SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 219431, August 24, 2020
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND G.R. NO. 219431 BEATRIZ GARCIA, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES ARNEL CRICELA SORIANO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
INTING, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 451 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated December 2, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated June 2, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 05485.
"That [petitioners] are given a grace period of six (6) months to one (1) year from date of signing this agreement to repurchase/redeem the two (2) parcels of land subject matter of this case and covered by TCT No. T-23868 and T.D. No. 3582. During this period, [petitioners] will look for an amount or buyers, and if able to dispose will give the amount of P300.000.00 to the [respondents] as repurchase/redemption price and interest/produce unearned interest for almost 14 years;On June 4, 2007, the RTC issued an Order (subject judgment based on compromise agreement) approving the aforesaid compromise agreement. Subsequently, petitioners failed to pay respondents the sum of f 300,000.00 within the one-year period under the subject judgment based on compromise agreement. Consequently, on September 9, 2008, respondents moved for the execution of the judgment and prayed that petitioners be ordered to deliver possession and ownership of Lot 3 (subject property), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-23868, and execute the corresponding deed of absolute sale in favor of respondents.6
That should [petitioners] failed (sic) to produce such amount or sell the above-mentioned properties within (the) period granted, then [petitioners] shall immediately turnover and deliver possession and ownership of Lot No. 3 covered by TCT No. T-23868 with an area of 513 square meters located at Poblacion, Tanuan, Leyte, and that, a Deed of Absolute Sale shall be executed by [petitioners] in favor of [respondents];
That the other parcel of land covered by TD No. 3582, Cad. Lot No. 3210 with an area of 1.2971 hectares located at Guingawan, Tabontabon, Leyte shall be retained by the [petitioners], and that, [respondents] as (a) gesture of compassion and reconciliation are willing to part the said property in favor of [petitioners];
That the parties agreed to abide (by) the terms and conditions of this compromise agreement, and [respondents] are willing to withdraw the complaint against [petitioners];
x x x"5
"As the Court extended its help to the parties to be able to come up with an amicable settlement, finally, the [petitioners] prayed the Court that he be given up to April 30, 2009 to comply with the Compromise Agreement, the Court, with the permission of the [respondents], approved it, provided it is the last the time the Court will give to [petitioners].On April 28, 2009, petitioners alleged that they informed respondents that they are ready and able to pay the sum of P300,000.00, but respondents refused to accept the payment. On even date, petitioners filed a manifestation before the RTC that they are willing to pay the aforesaid sum.8
The Court, therefore, resets the hearing of this case to May 8, 2009 at 8:30 a.m.
SO ORDERED.7
"Whereas, judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise is not appealable, and is immediately executory, hence, the same is now final and executory.On June 1, 2009, petitioners filed a motion to quash writ of execution on the ground that execution is premature and constitutes a denial of due process in view of the extension of time for petitioners to pay the stipulated sum granted by the trial court in its Order dated January 30, 2009; and that execution would result in injustice as petitioners exerted utmost effort to raise the stipulated sum in order to retain the subject property that they acquired through their hard work.11
Whereas, [respondents] on April 29, 2009 filed with the court motion for execution of the above-mentioned compromise agreement, and accordingly allowed the issuance of this Writ of Execution."10
At the outset, the Court notes that the execution proceedings subject of this case was unnecessarily drawn-out, because the RTC erroneously permitted petitioners to resort to improper remedies.Issues
The Court deems the proper issues for resolution to be as follows:I.
Whether petitioners availed themselves of the proper remedies.II.
Whether the proper party litigants validly entered into a new or modified compromise agreement which superseded the judgment based on compromise agreement.III.
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the subject writ of execution to enforce the subject judgment based on compromise agreement.The Court's Ruling
The Court affirms the ruling of the, CA but for different reasons.
Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.The spirit or rationale of the foregoing rule is to require the movant to raise all available grounds for relief in a single opportunity in order to avoid multiple and piece-meal objections.19 In the present case, the second motion to quash raised additional arguments to support or amplify those contained in the first motion to quash, but which arguments were already available prior to and at the time of filing of the first motion to quash. Thus, such additional arguments are deemed waived and can no longer be raised in the second motion to quash by virtue of the Omnibus Motion Rule.
Certain it is x x x that execution of final and executory judgments may no longer be contested and prevented, and no appeal should He therefrom: otherwise, cases would be interminable, and there would be negation of the overmastering need to end litigations.
There may, to be sure, be instances when an error may be committed in the course of execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party. These instances, rare though they may be, do call for correction by a superior court, as where -
1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust;
3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
4) it appears that the controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of the court;
5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or,
6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari) or by a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.23Resultantly, flowing from the patent infirmities of the second motion to quash, the Order dated June 4, 2009 denying petitioners' first motion to quash attained finality; hence, the execution of the subject judgment based on compromise agreement should have proceeded as a matter of course.
The issue involving the validity of a compromise agreement notwithstanding a final judgment is not novel. Jesalva v. Bautista upheld a compromise agreement that covered cases pending trial, on appeal, and with final judgment. The Court noted that Article 204028 (of the Civil Code) impliedly allowed such agreements; there was no limitation as to when these should be entered into. Palanca v. Court of Industrial Relations sustained a compromise agreement, notwithstanding a final judgment in which only the amount of back wages was left to be determined. The Court found no evidence of fraud or of any showing that the agreement was contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.In the case at bar, there was nothing to prevent the parties from entering into a new or modified compromise agreement even after the subject judgment based on compromise agreement attained finality. Nonetheless, the Court holds that petitioners failed to convincingly show that respondents consented or agreed to this new or modified compromise agreement, which purported to supersede the subject judgment based on compromise agreement.
Gatchalian v. Arlegui upheld the right to compromise prior to the execution of a final judgment. The Court ruled that the final judgment had been novated and superseded by a compromise agreement. Also, Northern Lines, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals recognized the right to compromise final and executory judgments, as long as such right was exercised by the proper party litigants.
x x x x
There is no justification to disallow a compromise agreement, solely because it was entered into after final judgment. The validity of the agreement is determined by compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts, not by when it was entered into. As provided by the law on contracts, a valid compromise must have the following elements: (1) the consent of the parties to the compromise, (2) an object certain that is the subject matter of the compromise, and (3) the cause of the obligation that is established.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Tender of payment, without more, produces no effect; rather, tender of payment must be followed by a valid consignation in order to produce the effect of payment and extinguish an obligation.In the present case, petitioners failed to perform such valid consignation of payment. Before the Court, and up to this point in these proceedings, they merely reiterate that they are willing and able in earnest to pay the sum of P300,000.00 to respondents, if so ordered.36 The net effect of their lack of valid consignation of payment is that petitioners would have been, likewise, in default under the terms of the new or modified compromise agreement; thus, giving rise to the right of respondents to move for execution of the subject judgment based on compromise agreement. In short, the issuance of the subject writ of execution would still be proper.
Tender of payment is but a preparatory act to consignation. It is the manifestation by the debtor of a desire to comply with or pay an obligation. If refused without just cause, the tender of payment will discharge the debtor of the obligation to pay but only after a valid consignation of the sum due shall have been made with the proper court.35
Endnotes:
* Designated additional member per Raffle dated August 19, 2020.
** On official leave.
1Rollo, pp. 10-22.
2Id. at 23-36; penned by Associate Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla with Associate Justices Ramon Paul L. Hernando (now a Member of the Court) and Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan, concurring.
3Id. at 37-39; penned by Associate Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla with Associate Justices Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap and Renato C. Francisco, concurring.
4Id. at 24.
5Id. at 24-25.
6Id. at 25-26.
7Id. at 26.
8Id. at 26-27.
9Id. at 27.
10Id. at 27-28.
11Id. at 28.
12Id.
13Id. at 28-29.
14Id. at 29-30.
15Id. at 30.
16Id.
17 Formerly Section 8, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
18 Administrative Matter No. 19-10-20-SC (Approved: 15 October 2019; Effectivity: 01 May 2020).
19Manacop v. Court of Appeals, 290 Phil. 271. 279 (1992).
20Limpin, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 231 Phil. 466, 474 (1987). Citations omitted.
21Id.
22Reburiano v. CA, 361 Phil. 294. 301-302 (1999).
23Limpin, Jr. v. intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 20 at 472-474.
24Magbanua v. Uy, 497 Phil. 511, 525-526 (2005).
25Id.
26Id.
27Id.
28 ARTICLE 2040. If after a litigation has been decided by a final judgment, a compromise should be agreed upon, either or both parlies being unaware of the existence of the final judgment, the compromise may be rescinded.
Ignorance of a judgment which may be revoked or set aside is not a valid ground for attacking a compromise.
29Magbanua v. Uy, supra note 24. at 521-522. Citations omitted.
30Rollo, p. 52.
31Id. at 61.
32 There is an unreruted allegation by respondents that respondents Spouses Cricela and Arnel Soriano have children, id. at 57.
33Id. at 13.
34 595 Phil. 265 (2008).
35Id. at 277.
36Rollo.p. 18.
37Zabat, Jr. v. CA, 226 Phil. 489 (1986).