THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 233448, November 18, 2020
SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner, v. ALFREDO G. MARAÑON, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL AND CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON AWARDS AND DISPOSAL OF REAL PROPERTIES, THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, AND THE COMMITTEE ON AWARDS AND DISPOSAL OF REAL PROPERTIES OF THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL AND ITS MEMBERS, NAMELY: PATRICK LACSON, ATTY. MARY ANN MANAYONLAMIS, NILDA* GENEROSO, LUCILLE I. CHAVEZ-PINES, MERLITA V. CAELIAN, ENRIQUE S. PINONGAN, ERNIE F. MAPA, SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN AND ITS MEMBERS, AND AYALA LAND, INC., Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
INTING, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Resolutions respectively dated March 3, 20172 and July 26, 20173 of Branch 48, Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City (RTC Branch 48) in Civil Case No. 14-14323 dismissing the complaint of SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SMPHI) on the ground of forum shopping.
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. -
x x x x
(c) Appeal by certiorari. - In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
It is an act of malpractice for it trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice and adds to the already congested court dockets. What is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues, regardless of whether the court in which one of the suits was brought has no jurisdiction over the action.24Is there forum shopping in the instant case? The answer must be in the affirmative. To shed light on this finding, the Court deems it proper to trace a, bit of the history surrounding the controversy, and demonstrate the presence of forum shopping in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, finding no basis to reverse, modify, amend or set aside our Resolution dated September 6, 2011, petitioner's Motion for reconsideration, is DENIED. In the same wise, finding no merit in the Petition seeking to nullify the Order dated July 14, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 50, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 11-13803, the Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.Meanwhile, after trial in due course in SCA Case No. 11-13803, RTC Branch 50 rendered a Decision30 dated January 23, 2014 denying SMPHI's petition for lack of merit. It found no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of Resolution No. 11-001.
SO ORDERED.29
Respondent Committee's decision to declare a failure of the July 27, 2011 public bidding a failure is not without any basis. Section 178 of COA Circular No. 92-386 which prescribes the rules and regulations on supply and property management in the local governments, including the disposal of supplies and property, expressly provides, that:The RTC Branch 50 observed that SMPHI's contentions had already been passed upon by the COA in its Decision32 dated September 21, 2012. The RTC Branch 50 noted the fact that the COA did not find any irregularity in the bidding conducted by the Province.
"SEC. 178. Basis of Award. - Award shall be given to the highest complying bidder, provided the offer is not less than the appraised value of the property being sold."
Considering that the offers of both petitioner and Ayala were both below the appraised value of P19,500.00 fixed by respondent Committee, the latter deemed it proper and necessary not to give the award to the petitioner despite being the highest bidder, pursuant to the above-quoted circular, otherwise, the members of respondent Committee would have been liable for violating the same. Since no award could be made to any of the two bidders, consequently, respondent Committee has to declare a failure of bidding.x x x x
Petitioner insists that it should be declared the winning bidder since there was no failure of the July 7, 2011 public bidding and it offered a bid higher than that of Ayala. Petitioner cited COA Circular No. 88-296 which provides that there is a failure of bidding in any of the following instances: (a) if there is only one offeror; or (b) if all the offers/tenders are non-complying or unacceptable. According to the petitioner, since there was more than one bidder and it offered the highest bid which was acceptable, respondent Committee gravely abused its discretion in declaring the July 7, 2011 public bidding. Petitioner explained that while its bid of P18,888.00 is below the floor price of P19,500.00 fixed by respondent Committee, the difference of P612.00 is not excessive because it represents only 3% of the floor price, and since the difference is not excessive, respondent Committee should have accepted petitioner's winning bid because according to the petitioner, under COA Memorandum Nos. 91-712 and 88-659 "if the difference is found not excessive the sale may be allowed in audit."
It is true that there was more than one bidder, yet the offers of the two bidders are unacceptable to respondent Committee because they were both below the floor price of P19,500.00 which the Committee fixed pursuant to its mandate. Since the offers of both the petitioner and Ayala are unacceptable, then, based on COA Circular No. 88-296, the July 27, 2011 public bidding is a failure. Even if petitioner offered the highest bid it did not vest on said petitioner the right to be dec1ared the winning bidder in light of the express reservation in the Offer to Sell or Lease, which states that:cralawred"The Provincial Government reserves the right to reject any or all bids, to waive any informalities therein or to accept only such bid as may be considered most advantageous to the government." x x xIt is well settled that where such reservation is made in the an Invitation to Bid, the highest or lowest bidder, as the case may be, is not entitled to an award as a matter of right (C&C Commercial Corp. v. Menor, L-28360, 27 January 1983, 120 SCRA 112, cited in the case of J.G. Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124293, September 24, 2003). Even the lowest bid or any bid may be rejected or, in the exercise of sound discretion, the award may be made to another than the lowest bidder x x x.31
x x x Likewise, Section 180 of Rule 24 of COA Circular No. 92-386 dated October 20, 1992 provides that: "When public auction is impracticable, negotiated sale may be resorted to at such price as determined by the Committee on Awards." In this case, there was a failure of two (2) consecutive public biddings which legally justified the resolution of the PGNO to proceed to a negotiated sale.The Court observes that the above pronouncements by the COA were given merit and relied upon by the RTC Branch 50 in its Decision dated January 23, 2014.
The selling price of P19,500.00 per square meter of the property is based on the evaluation and appraisal of the PGNO which was found reasonable by the TIS, COA RO No. VI. In the Appraisal/Valuation Report dated April 11, 2012 of a team created under COA Office Order No. 2012-151 dated March 20, 2012 to conduct re-inspection/re-appraisal for the price reasonableness of the Properties subject of this case, the same was also appraised, using the Income Capitalization Approach, at P19,500.00 per square meter, which in the team's opinion is just, fair and reasonable. The offer of ALI during the Negotiated Sale was P20,500.00 per square meter which is higher than the appraised value of P19,500.00.
SMPHI contends that it should have been declared the winner although its Bid was below the floor price, considering that: 1) the difference of its bid with the floor price is within the allowable variance; 2) its bid is much higher than that of the bid of ALI; and 3) there is non-disclosure of the floor price by the Committee on Awards and Disposal and it was only announced after the Bid was tendered.
This Commission does not find merit in such contentions. SMPHI's first and second contentions are referring to the second auction when it avers that its bid is higher than ALI's and the difference of its bid price with the floor price is within the 10% allowable variance. But such second auction was declared a failure since both its and ALI's bids were lower than the floor price in line with Section 178 of COA Circular No. 92-386 deriving authority from Section 383 of the LGC which provides "[A]ward shall be given to the highest complying bidder, provided the offer is not less than the appraised value of the property being sold" x x x. Since the bid offer of SMPHI is lower than the appraised value rendered by the PGNO's Committee on Awards and Disposal, the declaration is in order. As to the SMPHI's contention that it should be declared as the winning bidder because its bid offer is within the 10% variance of the appraised value rendered by the PGNO's Committee on Awards and Disposal is unmeritorius because the 10% variance is not allowed in the determination by the said Committee for the highest and complying bidder. The 10% variance is for the exclusive use by the concerned Auditor and the COA Commission Proper in determining as to the reasonableness of the price of the item purchased/disposed x x x.
As to the third ground relied upon by SMPHI, there is no law or rule that requires the disclosure of the floor price prior to the conduct of a hiding. The announcement of the floor price is dependent upon the assessment of the Committee on Awards and Disposal based on the beneficial effect to the PGNO. In this case, the Committee on Awards and Disposal opted not to disclose the floor price earlier than the scheduled bidding as its strategy to come up with a competitive and advantageous offer. All the bidders did not know of the floor price, not until after the bid was tendered. Thus, there was no prejudiced party despite the lack of knowledge of the floor price. Moreover, there was no bidder that raised the issue before and during the bidding process. It is only SMPHI who raised the issue after the 2nd bidding on July 7, 2011 was declared a failure.38 (Underscoring omitted.)
x x x An adverse claim anchored on a mere "good reasons to believe" that a losing bidder is the winning bidder in the public auction and therefore has the sole and exclusive right to purchase or lease the property subject of a bidding is not a claim on the title, but at best an assailment of the bid proceeding. It has nothing to do with the title itself which can be considered as an adverse claim with the registered owner. To qualify as an adverse claim, the claimant must at least present some documents that would show his interest or claim on the title itself. In this case, none has been presented except a self-serving allegation in the affidavit of adverse claim.The LRA thereby sustained the RD's denial of registration. The LRA Resolution has attained finality per Certificate of Finality43 dated September 22, 2016.
In short and simple language, Petitioner's claim is not adverse to the registered owner neither against the title nor the property but towards the bid proceeding.42 (Italics supplied.)
Endnotes:
* Referred to as "Nelda" in some parts of the rollo.
* Designated additional Member per Raffle dated June 22, 2020.
** Designated additional Member per Raffle dated November 11, 2020.
1Rollo, pp. 15-37.
2Id. at 42-47; penned by Presiding Judge Rosario Ester B. Orda-Caise.
3Id. at 48-51.
4Id. at 180-183.
5Id. at 185-186.
6 See letter dated June 28, 2011, id. at 190-191.
7 An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and For Other Purposes.
8 An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 6957, Entitled "An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector, and For Other Purposes."
9Rollo, p. 194.
10Id. at 166-172.
11Id. at 146-154.
12Id. at 300-313.
13 Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
(I) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy;
x x x x
14 Section 197 of Commission on Audit (COA) Circular No. 92-386 has been amended by COA Circular No. 003-17 dated October 25, 2017.
15 Alfredo G. Marañon, Jr., in his official capacity as the Governor of the Province of Negros Occidental and Chairman of the Committee on Awards and Disposal of Real Properties, the Province of Negros Occidental, and the Committee on Awards and Disposal of Real Properties of the Province of Negros Occidental and its Members, namely: Patrick Lacson, Atty. Mary Ann Manayon-Lamis, Nilda Generoso, Lucille I. Chavez-Pines, Merlita V. Caelian, Enrique S. Pinongan, Ernie F. Mapa, Sangguniang Panlalawigan and its Members, and Ayala Land, Inc.
16Rollo, pp. 358-419. Excluding Ayala Land, Inc.
17Id. at 249-266.
18Id. at 664-685.
19Id. at 454-457.
20Id. at 42-47.
21Id. at 52-61.
22Id. at48-51.
23P N B - Republic Bank v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 102, 106 (1999). Citations omitted.
24Zamora v. Quinan, et al., 821 Phil. 1009, 1016 (2017), citing Toprate Construction & General Services, Inc. v. Paxton Development Corporation, 457 Phil. 740, 748 (2003).
25Rollo, pp. 197-218.
26Id. at 221-246.
27Id. at 757; per Court of Appeals, Cebu City, Special Nineteenth Division Decision dated February 16, 2012.
28Id. at 753-763; penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes with Associate Justices Ramon Paul L. Hernando (now a member of the Court) and Nina G. Antonio Valenzuela, concurring.
29Id. at 762.
30Id. at 664-685; penned by Judge Estefanio S. Libutan, Jr.
31Id. at 674-676.
32Id. at 249-266.
33Id. at 689-698; penned by Associate Justice Germano Francisco D. Legaspi with Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and Jhosep Y. Lopez, concurring.
34Id. at 705-706.
35Id. at 91-131.
36Id. at 249-266.
37Id. at 483-487; penned by Administrator Eulalio C. Diaz III.
38Id. at 261-262.
39Id. at 485, per the LRA Resolution dated March 17, 2014 in Consulta No. 5337.
40 Section 76 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides:
Section 76. Notice of Lis Pendens. - No action to recover possession of real estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition, or other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any effect upon registered land as against persons other than the parties thereto, unless a memorandum or notice stating the institution of such action or proceeding and the court wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of the institution thereof, together with a reference to the number of the certificate of title, and an adequate description of the land affected and the registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and registered.
41Rollo, pp. 483-487.
42Id. at 486-487.
43Id. at 489.
44Eulogio, et al. v. Bell, et al., 763 Phil. 266, 280 (2015), citing Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
45Id.
46Id.
47Id.
48Id., citing Yap v. Chua, et al., 687 Phil. 392, 401 (2012).
49Lokin, Jr., v. COMELEC, et al., 635 Phil. 372, 390 (2010).