THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 227411, July 15, 2020
TERESITA DAYANDAYAN, YOLLY D. LAGUNA, CLARA "CARING" TALLE, MR. & MRS. RODRIGO RIOS, AND MR. & MRS. REDEN BIGNAY, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES EDUARDO P. ROJAS AND ENRIQUITA A. ROJAS, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GAERLAN, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners Teresita Dayandayan (Dayandayan), Yolly D. Laguna (Laguna), Clara Talle (Talle), Mr. and Mrs. Rodrigo Rios (Spouses Rios) and Mr. and Mrs. Reden Bignay (Spouses Bignay), praying for the reversal of the September 30, 2015 Decision2 and the July 22, 2016 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Cebu City in CA-G.R. SP No. 06815.
WHEREFORE, by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Plaintiffs-Spouses [respondents] Eduardo and Enriquita Rojas. Thereby, Defendants Teresita Dayandayan, Yolly D. Laguna, Clara "Caring" Talle, Spouses Rodrigo and Virginia Rios and Spouses Reden and Melody Bignay are hereby ordered, to wit:Aggrieved, the petitioners filed an appeal with the RTC.
1. To vacate the premises (Lot No. 635) occupied by them and to turn-over the possession thereof to plaintiffs;
2. To pay the plaintiffs, the sum of Twenty Thousand (Php 20,000.00) Pesos as Attorney's fees and
3. To reimburse the plaintiffs the litigation expenses amounting to Five Thousand (Php 5,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.16
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The instant case is ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction and the assailed Decision of the MCTC Isabel-Merida dated October 1, 2010 is hereby SET ASIDE and VACATED ordering the plaintiffs-appellees [respondents] to respect the physical possession of the defendants-appellants [petitioners] over the affected portions of Lot No. 635 without prejudice to their right to avail of other remedies provided by law to recover possession of the subject property. No pronouncement as to costs.Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.22
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of 13 May 2011 being assailed by herein plaintiffs-appellees (on motion for reconsideration) is partially modified in that the dismissal of the instant case (on appeal to this Court) is not for lack of jurisdiction but for lack of evidence. Consequently, except for said modification the rest of the dispositive portion in the said Decision of May 13, 2011 is maintained. The instant motion for reconsideration is therefore DENIED for lack of merit.Dissatisfied with the ruling, the respondents filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court with the CA.
SO ORDERED.24
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 13, 2011 and Order dated March 26, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Ormoc City in Civil Case No. R-Orm-10-100121-AP are hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 1, 2010 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Merida-Isabel Circuit is REINSTATED.Undeterred, the petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.30
The Owner of Real Property May Not Wrest Possession From the Lawful Occupant |
If the private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises and that possession thereof was deprived from him for more than twelve years, he should present his claim before the Regional Trial Court in an accion publiciana or an accion reinvindicatoria and not before the Municipal Trial Court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be wrested from another who had been in possession thereof for more than twelve (12) years through a summary action for ejectment.In the same vein, in Javelosa, the Court favored the possessors who have been residing in the property for 70 years over the owner who failed to prove the fact of tolerance in the unlawful detainer case. The Court cautioned that an owner cannot conveniently usurp possession of the property without availing of the proper remedy to regain possession:cralawred
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not responsibly address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.55 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
As a final note, an important caveat must be laid down. The Court's ruling should not in any way be misconstrued as coddling the occupant of the property, at the expense of the lawful owner. Rather, what this resolution seeks to impress is that even the legal owner of the property cannot conveniently usurp possession against a possessor, through a summary action for ejectment, without proving the essential requisites thereof. Accordingly, should the owner choose to file an action for unlawful detainer, it is imperative for him/her to first and foremost prove that the occupation was based on his/her permission or tolerance. Absent which, the owner would be in a better position by pursuing other more appropriate legal remedies.56In the case at bar, the respondents filed an action for unlawful detainer to recover possession of the subject property. In making this choice, they bore the correlative burden to sufficiently allege and prove by a preponderance of evidence all the jurisdictional facts for such action to prosper.
In An Action for Unlawful Detainer, Tolerance or Permission Must Be Present From the Beginning of the Possession and Must Be Proven Clearly and Distinctly |
A perusal of the Complaint filed by the respondents before the MCTC reveals that their action for unlawful detainer was premised on their tolerance of the petitioners' stay therein. As alleged in the Complaint:cralawred
(i) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (ii) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (iii) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (iv) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.57
x x x xSignificantly, in the 1968 landmark case of Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,59 "tolerance" was defined, thus:cralawred
4. That the plaintiffs are the lawful owner[s] and possessor[s] of the [subject property], having acquired the same through purchase by virtue of a cuerpo cierto sale from its owners Julieta Pinar and Generoso Pinar as evidenced by [a] Deed of Sale executed on March 9, 1997, and Affidavit of Non-Improvement executed on April 7, 1997 x x x;
5. That defendants Teresita Dayandayan and Clara Talle asked plaintiffs they be allowed to occupy a portion of the aforesaid parcel of land and construct their house on condition that they would vacate upon demand by plaintiffs;
6. That out of compassion, plaintiffs tolerated the aforesaid defendants to occupy on that condition, without paying any rental;
7. That in the process, said defendants Teresita Dayandayan and Clara Talle, let their respective children stay with them; thus defendants Yolly D. Laguna, daughter of Teresita Dayandayan, and Mr. & Mrs. Rodrigo Rios and Mr. & Mrs. Reden Bignay, children of Clara Talle, are occupying the house that their parents built on the portion of plaintiffs' property;
8. That on January 2009, plaintiffs verbally demanded from all defendants to vacate the premises as plaintiffs would now use their lot. However, defendants refused to vacate;
x x x x
10. That to give them another chance, on February 8, 2009, plaintiffs demanded from defendants to vacate the premises, but despite receipt of the demand letter, they refused and still refuse such valid and legal demand. x x x58 (Emphasis supplied)
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are "those which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which one's property can give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy." He adds that: "[t]hey are acts of little disturbances which a person, in the interest of neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to do on his property, such as passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting some water from a well." And, Tolentino continues, even though "this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by prescription." Further expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes: There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or license, acts of possession are realized or performed. The question reduces itself to the existence or non-existence of the permission.60 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)In the same vein, Sarona61 further impressed the rule that tolerance must be present at the outset of the possession:cralawred
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer — not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress — in the inferior court — provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court — upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in — and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.62 (Citations omitted)Over the years, the tenets laid down in Sarona have been consistently affirmed in subsequent rulings. As echoed in Dr. Carbonilla v. Abiera, et al.63 and Javelosa, "tolerance always carries with it 'permission' and not merely silence or inaction for silence or inaction is negligence, not tolerance."64 In Javelosa, the Court emphasized that tolerance cannot be confused with indifference or neglect to file an action in court. This doctrine was further reinforced in Lozano v. Fernandez,65 where the Court characterized "tolerance [as] more than mere passivity,"66 and clarified that "inaction should not be confused with tolerance as the latter transcends silence and connotes permission to possess the property subject of an unlawful detainer case."67
The Failure To Raise the Issue of Tolerance Shall Not Bar The Court From Ruling on the Matter |
The petitioner alleges that the respondents had never questioned before the MeTC the fact that their occupancy was by tolerance. x x xMoreover, it is bizarre that the respondents backpedaled, suddenly alleging that the issue regarding tolerance "is a new issue, [which the] petitioners raised for the first time on appeal."80 A simple perusal of the respondents' Complaint before the MCTC reveals that they introduced and alleged the fact of tolerance. They categorically and clearly stated "[t]hat out of compassion, [they] tolerated the aforesaid defendants [petitioners] to occupy on that condition, without paying any rental."81 In view of their very own assertion, the MCTC included the matter of tolerance as among the disputed issues in the case.82 Obviously, it was the respondents who first broached the subject of tolerance. They cannot dodge an issue which they themselves introduced.
x x x x
Regardless of the defenses raised by the respondents, the petitioner was required to properly allege and prove when the respondents entered the property and that it was the petitioner or his predecessors, not any other persons, who granted the respondents permission to enter and occupy the property. Furthermore, it was not the respondents' defense that proved fatal to the case but the petitioner's contradictory statements in his amended complaint which he even reiterated in his other pleadings.
Although the respondents did not use the word "tolerance" before the MeTC, they have always questioned the existence of the petitioner's tolerance. In their Answer to Amended Complaint, the respondents negated the possibility of their possession of the property under the petitioner and his lessor's tolerance when the respondents alleged to have occupied the premises even before the lessor acquired the property in 1991. They said as much in their Position Paper[.]79
Respondents Failed to Prove An Overt Act Signifying their Tolerance of Petitioners' Stay in the Subject Property |
This evidentiary situation only leaves us with the petitioner's affidavit. The affidavit only makes the sweeping statement that the respondents entered the subject lot with her consent and occupied it by mere tolerance. The petitioner failed to present convincing proof of her allegation of tolerance. There is no competent evidence to support her claim other than her own self-serving affidavit repeating her allegations in the complaint. Allegations are not evidence and without evidence, bare allegations do not prove facts.92 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)All told, the action for unlawful detainer must be dismissed due to the respondents' failure to establish the necessary averments for their action to prosper. However, the respondents are not left without a remedy in law. They may avail of other more appropriate legal remedies to obtain possession of the subject property before the proper regional trial court.
Very truly yours, (SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG III |
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 4-19.
2 Id. at 87-93; penned by Associate Justice Edward B. Contreras, with Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos (now a Member of this Court) and Renato C. Francisco, concurring.
3 Id. at 94-95.
4 Id. at 33.
5 Id. at 30; 138-139.
6 Id. at 30.
7 Id. at 36-37.
8 Id. at 31.
9 Id. at 29-32.
10 Id. at 38-43.
11 Id. at 40.
12 Id. at 39.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 70-77; penned by Presiding Judge Leda L. Nicol.
15 Id. at 75-76.
16 Id. at 77.
17 Id. at 78-83; penned by Presiding Judge Clinton C. Nuevo.
18 Id. at 82.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 83.
23 Id. at 84-86.
24 Id. at 86.
25 Id. at 87-93.
26 Id. at 90.
27 Id. at 90-91.
28 Id. at 91-92.
29 Id. at 92.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 15.
32 Id. at 15-16.
33 Id. at 13-14.
34 Id. at 14.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 17.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 143.
39 Id. at 144.
40 Id. at 149-150.
41 Id. at 149.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 150.
44 Id. at 149.
45 CIVIL CODE, Art. 428.
46Eversley Childs Sanitarium v. Barbarona, G.R. No. 195814, April 4, 2018, 860 SCRA 283, 305. (Citation omitted)
47 Id.
48Heirs of Alfonso Yusingco v. Busilak, G.R. No. 210504, January 24, 2018, 852 SCRA 631, 640. (Citation omitted)
49 Id.
50Suarezv. Sps. Emboy, Jr., 729 Phil. 315, 329-330 (2014), citing Spouses Valdez, Jr. v. CA, 523 Phil. 39 (2006).
51Javelosa v. Tapus, G.R. No. 204361, July 4, 2018, 870 SCRA 496, 509-510, citing Suarez v. Sps. Emboy, Jr., supra note 50.
52 745 Phil. 40 (2014).
53 214 Phil. 216 (1992).
54Javelosa v. Tapus, supra.
55 Supra at 225, 227.
56Javelosa v. Tapus, supra note 51 at 514-515.
57Suarez v. Sps. Emboy, Jr., supra note 50 at 330.
58Rollo, pp. 30-31.
59 G.R. No. L-22984, March 27, 1968, 131 SCRA 363.
60 Id. at 372-373.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 373.
63 639 Phil. 473 (2010).
64 Id. at 482.
65 G.R. No. 212979, February 18, 2019.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69De Guzman-Fuerte v. Estomo, G.R. No. 223399, April 23, 2018, 862 SCRA 382, 399-400, citing Ocampo v. Heirs of Bernardino Dionisio, 744 Phil. 716, 724 (2014).
70 532 Phil. 714 (2006).
71 Supra.
72 Id. at 400.
73Jose v. Alfuerto, 699 Phil. 307, 318 (2012).
74 744 Phil. 201 (2014).
75Jose v. Alfuerto, et al., supra.
76Quijano v. Amante, supra note 52 at 52.
77 Javelosa v. Tapus, supra note 51 at 513, citing Dr. Carbonilla v. Abiera, et al., supra note 63 at 482.
78Jose v. Alfuerto, et al., supra note 73.
79 Id. at 322-323.
80Rollo, p. 143.
81 Id. at 30.
82 Id. at 73.
83 Id. at 30.
84 768 Phil. 224 (2015).
85 Id. at 237.
86Rollo, p. 64.
87 Id. at 62-63.
88 Id. at 65.
89 Id. at 66.
90 Id. at 68.
91Zosima Incorporated v. Salimbagat, 694 Phil. 636 (2012), citing RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Section The New Testament Church of God v. CA, 316 Phil. 330, 333 (1995); and Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84966, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 160, 168.
92 Supra note 84 at 237-238.