EN BANC
A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021
Re: LETTER OF MRS. MA. CRISTINA ROCO CORONA REQUESTING THE GRANT OF RETIREMENT AND OTHER BENEFITS TO THE LATE FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA AND HER CLAIM FOR SURVIVORSHIP PENSION AS HIS WIFE UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9946
D E C I S I O N
HERNANDO, J.:
Impeachment is a constitutional process that takes place within the political departments of our government. The House of Representatives accuses and the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court, decides. Public opinion, as well as the facts established by the evidence and the grounds and processes prescribed by the basic law, steer and weigh heavily in the formulation of its outcome. Nevertheless, the pervasive realm of the courts that is judicial review is retained as to any act within the limits of discretion provided by the Constitution.1
Upon a judgment of ouster by the impeachment court, however, some of its ramifications spring from a gray area in law. One such vagueness lies in the monetary entitlements of the public officer, who reached the legal age of retirement after his removal but died shortly thereafter without the separate charges filed against him having been resolved with finality. While retirement laws are interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree,2 the rare peculiarities of certain cases smoke out a legal gap that only legislature can address. The law beckons construction and construction becomes unnecessary without a law. Justice, nonetheless, shall not be denied by the courts to the deserving. Equity is the ink that writes the law and not its inverse.
Before the Court is the supplication for the grant of post-employment and survivorship benefits of Ma. Cristina Roco Corona (Mrs. Corona), as the spouse of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
Respondent betrayed the Public Trust, committed Culpable Violation of the Constitution and Graft and Corruption in the following manner:ARTICLE I
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS TRACK RECORD MARKED BY PARTIALITY AND SUBSERVIENCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE ARROYO ADMINISTRATION FROM THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS SUPREME COURT JUSTICE AND UNTIL HIS DUBIOUS APPOINTMENT AS A MIDNIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE TO THE PRESENT.ARTICLE II
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES, AND NET WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.ARTICLE III
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING TO MEET AND OBSERVE THE STRINGENT STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII, SECTION 7 (3) OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDES THAT "[A] MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST BE A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE" IN ALLOWING THE SUPREME COURT TO ACT ON MERE LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF FLIP-FLOPPING DECISIONS IN FINAL AND EXECUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS. ARROYO THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE TO OFFICE; AND IN DISCUSSING WITH LITIGANTS REGARDING CASES PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT.ARTICLE IV
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION WHEN HE BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY ISSUING A "STATUS QUO ANTE" ORDER AGAINST THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CASE CONCERNING THE IMPEACHMENT OF THEN OMBUDSMAN MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ.ARTICLE V
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH WANTON ARBITRARINESS AND PARTIALITY IN CONSISTENTLY DISREGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IN THE CASES INVOLVING THE 16 NEWLY-CREATED CITIES, AND THE PROMOTION OF DINAGAT ISLAND INTO A PROVINCE.ARTICLE VI
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY ARROGATING UNTO HIMSELF, AND TO A COMMITTEE HE CREATED, THE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION TO IMPROPERLY INVESTIGATE A JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXCULPATING HIM. SUCH AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION IS PROPERLY REPOSED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES VIA IMPEACHMENT.ARTICLE VII
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN GRANTING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AND HER HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESCAPE PROSECUTION AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, AND IN DISTORTING THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE TRO IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S OWN TRO.ARTICLE VIII
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST AND/OR COMMITTED GRAFT AND CORRUPTION WHEN HE FAILED AND REFUSED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR THE JUDICIARY (SAJ) COLLECTIONS.4
The SENATE sitting as an Impeachment Court, having tried Renato S. Corona, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, upon three Articles of Impeachment charged against him by the House of Representatives, by a guilty vote of 20 Senators, representing at least two-thirds of all the Members of the SENATE, has found him guilty of the charge under Article II of the said Articles of Impeachment: Now, therefore, be itNo objection or a motion for reconsideration was interposed against the judgment of the Senate. Having been dishonorably stripped of his public office and having undergone a most difficult and stressful trial, the Chief Justice's health quickly deteriorated culminating to his death on April 29, 2016. The separate criminal charges for graft and corruption then pending before the Sandiganbayan, as well as the tax evasion and forfeiture cases, were all necessarily dismissed in view of the Chief Justice's demise.
ADJUDGED, That Renato C. Corona be, and is hereby, CONVICTED of the charge against him in Article II of the Articles of Impeachment.
WHEREFORE, in accordance with Article XI, Section 3(7) of the Constitution, the penalty of removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines is hereby imposed upon respondent Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.5
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present."10When criminal penalties were excluded from the impeachment process, the Framers of the US Constitution departed from the English system, which incorporated provisions for criminal sanctions.12 Article II, Section 4 only stated that the impeached official "shall be removed from Office" upon conviction.13 Article I, Section 3 also provided that "[j]udgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States."14
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States; but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law."11 (Emphasis supplied.)
There are two additional reasons why the Judiciary, and the Supreme Court in particular, were not chosen to have any role in impeachments. First, the Framers recognized that most likely there would be two sets of proceedings for individuals who commit impeachable offenses-the impeachment trial and a separate criminal trial. In fact, the Constitution explicitly provides for two separate proceedings, x x x The Framers deliberately separated the two forums to avoid raising the specter of bias and to ensure independent judgments:cralawredBy sharply distinguishing a criminal prosecution from an impeachment, the Framers had made it clear that impeachment is not the means intended to redress and punish offenses against the state, but rather a mere political safeguard designed to preserve the state and its system of laws from internal harm. 17 Precisely, it was not crafted to mete out punishment.18Would it be proper that the persons, who had disposed of his fame and his most valuable rights as a citizen in one trial, should in another trial, for the same offence, be also the disposers of his life and his fortune? Would there not be the greatest reason to apprehend, that error in the first sentence would be the parent of error in the second sentence? That the strong bias of one decision would be apt to overrule the influence of any new lights, which might be brought to vary the complexion of another decision? (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied.)
SECTION 1. The President, the Vice-President, the Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Auditor General, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribeiy, or other high crimes.
x x x x
SEC. 4. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Government of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
SEC. 2. The President, the Members of the Supreme Court, and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and corruption.
x x x x
SEC. 4. Judgments in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, in accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x xImpeachment is, thus, designed to remove the impeachable officer from office, not punish him.22 It is purely political, and it is neither civil, criminal, nor administrative in nature. No legally actionable liability attaches to the public officer by a mere judgment of impeachment against him or her, and thus lies the necessity for a separate conviction for charges that must be properly filed with courts of law.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. (Emphasis supplied.)
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
x x x x
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law. (Emphasis supplied)
Father Bernas elucidated on the matter:
The object of the process is not to punish but only to remove a person from office. As Justice Storey put it in his commentary on the Constitution, impeachment is "a proceeding, purely of a political nature, is not so much designed to punish an offender as to secure the state against gross political misdemeanors. It touches neither his person nor his property, but simply divests him of his political capacity." Put differently, removal and disqualification are the only punishments that can be imposed upon conviction on impeachment. Criminal and civil liability can follow after the officer has been removed by impeachment. Prosecution after impeachment does not constitute prohibited double jeopardy.21 (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court hereafter established who has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or in both, (a) retires for having attained the age of seventy years, or (b) resigns by reason of his/her incapacity to discharge the duties of his/her office as certified by the Supreme Court x x x (Emphasis supplied.)According to the OCAt, Chief Justice Corona did not retire or resign, and that the "resignation by reason of his/her incapacity to discharge the duties of his/her office" in Section 1 must refer to "physical incapacity", as implied by the usage of the phrase "permanent disability" in Section 3 in the following manner:cralawred
SEC. 3. x x x Provided, however, That if the reason for the retirement be any permanent disability contracted during his/her incumbency in office and prior to the date of retirement, he/she shall receive a gratuity equivalent to ten (10) years' salary and the allowances aforementioned: Provided, further, That should the retirement under Section 1 (a) hereof be with the attendance of any partial permanent disability contracted during his/her incumbency and prior to the date of retirement, he/she shall receive an additional gratuity equivalent to two (2) years lump sum that he/she is entitled to under this Act x x x (Emphasis lifted from the original Petition.)The Court disagrees.
SECTION 1. x x x When a Justice of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court, shari'a district court, shari'a circuit court, or any other court hereafter established has attained the age of sixty (60) years and has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service in the Government, the last three (3) of which shall have been continuously rendered in the Judiciary, he/she shall likewise be entitled to retire and receive during the residue of his/her natural life also in the manner hereinafter provided, the salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation and other allowances such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional compensation allowance which he/she was then receiving and the non-wage benefit in the form of education scholarship to one (1) child of all Justices and Judges to free tuition fee in a state university or college x x xSection 1 of RA 9964 yields two instances of retirement available to a magistrate - first, a compulsory retirement at 70 years old; and second, an optional retirement upon reaching 60 years of age. The following legal requisites must concur for the optional retirement of a magistrate and the consequent entitlement to the benefits under RA 9946:cralawred
(1)That the retiree be a magistrate, i.e., a Justice of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a judge of the trial courts, shari 'a court, or of any other judicial court;The requirements are straightforward and have all been satisfactorily complied with by the late Chief Justice. Mrs. Corona recalled her husband's legal career in this wise:cralawred
(2)That the retiring magistrate has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service in the judiciary, in any other branch of the government, or in both;
(3)That the retiring magistrate be at least sixty (60) years of age at the time of retirement; and
(4)That the last three (3) years of public service by the retiring magistrate be continuously rendered in the Judiciary.
My late husband first joined government service as a working student in the 1960s when he was an undergraduate student at the Ateneo de Manila University, and while obtaining his law degree at the Ateneo Law School; he worked in the Office of the President of the Philippines, in the Office of then Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor, the Department of Public Information, and the City of Makati. After pursuing his private law practice since he became a lawyer in 1975, he was appointed in 1992 as Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs and concurrent Head of the Malacanang Legal Office during the administration of then President Fidel V. Ramos. He was thereafter designated as Deputy Executive Secretary and later, Chief Presidential Legal Counsel in 1994-1998. He then became the Chief of Staff and Spokesperson of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in 1998-2001. Under the administration of President Gloria Macapagal[-]Arroyo, he served as Presidential Chief of Staff and Acting Executive Secretary in 2001 until his appointment as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in April 2002. After eight (8) years of service as Associate Justice, he was appointed as its 23rd Chief Justice in 2010.Indeed, the administrative penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the inherent disabilities of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualifications for re-employment in the government service.43 The following accessory penalties of disqualifications from exercise of political rights, civil interdiction, indemnification, forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of the offense, and payment of costs also flow from the criminal convictions of public officers.44 Article 30(4) of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this: "loss of all right to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held" is expressly mentioned as one of the effects of the penalty of perpetual or absolute disqualification. The disparities between the salaries received and the declarations made in a SALN may be considered evidence of ill-gotten wealth during the declarant's incumbency if properly proven in a civil case for forfeiture.
Section 1. Declaration of State Policy. - It is hereby declared that it is the policy of the State to ensure the timely and expeditious release of the retirement pay, pensions, gratuities and other benefits of all retiring employees of the government. Public officers and employees who have spent the best years of their lives serving the government and the public should not be made to wait to receive benefits which are due to them under the law. Accordingly, it is hereby mandated that highest priority shall be given to the payment and/or settlement of the pensions, gratuities and/or other retirement benefits of retiring government employees.Section 3 of RA 10154 also finds particular relevance to the present case:cralawred
x x x x
Section 4. Coverage. - This Act shall cover all branches, agencies and/or instrumentalities of the government, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs), excluding personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and shall be applicable both to applications for compulsory retirement and optional or early retirement as authorized by law. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 3. Retiring Employees With Pending Cases. - In the case of retiring government employees with pending cases and whose retirement benefits are being lawfully withheld due to possible pecuniary liability, the head of the agency where such case is pending shall ensure that the said case shall be terminated and/or resolved within a period of three (3) months from the date of the retirement of the concerned, employee: Provided, That in case the concerned agency fails to terminate and/or resolve the case within the said period without any justifiable reason(s), the retirement benefits due to the employee shall be immediately released to him/her without prejudice to the ultimate resolution of the case; except, when the delay is deliberately caused by the retiring employee. (Emphasis supplied.)Penal sanctions even loom over the government institution that unjustly fails to or delays the timely release of the monetary benefits of its retiring employee:cralawred
Section 5. Penal Provisions. - The unjustified failure and/or refusal to release the pension, gratuities and other retirement benefits due to a retiring government employee within the periods prescribed above or to comply with any provision of this Act shall be a ground for the filing of administrative disciplinary action against the erring officer(s) and/or employee(s). Such erring officer(s) and/or employee(s) shall, after hearing and due proceedings, be penalized with suspension from the service without pay from six (6) months to one (1) year, at the discretion of the disciplining authority.The more important consideration for granting retirement benefits is to compensate satisfactory service to the government.46These are not mere gratuity, but a reward for allotting the best years of a public servant's life in the service of the country.47 In the same vein, retirement benefits also form part of the emolument that serve the alternative purpose of encouraging and retaining qualified employees in the government service.48
This penalty shall not apply if the release of the retirement benefits could not be accomplished due to force majeure and other insuperable causes. In such cases, the thirty (30)-day period shall be counted from the time such cause(s) cease(s) to exist.
Enacted in 1954, R.A. No. 910 is the law on retirement benefits for the justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. It provides for two kinds of benefits: (1) retirement and (2) death benefits.Mrs. Corona's claim for survivorship benefits relies mainly on Section 3 (2), RA 9946, the wordings of which are mirrored by Subsection E, AC No. 81-2010, or the Guidelines on the Implementation of Republic Act No. 9946:50
The retirement benefits granted under R.A. No. 910 may be compulsory or optional, subject to certain age and length of service requirements. For compulsory retirement, a justice must have reached the age of 70 years and must have rendered service in the Judiciary or any other government branch for at least 20 years; for optional retirement, 57 years of age and 20 years in government service, the last 10 of which must be continuously rendered in the Judiciary. Compulsory retirement also applies when the justice, regardless of age, is forced to resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office.
The death benefits, on the other hand, are given to the heirs of the justice who dies while in actual service. The benefits are equivalent to a five-year lump sum of the salary the justice was receiving during the period of death, provided the justice had reached the minimum 20 years of government service; and only two-year lump sum of the salary, if service rendered was less than 20 years. The same benefits are granted as to justices who have not attained the 20-year service requirement but are compulsorily retired upon reaching the age of 70 years, or were forced to retire due to illness or other causes beyond their control.
Under R.A. No. 910, the retirement benefits were granted the justice; the death benefits to the heirs. No benefits were granted to the surviving legitimate spouse of the retired justice except for the death benefit which is paid to the surviving spouse as a rightful heir.
Subsequent legislations expanded the coverage of R.A. No. 910 to include justices or judges of other courts, such as the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Shari' a District Court, the Shari' a Circuit Court, and any other court. The qualifications for entitlement to the benefits were likewise amended. Thus, in 1959, R.A. No. 2614 adjusted the minimum age for optional retirement of justices and judges to 65 years.
The enactment of R.A. No. 9946 in 2010 introduced more changes to R.A. No. 910, more importantly the amendments to benefits granted to the surviving spouses of justices and judges: (1) Retirement Benefits; (2) Death Benefits; (3) Lump Sum Retirement Benefits; (4) Survivorship Pension Benefits; and (5) Automatic Pension Adjustment, x x x (Citations omitted and emphasis/underscoring supplied.)
SEC 3. xxxRe: Requests for Survivorship Pension Benefits pointed out the surviving legitimate spouses entitled to receive the benefits under Section 3 (2) of RA 9946:cralawred
Upon the death of a Justice or Judge of any court in the Judiciary, if such Justice or Judge has retired, or was eligible to retire optionally at the time of death, the surviving legitimate spouse shall be entitled to receive all the retirement benefits that the deceased Justice or Judge would have received had the Justice or Judge not died. The surviving spouse shall continue to receive such retirement benefits until the surviving spouse's death or remarriage.
The benefits of [RA 9946], effective 11 February 2010, are granted to a surviving legitimate spouse of a justice or judge who:AC No. 81-2010 provides the disqualifying circumstances to pension under RA 9946:
1. had retired; or
2. was eligible to retire optionally at the time of death.
The Guidelines (RAC 81-2010) also describes the beneficiaries of the law to be the surviving legitimate spouse of a justice or judge who:cralawred1. had retired and was receiving a monthly pension; orxxxx
2. was eligible to retire optionally at the time of death and would have been entitled to receive a monthly pension.
xxx [T]he the term "retired" under Section 3, paragraph 2, of R.A. No. 9946 is used in its strict sense, i.e., the justice or judge who is considered "retired" must be one who had reached certain age and length of service conditions only, just like a justice or judge who is eligible to retire optionally. A reading of the entire law, however, reveals that it also refers to justices and judges who "retire" due to permanent disability, whether total or partial, and justices or judges who died or were killed while in actual service.51 (Emphasis supplied.)
Mangibabaw nawa ang respeto sa bawat isa. Mangibabaxv nawa ang paggalang. Mangibabaw nawa ang katanmgan. At higit sa lahat, mangibabaw nawa ang tama.62WHEREFORE, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona is hereby DECLARED entitled to retirement benefits and other allowances under Republic Act No. 9946 equivalent to a five-year lump sum of the salary and other allowances he was receiving at the time of his removal by impeachment on May 29, 2012. The claim of survivorship benefits of Ma. Cristina Roco Corona is hereby GRANTED reckoned from the lapse of the five-year period on the lump sum. All benefits granted herein are ordered immediately RELEASED to his widow and beneficiary, Ma. Cristina Roco Corona, subject to usual clearances.
Very truly yours, | |
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA | |
Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
1Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 878-926.
2Aniñon v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 190410, April 10,2019.
3 Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states:
The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
4https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2011/12/12/articles-of-impeachment-against-chief-iustice-renato-c- corona-december-12-2011 /. Accessed January 3, 2021.
5 Per Ma. Cristina's letter. The Official Record of the Senate Sitting as an Impeachment Court taken on May 29, 2012, however, stated the Senate's original verdict in the following manner and without mention of the penalties imposed:
With at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate having pronounced the Respondent guilty, the Chair, pursuant to Rule XXI of the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials, directs judgment to be entered in accordance with the judgment of the Senate as follows:
The Senate, sitting as an Impeachment Court, having tried Renato S. Corona, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, upon three Articles of Impeachment charged against him by the House of Representatives, by a guilty vote of 20 Senators, representing at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate, has found him guilty of the charge under Article II of the said Articles of Impeachment; Now, therefore, be it Adjudged, that Renato C. Corona be, and is hereby convicted of the charge against him in Article II of the Articles of Impeachment.
SO ORDERED.
The Secretary, as Clerk of Impeachment of Court, is directed to provide a certified copy of the judgment to the Respondent and his Counsel, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Supreme Court En Bane, the Judicial and Bar Council and the President of the Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2012/05mav/20120529-Official-TSN.pdf. Accessed January 3, 2021.
6The Heritage Guide to the Constitution. The Heritage Foundation. littps://www.heritage.oi'g/constitiition/#!/articles/l/essays/l 1/impeachment. Accessed on December 6, 2020.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 USCS Const. Art. I, § 3, Cl 6.
11 USCS Const. Art. I, § 3, Cl 7.
12 Gormley, Ken. Impeachment and the Independent Counsel: A Dysfunctional Union. Stanford Law Review, vol. 51, no. 2, 1999. JSTOR, www.istor.org/stable/1229271. Accessed December 27, 2020.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 506 U.S. 224 (1993). Unofficial full text of the case viewed on https://supreme.iustia.com/case/federal/us/506/224/. Accessed on January 4, 2021.
16 In Burton v. United States [202 U.S. 344 (1906)], a United States Senator made the comparable claim that a criminal conviction was the equivalent of expulsion from the Senate, which required a two-thirds vote of the Senate. The Court rejected this claim, stating: "the final judgment of conviction [does] not operate, ipso facto to vacate the seat of the convicted Senator, nor compel the Senate to expel him or to regard him as expelled by force alone of the judgment".
In Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, [398 U.S. 74 (1970)], both Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Black noted the important distinction between criminal proceedings and impeachment proceedings against federal judges. Justice Black, while emphasizing that federal judges could be removed from office only by impeachment, stated that "judges, like other people, can be tried, convicted, and punished for crimes". Justice Douglas stated that "if they [federal judges] break a law they can be prosecuted. If they become corrupt or sit in cases in which they have a personal or family stake, they can be impeached by Congress." Finally, the legislative history of the 1980 Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 is replete with statements recognizing that while Congress retains the exclusive power to remove federal judges from office for high crimes and misdemeanors, federal judges, like other people, are subject to criminal prosecution for their misdeeds.
In United States v. Claiborne [727 F.2d 842 (1984)], it was held: "Claiborne also contends the Constitution's vesting of impeachment power exclusively in the Congress precludes criminal prosecutions of sitting federal judges. Two very important assumptions underlie this contention. First, impeachment is the exclusive means of removing federal judges from office; and second, a criminal prosecution is the equivalent of removal from office. We, like the court in Hastings, are unwilling to accept this second assumption. See Hastings, 681 F.2d at 710 n. 10."
17 Supra note 11.
18 Id.
19 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974). Unofficial full text of the case viewed on https://casetext.com/case/united-states- v-isaacs-8. Accessed on January 4, 2021.
20 487 F.2d 700 (1973). Unofficial full text of the case viewed on https;//casetext,com/case/nixon-v-sirica. Accessed on January 4, 2021.
21 Bernas, Joaquin G. The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of The Philippines: A Commentary. Rex Book Store, Manila, Philippines (2003).
22Impeachment[:] A Political and Historical Guide. https://www.gov.ph/documents/20147/233614/ImpeachmentPrimer.pdf/72801f41-71el-ae60-d5bb-c69dbf622994?version=l .0. Accessed January 4, 2021.
23Heirs ofMarcelo Sotlo v. Palicte, 726 Phil. 651 (2014).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27Cerezo v. People, 665 Phil. 365 (2011).
28 Id.
29 G.R. No. 237428, May 11,2018.
30 Id.
31 Section 9, Rule 66.
32https://www,rappler.com/natiori/doj-approves-tax-evasion-raps-vs-corona. Accessed January 1, 2021.
33https://www,rappler.com/nation/corona-ombudsman-charges. Accessed January 1, 2021.
34 Id.
35 Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Ed. West Publishing Co., Unites States of America (2009).
36 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. https://www,mei'riam-webster.corn/dictionary/retirement. Accessed on January 4, 2021.
37 Re: Requests for Survivorship Pension Benefits of Spouses of Justices and Judges Who Died Prior to the Effectivity of Republic Act No. 9946, A.M. No. 17-08-01 -SC, September 19, 2017.
38Republic v. Sereno, supra note 29.
39 Impeachment[:] A Political and Historical Guide.
https://www.gov.ph/documents/20147/233614/ImpeachmentPrimer.pdf/72801 f41 -71 e 1 -ae60-d5bb-c69dbf622994?version=l .0. Accessed December 26, 2020.
40Reyes v. Lim, 456 Phil. 1 (2003).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Section 52, Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
44 Article 25, Revised Penal Code.
45Government Service Insurance System v. De Leon, 649 Phil. 610 (2010).
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Supra note 37.
50 Subsection E, AC No. 81-2010 provides:
E. Survivorship Pension Benefits
The legitimate surviving spouse of a Justice or Judge who (1) has retired or was eligible to retire optionally at the time of death, and (2) was receiving or would have been entitled to receive a monthly pension, shall be entitled to receive the said benefits that the deceased Justice or Judge would have received had the Justice or Judge not died. The surviving spouse shall continue to receive such retirement benefits until the surviving spouse's death or remarriage.
51 Id.
52 699 Phil. 1 (2012).
53 A.M. No. RTJ-90-474, October 4,1991. 51 282 Phil. 897(1992).
55 A.M. No. RTJ-90-474 & RTJ-90-606, February 7, 1992, as cited in Guerrero v. Villamor, 357 Phil 90, 90- 93(1998).
56 419 Phil. 603(2001).
57 276 Phil. 70(1991).
58 Id.
59 Cited in Meris v. Ofilada, supra note 56.
60 509 Phil. 65 (2005).
61 Id.
62https://www,officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2012/05inav/20120529-Official-TSN.pdf, Accessed January 3, 2020.