, stressing that he had been previously sanctioned by the Court for gross ignorance of the law.
In Apiag vs. Judge Cantero37 the respondent judge was charged with gross misconduct for allegedly having committed bigamy and falsification of public documents. The case was referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City for investigation, report and recommendation. An investigation was imperative considering that factual issues, including the circumstances of the respondent's first marriage to the complainant, were inextricably involved. Upon receipt of the report of the Investigating Judge, who recommended that the respondent judge be suspended for one (1) year without pay, the Court referred the matter to OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. The OCA, in its memorandum, recommended that the respondent judge be dismissed from the service. The respondent judge died while the case was still being deliberated upon by the Court. The Court there held -However, we also cannot just gloss over the fact that he was remiss in attending to the needs of his children of his first marriage - children whose filiation he did not deny. He neglected them and refused to support them until they came up with this administrative charge. For such conduct, this Court would have imposed a penalty. But in view of his death prior to the promulgation of this Decision, dismissal of the case is now in order.38cralawlawlibrary
'SEC. 2. In case a Justice of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court in cities, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court hereafter established, dies while in actual service, regardless of his/her age and length of service as required under Section 1 hereof, his/her heirs shall receive a lump sum of five (5) years' gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance received by him/her as such Justice or Judge: Provided, however, That where the deceased Justice or Judge has rendered at least fifteen (15) years either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of Government, or both, his/her heirs shall instead be entitled to a lump sum often (10) years gratuity computed on the same basis as indicated in this provision: Provided, further, That the lump sum often (10) years gratuity shall be received by the heirs of the Justice or the Judge who was killed because of his/her work as such: Provided, That the Justice or Judge has served in Government for at least five (5) years regardless of age at the time of death. When a Justice or Judge is killed intentionally while in service, the presumption is that the death is work-related.According to A.M. No. 17-08-01-SC, in case of permanent disability due to death while in actual service, a judge is entitled to the following benefits: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 3. Upon retirement, a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court in cities, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court hereafter established shall be automatically entitled to a lump sum of five (5) years' gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance he/she was receiving on the date of his/her retirement and thereafter upon survival after the expiration of five (5) years, to further annuity payable monthly during the residue of his/her natural life pursuant to Section 1 hereof: Provided, however, That if the reason for the retirement be any permanent disability contracted during his/her incumbency in office and prior to the date of retirement, he/she shall receive a gratuity equivalent to ten (10) years' salary and the allowances aforementioned: Provided, further, That should the retirement under Section 1(1) hereof be with the attendance of any partial permanent disability contracted during his/her incumbency and prior to the date of retirement, he/she shall receive an additional gratuity equivalent to two (2) years lump sum that he/she is entitled to under this Act; Provided, furthermore, That if he/she survives after ten (10) years or seven (7) years, as the case may be, he/she shall continue to receive a monthly annuity as computed under this Act during the residue of his/her natural life pursuant to Section 1 hereof: Provided, finally, That those who have retired with the attendance of any partial permanent disability five (5) years prior to the effectivity of this Act shall be entitled to the same benefits provided herein.
Upon the death of a Justice or Judge of any court in the Judiciary, if such Justice or Judge has retired, or was eligible to retire optionally at the time of death, the surviving legitimate spouse shall be entitled to receive all the retirement benefits that the deceased Justice or Judge would have received had the Justice or Judge not died. The surviving spouse shall continue to receive such retirement benefits until the surviving spouse's death or remarriage.'xxx xxx xxx
'SEC. 3 -A. All pension benefits of retired members of the Judiciary shall be automatically increased whenever there is an increase in the salary of the same position from which he/she retired.'
B. 1 Where government service is at least 15 years, regardless of ageBased on the foregoing, Judge Abul's heirs should be given death benefits granted under Section 2 of RA No. 9946. If Judge Abul served for at least 15 years, his heirs should receive a lump sum equivalent to ten (10) years. Alternatively, if he served for less than 15 years, the lump sum should be equivalent to five (5) years. Subsequently, after the gratuity period of ten (10) years has passed, his heirs are entitled to survivorship benefits, specifically, full monthly pension (if Judge Abul rendered at least 15 years of service) or pro-rated monthly pension (if he served for less than 15 years).
(1) Lump sum gratuity of 10 years, to be received by the heirs (Section 2) 49
(2) Full survivorship pension benefits (Section I),50 to be received by the surviving legitimate spouse upon survival of the gratuity period of 10 years (Section 3, first paragraph);51
(3) Automatic increase of pension benefits (Section 3-A).52
Provided, The same benefits shall apply in respect to a justice or judge, who, with at least 5 years of government service, was killed due to his/her work as such.
B. 2 Where government service is less than 15 years, regardless of age-
(1) Lump sum gratuity of 5 years, to be received by the heirs (Section 2)53
(2) Pro-rated pension benefits (Section I),54 to be received by the surviving legitimate spouse upon survival of the gratuity period of 10 years (Section 3, first paragraph);55
(3) Automatic increase of pension benefits (Section 3-A).56xxx xxx xxx
E. Survivorship Pension Benefits
The legitimate surviving spouse of a Justice or Judge who (1) has retired or was eligible to retire optionally at the time of death, and (2) was receiving or would have been entitled to receive a monthly pension, shall be entitled to receive the said benefits that the deceased Justice or Judge would have received had the Justice or Judge not died, Provided, That the justice or judge who, regardless of age, died or was killed while in actual service shall be considered as retired due to permanent disability. Provided, further, That the survivorship benefit shall be pro-rated if the deceased justice or judge had rendered government service for less than 15 years. The surviving spouse shall continue to receive such retirement benefits until the surviving spouse's death or remarriage.57cralawlawlibrary
Very truly yours, (SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
* On leave.
1Rollo, p. 137.
2 Id. at 104-119.
3 Died on August 5, 2017 by multiple gunshot wounds at 68 years old; id. at 91, 95-97.
4Rollo, pp. 95-96.
5 Id. at 137-147.
6 Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Diosdado M. Peralta (now Chief Justice), Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Francis H. Jardeleza, Jose C. Reyes, Jr., Rosmari D. Carandang, and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting voted with the majority. The Dissent of Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando was joined by Associate Justices Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, Andres B. Reyes, Jr., Alexandei G. Gesmundo, Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, and Rodil V. Zalameda. Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen wrote a strong Separate Opinion.
7Rollo, pp. 145-146.
8 Id. at 186-194.
9 Id. at 186-189.
10 Id. at 186.
11 See Dissenting Opinion of J. Hernando, p. 3; id. at 170.
12 Id. at 4; id. at 171.
13Gonzales v. Escalona, 587 Phil. 448, 465 (2008).
14 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article 3, §14.
15 RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, § 5.
16 REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 89(1).
17 That amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, Office of the Court Administrator v. Yu, 807 Phil. 277, 293 (2017).
18Supra note 3.
19 469 Phil. 896 (2004).
20 785 Phil. 14(2016).
21 Judge Lubao was found guilty of the following offenses: gross misconduct; violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars; undue delay in rendering a decision or order; and undue delay in the submission of monthly reports.
22 504 Phil. 512(2005).
23 365 Phil. 496(1999).
24 Id. at 510.
25 195 Phil. 344(1981).
26 388 Phil. 60(2000).
27 421 Phil. 677(2001).
28 450 Phil. 38(2003).
29 443 Phil. 732 (2003).
30 508 Phil. 166(2005).
31 509 Phil. 401 (2005).
32 725 Phil. 151 (2014).
33 597 Phil. 86 (2009).
34 427 Phil. 518(2002).
35 159 Phil. 417(1975).
36 318 Phil. 744(1995).
37 335 Phil. 511(1997).
38Bayaca v. Ramos, supra note 33 at 99-101. Citations omitted.
39Gonzales v. Escalona, supra note 13, citing Loyao, Jr. v. Caube, 450 Phil. 38 (2003).
40Supra note 13.
41Gonzales v. Escalona, supra note 13, citing Limliman v. Judge Ulal-Marrero, supra note 42, which cited Camsa v. Judge Rendon, 427 Phil. 518 (2002) and Apiag v. Judge Cantero, 335 Phil. 511(1997).
42Gonzales v. Escalona, supra note 13, citing Limliman v. Judge Ulat-Marrero, supra note 41 which cited Judicial Audit Report, Branches 21, 32 & 36, et. al, 397 Phil. 476 (2000) and Hermosa v. Paraiso, 159 Phil. 417(1975).
43Gonzales v. Escalona, supra note 13, citing Limliman v. Judge Ulat-Marrero, supra note 41. which cited Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in RTC, Br. 1, Bangued, Abra, 388 Phil. 60 (2000); Apiag v. Judge Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997), Mañozca v. Judge Domagas,318 Phil. 744 (1995); and Loyao, Jr. v. Caube, 450 Phil. 38 (2003).
44Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 565 Phil. 731 (2007) citing Libres v. National Labor Relations Commission, 367 Phil. 181 (1999).
45Rollo, p. 91.
46 Judge Abul's date of birth is on August 1, 1949.
47 Republic Act No. 9946, An Act Granting Additional Retirement, Survivorship, and Other Benefits to Members of the Judiciary, Amending For the Purpose Republic Act No. 910, As Amended, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes (2009).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 A.M. No. 17-08-01-SC, Re: Requests for Survivorship Pension Benefits of Spouses of Justices and Judges Who Died Prior to the Effectivity of Republic Act No. 9946, September 19, 2017.
LEONEN, J.:
I concur.
The death of respondent Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., prior to the promulgation and finality of his administrative case, effectively renders the case moot. Proceeding further would be a gross violation of the fundamental right to due process.
Further, imposing any monetary penalty in lieu of dismissal only punishes respondent's wife and heirs: those who are innocent of the charges against respondent. Once a respondent in an administrative case dies, it is simply illogical and impractical for this Court to continue with the proceedings. There would be no one left to punish.
To recall, Rev. Father Antoni A. Saniel, Director of the Prison Ministry of the Diocese of Butuan, filed a complaint alleging that respondent was demanding money ranging from P200,000.00 to P300,000.00 from detainees of the Provincial Jail of Agusan in exchange for their release or dismissal of their cases.1 The judicial audit team's investigation report confirmed these allegations.2
While the case was pending, or on August 5, 2017, respondent was killed by unidentified motorcycle-riding assailants outside his house.3
Nonetheless, the Office of the Court Administrator found respondent rt guilty of grave misconduct. Since the offense was punishable by dismissal from service, the Office of the Court Administrator instead recommended the penalty of a fine of P500,000.00, to be deducted from respondent's retirement gratuity, in view of his death.4
In the September 3, 2019 Decision,5 this Court adopted the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator but modified the recommended penalty to the forfeiture of all benefits, including retirement gratuity, on the ground that the death of a respondent in an administrative case did not oust this Court of its jurisdiction to proceed with the case, or to impose accessory penalties on the respondent.6
Respondent's widow, Bernadita C. Abul, then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the case should have been rendered moot since her husband was no longer in a position to assail the September 3, 201.9 Decision of this Court, to plead his innocence, or to express remorse.7
This Court, guided by the able ponencia of Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, has now seen it fit to: (1) reverse its earlier Decision; (I) grant the Motion for Reconsideration; and (3) dismiss the administrative case against respondent.
The ponencia is anchored on four (4) grounds: (1) Judge Abul still enjoyed the right to be presumed innocent, since his death preceded any final judgment on the charges against him; (2) administrative liability, like criminal liability, may be extinguished through death; (3) the imposition of a penalty would violate due process since Judge Abul can no longer exercise any of the remedies that would have been available to him; and (4) Judge Abul's mistakes should not unduly punish his heirs.
I concur.
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.Disciplinary proceedings, being administrative in nature, do not necessarily require the strict procedural rules usually found in civil and criminal cases. It is a generally accepted rule that due process in administrative proceedings does not require that the respondent must be heard. It merely requires that the respondent is given the opportunity to be heard.8
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.10 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)Criminal liability is immediately extinguished if the accused dies before final judgment is rendered.11 The reason is simple: due process requires that the accused be informed of the evidence and findings against them, and be given the opportunity to appeal the conviction. As the ponencia correctly points out,12 there is no reason why the same principle should not apply in administrative cases where a lower quantum of proof is required.
Cessation from public office during the pendency of the case may occur in three (3) different ways: (1) resignation; (2) retirement; or (3) death.Here, respondent only knew of the conclusions of the judicial audit team before his death. He had no knowledge that the Office of the Con' Administrator would adopt the findings of the judicial audit team, h^ certainly would not have known that this Court would adopt the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator. As was demonstrated by the subsequent events of this case, his widow was the one who filed a Motion for Reconsideration—not to ask for clemency, but rather, to have the case dismissed, because her husband did not know he would be found guilty of the charges against him.
Resignation requires intent. It is a voluntary cessation from public office. Sometimes, however, respondents in disciplinary proceedings opt to resign to avoid being forcibly dismissed from service. Thus, this Court has stated that resignation "should be used neither as an escape nor as an easy way out to evade administrative liability by a court personnel facing administrative sanction."
Therefore, once this Court assumes jurisdiction—that is, after an administrative case has been filed—resignation from public office will not render the case moot. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.:A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioner's separation from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions - that of separation from service - may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.Retirement, meanwhile, may be optional or compulsory. Optional retirement for government employees may be availed after 20 to 30 years of service, regardless of age. Judges and justices may also opt to retire upon reaching 60 years old as long as they have rendered 15 years of service in the judiciary. Optional retirement, like resignation, is a voluntary cessation from public office. Thus, the same rationale is applied to those who avail of optional retirement during the pendency of an administrative case. In Aquino, Jr. v. Miranda:
Moreover, this Court views with suspicion the precipitate act of a government employee in effecting his or her separation from service, soon after an administrative case has been initiated against him or her. An employee's act of tendering his or her resignation immediately after the discovery of the anomalous transaction is indicative of his or her guilt as flight in criminal cases.A public servant whose career is on the line would normally want the investigating body to know his or her whereabouts for purposes of notice. The timing of respondent's application for leave, for optional retirement, and her sudden unexplained disappearance, taken together, leads us to conclude that hers is not a mere case of negligence. Respondent's acts reveal a calculated design to evade or derail the investigation against her. Her silence at the least serves as a tacit waiver of her opportunity to refute the charges made against her.. . . .
Neither respondent's disappearance nor her retirement precludes the Court from holding her liable. Her disappearance constitutes a waiver of her right to present evidence in her behalf. The Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of respondent's case.
Respondents in an administrative case could apply for optional retirement to evade liability. Thus, optional retirement during the pendency of an administrative case, like resignation, will not render the case moot.
Unlike resignation, however, retirement may also be involuntary. Retirement from public service is compulsory for government employees who have reached 65 years old or for judges and justices who have reached 70 years old.
In the leading case of Perez v. Abiera, this Court was confronted with the issue of whether an administrative complaint against a judge, was rendered moot when he compulsorily retired while the case was pending. Citing Diamalon v. Quintillan14 respondent Judge Carlos Abiera argued y that he could not be meted the penalty of dismissal since he was no longer in service.
In Quintillan, this Court dismissed the complaint against Judge Jesus Quintillan since he had already resigned from service before a judgment could be rendered: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary[T]he. petition for dismissal must be granted. There is no need to inquire further into the charge imputed to respondent Judge that his actuation in this particular case failed to satisfy the due process requirement. As an administrative proceeding is predicated on the holding of an office or position in the Government and there being no doubt as to the resignation of respondent Judge having been accepted as of August 31, 1967, there is nothing to stand in the way of the dismissal prayed for.In Abiera, however, this Court clarified that Quintillan was not meant to be a precedent to immediately dismiss complaints against judges who resigned or retired while the administrative cases were pending: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryIt was not the intent of the Court in the case of Quintillan to set down a hard and fast rule that the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge as the case may be renders [sic] moot and academic the administrative case pending against him; nor did the Court mean to divest itself of jurisdiction to impose certain penalties short of dismissal from the government service should there be a finding of guilt on the basis of the evidence. In other words, the jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For what remedy would the people have against a judge or any other public official who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his last days in office? What would prevent some corrupt and unscrupulous magistrate from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune to all administrative penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he served well and faithfully, if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.This Court, thus, established that: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryIn short, the cessation from office of a respondent Judge either because of resignation, retirement or some other similar cause does not per se warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint which was filed against him while still in the service. Each case is to be resolved in the context of the circumstances present thereat.As this doctrine developed, this Court has interpreted "some other similar cause" to include death. Death, however, cannot be placed on the same footing as resignation or retirement. Resignation and optional retirement are voluntary modes of cessation. The respondent may avail of them as a way to escape or evade liability. This Court, therefore, should not be ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the administrative complaint even if the resignation is accepted or the application for retirement is approved.
Death, unless self-inflicted, is involuntary. Respondents who die during the pendency of the administrative case against them do not do so with the intent to escape or evade liability. The rationale for proceeding with administrative cases despite resignation or optional retirement, therefore, cannot apply.
It is conceded that compulsory retirement is also involuntary. Respondents or this Court cannot fight against the passage of time.
Abiera, however, had a different rationale for respondents who have reached the compulsory age of retirement: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibraryA contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For what remedy would the people have against a judge or any other public official who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his last days in office? What would prevent some corrupt and unscrupulous magistrate from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully well that he would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune to all administrative penalties? If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interests of litigants and the general public.In formulating the doctrine, this Court was trying to guard against corrupt and unscrupulous magistrates who would commit abuses knowing fully well that after retirement, they could no longer be punished.
It is this certainty of cessation that differentiates compulsory retirement from death as a mode of cessation from public service. A respondent judge knows when he or she will compulsorily retire. In contrast, nobody knows when one will die, unless the cause of death is self-inflicted. Even those with terminal illnesses cannot pinpoint the exact day when they will die.
The essence of due process in administrative cases is simply the opportunity to be heard. Respondents must be given the opportunity to be informed of and refute the charges against them in all stages of the proceedings.
Only in resignation and retirement can there be a guarantee that respondents will be given the opportunity to be heard. Even if they resign or retire during the pendency of the administrative case, they can still be aware of the proceedings and actively submit pleadings. Thus, they should not be allowed to evade liability by the simple expediency of separation from public service.
It would be illogical and impractical to treat dead respondents as equal to resigned or retired respondents. Dead respondents are neither aware of the continuation of the proceedings against them, nor are in any position to submit pleadings. Death forecloses any opportunity to be heard. Continuing with the administrative proceedings even after the respondent's death, therefore, is a violation of the right to due process.15 (Citations omitted)
[We] cannot just gloss over the fact that he was remiss in attending to the needs of his children of his first marriage - children whose filiation he did not deny. He neglected them and refused to support them until they came up with this administrative charge. For such conduct, this Court would have imposed a penalty. But in view of his death prior to the promulgation of this Decision, dismissal of the case is now in order.19cralawlawlibraryIn Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tambulig and the 11 th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mahayag-Dumingag-Josefina, both in Zamboanga del Sur,20 this Court found that respondent was constrained to dismiss the case and release his retirement benefits to his heirs despite finding him guilty of gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent Escalona had already resigned from the service. His resignation, however, does not render this case moot, nor does it free him from liability. In fact, the Court views respondent Escalona's resignation before the investigation as indication of his guilt, in the same way that flight by an accused in a criminal case is indicative of guilt. In short, his resignation will not be a way out of the administrative liability he incurred while in the active service. While we can no longer dismiss him, we can still impose a penalty sufficiently commensurate with the offense he committed.However, in Loyao, Jr. v. Caube,23 the case that Gonzales cites as basis, this Court was constrained to dismiss the case and consider it closed and terminated, since the penalty could no longer be served:
We treat respondent Superada no differently. While his death intervened after the completion of the investigation, it has been settled that the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction over an administrative matter by the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to hold office during the pendency of the respondent's case; jurisdiction once acquired, continues to exist until the final resolution of the case. In Loyao, Jr. v. Caube, we held that the death of the respondent in an administrative case does not preclude a finding of administrative liability22 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
To be sure, respondent Caube's death has permanently foreclosed the prosecution of any other actions, be it criminal or civil, against him for his malfeasance in office. We are, however, not precluded from imposing the appropriate administrative sanctions against him. Respondent's misconduct is so grave as to merit his dismissal from the service, were it not for his untimely demise during the pendency of these proceedings. However, since the penalty can no longer be carried out, this case is now declared closed and terminated.24 (Citations omitted)Gonzales even discusses several exceptions to the general rule. rt stated that the presence of the following circumstances is enough to warrant the dismissal of the case: "first, the observance of respondent's right to due process; second, the presence of exceptional circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and humanitarian reasons; and third, it may also depend on the kind of penalty imposed."25
(SGD.) MARVIC M.V. F. LEONEN Associate Justice |
Endnotes:
1Ponencia, p. 2.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5Re Alleged Extortion Activities of Judge Abul, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2486, September 3, 2019, [Per Curiam, En Banc].
6 Id.
7Ponencia, p. 3.
8Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 890, 905 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Bane].
9 346 Phil. 807 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Bane].
10 Id. at 828 citing Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez, 310 Phil. 549 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc]; Mutuc v. Court of Appeals, 268 Phil. 37 (1990) [Per J. Paras, Second Division]; Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM) v. Civil Service Commission, 311 Phil. 573 [Per J. Vitug, En Banc]; and Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 890 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Bane].
11See Rev. Pen. Code, art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.]
12Ponencia, p. 5.
13Perez v. Abiera, 159-APhil. 575, 580-581 [Per J. Munoz Palma, En Banc].
14 139 Phil. 654 (1969) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
15 Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Re Alleged Extortion Activities of Judge Abul, A.M. No. RTJ-17- 2486, September 3, 2019, [Per Curiam, En Banc] citing Pagano v. Nazairo, Jr., 560 Phil. 96, 104-105 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazaro, Third Division]; Republic Act 1616(1957), sec. 1; Re: Requests for survivorship benefits of spouses of justices and judges who died prior to the effectively of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9946, 818 Phil. 344 (2017) [Per J. Martires, En Banc]; Aquino, Jr. v. Miranda, 473 Phil. 216, 227 (2004) [Per Curiam, En Banc]; Pres. Decree No. 1146 (1977), sec. 11 (b); Republic Act No. 9946 (2010), sec. 1; Diamalon v. Quintillan, 139 Phil. 654, 656-657 (1969) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc]; Perez v. Abiera, 159-A Phil. 575, 580-581 (1975) [Per J. Munoz Palma, En Banc].
16 427 Phil. 518 (2003) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].
17 Id. at 525-526.
18 335 Phil. 511 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
19 Id. at 526.
20 509 Phil. 401 (2005) [Per CJ. Davide, Jr., First Division].
21 587 Phil. 448 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division],
22 Id. at 462-463.
23 450 Phil. 38 (2003) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
24 Id. at 47.
25Gonzalez v. Escalona, 587 Phil. 448, 463 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
CAGUIOA, J.:
I concur in the granting of the Motion for Reconsideration (MR) and the resulting dismissal of the administrative complaint against the late Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. (Judge Abul). Nevertheless, I dissent as to the majority's holding that the death of the respondent in an administrative case before its final resolution should ipso facto lead to the dismissal of the case.
To recall, a Complaint was filed against Judge Abul for alleged extortion from detainees in exchange for their release from prison or the dismissal of their criminal cases. After its investigation, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found Judge Abul liable for grave misconduct and recommended that he be fined in the amount of P500,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement gratuity. While the administrative case was pending review by the Court, Judge Abul "met an untimely death when he was targeted by an unidentified motorcycle-riding shooter while he was about to depart from his house."1
Despite his death, the Court found Judge Abul administratively liable in the September 3, 2019 Decision. He was meted the penalty of forfeiture of all retirement and allied benefits, except accrued leaves. Therein, I joined the Dissenting Opinion of my esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando. Specifically, I agreed with Justice Hernando's appreciation of the humanitarian considerations that should have impelled the Court to mitigate the penalty imposed against Judge Abul. As Justice Hernando rioted, Judge Abul was murdered a couple of days after he turned 68. Moreover, Judge Abul's wife, who also sustained gunshot wounds, had written a letter to the Court explaining that she is a housewife who has no work and no source of income and that ever since Judge Abul's preventive suspension from office, their family had faced financial crisis. She therefore entreated the Court to release the accrued leave benefits of Judge Abul as well as such other benefits or assistance which the Court could extend to them in order to help their family sustain their daily needs and to fund her son's education in medical school. I was of the view then that these: considerations should have prompted the Court to dismiss the case. As. Justice Hernando stated:
Given the specific circumstances of Judge Abul's case, it is my view that his mistakes should not unduly punish his spouse or his heirs, especially if they had no hand in or knowledge about the alleged extortions. Judge Abul's liability should be considered personal and extinguished by reason of his death, and should not extend beyond the said death only to be shouldered by his spouse or his son. Doing so would indirectly impose a harsh penalty upon innocent individuals who not only have to come to terms with the unjust death of a loved one but also live without one henceforth. Without a doubt, forfeiture of all of Judge Abul's death and survivorship benefits would add to the grief and hardships that his family is already enduring. Thus, it is my humble position that assuming that the Court would maintain the non-dismissal rule in administrative cases in case of death of the respondent, the Court should, instead of imposing such a strict and unforgiving punishment even when Judge Abul has already passed away, impose a fine to be deducted from his retirement benefits. This is what the OCA had in fact recommended in the first place.2 (Emphasis supplied)It is in light of the foregoing, and only to such extent, that I joined Justice Hernando's dissent in the main Decision.
xxx The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental, xxx12cralawlawlibraryAs gleaned from the foregoing explanation, the action survives when the wrong complained of affects primarily and principally property and property rights with the injury to a person or third party being merely incidental. In administrative cases, the injury to another is incidental. What is involved in administrative cases is principally an offense to the public office, the same being a sacred public trust. Thus, the Court has consistency held that in administrative cases, no investigation shall be interrupted ov terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution; withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.13 The need to maintain the faith and confidence of our people in thr, government and its agencies and instrumentalities demands that proceedings in administrative cases against public officers and employees should not be made to depend on the whims and caprices of complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses.14
(SGD.) ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA Associate Justice |
Endnotes:
1Ponencia, p. 2.
2 J. Hernando, Dissenting Opinion in Re: Investigation Report on the Alleged Extortion Activities of Presiding Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., Br. 4, RTC, Butuan City, Agusan Del Norte, A.M. No. RTJ- 17-2486, September 3, 2019, p. 7.
3Ponencia, p. 4.
4Gonzales v. Escalona, A.M. No. P-03-1715, September 19, 2008, 566 SCRA 1, 15.
5Ponencia, pp. 4-5.
6 Id. at 4.
7 See Ocampo v. Enriquez, 815 Phil. 1175, 1238-1239 (2017).
8 See Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 767 Phil. 147 (2015).
9Vizconde v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74231, April 10, 1987, 149 SCRA 226, 233.
10People v. Culas, G.R. No. 211166, June 5, 2017, 825 SCRA 552, 554-556; People v. Paras, G.R. No. 192912, October 22, 2014, 739 SCRA 179, 183-184, citing People v. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 239, 255-256.
11 No. L-41715, June 18, 1976, 71 SCRA 491.
12 Id. at 495-496.
13Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, A.M. No. P-99-1285, October 4, 2000, 342 SCRA 6, 11, citing REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 139-B, Sec. 5 and Tejada v. Hernando, A.C. No. 2427, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 517, 521-522.
14 Id. at 12, citing Sy v. Academia, A.M. No. P-87-72, July 3, 1991, 198 SCRA 705, 715.
15 A.C. No. 377, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 623, 628.
16Ponencia, pp. 10-11.
17 In previous cases where the Court upheld the general rule that the death of the respondent does not ipso facto lead to the dismissal of the administrative case, the Court had nevertheless recognized certain exceptions to this rule. Thus, the Court held that death of the respondent would necessitate the dismissal of the administrative case upon a consideration of any of the following factors: (1) the observance of respondent's right to due process; (2) the presence of exceptional circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and humanitarian reasons; and (3) it may also depend on the kind of penalty imposed. Gonzales v. Escalona, supra note 4, at 15-16, citing Limliman v. Ulat-Marrero, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1739, January 22, 2003, 395 SCRA 607.
18Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013, 709 SCRA 276, 281.
19Disciplinary Board, LTO v. Gutierrez. G.R. No. 224395, July 3, 2017, 828 SCRA 663, 669.
20Per Curiam Decision in Re: Investigation Report on the Alleged Extortion Activities of Presiding Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., Br. 4, RTC, Butuan City, Agusan Del Norte, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2486, September 3, 2019, p. 3.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 9.
23Arabani v. Arabani, AM Nos. SCC-10-14-P, SCC-10-15-P and SCC-11-17, November 12, 2019, p.
24How v. Ruiz, A.M. No. P-05-1932, February 15, 2005, 451 SCRA 320, 325.
25 Supra note 17.
CARANDANG, J.:
I dissent.
In the Decision dated September 3,2019, the Court adopted the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) holding Judge Godofredo Abul, Jr. (Judge Abul) guilty for violating Canon 2 (Integrity), Canon 3 (Impartiality), and Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (Code of Judicial Conduct) amounting to grave misconduct despite his death on August 5, 2017. However, the recommendation of the OCA was modified. Applying the Court's ruling in Gonzales v. Escalona,1 it was held that Judge Abul's death should not result in the dismissal of the administrative complaint as the Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to hold office.2 We ruled that death of respondent judge during the pendency of his administrative case shall not terminate the proceedings against him, much less absolve him, or cause the dismissal of the complaint if the investigation was completed prior to his demise. If death intervenes before he has been dismissed from service, the appropriate penalty is forfeiture of all retirement and other benefits, except accrued leaves.3
Considering that the Court had previously warned Judge Abul in Calo v. Judge Abul, Jr.4 "to be more circumspect in issuing orders which must tru'y reflect the actual facts they represent to obviate engendering views of partiality x x x,"5 We imposed the stiffer penalty of dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all benefits including retirement gratuity, exclusive of his accrued leaves, which shall be released to his legal heirs.6
In the present Motion for Reconsideration, Bernardita Abul (Mrs. Abul), surviving spouse of Judge Abul, points out that Judge Abul's death preceded the release of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense charged against him. Mrs. Abul posits that Judge Abul was already dead when the OCA concluded its investigation on the charge against him and that his death necessitates the dismissal of the administrative case.7 In the alternative, if the administrative case cannot be dismissed, Mrs. Abul proposes that Judge Abul's retirement benefits should not be forfeited for humanitarian reasons. Instead of forfeiture, Mrs. Abul suggests that a reasonable amount of fine be imposed and deducted from his retirement benefits.8
The Motion for Reconsideration should be denied.
This is not the first time that the Court addressed the implications of imposing a penalty on an erring court employee who died during the pendency of an administrative case against him. As early as 1975, a similar issue was raised in Hermosa v. Paraiso,9 where the respondent branch clerk of court died after the Investigating Judge recommended that he be exonerated of the charges for lack of sufficient evidence but while the case remained pending before the Court. The Court resolved the case so that the heirs of the respondent may receive any retirement benefits due to them and ordered tl u.; dismissal of the case for lack of substantial evidence.10
In Manozca v. Judge Domagas,11 the erring judge charged with gross ignorance of the law died while the case was being evaluated by the OCA for appropriate action. Nonetheless, the Court resolved to impose a fine of P5,000.00 based on the record which was not disputed.
In Baikong Akang Camsa v. Rendon,12 the Court deemed the case against the late judge closed and terminated because no investigation had been conducted at the time of his demise. The Court explained that to "allow an investigation to proceed against him who could no longer be in any position to defend himself would be a denial of his right to be heard, our most basic understanding of due process."13 However, it must be clarified that the Court terminated the case in Baikong Akong Camsa,14 because no investigation at all had been conducted at the time of the demise of the erring court employee. This is not applicable to the present case because an investigation was already concluded at the time of Judge Abul's demise and he was given an opportunity to be heard.
In Loyao, Jr. v. Caube,15 the Court declared that the death or retirement of any judicial officer from service does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. In highlighting the necessity of retaining jurisdiction over an erring judicial officer's administrative case beyond his death, the Court quoted its ruling in Gallo v. Cordero,16 to wit:
[T]he jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications ... If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.17cralawlawlibraryThe Court similarly ruled in Sexton v. Casida,18Gonzales v. Escalona,19 and Mercado v. Salcedo20 that the death of the respondent in an administrative case does not preclude a finding of administrative liability. In both cases, the Court imposed fines on the erring respondents who died during the pendency of their respective administrative cases.
xxx [F]irst, if the respondent's right to due process was not observed; second, the presence of exceptional circumstances in the case on the grounds of equitable and humanitarian reasons; and third, the kind of penalty imposed.22 (Italics in the original)In Agloro, the Court did not dismiss the administrative case merely on account of the respondent's death since she was afforded her right to due process when she answered the charges against her and was even able to file her comment before the OCA.
From another perspective, administrative liability is separate and distinct from criminal and civil liability which are governed by a different set of rules. In Flecther v. Grinnel Bros., et al, the United States District Court of Michigan held that whether a cause of action survives the death of the person depends on the substance of the cause of action and not on the form of the proceeding to enforce it. Thus, unlike in a criminal case where the death of the accused extinguishes his liability arising thereon under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, or otherwise relieves him of both criminal and civil liability (arising from the offense) if death occurs before final judgment, the dismissal of an administrative case is not automatically terminated upon the respondent's death. The reason is one of law and public interest; a public office is a public trust that needs to be protected and safeguarded at all cost and even beyond the death of the public officer who has tarnished its integrity. Accordingly, we rule that the administrative proceedings is, by its very nature, not strictly personal so that the proceedings can proceed beyond the employee's death, subject to the exceptional considerations we have mentioned above. This, conclusion is bolstered up by Sexton v. Casida, where the respondent, who in the meantime died, was found guilty of act unbecoming a public official and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), deductible from his terminal leave pay.26 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)The Court has utmost interest in ensuring that only those who possess and carry out the core values enshrined in the Code of Judicial Conduct are permitted to serve in the judiciary. This paramount concern prevails notwithstanding the death of erring officers of the Court due to the significant responsibilities entrusted to them.
(SGD.) ROSMARI D. CARANDANG Associate Justice |
Endnotes:
1 587 Phil. 448 (2008).
2 A.M. No. RTJ-17-2486, Septembers, 2019.
3 Id.
4 528 Phil. 827 (2006).
5 Id. at 832.
6Calo v. Judge Abul, Jr., supra note 2.
7 Temporary rollo (A.M No. RTJ-17-2486), p. 4.
8 Id. at 4-5.
9 159 Phil. 417(1975).
10 Id. at 419.
11 318 Phil. 744(1995).
12 448 Phil. 1 (2002).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 450 Phil. 38 (2003).
16 315 Phil. 210(1995).
17 Id. at 220.
18 508 Phil. 166(2005).
19 Supra note 1.
20 619 Phil. 3(2009).
21 804 Phil. 621 (2017).
22 Id. at 635.
23Re: Audit Report on Attendance of Court Personnel of RTC, Br. 32, Manila, 532 Phil. 51 (2006); Gonzales v. Escalona, supra note 1.
24Rollo (A.M. No. RTJ-17-2486), pp. 2-12.
25 Id. at 61-75.
26Gonzales v. Eacalona, supra note 1 at 464-465.
27 Supra note 4.
28 Id. at 832.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary