FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 229372, August 27, 2020
MARYVILLE MANILA, INC., Petitioner, v. LLOYD C. ESPINOSA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LOPEZ, J.:
The reasonable link between the seafarer's illnesses and nature of work is the main issue in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Court of Appeal's (CA) Decision1 dated September 1, 2016 in CA-G.R. SP No. 138222, which reversed and set aside the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
At the outset, while it may be conceded that the instant complaint was only filed several months after the complainant's repatriation and that there was no record at all that shows that complainant was repatriated due to his present illness, this Office, however, cannot help but consider the glaring fact that complainant, for one reason or another, had failed to finish his last contract with respondent, x x x [T]his Office finds the respondents' allegation that it was complainant who requested for his early repatriation bereft of any evidentiary support. As correctly pointed out by the complainant, respondents could have easily presented pertinent evidence, [i.e.] master's report, to prove such an allegation. This notwithstanding, respondents, for no apparent valid reason, lifted no finger to do so, thus, renders their stance, highly suspect, x x xDissatisfied, both parties appealed to the NLRC. Maryville Manila and Maryville Maritime maintained that Lloyd is not entitled to any disability benefit. In contrast, Lloyd argued that the LA should grant him double compensation benefit due to disability in high risk areas.9 On August 29, 2014, the NLRC reversed the LA's findings and dismissed Lloyd's complaint. It ratiocinated that Lloyd failed to establish that he was repatriated for medical reasons. Also, it held that the reportorial requirement applies to claims for disability compensation. Lastly, there was no reason to relax the requirement absent evidence that Lloyd was incapacitated to submit himself to post-employment medical examination before the company-designated physician or that he had submitted a written notice to that effect,10 viz.:cralawredx x x x
In addition, anent the respondents' contention that complainant failed to report within three days after his repatriation, be that as it may, this, albeit assailed by complainant, does not detract from the complainant's entitlement to full disability compensation. It should be stressed that compliance with the provision of the POEA Contract on the reportorial requirement is a condition [sine qua non] only for claiming sickness allowance and not for a total permanent disability benefits, x x x
Thus, granting that complainant had failed to report within three days, albeit he insisted that he indeed reported but respondents refused to accommodate him, complainant had merely waived, in effect, his right to sickness allowance and never his complaint for total and permanent disability.x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the complainant entitled to total and permanent disability benefits in the amount of USD 60,000.00 under the POEA Contract, [sic] and attorney's fee equivalent to ten percent of the said amount.
However, all other claims, including the claim for moral and exemplary damages are denied for lack of factual basis.
SO ORDERED.8 (Emphases supplied.)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents' appeal is GRANTED and the Labor Arbiter's Decision dated February 28, 2014 is VACATED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby entered DISMISSING complainant-appellant's complaint for total and permanent disability benefits. Accordingly, his partial appeal is DENIED for lack of meritUnsuccessful at a reconsideration,12 Lloyd elevated the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 138222. On September 1, 2016, the CA set aside the NLRC's Decision and reinstated the LA's award of total and permanent disability benefits. The CA cited Baron, et al. v. EPE Transport, Inc., et al.13 and Barros v. NLRC14 and ruled that the burden rests upon Maryville Manila and Maryville Maritime to prove that Lloyd was not medically repatriated. It also cited Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc., et al. v. Serna15 and held that Lloyd sought medical examination but was refused, thus:cralawred
SO ORDERED.11
There is no dispute that the Petitioner was repatriated before the end of his contract with the Private Respondent. The parties, however, cannot agree on the reason for such repatriation. As there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the Petitioner's repatriation, the issue will, therefore, be resolved in like manner as claims for illegal dismissal, which means that the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause.Maryville Manila moved for a reconsideration but was denied.17 Hence, this recourse. Maryville Manila argued that the CA erred in evaluating the parties' evidence in certiorari proceedings and insisted that Lloyd was neither repatriated for medical reason nor refused medical treatment.18chanrobleslawx x x x
As for the post-employment medical examination requirement, both the Petitioner and the Private Respondents failed to present supporting evidence of their contrasting claims. On the part of the Petitioner, he failed to show proof that he was refused medical examination while, on the part of the Private Respondents, the latter failed to present proof that the Petitioner made such a request. Pertinent on this score is the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Career Philippines Shipmanagemeni, Inc., et al. v. Serna, viz.:xxx While Serna's verified claim with respect to his July 14, 1999 visit to the petitioner's office may be seen by some as a bare allegation, we note that the petitioners' corresponding denial is itself also a bare allegation that, worse, is unsupported by other evidence on record. [In contrast, the events that transpired after the July 14, 1999 visit, as extensively discussed by the CA above, effectively served to corroborate Serna's claim on the visit's purpose, i.e., to seek medical assistance.] Under these circumstances, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when it affirmed the labor arbiter ruling and gave credence to Serna on this point. Under the evidentiary rules, a positive assertion is generally entitled to more weight than a plain denial.Using the foregoing as baseline, it could thus be concluded that, first, as between the Petitioner and the Private Respondents' contrasting claims, the Petitioner's positive assertion that he sought, but was refused, medical examination is entitled to more weight than the Private Respondents' bare denial and, second, the lack of a post-medical examination in this case cannot be used to defeat respondent's [Petitioner, in this case] claim since the failure to subject the seafarer to this requirement was not due to the seafarer's fault but to the inadvertence or deliberate refusal of petitioners [Private Respondents, in this case]. Needless to stress, the time-honored rule that, in controversies between a laborer and his employer, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence should be resolved in the former's favor in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor finds application at bench.
We note on this point that the obligation imposed by the mandatory reporting requirement under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 1996 POEA-SEC is not solely on the seafarer. It requires the employer to likewise act on the report, and in this sense partakes of the nature of a reciprocal obligation. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, and where each party is effectively a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. While the mandatory reporting requirement obliges the seafarer to be present for the post-employment medical examination, which must be conducted within three (3) working days upon the seafarer's return, it also poses the employer the implied obligation to conduct a meaningful and timely examination of the seafarer.x x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed dispositions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.16 (Emphases supplied.)
The labor arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA are one in finding that on July 14, 1999, or two days after his repatriation, Serna reported to the office of Career Phils, specifically to report his medical complaints, only to be told to wait for his referral to company-designated physicians. The referral came not on the following day, but nearly three (3) weeks after, on August 3, 1999.Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. is far different from Lloyd's case. Here, there is no unanimous and definite finding that Lloyd timely reported to the company-designated physician. The LA even brushed aside this issue and held that compliance with the reportorial requirement applies only to claims for sickness allowance and not to disability benefits. On the other hand, the NLRC found that Lloyd "failed to substantiate his allegations that he sought respondent-appellants' help for his purported medical condition and that the same was refused.'"26 On appeal, the CA ruled that Lloyd's "assertion that he sought, but was refused, medical examination is entitled to more weight than the Private Respondents ' bare denial x x x."27 In these circumstances, we agree with the NLRC that Lloyd did not report to the company-designated physician. Again, it is Lloyd who has the duty to establish his affirmative allegation that he submitted himself to post-medical examination after his repatriation. Nevertheless, Lloyd failed to present substantial evidence to prove this assertion. In contrast, Maryville Manila, which denies such allegation, has no burden to produce such proof.
We see no reason to disturb the lower tribunals' finding, x x xx x x x
The petitioners failed to perform their obligation of providing timely medical examination, thus rendering meaningless Scrna's compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement. With his July 14, 1999 visit, Serna clearly lived up to his end of the agreement; it was the petitioners who defaulted on theirs. They cannot now be heard to claim that Serna should forfeit the right to claim disability benefits under the POEA-SEC and their CBA.
The Court has in the past, under unique circumstances, sustained the award of disability benefits even if the seafarer's disability had been assessed by a personal physician. In Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC, we affirmed the grant by the CA and by the NLRC of disability benefits to a claimant, based on the recommendation of a physician not designated by the employer. The "claimant consulted a physician of his choice when the company-designated physician refused to examine him." In Cabuyoc v. Inter-Orient Navigation Shipmanagement, Inc., we reinstated the NLRC's decision, affirmatory of that of the labor arbiter, which awarded sickness wages to the petitioner therein even if his disability had been assessed by the Philippine General Hospital, not by a companydesignated hospital. Similar to the case at bar, the seafarer in Cabuyoc initially sought medical assistance from the respondent employer but it refused to extend him help.25 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted.)
[S]eafarer's complaints for disability benefits arise from (1) injury or illness that manifests or is discovered during the term of the seafarer's contract, which is usually while the seafarer is on board the vessel or (2) illness that manifests or is discovered after the contract, which is usually after the seafarer has disembarked from the vessel. As further explained below, it is only in the first scenario that Section 20(A) of the POEA-SEC applies.In this case, Lloyd was diagnosed with "Occupational Stress Disorder (Work-related); Hypomanic Mood Disorder, to consider; Bipolar Condition; R/O Schizophrenic Episode; and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder"31 after the term of his contract. These conditions are not listed as occupational illnesses under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC. As such, Lloyd is required to prove the reasonable link between his illnesses and nature of work. Lloyd must establish the risks involved in his work, his illnesses were contracted as a result of his exposure to the risks, the diseases were contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract them, and he was not notoriously negligent. Yet, Lloyd failed to pass the reasonable linkage test.x x x x
Accordingly, it was an error for the CA to rely on Section 20(A) of the POEA-SEC. Section 20(A) applies only if the seafarer suffers from an illness or injury during the term of his contract, i.e., while he is employed. Section 20(A) of the POEA-SEC clearly states the parameters of its applicability:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR
ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:x x x x
Based on the foregoing, if the seafarer suffers from an illness or injury during the term of the contract, the process in Section 20(A) applies. The employer is obliged to continue to pay the seafarer's wages, and to cover the cost of treatment and medical repatriation, if needed. After medical repatriation, the seafarer has the duty to report to the company-designated physician within three days upon his return. The employer shall then pay sickness allowance while the seafarer is being treated. And thereafter, the dispute resolution mechanism with regard to the medical assessments of the company-designated, seafarer-appointed, and independent and third doctor, shall apply.x x x x
In instances where the illness manifests itself or is discovered after the term of the seafarer's contract, the illness may either be (1) an occupational illness listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, in which case, it is categorized as a work-related illness if it complies with the conditions stated in Section 32-A, or (2) an illness not listed as an occupational illness under Section 32-A but is reasonably linked to the work of the seafarer.
For the first type, the POEA-SEC has clearly defined a work-related illness as "any sickness as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied." What this means is that to be entitled to disability benefits, a seafarer must show compliance with the conditions under Section 32-A, as follows:As to the second type of illness — one that is not listed as an occupational disease in Section 32-A — Magsaysay Maritime Services v. Laurel, instructs that the seafarer may still claim provided that he suffered a disability occasioned by a disease contracted on account of or aggravated by working conditions. For this illness, "[i]t is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had." Operationalizing this, to prove this reasonable linkage, it is imperative that the seafarer must prove the requirements under Section 32-A: the risks involved in his work; his illness was contracted as a result of his exposure to the risks; the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and he was not notoriously negligent.
- The seafarer's work must involve the risks described therein;
- The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
- The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and
- There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
x x x x
More importantly, the rule applies that whoever claims entitlement to benefits provided by law should establish his right thereto by substantial evidence which is more than a mere scintilla; it is real and substantial, and not merely apparent. Further, while in compensation proceedings in particular, the test of proof is merely probability and not ultimate degree of certainty, the conclusions of the courts must still be based on real evidence and not just inferences and speculations. (Emphases supplied; citations omitted.)
At any rate, there is no substantial evidence on the link between Lloyd's supposed illnesses and nature of work. Foremost, piracy is a risk confronting all seafarers while in voyage, but the clinical report only made general statements on punishments and deprivation of food, water and liberty. The relationship of the risk and the diseases was not fairly established. There was no proof or explanation as to how Lloyd acquired the illnesses as a result of the hostage incident. The psychologists hastily concluded that Lloyd's conditions started after the piracy. Moreover, Lloyd's actions after the hostage incident are incompatible with the clinical psychologist's findings. Lloyd was repatriated from M/V Renuar on May 5, 2011 but he applied again and was deployed on January, 10, 2012 on board M/V Iron Manolis. There is no indication, during the intervening period of eight months from repatriation to deployment, that Lloyd experienced any sign of the alleged diseases. In fact, Lloyd passed the pre-employment medical examination and was cleared for re-employment. Lloyd even claimed that he "more than fully and ably discharged his duties and responsibilities expected of him on board the vessel."33 Verily, it would be improbable for Lloyd to properly perform his tasks as he claims if he had palpitations, chest pains, tremors, muscle tension, dizziness, upset stomach, fatigue, irritability, restlessness and total lack of sleep. Quite the contrary, these symptoms were belied since Lloyd lasted for seven months in M/V Iron Manolis.
NOI: Occupational Stress Disorder (Work-related); Hypomanic Mood Disorder, to consider Bipolar Condition R/O Schizophrenic Episode; Posttraumatic Stress Disorder; DOI: On repeated and persistent episodes in a series of [e]xacerbations after a traumatic incident in 2012; TOI: Persistent episodes from aforesaid period; POI: MV Renuar, that sailed from Brazil and was in the seas of Iran in February 2012 when sometime during aforesaid period above-named seaman and fellow seamen on board above-named ship were hostage [sic] by Somalian pirated; [sic] and incurring the following: History points out that from above-mentioned dates, above-named patient suffered the following signs and symptoms of palpitations, accompanied with chest pains and tachycardia; tremors, muscle tension, and tingling in the extremities; light-headedness and dizziness; upset stomach; feeling of weakness and fatigue; irritability; restlessness and feeling of being on edge; difficulty concentrating and feeling blank; and wakefulness or total lack of sleep. The condition started when above-named patient and his co-seafarers suffered from punishments, including deprivation from food, water and liberty from Somalian pirates. He was repatriated and had undergone treatment sessions with the undersigned for the following diagnosed conditions, x x x32 (Emphases supplied.)
Endnotes:
1Rollo at 20-B-25-B; penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a Member of this Court) and Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla.
2Id. at 21-A.
3Id. at 21-A.
4Id. at 42-B-43-A.
5Id. at21-B.
6Id.
7Rollo, pp. 115-122.
8Id. at 119-122.
9Id. at 22-A.
10Id. at 124-135.
11Id. at 134.
12Id. at 137-139.
13 765 Phil. 866(2015).
14 373 Phil. 635(1999).
15 700 Phil. 1 (2012).
16Rollo, pp. 23-25.
17Id. at 26-A-27.
18Id. at 10-B-16-B.
19Paredes v. Feed the Children Philippines., Inc., et al., 769 Phil. 418, 434 (2015), citing Univac Development, Inc. v. Soriano, 711 Phil. 516, 525 (2013).
20Id., citing Diamond Taxi, et al. v. Llamas, Jr., 729 Phil. 364, 376 (2014).
21Paredes v. Feed the Children Philippines., Inc., et al., 769 Phil. 418, 435 (2015), citing Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Molon, 704 Phil. 120 (2013).
22Id., citing Plastimer Industrial Corporation, et al. v. Gopo, et al., 658 Phil. 627, 633 (2011).
23Sevillana v. I.T. (International) Corp./Samir Maddah & Travellers Insurance & Surety Corp., 408 Phil. 570,583-584(2001).
24Sambalilo, et al. v. Sps. Llarenas, 811 Phil. 552, 568 (2017). See also Princess Talent Center Production. Inc., et al. v. Masagca, 829 Phil. 381 (2018).
25Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc., et al, v. Serna, 700 Phil. 1, 14-16 (2012).
26Rollo, p. 131.
27Id. at 24-B.
28C.F. Sharp Crew Mgm'l., Inc., et al. v. Legal Heirs of the late Godofredo Repiso, 780 Phil. 645, 665- 666(2016).
29 See POEA Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 2010, dated October 26, 2010.
30 G.R. No. 238578, June 8,2020.
31 Supra note 4.
32Rollo, pp. 42-B-43-B.
33Id. at 49.
34Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency, Inc., et al, 698 Phil. 170, 184 (2012). See also Loadstar International Shipping, Inc. v. Yamson, et al., 830 Phil. 73 1, 746 (2018).
35Auza, Jr., et al. v. MOL Phils, Inc., et al., 699 Phil. 62, 67 (2012), citing Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission (2nd Div.), 351 Phil. 1013, 1020(1998).
36In Panganiban v. TARA TradingShipmanagement, Inc., et al., 647 Phil. 675 (2010), this Court affirmed the award of P50,000.00 financial assistance. In Villaruel v. Yeo Han Guan, 665 Phil. 212, 221 (2011), this Court granted financial assistance of P50,000.00. In Loadstar International Shipping, Inc. v. Yamson, et al., supra note 34, this Court awarded P75,000.00 financial assistance. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Antonio, 618 Phil. 601, 614-615 (2009), this Court gave financial assistance of P100,000.00.