FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 48100. June 20, 1941. ]
FLORENCIO PELOBELLO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. GREGORIO PALATINO, Respondent-Appellee.
Rodriquez & Aclaro for Appellant.
Cecilio Maneja for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. PARDON; SCOPE AND EXTENT. — The pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. While there may be force in the argument which finds support in well considered cases that the effect of absolute pardon should not be extended to cases of this kind, we are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction.
2. ID.; ID.; EFFECT ON RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE. — In the case at bar, it is admitted that the respondent mayor-elect committed the offense more than twenty-five years ago; that he had already merited conditional pardon from the Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he had exercise the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December, 1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive.
2. ID.; ID.; EFFECT ON RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE. — In the case at bar, it is admitted that the respondent mayor-elect committed the offense more than twenty-five years ago; that he had already merited conditional pardon from the Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he had exercise the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December, 1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive.
D E C I S I O N
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner-appellant, Florencio Pelobello, instituted quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas against the respondent-appellee, Gregorio Palatino, the mayor-elect of the municipality of Torrijos, Province of Marinduque. The proceedings were had pursuant to the provisions of section 167, in relation with section 94 (a), of the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357). It was alleged that the respondent-appellee, having been convicted by final judgment in 1912 of atentado cointra la autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to imprisonment for two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, was disqualified from voting and being voted upon for the contested municipal office, such disqualification not having been removed by plenary pardon.
The fact of conviction as above set forth is admitted; so is the election and consequent proclamation of the respondent-appellee for the office of municipal mayor. It is also admitted that the respondent-appellee was granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon back in 1915; and it has been proven (Vide Exhibit 1, admitted by the lower court, rec. of ap., p. 20) that on December 25, 1940, His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, granted the respondent- appellee absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights.
The question presented is whether or not the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction under paragraph (a) of section 94 of the Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office (sec. 4, Election Code). Without the necessity of inquiring into the historical background of the benign prerogative of mercy, we adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador, G. R. No. 47941, promulgated December 7, 1940, that subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. While there may be force in the argument which finds support in well considered cases that the effect of absolute pardon should not be extended to cases of this kind, we are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. In the case at bar, it is admitted that the respondent mayor-elect committed the offense more than 25 years ago; that he had already merited conditional pardon from the Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December, 1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant. So ordered.
Avancena, C.J., Diaz and Moran, JJ., concur.
HORRILLENO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A modo de preliminar, y para evitar que se me entienda equivocadamente, es preciso hacer constar que no discuto la prerrogativa constitucional del Jefe Ejecutivo de otorgar indultos. Tal poder esta para mi fuera de toda discusion.
Los hechos en este asunto son como los expone la mayoria en su decision.
Pareceme erronea la aplicacion del caso de Cristobal contra Labrador y otros (R. G. No. 47941) al presente. No existe paridad entre uno y otro. En el primero, el recurrido principal, Teofilo C. Santos, obtuvo indulto condicional mucho antes de las elecciones en que se inscribio como elector y se presento como candidato a un cargo municipal. Admitiendo como buena la opinion de la mayo ria en dicho asunto, Santos, al registrarse como elector, ya habia recobrado sus derechos civiles y politicos; ya no estaba incapacitado para votar, segun el articulo 94 del Codigo Electoral. En el presente, Gregorio Palatino, el apelado, cuando se inscribio como elector, no poseia las condiciones que requiere el mencionado codigo. Pues esta admitido que el fue convicto del delito de atentado contra la autoridad y sus agentes, en virtud de una sentencia firme y definitiva, el año 1912; y que, si bien consiguio indulto del entonce Gobernador General de Filipinas el año 1912; y que, si bien consiguio indulto del entonces Gobernador General de Filipinas el año 1915, tal indulto fue condicional, en el no se le reintegraban expresamente sus derechos civiles y politicos. Es evidente, pues, que, bajo las disposiciones del articulo 94 del Codigo Electoral, dicho apelado no podia legalmente ser elector en las elecciones del 10 de diciembre de 1940; por tanto, no estaba calificado para ser electo al cargo de alcalde se su municipio (art. 2174, Codigo Administrativo Revisado). El indulto absoluto concedido por su Excelencia, el Presidente de Filipinas, lo fue el 25 de diciembre de 1940, o sea, 15 diad despues de las elecciones, y despues de habersele proclamado como el candidato electo para alcalde de su municipio. No existe, por consiguiente, identidad entre el caso de Cristobal contra Labrador y el que ahora nos ocupa. Este, siguiendo el principio enunciado por la mayoria en su decision, es de consecuencias mas remotas, mas transcendentales todavia, pues en el se retrotraen los efectos del indulto a fechas anteriores a la de las elecciones mismas, que se verificaron el 10 de dicimebre de 1940; esto es, que el apelado, por el decreto de indulto de 25 de diciembre del repetido año 1940, se le considera habilitado para ser elector en las mencionadas elecciones, y, por ende, eligible al cargo para el cual se habia presentado como candidato. Pero no es esto todo. Dejamos dicho que el apelado no era elector calificado en las ultimas del 10 de diciembre de 1940. Por tanto, al prestar juramento e inscribirse en el censo electoral como elector calificado, no siendolo, cometio el delito castigado por el articulo 179, en relacion con los articulos 177 y 94 del Codigo Electoral; por el cual delitopuede y debe ser acusado. Ahora bien; en el suspuesto de que lo fuera,
The fact of conviction as above set forth is admitted; so is the election and consequent proclamation of the respondent-appellee for the office of municipal mayor. It is also admitted that the respondent-appellee was granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon back in 1915; and it has been proven (Vide Exhibit 1, admitted by the lower court, rec. of ap., p. 20) that on December 25, 1940, His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, granted the respondent- appellee absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights.
The question presented is whether or not the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction under paragraph (a) of section 94 of the Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by law for assuming office (sec. 4, Election Code). Without the necessity of inquiring into the historical background of the benign prerogative of mercy, we adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador, G. R. No. 47941, promulgated December 7, 1940, that subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction; and that when granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. While there may be force in the argument which finds support in well considered cases that the effect of absolute pardon should not be extended to cases of this kind, we are of the opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction. In the case at bar, it is admitted that the respondent mayor-elect committed the offense more than 25 years ago; that he had already merited conditional pardon from the Governor-General in 1915; that thereafter he had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December, 1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive. We, therefore, give efficacy to executive action and disregard what at bottom is a technical objection.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant. So ordered.
Avancena, C.J., Diaz and Moran, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
HORRILLENO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A modo de preliminar, y para evitar que se me entienda equivocadamente, es preciso hacer constar que no discuto la prerrogativa constitucional del Jefe Ejecutivo de otorgar indultos. Tal poder esta para mi fuera de toda discusion.
Los hechos en este asunto son como los expone la mayoria en su decision.
Pareceme erronea la aplicacion del caso de Cristobal contra Labrador y otros (R. G. No. 47941) al presente. No existe paridad entre uno y otro. En el primero, el recurrido principal, Teofilo C. Santos, obtuvo indulto condicional mucho antes de las elecciones en que se inscribio como elector y se presento como candidato a un cargo municipal. Admitiendo como buena la opinion de la mayo ria en dicho asunto, Santos, al registrarse como elector, ya habia recobrado sus derechos civiles y politicos; ya no estaba incapacitado para votar, segun el articulo 94 del Codigo Electoral. En el presente, Gregorio Palatino, el apelado, cuando se inscribio como elector, no poseia las condiciones que requiere el mencionado codigo. Pues esta admitido que el fue convicto del delito de atentado contra la autoridad y sus agentes, en virtud de una sentencia firme y definitiva, el año 1912; y que, si bien consiguio indulto del entonce Gobernador General de Filipinas el año 1912; y que, si bien consiguio indulto del entonces Gobernador General de Filipinas el año 1915, tal indulto fue condicional, en el no se le reintegraban expresamente sus derechos civiles y politicos. Es evidente, pues, que, bajo las disposiciones del articulo 94 del Codigo Electoral, dicho apelado no podia legalmente ser elector en las elecciones del 10 de diciembre de 1940; por tanto, no estaba calificado para ser electo al cargo de alcalde se su municipio (art. 2174, Codigo Administrativo Revisado). El indulto absoluto concedido por su Excelencia, el Presidente de Filipinas, lo fue el 25 de diciembre de 1940, o sea, 15 diad despues de las elecciones, y despues de habersele proclamado como el candidato electo para alcalde de su municipio. No existe, por consiguiente, identidad entre el caso de Cristobal contra Labrador y el que ahora nos ocupa. Este, siguiendo el principio enunciado por la mayoria en su decision, es de consecuencias mas remotas, mas transcendentales todavia, pues en el se retrotraen los efectos del indulto a fechas anteriores a la de las elecciones mismas, que se verificaron el 10 de dicimebre de 1940; esto es, que el apelado, por el decreto de indulto de 25 de diciembre del repetido año 1940, se le considera habilitado para ser elector en las mencionadas elecciones, y, por ende, eligible al cargo para el cual se habia presentado como candidato. Pero no es esto todo. Dejamos dicho que el apelado no era elector calificado en las ultimas del 10 de diciembre de 1940. Por tanto, al prestar juramento e inscribirse en el censo electoral como elector calificado, no siendolo, cometio el delito castigado por el articulo 179, en relacion con los articulos 177 y 94 del Codigo Electoral; por el cual delitopuede y debe ser acusado. Ahora bien; en el suspuesto de que lo fuera,
