EN BANC
[G.R. No. 47790. June 30, 1941. ]
In re adoption of EMILIANO GUZMAN. PETRONILO RAMIREZ and ANACLETA CAMANDRE, Petitioners-Appellants.
Rupisan & Ramirez for Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. ADOPTION; LAW APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR; EXCLUSION OF ADULTS. — The law applicable to the case is the old Code of Civil Procedure, the petition having been filed prior to July 1, 1940, when the new Rules of Court took effect. Sections 765 to 769 of the Code of Civil Procedure speak only of "minor" as the subject of the adoption proceeding provided therein; and, as correctly ruled by the trial court, the use of the term "minor" precludes, in the absence of specific provisions to the contrary, the adoption of adults. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
2. STATUTES; IMPLIED REPEAL; LATER STATUTE COVERING WHOLE SUBJECT OF EARLIER ONE. — It will be noted that Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure appears to be a complete enactment on the subject of adoption, and may thus be regarded as the expression of the whole law thereon. So viewed, that chapter must be deemed to have repealed the provisions of the Civil Code on the matter. While, as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a later one is not favored, yet "if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act." (Posadas v. National City Bank of New York, 296 U. S., 497; 80 Law. ed., 351.)
2. STATUTES; IMPLIED REPEAL; LATER STATUTE COVERING WHOLE SUBJECT OF EARLIER ONE. — It will be noted that Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure appears to be a complete enactment on the subject of adoption, and may thus be regarded as the expression of the whole law thereon. So viewed, that chapter must be deemed to have repealed the provisions of the Civil Code on the matter. While, as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a later one is not favored, yet "if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act." (Posadas v. National City Bank of New York, 296 U. S., 497; 80 Law. ed., 351.)
D E C I S I O N
MORAN, J.:
On May 20, 1940, spouses Petronilo Ramirez and Anacleta Camandre filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a petition for the adoption of Emiliano Guzman, of age and natural son of said Petronilo Ramirez with one Cristina Guzman. The petition alleges that petitioners are childless; that the person sought to be adopted has been reared and brought up by them until he finished his course as forest ranger; and that he, together with his natural mother, consents to the adoption. The lower court, declaring that a person of age cannot legally be adopted under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, denied the petition, and from this order of denial, petitioners appealed.
The law applicable to the case is the old Code of Civil Procedure, the petition having been filed prior to July 1, 1940, when the new Rules of Court took effect. Sections 765 to 769 of the Code of Civil Procedure speak only of "minor" as the subject of the adoption proceeding provided therein; and, as correctly ruled by the trial court, the use of the term "minor" precludes, in the absence of specific provisions to the contrary, the adoption of adults. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
Appellants argue, however, that the provisions of article 178 of the Civil Code, which impliedly sanctions the adoption of a person of age, cannot be deemed repealed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It will be noted that Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure appears to be a complete enactment on the subject of adoption, and may thus be regarded as the expression of the whole law thereon. So viewed, that chapter must be deemed to have repealed the provisions of the Civil Code on the matter. While, as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a later one is not favored, yet "if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act." (Posadas v. National City Bank of New York, 296 U. S., 497, 80 Law. ed. 351.)
It has been held that "where the legislature frames a new statute upon a certain subject-matter, and the legislative intention appears from the latter statute to be to frame a new scheme in relation to such subject-matter and make a revision of the whole subject, there is in effect a legislative declaration, that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail, and that whatever is excluded is discarded." (People v. Thornton, 186 Ill., 162, 173, 57 N. E. 841.)
And an author says: "So where there are two statutes on the same subject, passed at different dates, and it is plain from the frame- work and substance of the last that it was intended to cover the whole subject, and to be a complete and perfect system or provision in itself, the last must be held to be a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in it shall prevail and whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed." (I Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 521.) .
Order is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Avanceña, C.J., Laurel and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
DIAZ, M., disidente:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Disiento:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
El Capitulo XLI de la Ley No. 190 no pudo haber venido a derogar todas las disposiciones del Codigo Civil en materia de Adopcion, porque no se refiere mas que a la forma en que puede adoptarse por una persona competente, un menor, no diciendose alli claramente ni permitiendo que se haga la inferencia de que uno que es mayor de edad no puede, aun con su consentimiento, ser adoptado. La adopcion, cuando Se trata de casos como el de los interesados en esta causa es y debe considerarse como un contrato que requiere para su consumacion, la autorizacion judicial. Cuando no es contraria a la ley ni a la moral ni al orden publico, no hay razon para negarla dicha autorizacion judicial. Indudablemente no es contraria a la ley porque la permite precisamente el articulo 178 del Codigo Civil, el cual, como ya he dicho, no ha sido derogado y puede coexistir validamente con los articulos comprendidos dentro del Capitulo XLI de la referida Ley No. 190.
Debe tenerse presente que no es solamente el deseo de las partes interesadas, es decir, los solicitantes que piden la adopcion de Emiliano de Guzman por un lado, y dicho Emiliano de Guzman, por otro, establecer entre ellos una paternidad ficticia, sino un reconocimiento, mejor dicho, una confirmacion de una paternidad real, por lo menos entre el solicitante Petronilo Ramirez y Emiliano de Guzman, porque este es hijo de aquel, si bien con otra mujer que no es la solicitante Anacleta Camandre; y debe tenerse tambien presente que los solicitantes, como asi se afirma en los escritos que obran en autos, no tienen hijos; que han hecho crecer y cuidar y dado educacion enviandole a las escuelas hasta terminar sus estudios, a Emiliano de Guzman.
Por todo lo expuesto, voto por la revocacion de la orden apelada, de modo que se permita la adopcion solicitada por Petronilo Ramirez y Anacleta Camandre.
The law applicable to the case is the old Code of Civil Procedure, the petition having been filed prior to July 1, 1940, when the new Rules of Court took effect. Sections 765 to 769 of the Code of Civil Procedure speak only of "minor" as the subject of the adoption proceeding provided therein; and, as correctly ruled by the trial court, the use of the term "minor" precludes, in the absence of specific provisions to the contrary, the adoption of adults. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
Appellants argue, however, that the provisions of article 178 of the Civil Code, which impliedly sanctions the adoption of a person of age, cannot be deemed repealed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It will be noted that Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure appears to be a complete enactment on the subject of adoption, and may thus be regarded as the expression of the whole law thereon. So viewed, that chapter must be deemed to have repealed the provisions of the Civil Code on the matter. While, as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a later one is not favored, yet "if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act." (Posadas v. National City Bank of New York, 296 U. S., 497, 80 Law. ed. 351.)
It has been held that "where the legislature frames a new statute upon a certain subject-matter, and the legislative intention appears from the latter statute to be to frame a new scheme in relation to such subject-matter and make a revision of the whole subject, there is in effect a legislative declaration, that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail, and that whatever is excluded is discarded." (People v. Thornton, 186 Ill., 162, 173, 57 N. E. 841.)
And an author says: "So where there are two statutes on the same subject, passed at different dates, and it is plain from the frame- work and substance of the last that it was intended to cover the whole subject, and to be a complete and perfect system or provision in itself, the last must be held to be a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in it shall prevail and whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed." (I Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 521.) .
Order is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Avanceña, C.J., Laurel and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
DIAZ, M., disidente:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Disiento:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
El Capitulo XLI de la Ley No. 190 no pudo haber venido a derogar todas las disposiciones del Codigo Civil en materia de Adopcion, porque no se refiere mas que a la forma en que puede adoptarse por una persona competente, un menor, no diciendose alli claramente ni permitiendo que se haga la inferencia de que uno que es mayor de edad no puede, aun con su consentimiento, ser adoptado. La adopcion, cuando Se trata de casos como el de los interesados en esta causa es y debe considerarse como un contrato que requiere para su consumacion, la autorizacion judicial. Cuando no es contraria a la ley ni a la moral ni al orden publico, no hay razon para negarla dicha autorizacion judicial. Indudablemente no es contraria a la ley porque la permite precisamente el articulo 178 del Codigo Civil, el cual, como ya he dicho, no ha sido derogado y puede coexistir validamente con los articulos comprendidos dentro del Capitulo XLI de la referida Ley No. 190.
Debe tenerse presente que no es solamente el deseo de las partes interesadas, es decir, los solicitantes que piden la adopcion de Emiliano de Guzman por un lado, y dicho Emiliano de Guzman, por otro, establecer entre ellos una paternidad ficticia, sino un reconocimiento, mejor dicho, una confirmacion de una paternidad real, por lo menos entre el solicitante Petronilo Ramirez y Emiliano de Guzman, porque este es hijo de aquel, si bien con otra mujer que no es la solicitante Anacleta Camandre; y debe tenerse tambien presente que los solicitantes, como asi se afirma en los escritos que obran en autos, no tienen hijos; que han hecho crecer y cuidar y dado educacion enviandole a las escuelas hasta terminar sus estudios, a Emiliano de Guzman.
Por todo lo expuesto, voto por la revocacion de la orden apelada, de modo que se permita la adopcion solicitada por Petronilo Ramirez y Anacleta Camandre.
