EN BANC
G.R. No. 232579, September 08, 2020
DR. NIXON L. TREYES, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO L. LARLAR, REV. FR. EMILIO L. LARLAR, HEDDY L. LARLAR, ET AL., Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CAGUIOA, J.:
Under the Civil Code, when the brothers and sisters of a deceased married sister survive with her widower, the latter shall be entitled by law to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters to the other half1The Civil Code likewise states that this successional right of the legal heirs is vested in them from the very moment of the decedent's death.2
Given that successional rights are conferred by the Civil Code, a substantive law, the question to be resolved here by the Court is whether a prior determination of the status as a legal or compulsory heir in a separate special proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary civil action seeking for the protection and enforcement of ownership rights given by the law of succession. The Court now definitively settles this question once and for all.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari3 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) filed by petitioner Dr. Nixon L. Treyes (petitioner Treyes) assailing the Decision4 dated August 18, 2016 (assailed Decision) and Resolution5 dated June 1, 2017 (assailed Resolution) promulgated by the Court of Appeals, Cebu City (CA)6 in CA-G.R. SP Case No. 08813, which affirmed the Resolution7 dated July 15, 2014 and Order8 dated August 27, 2014 issued by public respondent Hon. Kathrine A. Go (Go), in her capacity as presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Branch 59 (RTC) in favor of private respondents Antonio L. Larlar (Antonio), Rev. Fr. Emilio L. Larlar (Emilio), Heddy L. Larlar (Heddy), Rene L. Larlar (Rene), Celeste L. Larlar (Celeste), Judy L. Larlar (Judy), and Yvonne L. Larlar (Yvonne) (collectively, the private respondents).
x x x A perusal of the Complaint shows that the causes of action are 1) the Annulment of the Affidavit of Self Adjudication; 2) Reconveyance (3) Partition; and 4) Damages. Hence, the Court has jurisdiction over the first, second and fourth causes of action but no jurisdiction over the third cause of action of Partition and the said cause of action should be dropped from the case.27
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated dated (sic) August 27, 2014, and the Resolution dated July 15, 2014 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.33
III. | The Necessity of a Prior Determination of Heirship in a Separate Special Proceeding |
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter's favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent's lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent's lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x[.]
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.66
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.67
Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by one against another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact. Where a party-litigant seeks to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.72
"[F]rom the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, x x x [t]he right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings."81
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. (953-837a).
Likewise, we are of the opinion that the lower court should not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa Rivera is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceeding No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition.87
Arsenio de Vera, as surviving spouse of the deceased Isabel Domingo, acting for himself and as guardian ad litem of six minors heirs, instituted an action against Cleotilde Galauran in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the annulment of a deed of sale of a registered parcel of land. It is alleged in the complaint that Arsenio de Vera and his wife Isabel Domingo, now deceased, have mortgaged their property to the defendant to secure a loan received from him, but said defendant illegally made them sign a deed which they then believed to be of mortgage and which turned out later to be of pacto de retro sale; and that the six minor children named in the complaint are the legitimate children and legitimate heirs of the deceased Isabel Domingo. A demurrer was interposed by the defendant alleging that the plaintiffs have no cause of action, for they have not been declared legal heirs in a special proceeding. The demurrer was sustained, and, on failure of plaintiffs to amend, the action was dismissed. Wherefore, this appeal.
Unless there is pending a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, the legal heirs may commence an ordinary action arising out of a right belonging to the ancestor, without the necessity of a previous and separate judicial declaration of their status as such.89
Another ground on which the dismissal is predicted is that the complaint states no cause of action because while it appears in the complaint that the land was transferred to one Guadalupe Saralde, deceased wife of Defendant Alejandro Quito, there is no allegation that said Alejandro Quito and his daughter Aida, a co-Defendant, had been [judicially] declared heirs or administrators of the estate of the deceased. Because of this legal deficiency, the court has concluded that Plaintiffs have no cause of action against Defendants because there is no legal bond by which the latter may be linked with the property.
This conclusion is also erroneous. The rule is that, to determine the sufficiency of a cause of action on a motion to dismiss, only the facts alleged in the complaint should be considered, and considering the facts herein alleged, there is enough ground to proceed with the case. Thus, it appears in the complaint that Guadalupe Saralde is the wife of Alejandro Quito, the Defendant, and as said Guadalupe has already died, under the law, the husband and his daughter Aida are the legal heirs. We have already said that in order that an heir may assert his right to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary. It was therefore a mistake to dismiss the complaint on this ground.103
Appellants contend, however, that for Defendant to acquire a vested right to Eugeniano's property, he must first commence proceedings to settle Eugeniano's estate — which he had not done, There is no merit to the contention. This Court has repeatedly held that the right of heirs to the property of the deceased is vested from the moment of death. Of course the formal declaration or recognition or enforcement of such right needs judicial confirmation in proper proceedings. But we have often enforced or protected such rights from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration. Which can only mean that the heir acquired hereditary rights even before judicial declaration in testate or intestate proceedings.105
Inasmuch, however, as succession takes place, by operation of law, "from the moment of the death of the decedent" and "(t)he inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death," it follows that if his heirs were included as defendants in this case, they would be sued, not as "representatives" of the decedent, but as owners of an aliquot interest in the property in question, even if the precise extent of their interest may still be undetermined and they have derived it from the decent. Hence, they may be sued without a previous declaration of heirship x x x.108
The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.110
There is also the issue of the capacity to sue of the petitioners who, it is claimed by the private respondents, are not the proper parties to question the validity of the deed of sale. The reason given is that they are not the legitimate and compulsory heirs of Paulina Baranda nor were they parties to the challenged transactions.
It is not disputed that Paulina Baranda died intestate without leaving any direct descendants or ascendants, or compulsory heirs. She was survived, however, by two brothers, namely, Pedro and Teodoro, and several nephews and nieces, including the private respondents, as well as petitioners Flocerfina Baranda, Salvacion Baranda, and Alipio Baranda Villarte, children of two deceased brothers and a sister. The above-named persons, together with Pedro Baranda, who was not joined as a petitioner because he is the father of the private respondents, and the children of another deceased sister, are the legitimate intestate heirs of Paulina Baranda.
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are the following:cralawred[]Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
[]Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces, who are the children of the descendant's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes
[]Art. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending.
[]In the collateral line it takes place only in favor of the children or brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.[]
As heirs, the petitioners have legal standing to challenge the deeds of sale purportedly signed by Paulina Baranda for otherwise property claimed to belong to her estate will be excluded therefrom to their prejudice. Their claims are not merely contingent or expectant, as argued by the private respondents, but are deemed to have vested in them upon Paulina Baranda's death in 1982, as, under Article 777 of the Civil Code, "the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." While they are not compulsory heirs, they are nonetheless legitimate heirs and so, since they "stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or suit," are entitled to protect their share of successional rights.
This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in interest to commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased, without separate judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said decedent, provided that there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate."112
Title or rights to a deceased person's property are immediately passed to his or her heirs upon death. The heirs' rights become vested without need for them to be declared "heirs". Before the property is partitioned, the heirs are co-owners of the property.
In this case, the rights to Gregoria Lopez's property were automatically passed to her sons — Teodoro, Francisco, and Carlos — when she died in 1922. Since only Teodoro was survived by children, the rights to the property ultimately passed to them when Gregoria Lopez's sons died. The children entitled to the property were Gregorio, Simplicio, Severino, and Enrique.
Gregorio, Simplicio, Severino, and Enrique became co-owners of the property, with each of them entitled to an undivided portion of only a quarter of the property. Upon their deaths, their children became the co-owners of the property, who were entitled to their respective shares, such that the heirs of Gregorio became entitled to Gregorio's one-fourth share, and Simplicio's and Severino's respective heirs became entitled to their corresponding one-fourth shares in the property. The heirs cannot alienate the shares that do not belong to them.117
The dispute in this case is not about the heirship of petitioner to Norberto but the validity of the sale of the property in 1939 from Pedro to Faustina, from which followed a series of transfer transactions that culminated in the sale of the property to Norberto. For with Pedro's sale of the property in 1939, it follows that there would be no more ownership or right to property that would have been transmitted to his heirs.
x x x What petitioner is pursuing is Norberto's right of ownership over the property which was passed to her upon the latter's death.
This Court has stated that no judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may assert his or her right to the property of the deceased. In Marabilles v. Quito:cralawredThe right to assert a cause of action as an heir, although he has not been judicially declared to be so, if duly proven, is well settled in this jurisdiction. This is upon the theory that the property of a deceased person, both real and personal, becomes the property of the heir by the mere fact of death of his predecessor in interest, and as such he can deal with it in precisely the same way in which the deceased could have dealt, subject only to the limitations which by law or by contract may be imposed upon the deceased himself. Thus, it has been held that "[t]here is no legal precept or established rule which imposes the necessity of a previous legal declaration regarding their status as heirs to an intestate on those who, being of age and with legal capacity, consider themselves the legal heirs of a person, in order that they may maintain an action arising out of a right which belonged to their ancestor" [x x x] A recent case wherein this principle was maintained is Cabuyao vs. [C]aagbay.119 (Emphasis supplied)
Endnotes:
1 Art. 1001, CIVIL CODE.
2 Art. 777, CIVIL CODE.
3Rollo, pp. 15-55.
4 Id. at 214-219. Penned by Associate Justice Edward B. Contreras and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos (now a Member of this Court) and Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig.
5 Id. at 223-225.
6 Nineteenth Division.
7Rollo, pp. 288-290.
8 Id. at 317.
9 Id. at 19; see Certificate of Death dated May 2, 2008, id. at 253.
10 Id.
11 Covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-249139, T-554522, M-43623, T-18709, T-18698, T-18699, T-18700, T-18701, T-18757, T-18758, T-18759, T-18760, T-18761, and T-627723; id. at 90-93.
12 Id. at 270-280.
13 Id. at 282-287.
14 Id. at 278, 286.
15 Id. at 235.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 228-241.
19 Id. at 238-239.
20 Supra note 9.
21 Id. at 19-20.
22 Id. at 20.
23 Id. at 227.
24 Id. at 20.
25 Id. at 242-252.
26 Supra note 7.
27 Id. at 289. Emphasis supplied.
28 Id. at 291-305.
29 Id. at 306-309.
30 Id. at 310-316.
31 Supra note 8.
32 Id. at 56-82.
33 Id. at 218.
34 Id. at 318-334.
35 Supra note 5.
36 Id. at 342-358.
37 Id. at 389-404.
38SECTION. 1. Where estate of deceased person settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
39Rollo, p. 16.
40SECTION 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:cralawred(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is enforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, (1a)
41 Supra note 21.
42 Rule 14, Sec. 20, RULES OF COURT, provides:
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (23a)
43Ernesto Oppen, Inc. v. Compas, G.R. No. 203969, October 21, 2015, 773 SCRA 546, 557.
44SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. – If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time of two (2) years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation and order how much and in what manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in the preceding section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such bond and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of two (2) years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have been made.
45 See Rule 72, Sec. 1, RULES OF COURT.
46 Supra note 5.
47 104 Phil. 70 (1958).
48 Art. 1441, CIVIL CODE.
49 Eduardo P. Caguioa, COMMENTS AND CASES ON CIVIL LAW, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Revised 2nd ed. 1983, Vol. IV, p. 673.
50 Id. at 674.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97995, January 21, 1993, 217 SCRA 347.
55 G.R. No. 125715, December 29, 1998, 300 SCRA 653.
56 Id. at 658.
57 Id. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
58Lopez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157784, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 26, 39.
59Gomez v. Montalban, G.R. No. 174414, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 693, 705.
60 Supra note 7.
61 Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
62 G.R. No. 198680, July 8, 2013, 700 SCRA 778.
63 G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999, 304 SCRA 18.
64 G.R. No. 155555, August 16, 2005, 467 SCRA 184.
65 G.R. No. 162956, April 10, 2008, 551 SCRA 86.
66Heirs of Ypon v. Ricaforte, supra note 62 at 784-785. Emphasis, underscoring, and citations omitted.
67 Id. at 786.
68 42 Phil. 880 (1920).
69 Id. at 882.
70 Id.
71 G.R. Nos. 109373 & 112991, March 20, 1995, 242 SCRA 492.
72 Id. at 503.
73 Rule 1, Sec. 3(a), RULES OF COURT.
74Pacific Banking Corp. Employees Organization v. Court of Appeals, supra note 71 at 503.
75Muñoz v. Yabut, Jr., G.R. Nos. 142676 & 146718, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 344, 367.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Ruben F. Balane, JOTTINGS AND JURISPRUDENCE IN CIVIL LAW (SUCCESSION), 2010 ed., p. 35.
79Heirs of Gregorio Lopez v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R, No. 193551, November 19, 2014, 741 SCRA 153, 163 citing Bonilla, et al. v. Barcena, et al., G.R. No. L-41715, June 18, 1976, 71 SCRA 491.
80Bonilla, et al. v. Barcena, et al., supra note 79.
81 Id. at 495. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
82Heirs of Gregorio Lopez v. Development Bank of the Philippines, supra note 79 at 163.
83 Rule 74, Sec 1, RULES OF COURT.
84 Separate Opinion of Justice Bernabe, p. 7.
85 100 Phil. 364 (1956).
86 Id. at 360.
87 Id. at 378.
88 67 Phil. 213 (1939).
89 Id. at 213-214. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
90 14 Phil. 194 (1909).
91 45 Phil. 430 (1923).
92 59 Phil. 486 (1934).
93 63 Phil. 93 (1934).
94 Article VIII, Section 4(3), 1987 CONSTITUTION.
95 95 Phil. 614 (1954).
96 Id. at 616.
97 Id. at 620. Emphasis supplied.
98 Id. Emphasis supplied.
99 97 Phil. 762 (1955).
100 Id. at 765.
101 100 Phil. 64 (1956).
102 Id. at 65.
103 Id. at 66-67. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
104 98 Phil. 677 (1956).
105 Id. at 678-679. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
106 G.R. No. L-28394, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 104.
107 Id. at 107.
108 Id. at 107-108.
109 Supra note 79.
110 Id. 495. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
111 G.R. No. 73275, May 20, 1987, 150 SCRA 59.
112 Id. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
113 Supra note 55.
114 G.R. No. 168979, December 2, 2013, 711 SCRA 219.
115 Id. at 227.
116 Supra note 79.
117 Id. at 163-164.
118 G.R. No. 224144, June 28, 2017, 828 SCRA 482. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
119 Id. at 492-493. Underscoring supplied; emphasis in the original.
120Rollo, pp. 89-90.
121Sayson, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1992, 205 SCRA 321, 328.
122 Rule 8, Sec. 8, RULES OR COURT.
123 See De Vera, et al. v. Galauran, supra note 88; Cabuyao v. Caagbay, et al., supra note 95; Atun et al. v. Nuñez, supra note 99; and Marabilles, et al. v. Sps. Quito, supra note 101.
124 See Morales, et al. v. Yañez, supra note 104; Gayon v. Gayon, supra note 106; Bonilla, et al. v. Barcena, et al., supra note 79; Baranda, et al v. Baranda, et al., supra note 111; Marquez v. Court of Appeals, supra note 55; Pacaña-Contreras and Pacaña v. Rovila Water Supply, Inc., et al., supra note 114.; Heirs of Gregorio Lopez v. Development Bank of the Philippines, supra note 79; and Capablanca v. Heirs of Pedro Bas, et al., supra note at 118.
125 Separate Opinion of Justice Bernabe, p. 7. Emphasis and italics in the original.
126Padunan v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, G.R. No. 132163, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 196, 204.
127 Rule 1, Sec. 6, RULES OF COURT.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
I concur. The Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Branch 59 (RTC) did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the second motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Dr. Nixon L. Treyes (petitioner). Hence, the Court of Appeals (CA) correctly denied the petition for certiorari1 filed by petitioner before it.
This case stemmed from a Complaint2 filed before the RTC by respondents Antonio L. Larlar, et al. (respondents) against petitioner. The nature of the actions/s may be seen from the four (4) reliefs prayed for in the Complaint as follows:
FIRST ITEM OF RELIEF
(Annulment of Affidavits of Self Adjudication and Cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title issued pursuant thereto)
SECOND ITEM OF RELIEF
(Reconveyance)
THIRD ITEM OF RELIEF
(Partition)
FOURTH ITEM OF RELIEF
(Damages)3
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that, after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered as follows:
a) Declaring the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication dated September 2, 2008 (Annex "X") and May 19, 2011 (Annex "Y") as null and void and illegal and ordering the cancellation of all Transfer Certificates of Titles issued pursuant thereto; b) Ordering the defendant to reconvey the plaintiffs' successional share in the estate of the late ROSIE LARLAR TREYES; c) Ordering the partition of the estate of ROSIE LARLAR TREYES among the parties hereto who are also the heirs of the latter; d) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs moral damages of not less than P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of not less than P500,000.00[; and] e) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs attorney's fees of P200,000.00 and litigation expenses of not less than P150,000.00.
Other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the premises are also prayed for.5
To rebut these contentions of the defendant, plaintiffs cite the case of Ricardo F. Marquez, et al. vs. Court of Appeals which in essence settles the issues now raised by the defendant.
In that case, a father executed an Affidavit of Self Adjudication unilaterally adjudicating unto himself the property owned by his deceased wife to the exclusion of his children. A civil case was brought by his children for the reconveyance of the said property. The Supreme Court held:cralawredAs such, when Rafael Marquez, Sr., for one reason or another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was established. Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress, or abuse of confidence obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold. Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, did the action for reconveyance prescribe, as held by the Court of Appeals?
In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
The factual antecedents in the cited case and in the case at bar are on all points. A perusal of the Complaint shows that the causes of action are 1) the Annulment of the Affidavit of Self Adjudication; 2) Reconveyance; 3) Partition; and 4) Damages. Hence, the Court has jurisdiction over the first, second and fourth causes of action but no jurisdiction over the third cause of action of Partition and the said cause of action should be dropped from the case.
Lastly, venue is properly laid as it appears from the allegations of the Complaint that majority of the parcels of land object of this case is situated in San Carlos City. As this is an action involving title to real property then the action can be filed in any jurisdiction where the property or a portion thereof is located.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby resolves to DENY the "Motion to Dismiss" for lack of merit.8 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in interest to commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased, without separate judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said decedent, provided that there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate. There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of Mrs. Treyes' estate, Private Respondents, as her intestate heirs, had the right to sue for the reconveyance of the disputed properties, not to them, but to the estate itself, for distribution later in accordance with law.
Moreover, Public Respondent admitted that it only has jurisdiction over the Annulment of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, Reconveyance, and Damages, while specifically stating that it had no jurisdiction over Partition. Clearly, Public Respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion.12
There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of Mrs. Treyes' estate, Private Respondents, as her intestate heirs, had the right to sue for the reconveyance of the disputed properties, not to them, but to the estate itself, for distribution later in accordance with law.
Moreover, [the RTC] admitted that it only has jurisdiction over the Annulment of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, Reconveyance, and Damages, while specifically stating that it had no jurisdiction over Partition. Clearly, Public Respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion.35 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
A perusal of the Complaint shows that the causes of action are 1) the Annulment of the Affidavit of Self Adjudication; 2) Reconveyance; (3) Partition; and 4) Damages. Hence, the Court has jurisdiction over the first, second and fourth causes of action but no jurisdiction over the third cause of action of Partition and the said cause of action should be dropped from the case.39
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 15-55.
2 Id. at 228-241.
3 See ponencia, p. 3.
4 Article 1001 of the CIVIL CODE reads:cralawredArticle 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
5Rollo, pp. 238-239.
6 Dated June 20, 2014. Id. at 102-112.
7 Id. at 83-85. Penned by Presiding Judge Katherine A. Go.
8 Id. at 83-84.
9 See Omnibus Motion to Reconsider Resolution dated 15 July 2014 and to Defer Filing of Answer dated July 28, 2014; id. at 147-161.
10 Id. at 86.
11 Id. at 214-219. Penned by Associate Justice Edward B. Contreras, with Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos (now a member of the Court) and Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig, concurring.
12 Id. at 217.
13 Id. at 223-225.
14 Id. at 224.
15 Id. at 15-52.
16 Id. at 84.
17 See ponencia, pp. 6-7.
18 Section 1, Rule 9, RULES OF COURT.
19 See ponencia, pp. 8-10.
20 See rollo, p. 216.
21 100 Phil. 364, 378 (1956).
22 363 Phil. 393 (1999).
23 504 Phil. 456 (2005).
24 574 Phil. 2445 (2008).
25 713 Phil. 570 (2013).
26Heirs of Gabatan v. CA, 600 Phil. 112, 125 (2009), citing Agapay v. Palang, 342 Phil. 302, 313 (1997).
27Ypon, supra at 576.
28 See rollo, pp. 24-38.
29 See id. at 38-39.
30 See id. at 347.
31 747 Phil. 427 (2014).
32 811 Phil. 861 (2017).
33 See ponencia, p. 28.
34Rioferio v. Court of Appeals, 464 Phil. 67 (2004).
35Rollo, p. 217.
36Ponencia, p. 30; emphasis supplied.
37 See Spouses Marcos R. Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla v. Coprada, 653 Phil. 96 (2010).
38 Section 1, Rule 74 of the RULES OF COURT reads:cralawredSection 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the nest succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
39Rollo, p. 84.
LEONEN, J.:
It is well established that special proceedings have different procedural requirements from those of ordinary civil actions. Ordinary civil actions, whether they be actions in personam or quasi in rem, are binding only upon the parties. On the other hand, special proceedings, such as the settlement of a decedent's estate, are actions in rem—they entail a binding effect on the whole world.
Estate settlements and declarations of heirship, to be binding on the whole world, must undergo any of these: (1) an extrajudicial settlement pursuant to Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court; (2) a judicial summary settlement; or (3) testate or intestate settlement of estate. If none of these remedies are utilized, there could be no declaration of heirs. This rule is long entrenched in jurisprudence, and must likewise govern here.
This case centers on the estate of Rosie Larlar Treyes (Rosie), whose death left her husband, petitioner Nixon L. Treyes, and her siblings (private respondents) embroiled over the heirship to her 14 properties. Petitioner executed two Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, transferring the entire estate to himself as Rosie's sole heir—one that Rosie's siblings contested as they, too, claim to be compulsory heirs.
For the majority, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the Regional Trial Court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's second Motion to Dismiss private respondents' Complaint, where he cited the following grounds: (a) improper venue; (b) prescription, and (c) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The majority maintained that none of these grounds were proper.
I dissent.
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. "Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon a claim asserted therein — a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant."5 (Citations omitted)
1.6 Plaintiffs sister, ROSIE LARLAR TREYES, died without leaving any will. She also did not bear any children with the defendant TREYES.
1.7. Accordingly, the estate of ROSIE LARLAR TREYES, which consists of her one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal properties that she owns with her husband (defendant TREYES), became subject to the operation of the law on intestate succession.
1.8. In particular, Article 1001 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that where there are brothers and sisters who survive together with the widow or widower of the deceased, one-half (1/2) of the decedent's estate shall belong to the widow or widower, while the other half shall belong to the surviving brothers and sister. Thus:
...
1.9. In effect, plaintiffs are legally the co-heirs of the estate of ROSIE LARLAR TREYES together with the defendant and are entitled to a share in the same.
1.10. However, in gross bad faith and with malicious intent, defendant TREYES falsely and fraudulently caused the above-described properties to be transferred in his own name to the exclusion of the herein plaintiffs by executing two (2) Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, the first one dated September 2, 2008 (copy attached as Annex "X"), while the second one is dated May 19, 2011 (copy hereto attached as Annex "Y"). The contents of both Affidavits of Self-Adjudication are practically identical, and only the dates appear to vary.6
In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent's lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.8 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion."
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:cralawred"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. . . . A special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice."
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same provision contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.10 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The Court in Pilapil adjudged:cralawredWhile it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the publication in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily made....12 (Emphasis in the original)
In actions in personam, the judgment is for or against a person directly. Jurisdiction over the parties is required in actions in personam because they seek to impose personal responsibility or liability upon a person.
Courts need not acquire jurisdiction over parties on this basis in in rem and quasi in rem actions. Actions in rem or quasi in rem are not directed against the person based on his or her personal liability.
Actions in rem are actions against the thing itself. They are binding upon the whole world. Quasi in rem actions are actions involving the status of a property over which a party has interest. Quasi in rem actions are not binding upon the whole world. They affect only the interests of the particular parties.
However, to satisfy the requirements of due process, jurisdiction over the parties in in rem and quasi in rem actions is required.
The phrase, "against the thing," to describe in rem actions is a metaphor. It is not the "thing " that is the parly to an in rem action; only legal or natural persons may be parties even in in rem actions. "Against the thing" means that resolution of the case affects interests of others whether direct or indirect. It also assumes that the interests — in the form of rights and duties — attach to the thing which is the subject matter of litigation. In actions in rem, our procedure assumes an active vinculum over those with interests to the thing subject of litigation.14 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, this Court had likewise held that recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a good and compelling reason for such recourse. Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial. In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, this Court held:In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case — subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
....
Similar to Portugal, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as the inheritance from Eulalio. It would be more practical, as Portugal teaches, to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses Gualvez admitted in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs with rights over the subject land.19 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Likewise, we are of the opinion that the lower court should not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa Rivera is the only heir of the decedent, such declaration is improper in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceeding No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition.21
It is clear that His Honor read the law correctly. Appellants contend, however, that for defendant to acquire a vested right to Eugeniano's property, he must first commence proceedings to settle Eugeniano's estate — which he had not done. There is no merit to the contention. This Court has repeatedly held that the right of heirs to the property of the deceased is vested from the moment of death. Of course the formal declaration or recognition or enforcement of such right needs judicial confirmation in proper proceedings. But we have often enforced or protected such rights from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration. Which can only mean that the heir acquired hereditary rights even before judicial declaration in testate or intestate proceedings.26
As heirs, the petitioners have legal standing to challenge the deeds of sale purportedly signed by Paulina Baranda for otherwise property claimed to belong to her estate will be excluded therefrom to their prejudice. Their claims are not merely contingent or expectant, as argued by the private respondents, but are deemed to have vested in them upon Paulina Baranda's death in 1982, as, under Article 777 of the Civil Code, "the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." While they are not compulsory heirs, they are nonetheless legitimate heirs and so, since they "stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or suit," are entitled to protect their share of successional rights.
This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in interest to commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased, without separate judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said decedent, provided that there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate."
There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of Paulina Baranda's estate, the petitioners, as her intestate heirs, had the right to sue for the reconveyance of the disputed properties, not to them, but to the estate itself of the decedent, for distribution later in accordance with law. Otherwise, no one else could question the simulated sales and the subjects thereof would remain in the name of the alleged vendees, who would thus have been permitted to benefit from their deception. In fact, even if it were assumed that those suing through attorneys-in-fact were not properly represented, the remaining petitioners would still have sufficed to impugn the validity of the deeds of sale.29 (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to the erroneous conclusion of the Court of Appeals, this Court finds no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of heirship in order to resolve petitioner's action for cancellation of titles of the property.
The dispute in this case is not about the heirship of petitioner to Norberto but the validity of the sale of the property in 1939 from Pedro to Faustina, from which followed a series of transfer transactions that culminated in the sale of the property to Norberto. For with Pedro's sale of the property in 1939, it follows that there would be no more ownership or right to property that would have been transmitted to his heirs.
Petitioner's claim is anchored on a sale of the property to her predecessor-in-interest and not on any filiation with the original owner. What petitioner is pursuing is Norberto's right of ownership over the property which was passed to her upon the latter's death.
This Court has stated that no judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that an heir may assert his or her right to the property of the deceased. In Marabilles v. Quito:cralawredThe right to assert a cause of action as an heir, although he has not been judicially declared to be so, if duly proven, is well settled in this jurisdiction. This is upon the theory that the property of a deceased person, both real and personal, becomes the property of the heir by the mere fact of death of his predecessor in interest, and as such he can deal with it in precisely the same way in which the deceased could have dealt, subject only to the limitations which by law or by contract may be imposed upon the deceased himself. Thus, it has been held that "[t]here is no legal precept or established rule which imposes the necessity of a previous legal declaration regarding their status as heirs to an intestate on those who, being of age and with legal capacity, consider themselves the legal heirs of a person, in order that they may maintain an action arising out of a right which belonged to their ancestor"[.]34 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's estate.36 (Citations omitted)
Endnotes:
1 Ponencia, p. 8.
2 Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
3 Ponencia, p. 10.
4 367 Phil. 438 (1999) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division].
5 Id. at 445.
6 Complaint, p. 12.
7 713 Phil. 570 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].
8 Id. at 575-576 citing Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, 600 Phil. 112 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
9 418 Phil. 669 (2001) [Per J. Buena, Second Division].
10 Id. at 676-678.
11Leriou v. Longa, G.R. No. 203923, October 8, 2018, https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64687> [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
12 Id. citing Pilapil v. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones, 519 Phil. 292 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Divison].
13 748 Phil. 706 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
14 Id. at 725-726.
15 SECTION 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time of two (2) years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation and order how much and in what manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in the preceding section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such bond and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of two (2) years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have been made. (Emphasis supplied)
16Heirs of Ypon, 713 Phil. 570, 576-577 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division] as cited in ponencia, p. 12.
17 735 Phil. 434 (2014) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
18 504 Phil. 456 (2005) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
19Rebusquillo v. Spouses Gualvez,735 Phil. 434, 441-143 (2014) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division].
20 100 Phil. 364 (1956) [J. Concepcion, En Banc].
21 Id. at 378.
22 67 Phil. 213 (1939) [Per J. Morean, En Banc].
23 95 Phil. 614 (1954) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].
24 100 Phil. 64 (1956) [Per J. Bautista-Angelo, En Banc].
25 98 Phil. 677 (1956) [Per J. Bengzon, First Division].
26 Id. at 678-678.
27 163 Phil. 156 (1976) [Per J. Martin, First Division].
28 234 Phil. 64 (1987) [Per. J. Cruz, First Division].
29 Id. at 74-75.
30 360 Phil. 843 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
31 722 Phil. 460 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
32 747 Phil. 427 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
33 811 Phil. 861 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
34 Id. at 870-871.
35 RULES OF COURT, Rule 74, sec. 1 (1) provides:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.
36Natcher v. Court of Appeals, 418 Phil. 669, 679-680 (2001) [Per J. Buena, Second Division].
37Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 556 (2002) [Per J. Puno, First Division].
38Pilapil v. Heirs of Briones, 543 Phil. 184 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
GESMUNDO, J.:
I concur with the ponencia that the petition must be denied. However, I respectfully dissent on the pronouncement in the ponencia that the established rule on declaration of heirs in "Ypon, Yaptinchay, Portugal, Reyes, Heirs of Gabatan v. Court of Appeals, and other similar cases, which requires a prior determination of heirship in a separate special proceeding as a prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil action to enforce ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession should be abandoned."1
On May 1, 2008, Rosie Larlar Treyes (Rosie), the wife of Dr. Nixon Treyes (petitioner), died intestate. Rosie did not have any children and had seven (7) siblings, i.e., the private respondents Antonio, Emilio, Heddy, Rene, Celeste, Judy, and Yvonne. At the time of her death, Rosie left behind as conjugal properties fourteen (14) real estates.
Petitioner executed two (2) Affidavits of Self-Adjudication dated September 2, 2008 and May 19, 2011, which were registered with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City on March 24, 2011, and with the Register of Deeds of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental on June 5, 2011, respectively. He adjudicated the estate of Rosie unto himself, claiming that he was the sole heir of his deceased spouse, which effectively deprived the private respondents of their share in the estate of the decedent. New transfer certificates of title were registered in the name of petitioner covering the land of Rosie.
Hence, private respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, Cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title, Reconveyance of Ownership and Possession, Partition, and Damages before the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Branch 59 (RTC) against petitioner, among others.
In said complaint, private respondents alleged that they are all brothers and sisters while petitioner is their brother-in-law. The copies of the birth certificates of private respondents and Rosie were attached as Annexes "A to H" of their complaint to prove the said assertion.2 They alleged that petitioner, in gross bad faith and with malicious intent, falsely and fraudulently caused the properties of Rosie to be transferred to his own name to the exclusion of private respondents by the execution of those two (2) Affidavits of Self- Adjudication.3
Private respondents assert that it is an irrefutable fact that they are co-heirs with petitioner and are collectively entitled to a share consisting of one-half (1/2) of the estate. Thus, the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication of petitioner must be annulled and declared to be of no legal effect.4 Private respondents also claimed that they are indubitably co-owners of the properties of Rosie by virtue of being co-heirs. Accordingly, there is a need to delineate the specific shares of each of the co-owners of the properties of Rosie's estate to avoid further conflict as to the use and disposition of the same and the specific shares of the co-heirs must be determined and partitioned.5
Private respondents prayed for the following reliefs:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that, after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered as follows:
a.) Declaring the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated September 2, 2008 (Annex "X") and May 19, 2011 (Annex "Y") as null and void and illegal and ordering the cancellation of all Transfer Certificates of Titles issued pursuant thereto; b.) Ordering the defendant to reconvey the plaintiffs' successional share in the estate of the late ROSIE LARLAR TREYES; c.) Ordering the partition of the estate of ROSIE LARLAR TREYES among the parties hereto who are also the heirs of the latter; d.) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs moral damages of not less than P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of not less than P500,000.00. e.) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs attorney's fees of P200,000.00 and litigation expenses of not less than P150,000.00.
Other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the premises are also prayed for.6 (emphasis supplied)
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation and by intellectual creation.
Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts by tradition.
They may also be acquired by means of prescription."
The will of Margarita Jose was made and she died after the present Code of Civil Procedure went into effect in these Islands. Her will was duly proved and allowed under the provisions of that Code. An administrator was duly appointed and he is now engaged in settling the affairs of the estate. The important question in this case is, Can an ordinary action at law be maintained under these circumstances by a person claiming to be an heir of the deceased against other persons, also claiming to be such heirs, for the purpose of having their rights in the estate determined? We think that such an action is inconsistent with the provisions of the new code, and that it can not be maintained. Section 600 of the present Code of Civil Procedure provides that the will of an inhabitant of the Philippine Islands shall be proved and his estate settled in the Court of First Instance in which he resided at the time of his death. By section 641 when a will is proved it is obligatory upon the court to appoint an executor or administrator. By virtue of other provisions of the code this executor or administrator has, under the direction of the court, the full administration and control of the deceased's property, real and personal, until a final decree is made in accordance with section 753. During the period of administration the heirs, devisees, and legatees have no right to interfere with the administrator of executor in the discharge of his duties. They have no right, without his consent, to the possession of any part of the estate, real or personal. The theory of the present system is that the property is all in the hands of the court, and must stay there until the affairs of the deceased are adjusted and liquidated, and then the net balance is turned over to the persons by law entitled to it. For the purpose of such administration and distribution there is only one proceeding in the Court of First Instance. That proceeding is not an action at law, but falls under Part II of the Code of Civil Procedure, and is a special proceeding. After the estate is fully settled, and all the debts and expenses of administration are paid, the law contemplates that there shall be a hearing or trial in this proceeding in the Court of First Instance for the purpose of determining who the parties are that are entitled to the estate in the hands of the executor or administrator for distribution, and after such hearing or trial it is made the duty of the court to enter a decree of final judgment, in which decree, according to section 753, the court "shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, and in its order the court shall name the persons and proportions or parts to which each is entitled." (See also sec. 782 of the Code of Civil Procedure.) By section 704 it is expressly provided that no action shall be maintained by an heir or devisee against an executor or administrator for the recovery of the possession or ownership of lands until there is a decree of the court assigning such lands to such heir or devisee, or until the time allowed for paying debts has expired.
It seems clear from these provisions of the law that while the estate is being settled in the Court of First Instance in a special proceeding, no ordinary action can be maintained in that court, or in any other court, by a person claiming to be the heir, against the executor or against other persons claiming to be heirs, for the purpose of having the rights of the plaintiff in the estate determined. The very purpose of the trial or hearing provided for in section 753 is to settle and determine those questions, and until they are settled and determined in that proceeding and under that section no action such as the present one can be maintained.
An examination of the prayer of the amended complaint above quoted will show that to grant it would be to prevent the settlement of the estate of a deceased person in one proceeding in the Court of First Instance. It would require, in the first place, the revocation of the judgment probating the will. This relief can not be obtained in an ordinary action. The plaintiff not having appealed from the order admitting the will to probate, as she had a right to do, that order is final and conclusive. It does not, however, as the court below held, determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to any part of the estate. The effect of such a decree was stated in the case of Castañeda v. Alemany (2 Off. Gaz., 366). The statements there made need not be repeated here. The plaintiff in her amended complaint asks also that the appointment of Engracio Palanca be annulled. This relief can not be granted in an ordinary action. The plaintiff had a right to appeal from the order of the court appointing the administrator in this case, and not having exercised that right such order is final and conclusive against her. The plaintiff also asks that the administrator be required to render an account to her of his administration, and deposit in court the money which he has in his possession. To grant this relief in an ordinary action between parties would be to take away from the court having in charge the settlement of the estate the express powers conferred upon it by law. To grant that part of the prayer of the amended complaint which asks that the plaintiff be declared to be entitled to three fourths of the property of the estate, would be to take away from the court administering the estate the power expressly given to it by section 753 to determine that question in the proceeding relating to the estate.38 (emphases and underscoring supplied)
Article 1011. In default of persons entitled to succeed in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Sections, the State shall inherit the whole estate."
Art. 1012. In order that the State may take possession of the property mentioned in the preceding article, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court47 must be observed.
Unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate or for the determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary civil action to declare the nullity of a deed, instrument, or conveyance of property, or any other action in the enforcement of their successional rights, without the necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration of their status as such.55
In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their allegations, have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither is there anything in the records of this case which would show that a special proceeding to have themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been instituted. As such, the trial court correctly dismissed the case for there is a lack of cause of action when a case is instituted by parties who are not real parties in interest. While a declaration of heirship was not prayed for in the complaint, it is clear from the allegations therein that the right the respondents sought to protect or enforce is that of an heir of one of the registered co-owners of the property prior to the issuance of the new transfer certificates of title that they seek to cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as such heirs in the proper forum.
Furthermore, in Portugal, the Court held that it would be superfluous to still subject the estate to administration proceedings since a determination of the parties' status as heirs could be achieved in the ordinary civil case filed because it appeared from the records of the case that the only property left by the decedent was the subject matter of the case and that the parties have already presented evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. In the present case, however, nothing in the records of this case shows that the only property left by the deceased Anacleto Cabrera is the subject lot, and neither had respondents Peter and Deborah Ann presented any evidence to establish their rights as heirs, considering especially that it appears that there are other heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are not parties in this case that had signed one of the questioned documents. Hence, under the circumstances in this case, this Court finds that a determination of the rights of respondents Peter and Deborah Ann as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera in a special proceeding is necessary.59 (emphasis supplied)
In this case, there is no necessity for a separate special proceeding and to require it would be superfluous considering that petitioner had already presented evidence to establish her filiation and heirship to Norberto, which respondents never disputed.68 (emphasis supplied)
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.69
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol vs. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong vs. Tecson, 89 Phil., pp. 28-30). As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate on intestate court already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil., 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra.; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 445, 460-461).72
In its Resolution dated July 15, 2014, the RTC denied for lack of merit petitioner [Treyes]' second Motion to Dismiss. Nevertheless, the RTC held that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the Complaint's third cause of action, i.e., partition:xxx A perusal of the Complaint shows that the causes of action are 1) the Annulment of the Affidavit of Self Adjudication; 2) Reconveyance (3) Partition; and 4) Damages. Hence, the Court has jurisdiction over the first, second and fourth causes of action but no jurisdiction over the third cause of action of Partition and the said cause of action should be dropped from the case.77
Hence, as correctly held by the RTC in its Resolution dated August 15, 2014, the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Complaint considering that the law confers upon the RTC jurisdiction over civil actions78 which involve the title to, or possession of, real property or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila, or where the assessed value exceeds P50,000.00 for civil actions in Metro Manila.79
To be sure, upon meticulous perusal of the petitioner's pleadings, it is clear that the status of the private respondents as siblings of Rosie was not even seriously refuted by petitioner Treyes. He also does not make any allegation that the birth certificates of the private respondents are fake, spurious, or manufactured. All he says is that there must first be a declaration in a special proceeding. Clearly, therefore, it cannot be said in the instant case that the private respondents were not able to present evidence as to their status as heirs and that the determination of their status as heirs was seriously contested by the petitioner.84
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that, after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered as follows:
a.) Declaring the Affidavit of Self-Adjudicated dated September 2, 2008 (Annex "X") and May 19, 2011 (Annex "Y") as null and void and illegal and ordering the cancellation of all Transfer Certificates of Titles issued pursuant thereto; b.) Ordering the defendant to reconvey the plaintiffs' successional share in the estate of the late ROSIE LARLAR TREYES; c.) Ordering the partition of the estate of ROSIE LARLAR TREYES among the parties hereto who are also the heirs of the latter; d.) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs moral damages of not less than P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of not less than P500,000.00. e.) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs attorney's fees of P200,000.00 and litigation expenses of not less than P150,000.00.
Other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the premises are also prayed for.86 (emphasis supplied)
Hence, the Court has held that even if the action is supposedly one for annulment of a deed, the nature of an action is not determined by what is stated in the caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.
There is likewise no merit to the claim that the action for partition filed by the heirs of Hermogenes amounted to a collateral attack on the validity of OCT No. P-10737. The complaint for partition filed by the heirs of Hermogenes seeks first, a declaration that they are a co-owners of the subject property, and second, the conveyance of their lawful shares. The heirs of Hermogenes do not attack the title of Feliciano; they alleged no fraud, mistake, or any other irregularity that would justify a review of the registration decree in their favor. Their theory is that although the subject property was registered solely in Feliciano's name, they are co-owners of the property and as such is entitled to the conveyance of their shares. On the premise that they are co-owners, they can validly seek the partition of the property in co-ownership and the conveyance to them of their respective shares.91 (emphasis supplied; citation omitted)
Section 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. — Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied under oath.
Endnotes:
1Majority Opinion, p. 29.
2Rollo, pp. 89-90.
3 Id. at 94.
4 Id. at 96.
5 Id. at 97.
6 Id. at 98-99.
7 713 Phil. 570 (2013).
8 574 Phil. 245 (2008).
9 363 Phil. 393 (1999).
10 504 Phil. 456 (2005).
11Article 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation and by intellectual creation.
Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition.
They may also be acquired by means of prescription.
12 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume III, p. 15.
13 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume III, pp. 15-16.
14 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume III, pp. 16.
15 Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law, 1970 Third Edition, Volume III, pp. 21-22.
16Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 257 Phil. 174, 180 (1989).
17Art. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
18 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Succession, Vol. III, p. 2.
19 Caguioa, Comment and Cases on Civil Law 1970 Third Edition, Sec. 17, p. 2.
20 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Succession, Vol. III, p. 9.
21 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Property, Vol. II, p. 452.
22Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640, 650 (1948).
23Art. 496. Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent with this Code.
Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
(1) By implication of law; or
(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills; or
(3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court.;
Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testator's a death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution;
Art. 881. The appointment of the administrator of the estate mentioned in the preceding article, as well as the manner of the administration and the rights and obligations of the administrator shall be governed by the Rules of Court;
Art. 1057. Within thirty days after the court has issued an order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with the Rules of Court, the heirs, devisees and legatees shall signify to the court having jurisdiction whether they accept or repudiate the inheritance.
If they do not do so within that time, they are deemed to have accepted the inheritance;
Art. 1058. All matters relating to the appointment, powers and duties of executors and administrators and concerning the administration of estates of deceased persons shall be governed by the Rules of Court.
24Acap v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 381, 390 (1995).
25 Id.
26 Rules of Court, Art. 838.
27Rule 76. Allowance or Disallowance of Will.
28Rule 74. Summary Settlement of Estate.
Section 2. Summary settlement of estate of small value. — Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact is made to appear to the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after such other notice to interest persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they are of lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper register's office.
29Rule 78. Letters Testamentary and of Administration, When and to Whom Issued.
Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
30Suiliong & Co. v. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil. 13, 19-20 (1908).
31Rule 74. Summary of Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
32Art. 496. Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent with this Code.
33Rule 1. General Provisions
Section 3. Cases governed. – These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and special proceedings.(a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong,
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
(b) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law,
(c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.
34Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, supra note 9, at 398-399.
35Rule 73. Venue and Process
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedents is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
36 Id.
37 5 Phil. 436 (1905).
38 Id. at 439-441.
39Rule 74. Summary Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the nest succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
40Gianan v. Imperial, 154 Phil. 705, 712-713 (1974).
41Macias v. Kim, 150-A Phil. 603, 611 (1972).
42Reyes v. Ysip, 97 Phil. 11, 13 (1955).
43 Section 1, Rule 90.
44 V. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, V-B, 359 (1970).
45 16 Phil. 489 (1910).
46 Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1970 Third Edition, Volume III, p. 406.
47 Rule 91, Rules of Court.
48 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume III, pp. 504-505.
49 Section 1, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 1. When an by whom petition filed. — When a person dies intestate, seized of real property in the Philippines, leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same, the Solicitor General or his representative in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, may file a petition in the Court of First Instance of the province where the deceased last resided or in which he had estate, if he resided out of the Philippines, setting forth the facts, and praying that the estate of the deceased be declared escheated.
50 Section 3, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 3. Hearing andjudgment. — Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has been published as directed and that the person died intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Philippines, leaving no heir or person entitled to the same, and no sufficient cause being shown to the contrary, the court shall adjudge that the estate of the estate of the deceased in the Philippines, after the payment of just debts and charges, shall escheat; and shall, pursuant to law, assign the personal estate to the municipality or city where he last resided in the Philippines, and the real estate to the municipalities or cities, respectively, in which the same is situated. If the deceased never resided in the Philippines, the whole estate may be assigned to the respective municipalities or cities where the same is located. Shall estate shall be for the benefit of public schools, and public charitable institutions and centers in said municipalities or cities.
The court, at the instance of an interested party, or on its own motion, may order the establishment of a permanent trust, so that the only income from the property shall be used.
51Heirs of Gabatan v. Court of Appeals, 600 Phil. 112, 126 (2009).
52Portugal v. Porlugal-Beltran, 504 Phil. 456, 469 (2005).
53See Heirs of Fabillar v. Paller, G.R. No. 231459, January 21, 2019.
54See Portugal v. Porlugal-Beltran, supra note 10.
55Majority Opinion, p. 18.
56 100 Phil. 364 (1956).
57 261 Phil. 231 (1990).
58 Supra note 9.
59 Supra note 8 at 253-254.
60 95 Phil. 614 (1954).
61 67 Phil. 213 (1939).
62 98 Phil. 677 (1956).
63 163 Phil. 516 (1976).
64 234 Phil. 64 (1987).
65 722 Phil. 460 (2013).
66 747 Phil. 427 (2014).
67 811 Phil. 861 (2017).
68 Id. at 875-876.
69 Supra note 10, at 470.
70 74 Phil. 100 (1943).
71 150 Phil. 138 (1972).
72 Id. at 144-145.
73 See Acap v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24, where it was held that in spite of the dismissal of the ordinary civil action, which tackled the issue of extrajudicial declaration of heirship, such dismissal is without prejudice to the filing of the proper case to establish the legal mode by which he claims to have acquired ownership of the land in question.
74Majority Opinion, p. 19.
75 In Spouses Maraño v. Pryce Gases, Inc., 757 Phil. 425,430 (2015), the Court emphasized that the rendering conflicting decisions should be avoided for the orderly administration of justice.
76Macias v. Uy Kim, supra note 41, at 611.
77Majority Opinion, p. 4.
78 Rule 1, Section 3(a) of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Cases governed. — These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and special proceedings.
(a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong, (1a, R2)
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to the specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. (n)
79Majority Opinion, p. 11.
80Rule 69, Scction 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property.
81 Rollo, pp. 89-90.
82 Id. at 94.
83 Ombudsman v. Peliño, 575 Phil. 221, 247 (2008); citation omitted.
84Majority Opinion, pp. 27-28.
85Rollo, p. 97.
86 Id. at 98-99.
87 G.R. No. 217755, September 18, 2019.
88 718 Phil. 91 (2013).
89 Agarrado v. Librando-Agarrado, G.R. No. 212413, June 6, 2018, 864 SCRA 582, 592.
90 784 Phil. 538 (2016).
91 Id. at 544-545.
ZALAMEDA, J.:
Petitioner filed the instant petition before this Court, adamant that the regular court is without jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the respondents for lack of a prior determination of heirship by a special court. In denying the petition, the ponencia, citing Article 777 of the New Civil Code and a myriad of jurisprudence, debunked petitioner's view. It concluded that the legal heirs, like herein respondents, have the right to file the instant suit arising out of their right of succession, without the need for a separate prior judicial declaration of heirship, provided only that there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate.1
Contrary to petitioner's posture, a prior determination of heirship in a special proceeding is not a condition sine qua non in the institution of an ordinary civil proceeding involving heirs. This jurisprudence is not novel. The ponencia pointed that the Court en banc made it clear, as early as the 1939 case of De Vera v. Galauran,2 that "unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased person, the legal heirs may commence an ordinary action arising out of a right belonging to the ancestor, without the necessity of a previous and separate judicial declaration of their status as such."3
Following long-settled precedents, the ponencia correctly held that the legal heirs, like herein respondents, are authorized, by operation of law and from the moment of the decedent's death, to fully protect their successional rights, without having to first, go through the rigors of proving their filiation or relation to the decedent in a separate special proceeding for that purpose. There is indeed clearly no judicial declaration of heirship necessary for an heir to assert his or her right to the property of the deceased, as what the Court emphasized in the fairly recent case of Capablanca v. Heirs of Bas (Capablanca).4 The putative or alleged heirs are to be considered real parties-in-interest to file the ordinary civil actions for cancellation of a deed or instrument and reconveyance of property, despite lack of a previous judicial declaration of heirship in an appropriate civil proceeding, for as long as they can show preponderant proof of their relationship or filiation to the deceased. This is because they are merely asserting their successional rights on the property, which are transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, in accordance with Article 777 of the New Civil Code.
Although said rule may have endured the test of time, the same is still not firmly cast in stone. Indeed, this rule has not been immune to attack. There have been a number of cases where the ordinary civil actions filed by the putative heirs were ultimately dismissed for lack of a prior declaration of heirship in a special proceeding. These conflicting rulings of the Court on this issue became the anchor of petitioner's steadfast stance for the dismissal of the complaint below. As the confusion brought to fore is capable of repetition if left unresolved, the ponente is thus right to use this opportunity to rid the jurisprudence of such obscurity, once and for all.
It is an equally long-standing rule that the determination of who the legal heirs of the deceased are must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.5 And it is for good reasons. As elucidated by the Court in Intestate Estate of Wolf son v. Testate Estate of Wolfson6 :
Paraphrasing the jurisprudence on this score, the salutary purpose of the rule is to prevent confusion and delay. It is not inserted in the law for the benefit of the parties litigant but in the public interest for the better administration of justice, for which reason the parties have no control over it. Consequently, every challenge to the validity of the will, any objection to its authentication, every demand or claim by any heir, legatee or party in interest in intestate or testate succession must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate should take cognizance of the question raised, for he will be called upon to distribute or adjudicate the property to the interested parties. WE stressed that the main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of the deceased either summarily or through the process of administration; and towards this end the probate court has to determine who the heirs are and their respective shares in the net assets of the estate. Section 1 of Rule 73, speaking as it does of "settlement of the estates of the deceased," applies equally to both testate and intestate proceedings. And the conversion of an intestate proceedings into a testate one is "entirely a matter of form and lies within the sound discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied.)
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case — subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal's estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners' status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners (Vide Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 [1989]; Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 [1955]), the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial x x x x
Similar to Portugal, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as the inheritance from Eulalio. It would be more practical, as Portugal teaches, to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses Gualvez admitted in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs with rights over the subject land. As confirmed by the RTC in its Decision, respondents have stipulated and have thereby admitted the veracity of the following facts during the pre-trial x x x x
The appellant contend that the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112. On the other hand, the appellees or the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan counter that the lower court did not decide the ownership of the twelve hectares when it ordered their exclusion from the project of partition. So, the problem is how the title to the twelve hectares should be decided, whether in a separate action or in the intestate proceeding.
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice 'which may be waived' (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232. Cf. Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re jurisdiction over the issue).
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the estate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266). That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action Lachenal vs. Salas, supra).
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of 'third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership (Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892; Cunanan vs. Amparo, supra; 3 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 4731).
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate action.
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from title inventory The only interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.
As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of society. They should not be forced to incur additional expenses (such as filing fees) by bringing a separate action to determine the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion.
Endnotes:
1Ponencia, p. 28.
2 G.R. No. L-45170, 10 April 1939.
3Id.
4 G.R. No. 224144, 28 June 2017.
5Heirs of Gabatan v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 150206, 13 March 2009.
6 G.R. No. L-28054, 15 June 1972.
7Heirs of Gabalan v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 150206, 13 March 2009.
8Cabuyao v. Caagbay, et al., G.R. No. L-6636 02 August 1954.
9 G.R. No. 124320, 2 March 1999.
10 G.R. No. 155555, 504 Phil. 456 (2005).
11 G.R. No. 204029, 04 June 2014.
12 G.R. No. 188773, 742 Phil. 658 (2014).
13 G.R. No. 231459, 21 January 2019.
14 G.R. No. 198680, 08 July 2013.
15 G.R. No. L-29545 and G.R. No. L-27082, 31 January 1978.
16 See Reyes v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 162956, 10 April 2008.
17 J. Leonen's Reflection, p. 8.
18Ponencia, p. 15.
19See Capablanca v. Heirs of Das, G.R No. 224144, 28 June 2017.
20Ponencia, p. 15.