EN BANC
UDK 16666, January 19, 2021
ISMAEL C. BUGNA, JR., BEVERLY C. MANANGUITE, CARISSA D. GALING, AND JOSEFINA O. PELO, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) COMMISSION PROPER AND COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VIII, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
GESMUNDO, J.:
This petition for certiorari filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Commission on Audit (COA) issued on December 28, 2017 and January 29, 2020, respectively. In both issuances, the COA dismissed the appeal filed by petitioners for being filed out of time.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal, treated as a Petition for Review, is hereby DISMISSED for having been filed out of time. Accordingly, Commission on Audit Regional Office No. VIII Decision No. 2015-019 dated July 14, 2015, which affirmed Notice of Disallowance Nos. 14-001-101 (2012), 14-002-101 (2012), and 14-003-101 (2012), all dated February 20, 2014, on the payment of Economic Crisis Assistance and Monetary Augmentation of Municipal Agency to the job order, contractual, and permanent or regular personnel of the Municipal Government of Mondragon, Northern Samar; and some employees of national government agencies, in the amounts of P2,247,339.54 and P618,800.00, respectively, or in the aggregate amount of P2,886,139.54, is FINAL and EXECUTORY.13Their motion for reconsideration having been denied,14 petitioners filed the instant petition.
Applying the above standards, the Court noted the following circumstances which led to the conclusion that petitioners were in good faith while performing their functions in relation to the disallowed amounts:cralawred
- If a Notice of Disallowance is set aside by the Court, no return shall be required from any of the persons held liable therein.
- If a Notice of Disallowance is upheld, the rules on return are as follows:
- Approving and certifying officers who acted in good faith, in regular performance of official functions, and with the diligence of a good father of the family are not civilly liable to return consistent with Section 38 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
- Approving and certifying officers who are clearly shown to have acted in bad faith, malice, or gross negligence are, pursuant to Section 43 of the Administrative Code of 1987, solidarity liable to return only the net disallowed amount which, x x x, excludes amounts excused under the following sections 2c and 2d.
- Recipients — whether approving or certifying officers or mere passive recipients — are liable to return the disallowed amounts respectively received by them, unless they are able to show that the amounts they received were genuinely given in consideration of services rendered.
- The Court may likewise excuse the return of recipients based on undue prejudice, social justice considerations, and other bona fide exceptions as it may determine on a case to case basis.22
First, a review of the SB Resolutions and Ordinance used as basis for the grant of the subject allowances shows that these were primarily intended as financial assistance to municipal employees in view of the increase of cost on prime commodities, shortage of agricultural products, and the vulnerability of their municipality to calamities and disasters. Notably, these subject allowances were granted after the onslaught of typhoon Yolanda which greatly affected the Municipality. While noble intention is not enough to declare the allowances as valid, it nevertheless supports petitioners' claim of good faith. As held in Escarez v. COA:cralawredHerein petitioners' defense of good faith in certifying the availability of funds and approving the disbursements deserves the same treatment extended in Madera.The grant of the FGI to petitioners has a lofty purpose behind it: the alleviation, to any extent possible, of the difficulty in keeping up with the rising cost of living. Indeed, under the circumstances, We find that the FGI was given and received in good faith. The NFA Council approved the grant under the belief, albeit mistaken, that the presidential issuances and the OGCC Opinion provided enough bases to support it; and the NFA officials and employees received the grant with utmost gratefulness.Second, that these additional allowances had been customarily granted over the years and there was no previous disallowance issued by the COA against these allowances further bolster petitioners' claim of good faith. Indeed, while it is true that this customary scheme does not ripen into valid allowances, it is equally true that in all those years that the additional allowances had been granted, the COA did not issue any ND against these grants, thereby leading petitioners to believe that these allowances were lawful.
Notably, since the issuance of the NDs in 2014, the Municipality has stopped giving these allowances to their employees. However, this is not to say that the presumption of good faith would be ipso facto negated if the Municipality had otherwise continued to grant the allowances despite the issuance of NDs. After all, an ND is not immediately final as it may still be reversed by the COA or even the Court. Unless and until an ND becomes final, the continued grant of a benefit or allowance should not automatically destroy the presumption of good faith on the part of the approving/certifying officers, especially when there is sufficient or, at the very least, colorable legal basis for such grant.
Third, petitioners relied on the Resolutions and Ordinance of the Sangguniang Bayan which have not been invalidated; hence, it was within their duty to execute these issuances in the absence of any contrary holding by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or the COA. They were of the belief, albeit mistakenly, that these Resolutions and Ordinance were sufficient legal bases for the grant of the allowances especially since the LGC empowers the Sangguniang Bayan to approve ordinances and pass resolutions concerning allowances. Similar to the ruling in Veloso v. Commission on Audit where the Court accepted as a badge of good faith the fact that the questioned disbursements were made pursuant to ordinances, petitioners' reliance on the SB Resolutions and Ordinance should likewise be considered in their favor.
As can be deduced above, petitioners disbursed the subject allowances in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such reward. Otherwise stated, and to borrow the language of Lumayna, these mistakes committed are not actionable, absent a clear showing that such actions were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. There was no showing of some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent, or ill will in the grant of these benefits. There was no fraud nor was there a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes.
Thus, petitioners-approving and certifying officers are shielded from civil liability for the disallowance under Section 38 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
As for the payees, the Court notes that the COA Proper already excused their return; hence, they no longer appealed. In any case, while they are ordinarily liable to return for having unduly received the amounts validly disallowed by the COA, the return was properly excused not because of their good faith but because it will cause undue prejudice to require them to return amounts that were given as financial assistance and meant to tide them over during a natural disaster.
In view of the foregoing, the return is excused in its entirety in favor of all persons held liable in the ND.23 (citations omitted)
| Very truly yours, |
(SGD) EDGAR O.
ARICHETA | |
Clerk of Court |
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 19-23; penned by Chairperson Michael G. Aguinaldo, Commissioners Jose A. Fabia and Isabel D. Agito; attested by Commission Secretariat, Director IV Nilda B. Plaras.
2 Id. at 24-27; penned by Chairperson Michael G. Aguinaldo, Commissioners Jose A. Fabia and Roland C. Pondoc; attested by Commission Secretariat, Director IV Nilda B. Plaras.
3 Id. at 4.
4 Id. at 30-31.
5 Id. at 32-33.
6 Id. at 34-44.
7 Id. at 45-49.
8 Id. at 50-54.
9 Id. at 55-59.
10 Id. at 60-65; penned by Regional Director, Director IV Delfin P. Aguilar.
11 Id. at 66-67.
12 Id. at 20-21.
13 Id. at 21-22.
14 Id. at 24-26.
15 Id. at 25.
16 Id. at 11-12.
17 See Albor v. Court of Appeals, 823 Phil. 901, 912 (2018); Ciudad Fernandina Food Corp. Employees Union-Associated Labor Unions v. Court of Appeals, 528 Phil. 415, 431 (2006).
18Albor v. Court of Appeals, supra.
19 See Trans International v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 830, 840 (1998).
20 See e.g. Estalilla v. Commission on Audit (G.R. No. 217448, September 10, 2019), whereby the Court entertained the petition although already filed out of time due to compelling reasons such as absence of proof that petitioner had personally benefitted from the proceeds of the disallowed amounts, and her liability to return the same will deprive her of the right to liberty and property, among others.
21 G.R. No. 244128, September 8, 2020.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24Rollo, p. 8.
25 Id. at 30.