EN BANC
G.R. No. 224469, January 05, 2021
DIOSDADO SAMA Y HINUPAS AND BANDY MASANGLAY Y ACEVEDA, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Prosecutor, under oath, accuses DIOSDADO SAMA y HINUPAS, DEMETRIO MASANGLAY y ACEVEDA, BANDY MASANGLAY y ACEVEDA, residents of Barangay Baras, Baco, Oriental Mindoro with the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of March 2005, at Barangay Calangatan, Municipality of San Teodoro, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority as required under existing forest laws and regulations and for unlawful purpose, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another did and then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly cut with the use of unregistered power chainsaw, a Dita tree, a forest product, with an aggregate volume of 500 board feet and with a corresponding value of TWENTY THOUSAND (Php20,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds accused DIOSDADO SAMA y HINUPAS, DEMETRIO MASANGLAY y ACEVEDA, and BANDY MASANGLAY y ACEVEDA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as (principals) of the crime charged in the aforequoted Information and in default of any modifying circumstance attendant, the Court hereby sentences said accused to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay the costs.The trial court ruled that a dita tree with an aggregate volume of 500 board feet can be classified as "timber" within the purview of Section 68, now Section 7718 of PD 705, as amended. Thus, cutting the dita tree without a corresponding permit from the DENR or any competent authority violated the law.
SO ORDERED.17
- the dita tree which petitioners had cut and collected is a specie of timber?;
- the dita tree was cut and collected from a forest land, an alienable or disposable public land, or a private land, as contemplated in Section 77 of PD 705, as amended?; and,
- the cutting of the dita tree was done without any authority granted by the State?
In practice, there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt where the judge can conclude: "All the above, as established during trial, lead to no other conclusion than the commission of the crime as prescribed in the law."29 It has been explained:cralawred
SECTION 2. Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt. — In a criminal case, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
With respect to those of a contrary view, it is difficult to think of a more accurate statement than that which defines reasonable doubt as a doubt for which one can give a reason, so long as the reason given is logically connected to the evidence. An inability to give such a reason for the doubt one entertains is the first and most obvious indication that the doubt held may not be reasonable. In this respect, I agree with the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, in U.S. v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819 (1993) at p.853: "The instruction ... fairly convey[s] that the requisite doubt must be 'based on reason' as distinguished from fancy, whim or conjecture."
...You will note that the Crown must establish the accused's guilt beyond a "reasonable doubt", not beyond "any doubt". A reasonable doubt is exactly what it says -a doubt based on reason- on the logical processes of the mind. It is not a fanciful or speculative doubt, nor is it a doubt based upon sympathy or prejudice. It is the sort of doubt which, if you ask yourself "why do I doubt?"-you can assign a logical reason by way of an answer.
A logical reason in this context means a reason connected either to the evidence itself, including any conflict you may find exists after considering the evidence as a whole, or to an absence of evidence which in the circumstances of this case you believe is essential to a conviction.
You must not base your doubt on the proposition that nothing is certain or impossible or that anything is possible. You are not entitled to set up a standard of absolute certainty and to say that the evidence does not measure up to that standard. In many things it is impossible to prove absolute certainty.30
Q: Hours after the policemen and the employees of the DENR passed by what happened, Mr. Witness?
A: After more or less two to three hours later, they already returned ma'am.
Q: Did you notice anything unusual Mr. Witness?
A: Yes (,) ma'am.
Q: And what was that? ,
A: They are accompanied by three (Mangyan) persons ma'am.
Q: And could you identify before this Court who these three (Mangyans) were?
A: Yes (,) ma'am.
Q: Could you identify the three?
A: Diosdado Sama, Bandy Masanglay (,) and Demetrio Masanglay ma'am.
Q: What was the reason that they were taken under the custody by these policemen?
A: They cut down trees or lumbers ma'am.
Q: And where was the felled log cut Mr. Witness according to them?
A: In the Sand owned by the Mangyans ma'am.
Q; Where in particular, Mr. Witness?
A: Sitio Matahimik, Barangay Baras, Baco ma'am.36
Section 46 (g) Legal Affairs Office — There shall be a Legal Affairs Office which shall advice the NCIP on all legal matters concerning ICCs/IPs and which shall be responsible for providing ICCs/IPs with legal assistance in litigation involving community interest. It shall conduct preliminary investigation on the basis of complaints filed by the ICCs/IPs against a natural or juridical person believed to have violated ICCs/IPs rights. On the basis of its findings, it shall initiate the filing of appropriate legal or administrative action to the NCIP.47In Unduran v. Aberasturi,48 the Court held that the NCIP may acquire jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving lands of ancestral domain only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICCs or IPs. If the dispute includes parties who are non-ICCs or IPs, the regular courts shall have jurisdiction.
PD 705 (1975): "SEC. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code . . ."
PD 1559 (1978) amending PD 705: "SEC. 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. — Any person shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land or from private land whose title has no limitation on the disposition of forest products found therein, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be punished with the penalty imposed under Arts. 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code..."
EO 277 (1987) amending PD 705: "SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code...."
Illegal cutting and removal of forest products. — [a] Any person who unlawfully cuts or gathers forest products in any forest lands without license or if under license, in violation of the terms hereof, shall, upon conviction for each act or omission, be fined for not less than ten thousand pesos but not more than one hundred thousand pesos or imprisoned for a term of not less than four years and one day but not more than six years, or both.Construing the original iteration of Section 77, as then Section 68 of the original version of PD 705, People v. CFI of Quezon (Branch VII)49 held that the elements of this offense are: 1) the accused cut, gathered, collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) the timber or other forest products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private individual; and 3) the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without any authority granted by the State. Note that CFI of Quezon (Branch VII) included the ownership of the timber or other forest products as the second element of this offense. In the same decision, however, the Court also ruled that -
Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section [68] of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material, it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the government.Hence, we do not consider the ownership of subject timber or other forest products as an element of the offense under Section 68 of PD 705, now Section 77 of PD 705, as amended.
... "wood used for or suitable for building or for carpentry or joinery." Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling, beams, tables, or chairs cannot be considered timber.... Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to lumber was "timber" fit "for building or for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.Here, the dita tree was intended for constructing a communal toilet. It therefore qualifies beyond reasonable doubt as timber pursuant to Section 77.
It seems to be common ground that the ownership of the lands was "tribal" or "communal," but what precisely that, means remains to be ascertained. In any case it was necessary that the argument should go the length of showing that the rights, whatever they exactly were, belonged to the category of rights of private property.60This statement clearly exudes the bias of a colonialist regime. The notion that land ownership existed only where it adhered to civil or common law concepts implied their acceptance at the expense of indigenous principles of ownership. While indigenous laws were not completely rejected under this formulation, only those forms of ownership which shared sufficient similarity with the civil or common law were deemed capable of securing legal protection.
The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not fatal. It should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public forest but from a private woodland registered in the name of complainant's deceased father, Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those produced in private woodlands. The case of Santiago v. Basilan Company, G.R. No. L-15532, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 349, clarified the matter on ownership of timber in private lands, This Court held therein:
"The defendant has appealed, claiming that it should not be held liable to the plaintiff because the timber which it cut and gathered on the land in question belongs to the government and not to the plaintiff, the latter having failed to comply with a requirement of the law with respect to his property.
"The provision of law referred to by appellant is a section of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, which reads:
'SEC. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land. — Every private owner of land containing timber, firewood and other minor forest products shall register his title to the same with the Director of Forestry. A list of such owners, with a statement of the boundaries of their property, shall be furnished by said Director to the Collector of Internal Revenue, and the same shall be supplemented from time to time as occasion may require.'
'Upon application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in which any such land lies shall render assistance in the examination of the title thereof with a view to its registration in the Bureau of Forestry.'
"In the above provision of law, there is no statement to the effect that noncompliance with the requirement would divest the owner of the land of his rights thereof and that said rights of ownership would be transferred to the government. Of course, the land which had been registered and titled in the name of the plaintiff under that Land Registration Act could no longer be the object of a forester license issued by the Director of Forestry because ownership of said land includes also ownership of everything found on its surface (Art. 437, New Civil Code).
"Obviously, the purpose of the registration required in section 1829 of the Administrative Code is to exempt the title owner of the land from the payment of forestry charges as provided for under Section 266 of the National Internal Revenue Code, to wit:
'Charges collective on forest products cut, gathered and removed from unregistered private lands. — The charges above prescribed shall be collected on all forest products cut, gathered and removed from any private land the title to which is not registered with the Director of Forestry as required by the Forest Law; Provided, however, that in the absence of such registration, the owner who desires to cut, gather and remove timber and other forest products from such land shall secure a license from the Director of Forestry Law and Regulations. The cutting, gathering and removing of timber and the other forest products from said private lands without license shall be considered as unlawful cutting, gathering and removing of forest products from public forests and shall be subject to the charges prescribed in such cases in this chapter.'"xxx xxx xxx.
"On the other hand, while it is admitted that the plaintiff has failed to register the timber in his land as a private woodland in accordance with the oft-repeated provision of the Revised Administrative Code, he still retained his rights of ownership, among which are his rights to the fruits of the land and to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof (Art. 429. New Civil Code) — the very rights violated by the defendant Basilan Lumber Company."
While it is only the state which can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest products it does not follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the just cited case, private ownership of forest products grown in private lands is retained under the principle in civil law that ownership of the land includes everything found on its surface.
Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section[68] of P.D. No. 705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not material, it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license from the government.
WHEREAS, proper classification, management and utilization of the lands of the public domain to maximize their productivity to meet the demands of our increasing population is urgently needed;Verily, State regulation of the utilization of forest lands cuts above ownership rights. This is in line with the police power of the State and its obligation to the entire nation to promote, protect, and defend its right to a healthy and clean environment and ecology as a third generation collective right.62
WHEREAS, to achieve the above purpose, it is necessary to reassess the multiple uses of forest lands and resources before allowing any utilization thereof to optimize the benefits that can be derived therefrom;
WHEREAS, it is also imperative to place emphasis not only on the utilization thereof but more so on the protection, rehabilitation and development of forest lands, in order to ensure the continuity of their productive condition;
WHEREAS, the present laws and regulations governing forest lands are not responsive enough to support re-oriented government programs, projects and efforts on the proper classification and delimitation of the lands of the public domain, and the management, utilization, protection, rehabilitation, and development of forest lands...
The vastness of this patrimony precludes the State from managing the same entirely by itself. In the interest of quality and efficiency, it thus outsources assistance from private entities, but this must be delimited and controlled for the protection of the general welfare. Then comes into relevance police power, one of the inherent powers of the State. Police power is described in Gerochi v. Department of Energy.
[P]olice power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found in the Latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ui alienum non laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers. We have held that the power to "regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons.
Hand-in-hand with police power in the promotion of general welfare is the doctrine of parens patriae. It focuses on the role of the state as a "sovereign" and expresses the inherent power and authority of the state to provide protection of the person and property of a person non sui juris. Under the doctrine, the state has the sovereign power of guardianship over persons of disability, and in the execution of the doctrine the legislature is possessed of inherent power to provide protection to persons non sui juris and to make and enforce rules and regulations as it deems proper for the management of their property. Parens patriae means "father of his country," and refers to the State as a last-ditch provider of protection to those unable to care and fend for themselves. It can be said that Filipino consumers have become such persons of disability deserving protection by the State, as their welfare are being increasingly downplayed, endangered, and overwhelmed by business pursuits.
While the Regalian doctrine is state ownership over natural resources, police power is state regulation through legislation, and parens patriae is the default state responsibility to look after the defenseless, there remains a limbo on a flexible state policy bringing these doctrines into a cohesive whole, enshrining the objects of public interest, and backing the security of the people, rights, and resources from general neglect, private greed, and even from the own excesses of the State. We fill this void through the Public Trust Doctrine.
The Public Trust Doctrine, while derived from English common law and American jurisprudence, has firm Constitutional and statutory moorings in our jurisdiction. The doctrine speaks of an imposed duty upon the State and its representative of continuing supervision over the taking and use of appropriated water. Thus, "[p]arties who acquired rights in trust property [only hold] these rights subject to the trust and, therefore, could assert no vested right to use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust." In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, a California Supreme Court decision, it worded the doctrine as that which —
...
Academic literature further imparts that "[p]art of this consciousness involves restoring the view of public and state ownership of certain natural resources that benefit all. [. . .]" The "doctrine further holds that certain natural resources belong to all and cannot be privately owned or controlled because of their inherent importance to each individual and society as a whole. A clear declaration of public ownership, the doctrine reaffirms the superiority of public rights over private rights for critical resources. It impresses upon states the affirmative duties of a trustee to manage these natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations and embodies key principles of environmental protection: stewardship, communal responsibility, and sustainability."
In this framework, a relationship is formed — "the [s]tate is the trustee, which manages specific natural resources — the trust principal — for the trust principal — for the benefit of the current and future generations — the beneficiaries." "[T]he [S]tate has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible." But with the birth of privatization of many basic utilities, including the supply of water, this has proved to be quite challenging. The State is in a continuing battle against lurking evils that has afflicted even itself, such as the excessive pursuit of profit rather than purely the public's interest.
These exigencies forced the public trust doctrine to evolve from a mere principle to a resource management term and tool flexible enough to adapt to changing social priorities and address the correlative and consequent dangers thereof. The public is regarded as the beneficial owner of trust resources, and courts can enforce the public trust doctrine even against the government itself.
3. Was the dita tree cut and collectedThere is, however, reasonable doubt that the dita tree was cut and collected without any authority granted by the State.
without authority granted by the
State?
The general rule is that acts punished under a special law are malum prohibitum. "An act which is declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial."
In contrast, crimes mala in se concern inherently immoral acts:
"Implicit in the concept of mala in se is that of mens rea." Mens rea is defined as "the nonphysical element which, combined with the act of the accused, makes up the crime charged. Most frequently it is the criminal intent, or the guilty mind[.]"
Crimes mala in se presuppose that the person who did the felonious act had criminal intent to do so, while crimes mala prohibita do not require knowledge or criminal intent:
In the case of mala in se it is necessary, to constitute a punishable offense, for the person doing the act to have knowledge of the nature of his act and to have a criminal intent; in the case of mala prohibita, unless such words as "knowingly" and "willfully" are contained in the statute, neither knowledge nor criminal intent is necessary. In other words, a person morally quite innocent and with every intention of being a law-abiding citizen becomes a criminal, and liable to criminal penalties, if he does an act prohibited by these statutes.
Hence, "[i]ntent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself [.]" When an act is prohibited by a special law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the performance of the prohibited act is the crime itself.
Volition, or intent to commit the act, is different from criminal intent. Volition or voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act being done [in contrast to knowledge of the nature of his act]. On the other hand, criminal intent — which is different from motive, or the moving power for the commission of the crime — refers to the state of mind beyond voluntariness. It is this intent that is being punished by crimes mala in se.
The malum prohibitum nature of an offense, however, does not automatically result in a conviction. The prosecution must still establish that the accused had intent to perpetrate the act.
Intent to perpetrate has been associated with the actor's volition, or intent to commit the act. Volition or voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act being done. In previous cases, this Court has determined the accused's volition on a case to case basis, taking into consideration the prior and contemporaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances.
. . .
[I]t is clear that to determine the presence of an accused's intent to perpetrate a prohibited act, courts may look into the meaning and scope of the prohibition beyond the literal wording of the law. Although in malum prohibitum offenses, the act itself constitutes the crime, courts must still be mindful of practical exclusions to the law's coverage, particularly when a superficial and narrow reading of the same with result to absurd consequences. Further, as in People v. De Gracia and Mendoza v. People, temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless commission of prohibited acts were considered as an indication of the absence of an intent to perpetrate the offense. (Emphasis in the original)
Further, it must be noted that the original iteration of Section 77 (then Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 [1975]) was passed under the 1973 Constitution and specifically described "authority" as being "under a license agreement, lease, license or permit." However, soon after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution or in July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 277 (EO 277) amending Section 77, which, among others, removed the above-mentioned descriptor, hence, leaving the phrase "without any authority,"generally-worded. To my mind, the amendment of Section 77 should be read in light of the new legal regime which gives significant emphasis on the State's protection of our IP's rights, which includes the preservation of their cultural identity. Given that there was no explanation in EO 277 as to the "authority" required, it may then be reasonably argued that the amendment accommodates the legitimate exercise of IP's rights within their ancestral domains. (Emphasis in the original)
To have a strict interpretation of the term "authority" under Sec. 77 of P.D. 705 despite the clear evolution of its text would amount to construing a penal law strictly against the accused, which cannot be countenanced. To stress, "[o]nly those persons, offenses, and penalties, clearly included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be considered within the statute's operation. They must come clearly within both the spirit and the letter of the statute, and where there is any reasonable doubt, it must be resolved in favor of the person accused of violating the statute; that is, all questions in doubt will be resolved in favor of those from whom the penalty is sought."
More importantly, to construe the word "authority" in Sec. 77, P.D. 705 as excluding the rights of ICCs/IPs already recognized in the IPRA would unduly undermine both the text and the purpose of this novel piece of legislation and significantly narrow down the rights recognized therein. (Emphasis in the original)
The peculiar circumstances of this case require the same liberal approach. The Court simply cannot brush aside petitioners' cultural heritage in the determination of their criminal liability. Unlike the accused in People v. De Gracia, petitioners cannot be presumed to know the import and legal consequence of their act. Their circumstances, specifically their access to information, and their customs as members of a cultural minority, are substantial factors that distinguish them from the rest of the population.
. . .
As for the Mangyans, their challenges in availing learning facilities and accessing information are well documented. The location of their settlements in the mountainous regions of Mindoro, though relatively close to the nation's capital, is not easily reached by convenient modes of transportation and communication. Further, the lack of financial resources discourages indigenous families to avail and/or sustain their children's education. Certainly, by these circumstances alone, Mangyans cannot reasonably be compared to those in the lowlands in terms of world view and behavior.
In the Mangyans' worldview, the forest is considered as common property of all the residents of their respective settlements. This means that they can catch forest animals, gather wood, bamboo, nuts, and other wild plants in the forest without the permission of other residents. They can generally hunt and eat animals in the forest, except those they consider inedible, such as pythons, snakes and large lizards. They employ swiddens or the kaingin system to cultivate the land within their settlements.
Based on the foregoing, to hold petitioners to the same standards for adjudging a violation of PD 705 as non-indigenous peoples would be to force upon them a belief system to which they do not subscribe. The fact that petitioners finished up to Grade 4 of primary education does not negate their distinct way of life nor justifies lumping IPs with the rest of the Filipino people. Formal education and customary practices are not mutually exclusive, but is in fact, as some studies note, co-exist in Mangyan communities as they thrive in the modern society. It may be opportune to consider that in indigenous communities, customs and cultural practices are normally transferred through oral tradition. Hence, it is inaccurate to conclude that a few years in elementary school results to IP's total acculturation.
As already discussed, Mangyans perceive all the resources found in their ancestral domain to be communal. They are accustomed to using and enjoying these resources without asking permission, even from other tribes, much less from government functionaries with whom they do not normally interact. Moreover, by the location of their settlements, links to local government units, or information sources are different from those residing in the lowlands. As such, the Court may reasonably infer that petitioners are unaware of the prohibition set forth in Sec. 77 of P.D. No. 705.
To my mind, an acknowledgment of the Mangyan's unique way of life negates any finding on the petitioners' intent to perpetrate the prohibited act. Taken with the fact that petitioners were caught cutting only one (1) dita tree at the time they were apprehended, and that it was done in obedience to the orders of their elders, it is clear that the cutting of the tree was a casual, incidental, and harmless act done within the context of their customary tradition.
. . .
In my opinion, P.D. 705, which took effect in 1975, should be viewed under the prism of the 1987 Constitution which recognizes the right of indigenous cultural communities. The noble objectives of P.D. 705 in protecting our forest lands should be viewed in conjunction with the Constitution's mandate of recognizing our indigenous groups as integral to our nation's existence. I submit that under our present Constitutional regime, courts cannot summarily ignore allegations or factual circumstances that pertain to indigenous rights or traditions, but must instead carefully weigh and evaluate whether these are material to the resolution of the case.
This does not mean, however, that the Court is creating a novel exempting circumstance in criminal prosecutions. It merely behooves the courts to make a case-to-case determination whether an accused's ties to an indigenous cultural community affects the prosecution's accusations or the defense of the accused. Simply put, the courts should not ignore indigeneity in favor of absolute reliance to the traditional purpose of criminal prosecution, which are deterrence and retribution.
In sum, the peculiar circumstances of this case compel me to take petitioners' side. I am convinced that petitioners' intent to perpetrate the offense has not been established by the prosecution with moral certainty. For this reason, I vote for petitioners' acquittal.
On this note, it may be well to remember that the case of Cruz which dealt with the constitutionality of the provisions of the IPRA was decided by an equally divided Court. This only goes to show that there are still nuances concerning the rights of IPs within their ancestral land and domain that are very much open to varying interpretations. Prescinding from this jurisprudential history, perhaps the instant case may not provide the most sufficient and adequate venue to resolve the issues brought about by this novel piece of legislation. It would be the height of unfairness to burden the instant case against petitioners with the need to resolve the intricate Constitutional matters brought about by their mere membership in the IP community especially since a criminal case, being personal in nature, affects their liberty as the accused.
The members of the Court may argue one way or the other, but no length of legal debate will remove from the fact that this case is still about two men who acted pursuant to precisely the kind of cultural choice and community-based environmental agency that they believe IPRA contemplated they had the freedom to exercise. The petitioners hang their liberty on the question of whether or not IPRA, vis-a-vis forestry laws, has failed or delivered on its fundamental promise. That the Court cannot categorically either affirm or negate their belief, only casts reasonable doubt not only as to whether or not they are guilty of an offense, but whether or not there was even an offense to speak of. At most, this doubt only further burdens the fate of the petitioners with constitutional questions, the answers to which must await a future, more suitable opportunity.
At the very least, this doubt 'must merit their acquittal.
(Emphases in the original)
In turn, the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act's provisions on self- governance and empowerment, along with those on the right to ancestral domains, social justice and human rights, and cultural integrity, collectively reflect and bring to fruition the 1987 Constitution's aims of preservation.
The 1987 Constitution devotes six (6) provisions "which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life":
ARTICLE II
Declaration of Principles and State Policies
SECTION 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Departmentxxx xxx xxx
SECTION 5.
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE XII
National Economy and Patrimony
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE XIII
Social Justice and Human Rights
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE XIV
Education, Science and- Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports Education
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies.
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE XVI
General Provisions
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from such communities.
The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act echoes the constitutional impetus for preservation. Its declaration of state policies reads:
SECTION 2. Declaration of State Policies. — The State shall recognize and promote all the rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) hereunder enumerated within the framework of the Constitution:
a) The State shall recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of national unity and development;
b) The State shall protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains to ensure their economic, social and cultural well-being and shall recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain;
c) The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national laws and policies;
d) The State shall guarantee that members of the ICCs/IPs regardless of sex, shall equally enjoy the full measure of human rights and freedoms without distinction or discrimination;
e) The State shall take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned, to protect their rights and guarantee respect for their cultural integrity, and to ensure that members of the ICCs/IPs benefit on an equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other members of the population; and
f) The State recognizes its obligations to respond to the strong expression of the ICCs/IPs for cultural integrity by assuring maximum ICC/IP participation in the direction of education, health, as well as other services of ICCs/IPs, in order to render such services more responsive to the needs and desires of these communities.
Towards these ends, the State shall institute and establish the necessary mechanisms to enforce and guarantee the realization of these rights, taking into consideration their customs, traditions, values, beliefs, interests and institutions, and to adopt and implement measures to protect their rights to their ancestral domains.
The 1987 Constitution's attitude toward indigenous peoples, with its emphasis on preservation, is a marked departure from regimes under the 1935 and 1973 constitutions, which were typified by integration. Integration, however, was still "like the colonial policy of assimilation understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship." Like assimilation, it was eager to have indigenous peoples attune themselves to the mainstream. This eagerness inevitably tended to measures that eroded indigenous peoples' identities.
Spanish and American colonial rule was characterized by the "need to impart civilization[.]" In People v. Cayat:
As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards these inhabitants, and in the different laws of the Indies, their concentration in so-called "reducciones" (communities) had been persistently attempted with the end in view of according them the "spiritual and temporal benefits" of civilized life. Throughout the Spanish regime, it had been regarded by the Spanish Government as a sacred'"duty to conscience and humanity" to civilize these less fortunate people living "in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "moral and material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws." (Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.) This policy had not been deflected from during the American period. President McKinley in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, said:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
The 1935 Constitution was silent on indigenous peoples. However, it was under the 1935 Constitution that Republic Act No. 1888, creating the Commission on National Integration, was passed. Its title and declaration of policy reveal a predisposed view of "Non-Christian Filipinos" or "National Cultural Minorities" as uncultivated, and whose advancement depended on the extent to which they were integrated to the mainstream:
REPUBLIC ACT No. 1888
AN ACT TO EFFECTUATE IN A MORE RAPID AND COMPLETE MANNER THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, MORAL AND POLITICAL AND ADVANCEMENT OF THE NON-CHRISTIAN FILIPINOS OR NATIONAL CULTURAL MINORITIES AND TO RENDER REAL, COMPLETE AND PERMANENT THE INTEGRATION OF ALL SAID NATIONAL CULTURAL MINORITIES INTO THE BODY POLITIC, CREATING THE COMMISSION ON NATIONAL INTEGRATION CHARGED WITH SAID FUNCTIONS
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to foster, accelerate and accomplish by all adequate means and in a systematic, rapid and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social and political advancement of the Non-Christian Filipinos, hereinafter called National Cultural Minorities, and to render real, complete and permanent the integration of all the said National Cultural Minorities into the body politic.
The 1973 Constitution devoted one (1) provision to "national cultural minorities." Its Article XV, Section 11 read:
SECTION 11. The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of State policies.
Section 11 began to deviate from the rigid view that it is indigenous people who must reconcile themselves with the mainstream. It expressly recognized that national cultural minorities were typified by their "customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests[.]" More important, unlike prior legal formulations, it committed to national cultural minorities the "consideration of their] customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests ... in the formulation and implementation of State policies."
Under the 1973 Constitution, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos enacted Presidential Decree No. 1414, creating the Office of the Presidential Assistant on National Minorities. With its policy of "integrating] into the mainstream . . . groups who seek full integration into the larger community, and at the same time protecting] the rights of those who wish to preserve their original lifeways beside that larger community[,]" Presidential Decree No. 1414 maintained the drive for integration, but conceded that indigenous peoples may want preservation rather than admission.
The 1987 Constitution reorients the State toward enabling indigenous peoples to maintain their identity. It declines articulating policies of integration and assimilation and transcends the 1973 Constitution's undertaking to "consider." Instead, it commits to not only recognize, but also promote, "the rights of indigenous cultural communities." It expressly aims to "preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It elevates to the level of constitutional text terms such as "ancestral lands" and "customary laws." Because the Constitution is the "fundamental and organic law of the land," these terms' inclusion in the Constitution renders them integral to the Republic's being. Through the same inclusion, the State manifestly assents to the distinctiveness of indigenous peoples, and undertakes obligations concomitant to such assent.
With the 1987 Constitution in effect, the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act was adopted precisely recognizing that indigenous peoples have been "resistan[t] to political, social[,] and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, [and] became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos."
It was never the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act's intent to facilitate such miscarriage of justice, Its view of self-governance and empowerment is not myopic, but is one that balances. Preservation is pursued in the context of national unity and is impelled by harmony with the national legal system. Customary laws cannot work to undermine penal statutes designed to address offenses that are an affront to sovereignty.
SECTION 4. Concept of Ancestral Lands/Domains. — Ancestral lands/domains shall include such concepts of territories which cover not only the physical environment but the total environment including the spiritual and cultural bonds to the areas which the ICCs/IPs possess, occupy and use and to which they have claims of ownership.
And:
SECTION 5. Indigenous Concept of Ownership. — Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity....
CHAPTER III
Rights to Ancestral Domains
SECTION 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains. — The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights shall include:
a) Right of Ownership. — The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. — Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of, ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;
c) Right to Stay in the Territories. — The right to stay in the territory and not to be removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain. Where relocation is considered necessary as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place only with the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned and whenever possible, they shall be guaranteed the right to return to their ancestral domains, as soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist. When such return is not possible, as determined by agreement or through appropriate procedures, ICCs/IPs shall be provided in all possible cases with lands of quality and legal status at least equal to that of the land previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and future development. Persons thus relocated shall likewise be fully compensated for any resulting loss or injury;
e) Right to Regulate Entry of Migrants. — Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and organizations into the domains;
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations. — The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains which have been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and intended for common public welfare and service; and
h) Right to Resolve Conflict. — Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice whenever necessary.
SECTION 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands. — The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.
a) Right to transfer land/property. — Such right shall include the right to transfer land or property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned.
b) Right to Redemption. — In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer.
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law.
Project: Communal ToiletsTaking account of petitioners' distinctive culture as IPs and their displacement from the ancestral domains and land, their efforts to build communal toilets came about most likely as part of the practice intended as a means for them to survive as an ICC as result of their displacement and thereafter re-settlement.97
The Mangyan people used to be the dominant dwellers of the entire island including the lowlands, but ever since more and more foreign settlers got in and started claiming (if not grabbing) majority of the land area, most of the Mangyans were driven to the remote mountains and marshlands. Aside from losing their ancestral lands to the foreign settlers, the island's natural resources like the forests and rivers got abused causing the fast deterioration of vegetation and wildlife. These adverse developments throughout the history of the land have affected the lifestyle of the natural inhabitants - they became scavengers in their own land, they became nomads having no permanent domain, moving from place to place to survive the day.
Being nomadic, their temporary settlements (haron) developed in them a culture of less desirable hygiene. This common practice in their household have cause epidemic diseases and death. But this hygiene problem was not limited to those Mangyan communities who are still nomadic because even those other communities who were blessed to be awarded with protected domains under the provision of National Council for Indigenous People (NCIP) and the local government were not able to withdraw themselves from the bad practice.
[Drops of Faith Christian Missions has] seen the importance of attending to this perilous issue and so we came up with a project to start building communal toilets in those Mangyan communities which have secured dwelling permanency in their ancestral land.96
The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding. It also seeks an official recognition of one's claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of ancestral lands is for the purpose of "officially establishing" one's land as an ancestral land. Just like a registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership upon the applicant but only recognizes ownership that has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interest's possession of the property since time immemorial.107
A. RightsB. Responsibilities — The community claimants shall have the responsibility to:
- The right to occupy, cultivate and utilize the land and all natural resources found therein, as well as to reside peacefully within the domain, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations applicable thereto;
- The right to benefit and to share the profits from the allocation and utilization of natural resources within the domain;
- The right to regulate in coordination with the Local Government Units concerned, the entry of migrant settlers, non-government organizations and other similar entities into the domain;
- The right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploitation of natural resources in the area for the purpose of ensuring the observance of ecological and environmental protection and conservation measures pursuant to national and customary laws, rules and regulations;
- The right to actively and collectively participate in the formulation and implementation of government projects within the domain;
- The right to lay claim on adjacent areas which may, after a more careful and thorough investigation, be proven to be in fact part of the ancestral domain;
- The right to access and availment of technical, financial and other form of assistance provided for by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and other government agencies;
- The right to claim ownership of all improvements made by them at any time within the ancestral domain.
- Prepare a Management Plan for the domain in consonance with the provisions of Article VI hereof;
- Establish and activate indigenous practices or culturally-founded strategies to protect, conserve and develop the natural resources and wildlife sanctuaries in the domain;
- Restore, preserve and maintain a balanced ecology in the ancestral domain by protecting flora, fauna, watershed areas, and other forest and mineral reserves;
- Protect and conserve forest trees and other vegetation naturally growing on the land specially along rivers, streams and channels;
- Preservation of natural features of the domain.108
.... the self-limiting and tight window within which the indigenous peoples may cut trees from their own ancestral domain without prior permission is" narrow enough as to sidestep any need to reconcile rights granted by IPRA vis-a-vis forestry regulations. This supports the primary aspiration that animates the IPRA, that is to restore ICCs/IPs to their land and affirm their right to cultural integrity and customary ways of life, with socio-cultural and legal space to unfold as they have done since time immemorial...Indeed, there is reasonable doubt as to the existence of petitioners' IP right to log the dita tree for the construction of a communal toilet for the Iraya- Mangyan ICC. It is engendered by the more expansive definition of authority under the law, the bundle of petitioners' IP rights both under the Constitution and IPRA, and a host of others like the ones mentioned by Justice Leonen in his Opinion, the sundry administrative regulations which seek to reconcile the regalian doctrine and the civilist concept of ownership with the indigenous peoples' sui generis ownership of ancestral domains and lands, the international covenants like the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, of which our country is a signatory, and Philippine and international jurisprudence which identifies the forms and contents of IP rights. In addition, we have the ever growing respect, recognition, protection, and preservation accorded by the State to the IPs, including their rights to cultural heritage and ancestral domains and lands.
I submit that perhaps, if not with this case, a tightrope must eventually be walked with respect to the issues of environmental sustainability and indigenous peoples' rights, without having to weaken one to enable the other.
For as affirmed by the IPRA, the cultural identity of the indigenous peoples has long been inseparable from the environment that surrounds it. There is, therefore, no knowable benefit in an indigenous custom or cultural belief that truthfully permits plunder of the environment that they hold synonymous with their collective identity. No legally sound argument may be built to support the premise that we ought not affirm the freedom of these indigenous peoples because they might exercise such freedom to bulldoze their own rights.
That the experience on the ground shows abuses from unscrupulous non-members of ICCs/IPs of ancestral domains does not merit that the very same indigenous communities that have been taken advantage of be made to pay the highest cost of relinquishing what little control that was restored to them by law.
Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. —Considering the afore-cited rule, a favorable judgment - as here - shall benefit accused Demetrio who did not appeal. For as stated, an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties.109 Thus, although it is only petitioners who persisted with the present appeal, the Court may still pass upon the issue of whether their co-accused Demetrio should also be exonerated, especially since the evidence and arguments against and the conviction of petitioners, on the one hand, and accused Demetrio, on the other, are inextricably linked.110
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter;
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 14-37.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles and concurred in by Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan-Castillo and Florito S. Macalino, all members of the Twelfth Division, id. at 79-89.
3 CA rollo, pp. 143-144.
4Rollo, pp. 48-49.
5SECTION 77. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, removed timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. The court shall further order the confiscation in favor cf the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
6Rollo. p. 57.
7Id.
8Id. at 52-55.
9 Brief for Accused-Appellants, CA rollo, p. 33.
10 Comment dated November 18, 2016; rollo, pp. 131-152.
11Id.
12Id.
13 Record, pp. 5-6.
14Rollo, pp. 58-59.
15Id. at 58.
16 Penned by Judge Manuel C. Luna, Jr.; id. at 57-62.
17Id. at 62.
18 Renumbered in PD 705 as Section 77 pursuant to Section 7 of RA 7161 (1991); See supra for text of Section 77, PD 705 as amended.
19 Record; p. 363
20 Appellants' Brief before the Court of Appeals, CA rollo, p. 34.
21Rollo, pp. 79-89.
22Id.
23Id.
24Id. at 39-40.
25 Supra note 1.
26Id.
27 Supra note 10.
28Rollo, pp. 158-167.
29Dinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356, 374 (2015).
30R. v. Lifchus, 1996 CanLII 6631 (MB CA), retrieved on 2020-08-25.< http://canlii.ca/t/1npkc
31 See J. Puno's Separate Opinion (Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, (Resolution, Per Curiam, En Banc), 400 Phil. 904, 947 (2000).
32Id.
33Id.
34See http://www.mangyan.org/content/iraya (last accessed: January 22, 2020).
35Rollo, pp. 48-49.
36Id at 69; See also id. at 84-85.
37Id.
38 See Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration to the RTC Decision dated September 08, 2010 signed by Atty. Jeanette A. Florita of the NCIP-Legal Affairs Office, id. at 63-71; See also Court of Appeals' Notice of Resolution dated April 11, 2016 addressed to Atty. Jeanette A. Florita of the NCIP - Legal Affairs Office as counsel for Accused-Appellants, id. at 38-40; See also Petition for Review dated May 16, 2014 signed by the Atty. Jeanette A. Florita of the NCIP - Legal Affairs Office, id. at 14-37.
39Id. at 52-55; signed by Atty. Leovigilda V. Guioguio.
40Id. at 63-71; signed by Jeanette A. Florita.
41Id. at 78-76; signed by Jeanette A. Florita.
42Id. at 90-109; signed by Atty. Jeanette A. Florita.
43Id. at 14-37; signed by Attys. Jeanette A. Florita and Rizzabel A. Madangeng.
44Id. at 158-169; signed by Atty. Jeanette A. Florita.
45 RA 8371 (1997), The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997. CHAPTER VII - National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), Section 38: National Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).— To carry out the policies herein set forth, there shall be created the National Commission on ICCs/IPs (NCIP),which shall be the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as the rights thereto. See infra for a discussion of the constitutional principle of preservation within the context of national unity.
46 See infra for a discussion of the constitutional principle of preservation within the context of national unity.
47 The Indigenous Peoples" Rights Act of 1997, Republic Act No. 8371, October 29, 1997.
48 771 Phil. 536, 569 (2015); See also Unduran v. Aberasturi, 808 Phil. 795, 800 (2017).
49 283 Phil. 78, 84 (1992).
50 577 Phil. 243, 256-257 (2008).
51 PD 705 as amended, Section 3 (a): Public forest is the mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purposes and which are not.
52 PD 705 as amended, Section 3 (b): Permanent forest or forest reserves refers to those lands of the public domain which have been the subject of the present system of classification and declared as not needed for forest purposes.
53 PD 705 as amended, Section 3 (g): Forest reservations refer to forest lands which have been reserved by the President of the Philippines for any specific purpose or purposes.
54Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, Presidential Decree No. 705, May 19, 1975.
55 John Borrows and Leonard Rotman, The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does it Make a Difference, 1997 36-1 Alberta Law Review 9, 1997 CanLIIDocs 142, http: //www.canlii.org/t/skv8 retrieved on 2020-09-13.
56 E.g. PD 410 (1974).
57 G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019.
58 Supra note 31 at 1025.
59 John Borrows and Leonard Rotman, supra note 55.
60 Re Southern Rhodesia, [1919] A.C. 211 (P.C.).
61 See e.g. People v. Molde, G.R. No. 228262, January 21, 2019: "The elements of qualified theft are: "(a) taking of personal property; (b) that the said property belongs to another; (c) that the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) that it be done without the owner's consent; (e) that it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; [and] (f) that it be done with grave abuse of confidence."
62 See Sumudu Atappatu, "The Right to Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted: The Emergence of a Human Right to a Healthy Environment under International Law," 16 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 65 (2002) at file:///C:/Users/SUPREME%20COURT/Downloads/2083-Article%20Text-7012-1-10-20190403%20(1).pdf. last accessed November 4, 2020.
63 G.R. No. 202897, August 6, 2019.
64Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc. v. Gozun, 520 Phil. 457, 478 (2006); Philippine Ports Authority v. Cipres Stevedoring and Arrastre Services, Inc., 501 Phil. 646, 663 (2005): "As 'police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep,' 48 whatever proprietary right that respondent may have acquired must necessarily give way to a valid exercise of police power, thus: 4. In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway. That is settled law . . ."
65 773 Phil. 614, 628 (2015).
66 783 Phil. 711, 728 (2016): "In Saguin v. People, we have said that non-remittance of Pag-IBIG Fund premiums without lawful cause or with fraudulent intent is" punishable under the penal clause of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1752. However, the petitioners in Saguin were justified in not remitting the premiums on time as the hospital they were working in devolved to the provincial government and there was confusion as to who had the duty to remit."
67 755 Phil. 709, 763-764 (2015).
68 See e.g., Nunavut Teachers' Association v. Nunavut, 2010 NUCJ 13 (CanLII), < http://canlii.ca/t/2c4sl >1234, retrieved on 2020-10-3: "The subjective element concerns a party's motive and intent.... The subjective element in the context of assessing good faith concerns the motive and intent of the parties...
69Nunavut Teachers' Association v. Nunavut, 2010 NUCJ 13 (CanLlI), , retrieved on 2020-10-3: "... the objective element relates to the party's bargaining with a view to concluding a collective agreement. The Board approved the words from ROK Tree (1999) Ltd. (Re), [2000] N.B.L.E.B.D. No. 14, 57 C.L.R.B.R. (2d) 293, that the efforts made to conclude a collective agreement are to be "measured against an objective standard, that of a rational and informed discussion within the framework of the statutory regime.... good faith bargaining includes rational discussion, consultation and reasonable efforts. Judging the objective component of good faith bargaining requires the judge to assess how the parties carried on the rational discussion, consultation and reasonable efforts."
70 Supra note 57.
71Ahousaht Indian Band and Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 BCSC 1494 (CanLII),< http://canlii.ca/t/g7mt9 , (last accessed or March 27,2020); Prof. Mario Victor "Marvic" F, Leonen, "The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act: An Overview of its Contents," PHILJA Judicial Journal (2002).
72Id.
73Id.
74Id.
75Id.
76 Supra note 57.
77Ahousaht Indian Band and Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), supra.
78Id.
79Id.
80Id.
81Id.
82Id.
83Tsilhqot 'in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 (CanLII), [2014] 2 SCRA 257, retrieved on 2020-03-27.< http://canlii.ca/tg7mt9
84Id.
85Id.
86Id.
87Id.
88 Id.
89 Prof. Mario Victor "Marvic" F, Leonen, "The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act: An Overview of its Contents," PHILJA Judicial Journal (2002).
90 Supra note 83.
91Id.
92Id.
93Id.
94Id.
95 Acosta v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 211559, October 15, 2019.
96 Drops of Faith Christian Missions, at https://dfcmtribaimissions.wordpress.com/tag/mangyan- tribes/page/3/. (last accessed March, 29, 2020).
97 Kristine Askeland, Torill Bull, Maurice B. Mittelmark, Understanding how the poorest can thrive: A case study of the Mangyan women on Mindoro, Philippines (Master's Thesis, May 2010), at http://dspace.uib.no/bitstream/handle/1956/4277/69634922.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=v (last accessed on September 21, 2020):
98 The Mangyans, Our Brothers, at http://www.newsflash.org/2004/02/tl/t1012695.htm (last accessed on September 21, 2020); Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan-Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services, at https://ncddp.dswd.gov.ph/site/feature profile/237 (last accessed on September 21, 2020); Kristine Askeland, Torill Bull, Maurice B. Mittelmark, supra; The Iraya Mangyan Village in Puerto Galera, at http://www.mariaronabeltran.com/2019/01/the-iraya-mangyan-village-in-puerto.html. (last accessed on March 29, 2020).
99Id.
100 Supra note 1.
101 https://www.doe.gov.ph/sites/default/files/pdf/eicc/cadt-region04, (last accessed: January 22, 2020).
102 Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court)
103 DENR AO No. 02-93, Rules and Regulations for the Identification, Delineation and Recognition of Ancestral Land and Domain Claims; DENR AO No. 29-96, Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of Executive Order 263, Otherwise Known as the Community-Based Forest Management Strategy (CBFMS); Palawan Council for Sustainable Development Resolution No. 38-A-93, Resolution Adopting the Guidelines for the Identification and Delineation of Ancestral Domain and Land Claims in Palawan; Palawan Council for Sustainable Development Resolution No. 38-A-93, Resolution Adopting the Guidelines for the Identification and Delineation of Ancestral Domain and Land Claims in Palawan; DENR AO No. 25-92, National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) Implementing Rules and Regulations; NCIP AO No. 04-12, Revised Omnibus Rules on Delineation and Recognition of Ancestral Domains and Lands of 2012.
104 See e.g., DENR AO No, 02-93, Rules and Regulations for the Identification, Delineation and Recognition of Ancestral Land and Domain Claims; Palawan Council for Sustainable Development Resolution No. 38-A-93, Resolution Adopting the Guidelines for the Identification and Delineation of Ancestral Domain and Land Claims in Palawan.
105 See Lim v. Gamosa, 77A Phil. 31 (2015).
106 648 Phil. 372, 393-394 (2010).
107 Citations omitted.
108 DENR AO No. 02-93, Rules and Regulations for the Identification, Delineation and Recognition of Ancestral Land and Domain Claims.
109 See People v. Merced, 827 Phil. 473, 492 (2018).
110 See Lim v. Court of Appeals, 524 Phil. 692 (2006).
PERALTA, C.J.:
The facts of the case are simple. Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 68,1 now Section 77, of Presidential Decree No. 705 (P.D. No. 705),2 as amended, for cutting a Dita tree within the lands of Baco, Oriental Mindoro, without the authority required therein. The Information reads:
That on or about the 15th day of March 2005, at Barangay Calangatan, Municipality of San Teodoro, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority as required under existing forest laws and regulations and for unlawful purpose, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly cut with the use of an unregistered power chainsaw, a Dita tree, a forest product, with an aggregate volume of 500 board feet and with a corresponding value of TWENTY THOUSAND (Php20,000.00), Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
SECTION 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
x x x is not mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in such a condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge, x x x x If upon such proof there is reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal. For it is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary; but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. This we take to be proof beyond reasonable doubt; because if the law, which mostly depends upon considerations of a moral nature, should go further than this, and require absolute certainty, it would exclude circumstantial evidence altogether.
Even the majority opinion noted that:
xxx Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not required by the law to convict of any crime charged but moral certainty is required and this certainty is required to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. The reasonable doubt should necessarily pertain to the facts constituted by the crime charged. Surmises and conjectures have no place in a judicial inquiry and thus are shunned in criminal prosecution. For the accused to be acquitted on reasonable doubt, it must arise from the evidence adduced or from lack of evidence. Reasonable doubt is not such a doubt as any man may start questioning for the sake of a doubt; nor a doubt suggested or surmised without foundation in facts, for it is always possible to question any conclusion derived from the evidence on record, xxx.
You will note that the, Crown must establish the accused's guilt beyond a "reasonable doubt", not beyond "any doubt." A reasonable doubt is exactly what it says -a doubt based on reason- on the logical processes of the mind. It is not a fanciful or speculative doubt, nor is it a doubt based upon sympathy or prejudice. It is the sort of doubt which, if you ask yourself "why do I doubt?" - you can assign a logical reason by way of an answer.
A logical reason in this context means a reason connected either to the evidence itself, including any conflict you may find exists after considering the evidence as a whole, or to an absence of evidence which in the circumstances of this case you believe is essential to a conviction, x x x.8
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, its resolution must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants, but must rely solely on what the law provides on the given set of facts. If the facts are disputed or if the issues require an examination of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact. The test, therefore, is not the appellation given to a question by the party raising it, but whether the appellate court can resolve the issue without examining or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.10
Section 23. Penal Provisions. — Refusal or failure without lawful cause or with fraudulent intent to comply with the provisions of this Decree, as well as the implementing rules and regulations adopted by the Board of Trustees, particularly with respect to registration of employees, collection and remittance of employee savings as well as employer counterparts, or the correct amount due x x x.
Second, We found that accused persons therein cannot be guilty of having fraudulent intent due to an apparent confusion brought about by the devolution. The Court pertinently provided as follows:cralawred
By April 1, 1993, however, the RMDH had been devolved to the Provincial or Local Government of Zamboanga del Norte. Thus, all financial transactions of the hospital were carried out through the Office of the Provincial Governor. The petitioners, therefore, had legal basis to believe that the duty to set aside funds and to effect the HDMF remittances was transferred from the hospital to the provincial government. Hence, the petitioners should not be penalized for their failure to perform a duty which were no longer theirs and over which they were no longer in control.
x x x x
The devolution of the hospital to the provincial government, therefore, was a valid justification which constituted a lawful cause for the inability of the petitioners to make the HDMF remittances for March 1993.14
There was no showing either of fraudulent intent or deliberate refusal on the part of the petitioners to make the March 1993 remittance. Whatever lapses attended such non-remittance may be attributed to the confusion of the concerned personnel as to their functions and responsibilities brought about by the advent of the devolution. More important was the honest belief of the petitioners that the remittance function was transferred to, and assumed by, the provincial government. In fact, the petitioners duly informed the Hospital Chief of the need to make representations to the Governor to make such payment.
For said reason, they cannot and should not be faulted for the non- remittance. Further, as aptly averred by petitioners, there was no reason for them to delay or realign the funds intended for remittances because they themselves were prejudiced and affected parties.
It is a general principle in law that in malum prohibitum case, good faith or motive is not a defense because the law punishes the prohibited act itself. The penal clause of Section 23 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended, however, punishes the failure to make remittance only when such failure is without lawful cause or with fraudulent intent.
As earlier stated, evidence for fraudulent intent was wanting in this case. In March 1993, the payroll was prepared showing all the amounts deductible from the salaries of the employees including Medicare, loan repayment, withholding taxes, retirement insurance premium, and Pag-IBIG contributions. In the said payroll, a total amount of P15,818.81 was deducted for the Pag-IBIG loan repayments and a total amount of P7,965.58 was deducted for the Pag-IBIG contributions of all the hospital and rural health employees. The deductions, however, were comingled with the funds of RMDH. The prosecution could not even argue and prove that the petitioners pocketed or misappropriated the deductions.15
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.54Maynilad bore emphasis on the State's role over the nation's natural resources as having a duty to regulate the same in the context of, and with due regard for, public interest. For the People, the State shall protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control the natural resources of the People.55
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Accepted. Section 8 126 rights to ancestral domain, this is where we transferred the other provision but here itself—Hence, even when former Chief Justice Puno found basis to believe that ancestral domains do not belong to the public domain, he nevertheless categorically declared that the IP right does not extend to the natural resources thereon.57 In line with this, Justice Kapunan similarly declared that neither Section 3(a)58 nor Section 7 (a)59 and (b)60 of the IPRA make mention of any right of ownership of IPs over natural resources. On the one hand, the former merely defines the coverage, extent, and limit of ancestral domains. On the other hand, the latter merely recognizes the "right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by indigenous peoples, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains." But these provisions do not confer or recognize any right of ownership over the natural resources. Their purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title.61
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may be allowed to make a very short Statement. Earlier, Mr. Chairman, we have decided to remove the provisions on natural resources because we all agree that belongs to the State. Now, the plight or the rights of those indigenous communities living in forest and areas where it could be exploited by mining, by dams, so can we not also provide a provision to give little protection or either rights for them to be consulted before any mining areas should be done in their areas, any logging done in their areas or any dam construction because this has been disturbing our people especially in the Cordilleras. So, if there could be, if our lawyers or the secretariat could just propose a provision for incorporation here so that maybe the right to consultation and the right to be compensated when there are damages within their ancestral lands.56
Respondents being holders of a mere CALC, their right to possess the subject land is limited to occupation in relation to cultivation. Unlike No. 1, 26 Par. 1, Section 1, Article VII of the same DENR DAO, which expressly allows ancestral domain claimants to reside peacefully within the domain, nothing in Section 2 grants ancestral land claimants a similar right, much less the right to build permanent structures on ancestral lands — an act of ownership that pertains to one (1) who has a recognized right by virtue of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title. On this score alone, respondents' action for injunction must fail.In the end, We held that PEZA acted well within its functions when it demanded the demolition of the structures which respondents had put up without first securing building and fencing permits therefrom. Like petitioners in this case, the respondents in PEZA failed to procure the permits that were required of them by law to obtain prior to their acts committed on their ancestral lands. But unlike the majority opinion in this case, We upheld in PEZA the enactments requiring prior authority and ruled that respondents should have first obtained the necessary permits. To me, PEZA is a proper application and harmonization of existing laws. It notably stands as a testament to the possibility of a healthy balance between the rights of IPs to their ancestral lands, on one end, and the duty of the State to protect said lands, on the other end.
Yet, even if respondents had established ownership of the land, they cannot simply put up fences or build structures thereon without complying with applicable laws, rules and regulations. In particular, Section 301 of P.D. No. 1096, otherwise known as the National Building Code of the Philippines mandates:cralawred
SEC. 301. Building Permits. —
No person, firm or corporation, including any agency or instrumentality of the government shall erect, construct, alter, repair, move, convert or demolish any building or structure or cause the same to be done without first obtaining a building permit therefor from the Building Official assigned in the place where the subject building is located or the building work is to be done, xxxx
This function, which has not been repealed and does not appear to be inconsistent with any of the powers and functions of PEZA under R. A. No. 7916, subsists. Complimentary thereto, Section 14 (i) of R.A. No. 7916 states:cralawred
SEC. 14. Powers and Functions of the Director General. — The director general shall be the overall [coordinator] of the policies, plans and programs of the ECOZONES. As such, he shall provide overall supervision over and general direction to the development and operations of these ECOZONES. He shall determine the structure and the staffing pattern and personnel complement of the PEZA and establish regional offices, when necessary, subject to the approval of the PEZA Board.
In addition, he shall have the following specific powers and responsibilities:xxx xxx xxx
(i) To require owners of houses, buildings or other structures constructed without the necessary permit whether constructed on public or private lands, to remove or demolish such houses, buildings, structures within sixty (60) days after notice and upon failure of such owner to remove or demolish such house, building or structure within said period, the director general or his authorized representative may summarily cause its removal or demolition at the expense of the owner, any existing law, decree, executive order and other issuances or part thereof to the contrary notwithstanding;
By specific provision of law, it is PEZA, through its building officials, which has Authority to issue building permits for the construction of structures within the areas owned or administered by it, whether on public or private lands.64
As early as 1981, Macatanda had already recognized the undeniable advancement of IPs insofar as civilization is concerned. A prime example of this is petitioners themselves: indigenes who are Grade IV graduates. It should no longer be reasoned that the unique character of IPs must operate to create a lenient exemption in their favor. As Macatanda instructs, mere membership in a cultural minority and the supposed lack of instruction it entails, does not completely exonerate an accused from criminal liability under penal laws.
Some later cases which categorically held that the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction does not apply to crimes of theft and robbery leave us with no choice but to reject the plea of appellant. Membership in a cultural minority does not per se imply being an uncivilized or semi- uncivilized state of the offender, which is the circumstance that induced the Supreme Court in the Maqui case, to apply lack of instruction to the appellant therein who was charged also with theft of large cattle. Incidentally, the Maqui case is the only case where lack of instruction was considered to mitigate liability for theft, for even long before it, in U.S. vs. Pascual, a 1908 case, lack of instruction was already held not applicable to crimes of theft or robbery. The Maqui case was decided in 1914, when the state of civilization of the Igorots has not advanced as it had in reaching its present state since recent years, when it certainly can no longer be said of any member of a cultural minority in the country that he is uncivilized or semi-uncivilized.85
Endnotes:
1 Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 provides:a
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Products without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code; Provided, That in the case of partnership, association or corporation, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering or collecting shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
2 Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, May 19, 1975.
3Rollo, p. 57.
4 See majority opinion, p. 33.
5Atty. Bernardo T. Constantino v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 225696, April 8, 2019.
6 808 Phil. 455,464-465 (2017). (Emphasis ours)
7 462 Phil. 72, 89-90 (2003).
8 See majority opinion p. 8.
9Atty. Bernado T. Contantino v. People of the Philippines, supra note 5.
10Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co. Inc. v. People, 721 Phil. 760, 767 (2013).
11 773 Phil. 614 (2015).
12 Entitled "Amending the Act Creating the Home Development Mutual Fund " December 14, 1980.
13 Entitled "An Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 1752, As Amended" June 17, 1994. .
14Saguin, et al. v. People, supra note 11.
15Id. at 628. (Emphasis ours)
16Monge, et. al. v. People, 571 Phil. 472, 481 (2008).
17 783 Phil. 429 (2016); cited also in the Dissenting Opinion ef Justice Mario V. Lopez.
18Tigoy v. Court of Appeals, 525 Phil. 613, 624 (2006).
19Monge v. People, supra note 16, at 479.
20 Section 69 of P.D. No. 389 provides:
SECTION 69. Cutting, Gathering, and/or Collection of Timber or Other Products. - The penalty of prision correccional in its medium period and a fine of five (5) times the minimum single forest charge on such timber and other forest products in addition to the confiscation of the same products, machineries, equipments, implements and tools used in the commission of such offense; and the forfeiture of improvements introduced thereon, in favor of the Government, shall be imposed upon any individual, corporation, partnership, or association who shall, without permit from the Director, occupy or use or cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any public forest, proclaimed timberland, municipal or city forest, grazing land, reforestation project, forest reserve of whatever character; alienable or disposable land: Provided, That if the offender is a corporation, partnership or association, the officers thereof shall be liable.
21 Section 68 of P.D. No. 705 provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Products without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code; Provided, That in the case of partnership, association or corporation, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering or collecting shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
22 Executive Order No. 277 provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private lands, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
23 EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 277 is reproduced below:
AMENDING SECTION 68 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE (P.P.-) NO. 705. AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, FOR THE PURPOSE OF PENALIZING POSSESSION OF TIMBER OR OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS WITHOUT THE LEGAL DOCUMENTS REQUIRED BY EXISTING FOREST LAWS, AUTHORIZING THE CONFISCATION OF ILLEGALLY CUT. GATHERED. REMOVED AND POSSESSED FOREST PRODUCTS, AND GRANTING REWARDS TO INFORMERS OF. VIOLATIONS OF FORESTRY LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS
WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forest laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is, a need to penalize certain acts to make our forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License.— Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
"The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found."
SECTION 2. Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is hereby further amended by adding Sections 68-A and 68-B which shall read as follows:
"SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation.— In all cases of violations of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
"SEC. 68-B. Rewards to Informants.— Any person who shall provide any information leading to the apprehension and conviction of any offender for any violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, or confiscation of forest products shall be given a reward in the amount of twenty per centum (20%) of the proceeds of the confiscated forest products."
SECTION 3. All laws, orders, issuances, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SECTION 4. This Executive Order shall take effect after fifteen days following its publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 25th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Seven.
Published in the Official Gazette, Vol. 83 No. 31, 3528-112 Supp., on August 3, 1987.
24An Act to Prohibit the Cutting, Destroying or Injuring of Planted or Growing Trees, Flowering Plants and Shrubs or Plants of Scenic Value Along Public Roads, in Plazas, Parks, School Premises or in Any Other Public Pleasure Ground.
25Requiring the Planting of Trees in Certain Places and Penalizing Unauthorized Cutting, Destruction, Damaging and Injuring of Certain Trees, Plants and Vegetation.
26Proclaiming Certain Areas and Types of Projects as Environmentally Critical and Within the Scope of the Environmental Impact Statement System Established Under Presidential Decree No. 1586.
27Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures and for Other Purposes (1978).
28 Presidential Proclamation No. 2146 provides:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby proclaim the following areas and types of projects as environmentally critical and within the scope of the Environmental Impact Statement System;A. Environmentally Critical Projects
x x x x
II. Resource Extractive Industries
x x x x
a. Major mining and quarrying projects
b. Forestry projects
1. Logging
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
29 Presidential Proclamantion No. 2146 provides:cralawredB. Environmentally Critical Areas30 Section 4 of P.D. No. 1586 provides:
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
5. Areas which are traditionally occupied by cultural communities or tribes;
Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. The President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the National Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain projects, undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized representative. For the proper management of said critical project or area, the President* may"by his proclamation reorganize such government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations or instrumentalities including the re-alignment of government personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities.
31 In People v. Dator, 398 Phil. 109, 121-122 (2000), the Court held that:
"The appellant cannot validly take refuge under the pertinent provision of DENR Administrative Order No. 79, Series of 199025 which prescribes rules on the deregulation of the harvesting, transporting and sale of firewood, pulpwood or timber planted in private lands. Appellant submits that under the said DENR Administrative Order No. 79, no permit is required in the cutting of planted trees within titled lands except Benguet pine and premium species listed under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987, namely: narra, molave, dao, kamagong, ipil, acacia, akle, apanit, banuyo, batikuling, betis, bolong-eta, kalantas, lanete, lumbayao, sangilo, supa, teak, tindalo and manggis.
Concededly, the varieties of lumber for which the appellant is being held liable for illegal possession do not belong to the premium species enumerated under DENR Administrative Order No. 78, Series of 1987. However, under the same DENR administrative order, a certification from the CENRO concerned to the effect that the forest products came from a titled land or tax declared alienable and disposable land must still be secured to accompany the shipment. This the appellant failed to do, thus, he is criminally liable under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 necessitating prior acquisition of permit and "legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations." (Emphasis ours)
32An Act Providing for the Establishment and Management of National Integrated Protected Areas System, Defining its Scope and Coverage, and for Other Purposes.
33Adopting Community-Based Forest Management as the National Strategy to Ensure the Sustainable Development of the Country's Forestlands Resources and Providing Mechanisms for its, Implementation.
34 Revised Guidelines in the Issuance of Private Land Timber Permit/Special Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP/SPLTP).
35 Rules 11.7. and 11.7.4 of DENR AO No. 2008-26 provide:
Rule 11.7. The PASu shall be primarily accountable to the PAMB and the DENR for the implementation of the Management Plan and operations of the protected area. He/she shall have the following specific duties and responsibilities:
x x x x
11.7.4 Issue cutting permit for planted trees for a volume of up to five (5) cubic meters per applicant per year for traditional and subsistence uses by ICCs/IPs and tenured migrants only. Provided, that PACBRMA holders with affirmed Community Resource Management Plan (CRMP) shall no longer be issued cutting permits. Provided further, that the total volume of extraction does not exceed the limit set by the PAMB and the location of extraction is within the appropriate site within the multiple use zone.
36 DENR AO No. 2019-05 provides:
Rule 11-B.3 In addition to the functions enumerated in Section 11-B, the PASU shall perform the following duties and responsibilities:
x x x x
d. Recommend actions for cutting permit for planted trees solely for the traditional and subsistence uses by ICCs/IPs and tenured migrants, of up to five (5) cubic meters per applicant per year. Provided, that, PACBRMA holders with affirmed Community-based Resource Management Plan shall no longer be issued cutting permits. Provided, further, that the total volume cut shall not exceed the limits set by the PAMB, and that the location of the cutting is within the appropriate site within the Multiple Use Zone; (Emphases ours)
37 The pertinent provisions of DENR-NCIP Joint AO No. 2008-01 state:
Pursuant to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705, as amended, Executive Order (EO) No. 192, Series of 1987, Republic Act (RA) No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1998, DENR-NCIP Memorandum Circular No. 2003-01, EO No. 318, Series of 2004, in deference to the forest resources management systems and practices of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) that should be recognized, promoted and protected, the guidelines and procedures as provided for in this Order shall be strictly observed.
Section 2. - Objectives. - For the effective implementation of this Order, the following objectives shall serve as guides:
2.1. General Objectives: The DENR and NCIP shall:
a. Jointly undertake the recognition, documentation, registration and confirmation of the Sustainable Traditional and Indigenous Forest Resources Management Systems and Practice (STIFRMSP) of ICCs/IPs found to be sustainable, which have either been established and/or effectively managed by families, clans and communities as part of their cultural practices and traditions as well as the role of indigenous socio-cultural and socio political institutions in this endeavour;
b. Adhere to the customary laws and recognize the Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Practices (IKSP) of the ICCs/IPs together with the intellectual property rights thereon, if any, in accordance with the applicable provisions of the IPRA;
c. Recognize the ICCs/IPs' preferential rights to benefit from the natural resources found within their ancestral lands/domains jointly documented and confirmed pursuant to this Order;
d. Institutionalize the traditional and culture-driven sustainable forest resources management systems and practices, policies and customary laws of the ICCs/IPs; and
x x x x
2.2. Specific Objectives:
a. To institutionalize the consultative, collaborative effort and consensus building processes between and among indigenous socio-political institutions including its leadership system, local government units (LGUs), the DENR, the NCIP and other concerned agencies
x x x x
Sec. 3. - Coverage. This Order shall cover and apply to all ICCs/IPs with traditional indigenous forest resources management systems and practices within their ancestral domains/lands, whether it be individual, family, clan and communal.
x x x x
Sec. 6. - Recognition of Indigenous and Traditionally Managed Forests Systems and Practices. All existing indigenous and traditionally managed forest systems and practices that were initially and jointly documented and verified by Regional Offices of the DENR and the NCIP to be promoting and practicing forest and biodiversity conservation, forest protection and sensible utilization of the resources found therein based on existing customary laws and duly endorsed by the LGUs concerned through Resolution or Ordinance shall be issued a Joint Confirmation and Recognition Order (JCRO) by the respective DENR-Regional Executive Director (RED) and the NCIP Regional Director (RD).
However, issuance of any utilization permit by the DENR for the resources found therein shall be held in abeyance pending the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between and among the DENR, the NCIP, the ICCs/IPs, socio-political structures and LGUs- Barangay, Municipal and Provincial level xxxx
Finally, validly existing resources utilization permits duly issued by the DENR to the ICCs/IPs prior to this Order shall continue to be respected until its expiration or until the allowable volume has been fully consumed or the harvesting in the allowable area has been finished, whichever comes first.
Sec. 7. - Formulation of a MOA and the JIRR. The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) shall contain, among others, the commitment of all concerned signatories to the sustainable management of the subject forest area and its forest resources, the procedures to be followed in the operationalization of the traditional and indigenous forest management systems and practices consistent with the traditions and culture therein including the corresponding penalties and sanctions to be imposed for each and every violation to be committed. Said MOA shall also include provisions on the roles and responsibilities of all parties in the documentation of information and/or in the gathering of primary data for the recognition and confirmation of the traditional and indigenous forest management systems and practices.
x x x x
Sec. 9. Registration. - Registration of the indigenous and traditionally managed forest as a result of the comprehensive evaluation, documentation and consultation activities found to be practicing a sustainable forest resources management system and practice shall be issued with a Joint Implementing Rules and Regulations (JIRR) jointly approved by the DENR, the NCIP and all parties mentioned in Section 6 hereof. The presence of the following factors/ conditions which in all cases shall be considered in the registration:
9.1 The existing Indigenous Forest Resources Management Systems/Practices is promoting forest conservation, protection, utilization and biodiversity conservation;
x x x x
9.3 The presence of customary laws, if verified to be within the framework of sustainable forest resources management, xxxx
9.4 The watershed forest management shall be the ecosystem management units and being managed in a holistic, scientific rights-based, technology-based and community-based manner and observing the principles of multiple use, decentralization and devolution actively participated by the Local Government Units (LGUs) and other concerned agencies with synergism of the economic, ecological, social and cultural objectives, and the rational utilization of all forest resources found therein;
9.5 The security of land tenure and land use rights as provided for under the IPRA and other applicable ENR laws, rules and regulations shall be a requirement for sustainable use; and
9.6 The current indigenous forest resources management systems/practices can be harmonized with current ENR laws, rules and regulations.
x x x x
Sec. 10. Resources Management and Sustainability. - Resource management within registered traditionally-managed forests shall be strictly in adherence to the established traditional leadership structure and practices. A resource management plan shall be prepared and institutionalized relative to the identified ancestral management units/blocks by the community underscoring collective agreements and commitments on natural resource protection, conservation and utilization. However, for purposes of ensuring sustainability and control, any resource utilization set by the communities shall be documented. All concerned entities (DENR, NCIP, and LGU) shall be informed accordingly for purposes of monitoring and transparency. The following principles shall be observed in resources utilization:
10.1. Only those ICCs/lPs with registered STIFRMSP shall be issued with forest resource utilization permit.
10.2. That any resource utilization in the form of timber or non-timber shall be replaced by the user with an equivalent number of tree seedlings or similar customary arrangement, and as imposed by the community in accordance with its policies and sustainable customs and practices;
10.3. That the existing land use as a traditionally managed forest especially for watershed protection shall be regulated and extraction of resources shall be allowed only in areas identified by the community as production site. However, utilization within the areas shall be allowed subject to the provisions of the approved Ancestral Domain Sustainable Development and Protection Plan (ADSDPP);
10.4. The resource extraction shall be in accordance with existing traditional resource rights defined by the community in its indigenous system and practice. All DENR laws, rules and guidelines on resource utilization shall be applicable in a supplementary manner;
10.5. The resources extracted for utilization or to be traded outside the domain/locality by the concerned ICC/IP shall be regulated. The disposition of timber and non-timber products shall be governed by the applicable DENR laws, rules and regulations relative to the requisite shipping/transport documents;
10.6. Resources utilization from naturally grown forests for livelihood projects as carving, handicrafts, manufacturing, etc., shall be regulated and only the allowable volume/number of species needed as raw materials for livelihood projects could be disposed of outside the domain/locality in accordance with existing traditional resource rights and DENR laws, rules and regulations; and
10. 7. Resources harvested from the established indigenous forest/ forest plantation to be further processed into finished products (i.e. carving, ornamental, handicrafts, novelty items, etc.), shall be allowed to be transported outside the point of origin to any market outlets subject to DENR laws, rules and regulations. (Emphases ours)
38 774 Phil. 31 (2015).
39Penera v. Commission on Elections, 615 Phil. Phil. 616, 1211 (2017).
40 734 Phil. 353 (2014).
41Id. at 425.
42 ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. — Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense. (Emphasis ours)
43Corpuz v. People, supra note 40, at 419.
44 Section 3(d) of P.D. No. 705 states that forest lands include the public forest, the permanent forest or forest reserves, and forest reservations.
45 Section 3 (c) of P.D. No. 705 provides that alienable and disposable lands refer to those lands of the public domain which have been the subject of the present system of classification and declared as not needed for forest purposes.
46 Section 3(mm) of P.D. No. 705 indirectly pertains to private land in stating that private right means or refers to titled rights of ownership under existing laws, and in the case of primitive tribes, to rights of possession existing at the time a license is granted under this Code, which possession may include places of abode and worship, burial grounds, and old clearings, but excludes production forest inclusive of logged-over areas, commercial forests and established plantations of forest trees and trees of economic value.
47 41 Phil. 935, 944 (1907).
48 G.R. No. 216999, July 4, 2018. Third Division, penned by Associate Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo, with Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, and then Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Lucas P. Bersamin, Samuel R. Martires concurring.
49 400 Phil. 904, 995 (2000).
50 Former Chief Justice Puno stated in Cruz:
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest,
xxx
Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are private.
x x x x
In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Carino and enshrined in the IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that the land is private and was never public. Carino is the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The long line of cases citing Carino did not touch on native title and the private character of ancestral domains and lands.
x x x x
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned ancestral lands.
For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is that ancestral land is private. It, however, has to be first converted to public agricultural land simply for registration purposes.
x x x x
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. (Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 49, at 460-472. (Emphasis ours; citations and italics omitted)
51 Justice Kapunan stated in Cruz:
The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial. In the landmark case of Cariño vs. Insular Government the United States Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the pre-war Philippine Supreme Court, made the following pronouncement: . . . x x x A proper reading of Carino would show that the doctrine enunciated therein applies only to lands which have always been considered as private, and not to lands of the public domain, whether alienable or otherwise. A distinction must be made between ownership of land under native title and ownership by acquisitive prescription against the State. Ownership by virtue a of native title presupposes that the land has been held by its possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or its successors-in-interest, the United States and the Philippine Government. There has been no transfer of title from the State as the land has been regarded as private in character as far back as memory goes. In contrast, ownership of land by acquisitive prescription against the State involves a conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to private land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private person. Since native title assumes that the property covered by it is private land and is deemed never to have been part of the public domain, the Solicitor General's thesis that native title under Cariño applies only to lands of the public domain is erroneous. Consequently, the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks under the Constitution is irrelevant to the application of the Cariño doctrine because the Regalian doctrine which vests in the State ownership of lands of the public domain does not cover ancestral lands and ancestral domains. (Id. at 1044-1046; Emphases ours)
52Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 49, at 1054-1955.
53 G.R. Nos. 202897, 206823 & 207969, August 6, 2019.
54Id. (Emphasis ours)
55Id.
56 See Separate Opinion of Justice Kapunan in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 49, at 1064.
57 Former Chief Justice Puno stated:
Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the regalian doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/lPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a). The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains." It will be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other natural resources found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover "waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other natural resources" enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution-as belonging to the State. The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a) complies with the Regalian doctrine. The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA is allowed under paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve" the natural resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the development or exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having priority rights over the natural resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that there is a.superior entity that owns these resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential rights over the resources to whosoever itself chooses. Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said doctrine that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read in the light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. (Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 49, at 933-1010.
58 SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
a) Ancestral Domains — Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
59 SECTION 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains. — The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights shall include:
a) Right of Ownership. — The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;
60 b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. — Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;
61Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 49, at 1062.
62Id. at 1071.
63 635 Phil. 541, 554 (2010).
64Id. at 550-554. (Emphases ours)
65 Section 7(b) of the IPRA provides:
b. Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interfere with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;
66 Section 2(e) of the IPRA provides:
e) The State shall take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned, to protect their rights and guarantee respect for their cultural integrity, and to ensure that members of the ICCs/IPs benefit on an equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other members of the population.
67 Section 9 of the IPRA provides:
Section 9. Responsibilities of ICCs/IPs to their Ancestral Domains. - ICCs/IPs occupying a duly certified ancestral domain shall have the following responsibilities:
a. Maintain Ecological Balance- To preserve, restore, and maintain a balanced ecology in the ancestral domain by protecting the flora and fauna, watershed areas, and other reserves;
b. Restore Denuded Areas- To actively initiate, undertake and participate in the reforestation of denuded areas and other development programs and projects subject to just and reasonable remuneration; and
c. Observe Laws- To observe and comply with the provisions of this Act and the rules and regulations for its effective implementation.
68 Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
69 296 Phil. 694 (1193).
70 P.D. No. 705 provides:
WHEREAS, proper classification, management and utilization of the lands of the public domain to maximize their productivity to meet the demands of our increasing population is urgently needed;
WHEREAS, to achieve the above purpose, it is necessary to reassess the multiple uses of forest lands and resources before allowing any utilization thereof to optimize the benefits that can be derived therefrom;
WHEREAS, it is also imperative to place emphasis not only on the utilization thereof but more so on the protection, rehabilitation and development of forest lands, in order to ensure the continuity of their productive condition;
WHEREAS, the present laws and regulations governing forest lands are not responsive enough to support re-oriented government programs, projects and efforts on the proper classification and delimitation of the lands of the public domain, and the management, utilization, protection, rehabilitation, and development of forest lands;
71Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 49.
72 Taken from website of the United Nations Development Program, (https://www.undp.org/content/dam/philippines/docs/Governance/fastFacts6%20%20Indigenous%20Peopl es%20in%20the%20Philippines%20rev%201.5.pdf), and from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples Official Facebook Portal (https://www.facebook.eom/NCIPportal/photos/a.2073888702837501/3114873668738994).
73 See majority opinion, p. 52-53.
74Id. at 49.
75 Records, p. 18.
76 Section 7 of R.A. No. 9175 provides:
SEC. 7. Penal Provisions.
1. Selling, Purchasing, Re-selling, Transferring, Distributing or Possessing a Chainsaw Without a Proper Permit. - Any person who sells, purchases, transfers the ownership, distributes, or otherwise disposes or possesses a chainsaw without first securing the necessary permit from the Department shall be punished with imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1 ) day to six years or a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (PhP 15,000.00) but not more than Thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000.00) or both at the discretion of the court, and the chainsaw/s confiscated in favor of the government, x x x x
4. Actual Unlawful Use of Chainsaw. - Any person who is found to be in possession of a chainsaw and uses the same to cut trees and timber in forest land or elsewhere except as authorized by the Department shall be penalized with imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years or a fine of not less than Thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000.00) or both at the discretion of the court without prejudice to being prosecuted for a separate offense that may have been simultaneously committed. The chainsaw unlawfully used shall be likewise confiscated in favor of the government.
77Rollo, pp. 59 and 142. Brgy. Captain Aceveda testified as follows:
Atty. Florita: Your Honor, we are presenting Rolando Aceveda as witness to prove that there was a project by a NGO for the construction of the community comfort room at Baco and to prove that the place where the tree allegedly cut were located at the portion of the land owned by the Mangyans of Oriental Mindoro. With the kind permission of the Honorable Court?
x x x x
Q: On that day Mr. Witness when you were resting along the load did you witness anything unusual?
A: Yes ma'am.
Q: And what was that Mr. Witness?
A: Several policemen and DENR employees passed by ma'am.
Q: Did you ask them where they were going?
A: Yes ma'am.
Q: And what did they say?
A: According to them they were going to a place called Laylay in the Municipality of San Teodoro ma'am.
Q: Did they tell you what the reason was in visiting the place?
A: No ma'am.
Q: And then what happened next Mr. Witness?
A: They already went ahead ma'am.
Q: Hours after the policemen and the employees of the DENR passed by what happened, Mr. Witness?
A: After more or less two to three hours later they already returned ma'am.
Q: Did you notice anything unusual Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And what was that?
A: They were already being accompanied by three mangyan persons ma'am.
Q: And could you identify before this Court who these mangyans were?
A: Yes ma'am.
Q: Could you identify the three?
A: Diosdado Sama, Bandy Masanglay, and Demetrio Masangiay ma'am.
Q: What was the reason that they were taken under custody by these policemen?
A: They cut down trees or lumbers ma'am.
Q: And where was the felled log cut Mr. Witness according to them?
A: In a land owned by the Mangyans ma'am.
Q: Where in particular Mr. Witness?
A: In Sitio Matahimik Barangay Baras, Baco ma'am.
Q: And according to them, what was the reason why that log was cut Mr. Witness?
A: Those logs would be used in a project being initiated by an NGO ma'am.
Q: What NGO and what project was it Mr. Witness?
A: Team MISSION ma'am.
Q: What particular project Mr. Witness?
A: Construction of a community comfort room ma'am.
Q: And you stated earlier Mr. Witness that the felled log was cut in the portion of the land owned by the Mangyans of Oriental Mindoro, am I correct?
A: Yes ma'am.
Q: Do you have any proof that the (discontinued) do you know of any proof that will establish the fact of ownership of the Mangyans?
A: Yes ma'am.
Q: What document is it Mr. Witness?
A: CADC 126 ma'am, x x x x
Q: And you know of the project by Team MISSION as regards the construction of the community comfort room because you yourself is also a Mangyan and the barangay captain of the area, correct?
A: Yes ma 'am. (TSN 5, pp. 3-8)
78DST Movers Corporation v. People's General Insurance Corporation, 778 Phil. 235, 248-249 (2016).
79 Records, p. 277.
80Id. at 170.
81Id.
82Id. at 12.
83 195 Phil. 604 (1981).
84 Article 15 of the RPC provides:
ARTICLE 15. Their Concept. — Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the offender.
85People v. Macatanda, supra note 83, at 510. (Emphasis ours)
86 Section 20 (c) which provides:
Sec. 20. Prohibited Acts. - Except as may be allowed by the nature of their categories and pursuant to rules and regulations governing the same, the following acts are prohibited within protected areas: xxxx
(c) Cutting, gathering, removing or collecting timber within the protected area including private lands therein, without the necessary permit, authorization, certification of planted trees or exemption such as for culling exotic species; except, however, when such acts are done in accordance with the duly recognized practices of the IPs/ICCs for subsistence purposes;
87An Act Declaring Protected Areas and Providing for Their Management, Amending for This Purpose Republic Act No. 7586, Otherwise Known as the "National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) Act of 1992" and for Other Purposes, approved on June 22, 2018.
88 Section 2 of R.A. No. 11083 provides: Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy, -xxx
"To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS), which shall encompass ecologically rich and unique areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and threatened species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall be designated as 'protected areas'.
89 See Section 5 of R.A. No. 11083 for full list of protected areas.
90 According to the Guidebook to Protected Areas in the Philippines, published by the Biodiversity Management Bureau and the DENR (2015), Mounts Iglit-Baco Natural Park was first established as a tamaraw reservation and bird sanctuary by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 557 in 1969, as a national park under R.A. No. 6148 in 1970, and as a protected area under both the NIPAS Act in 1992 and ENIPAS Act in 2018. It encompasses the municipalities of Sablayan, Calintaan, Rizal, and San Jose in Occidental Mindoro as well as municipalities of Gloria, Bansud, Bongabon, and Mansalay in Oriental Mindoro.
91 The Guidebook to Protected Areas in the Philippines, id., stated that the Mangyans, an indigenous group of Mindoro, is further classified into at least eight ethno-linguistic groups: Iraya, Batangan, Hanuno'o, Alangan, Ratagnon, Tagaydan or Tadyawan, Buhid and Pula.
92 Section 11 -B of the ENIPAS Act provides that
"Sec. 11-B. The Protected Area Management Office (PAMO). - There is hereby established a Protected Area Management Office (PAMO) to be headed by a Protected Area Superintendent (PASU) with a permanent plantilla position who shall supervise the day management, protection and administration of the protected area. A sufficient number of support staff with permanent plantilla position shall be appointed by the DENR to assist the PASU in the management of the protected area.
"The PASU shall be primarily accountable to the PAMB and the DENR for the management and operations of the protected area. Pursuant thereto, the PASU shall have the following duties and responsibilities: x x x x
"(i) Issue permits and clearances for activities that implement the management plan and other permitted activities in accordance with terms, conditions, and criteria established by the PAMS: Provided, That all permits for extraction activities, including collection for research purposes, shall also continue to be issued by relevant authorities, subject to prior clearance from the PAMB, through the PASU, in accordance with the specific acts to be covered;
93 The IRR of the ENIPAS Act provides:
Rule 11-B.3 In addition to the functions enumerated in Section 11-B, the PASU shall perform the following duties and responsibilities: x x x
d. Recommend actions for cutting permit for planted trees solely for the traditional and subsistence uses by ICCs/IPs and tenured migrants, of up to five (5) cubic meters per applicant per year. Provided, that, PACBRMA holders with affirmed Community-based Resource Management Plan shall no longer be issued cutting permits. Provided, further, that the total volume cut shall not exceed the limits set by the PAMB, and that the location of the cutting is within the appropriate site wthin the Multiple Use Zone; and x x x (emphasis ours)
94 Rule 23.5 of the IRR of the ENIPAS Act provides:
Rule 23.5 In case of protected areas that share common areas with ancestral territories covered by CADT/CALT, the DENR, upon the recommendation of the PAMB and with the FPIC of the affected ICCs/IPs, shall enter into a Protected Area Community-Based Resource Management Agreement (PACBRMA) with the tenured migrant communities of the protected areas.
The DENR shall organize individual tenured migrants into communities. Within one (1) year from the issuance of the PACBRMA, tenure holders shall be required to prepare a Community-Based Resource Management Plan (CBRMP), on the basis of the following processes: community mapping, plan preparation, map integration, final validation, PAMB endorsement, and affirmation by the DENR Regional Executive Director. Failure to implement the CBRMP shall be basis for the cancellation of the PACBRMA.
95 Under the ENIPAS Act and its IRR, the National Integrated Protected Area System is placed under the control and administration of the DENR, through the Biodiversity Management Bureau (BMB). Before a protected area is declared as such, it undergoes a rigorous process where the DENR prepares reports in consultation with other key stakeholders such as local government units (LGUs), NGOs, and IPs taking into consideration all essential factors of the area such as irreplaceability, vulnerability, naturalness, abundance and diversity, geological and aesthetic features of the area. Upon receipt of recommendations from the DENR, the President shall issue a proclamation establishing the proposed protected areas until such time when Congress shall have enacted a law to that effect. Then, the PAMB, with the support of the DENR, shall formulate the Protected Area Management Plan (PAMP) with the participation of necessary agencies such as NGOs, LGUS, and all stakeholders such as the IPs and other local communities. This plan serves as the basic long-term framework for the management of the protected area which shall be harmonized with the IPs' Ancestral Domain Sustainable Development and Protection Plan (ADSDPP) required under the IRR of the IPRA.
96 See Declaration of Policy under Section 2 of the ENIPAS Act.
97Maynilad Water Services, Inc. v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 53.
98Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 49, at 1077.
99 Records, p. 170.
100 See Separate Opinion of Justice Panganiban, Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 49, at 1105.
101Oposa v. Factoran, supra note 69, at 713.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
I concur in the result. Petitioners Diosdado Sama y Hinupas and Bandy Masanglay y Aceveda (petitioners) should be acquitted for the prosecution's failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt their criminal liability under Section 77 of the Forestry Code, as amended (Section 77).1
The essential facts are as follows: petitioners, who are part of the Iraya- Mangyan tribe, are among the indigenous peoples (IPs) in Mindoro. On March 15, 2005, they were caught cutting a dita tree using an unregistered power chainsaw, and were consequently charged under Section 77. While petitioners admit that they had no license to cut the tree, they argue that their act was justified pursuant to their right to utilize the natural resources within their ancestral domain for a communal purpose - that is, to build a community toilet. They also aver that as IPs, they are allowed to cut trees within their ancestral domain as part of their right to cultural integrity pursuant to the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 19972 (IPRA). The lower courts, however, convicted them based on a strict application of the penal provision, holding that a violation of Section 77 is considered malum prohibitum.
At the onset, emphasis must be made on the fact that this case only centers on the criminal liability of herein petitioners for cutting one tree within their ancestral domain for the undisputed purpose of building a community toilet. They claim that such acts were done for the benefit of their IP community, and therefore, amounts to an apparent legitimate exercise of their right to use natural resources within their ancestral domain. In the court a quo's proceedings, the prosecution neither questioned the purpose for which the dita tree was to be used nor presented any evidence as regards the use of such tree for the benefit of non-IPs. This case, therefore, must be resolved onth e basis of the peculiar circumstances attendant herein. Elementary is the rule in criminal law that the accused is entitled to an acquittal when there is reasonable doubt. To stress, the Court is called upon in this case to determine petitioners' criminal liability under Section 77 based on the specific facts established herein. Similar to Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, I espouse a sentiment of judicial restraint in going over and beyond this framework of analysis, and in so doing, unnecessarily demarcate constitutional lines and borders that would gravely impact the rights of IPs in general relative to the application of environmental regulations affecting them.
In determining criminal liability, the elements of the crime must be proven to exist by the highest threshold of evidence — that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. In this regard, case law states that:
Proof beyond reasonable doubt charges the prosecution with the immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty. The prosecution's case must rise on its own merits, not merely on relative strength as against that of the defense. Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, acquittal must follow as a matter of course.
SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State, x x x
x x x x
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Based on the foregoing, the subject timber8 or dita9 tree in this case was owned by the State even if it stood within an ancestral domain.10 Considering that petitioners admitted that they cut the dita tree found within the ancestral domain, there is proof beyond reasonable doubt that the first element of Section 77 is present in this case.
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may be allowed to make a very short Statement. Earlier, Mr. Chairman, we have decided to remove the provisions on natural resources because we all agree that belongs to the State. Now, the plight or the rights of those indigenous communities living in forest and areas where it could be exploited by mining, by dams, so can we not also provide a provision to give little protection or either rights for them to be consulted before any mining areas should be done in their areas, any logging done in their areas or any dam construction because this has been disturbing our people especially in the Cordilleras.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of the Forestry Code, to wit:Based on the provision itself, the first offense of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land is qualified by the general phrase "without any authority," whereas the second offense of possessing timber or other forest products is qualified by the more specific phrase "without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations":cralawred
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting!,] and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.29
Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. (Emphases supplied)Hence, should the first offense contemplate the requirement of a documentary license, then Congress should not have qualified it with the general phrase "without any authority," and instead, just applied the specific phrase "without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations" as in the second offense. The Congress' deliberate choice of words therefore reasonably supports the theory above-posited to allow for other exceptions to the first offense outside of the license requirement. At the very least, this creates a looming spectre of doubt in the application of penal law, which, as per our prevailing doctrines in criminal law, must be construed in favor of the accused, as petitioners in this case. To repeat the bedrock dictum, when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Endnotes:
1 See Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, Presidential Decree No. 705, May 19, 1975, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, July 25, 1987, and renumbered pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7161, October 10, 1991.
2 Entitled, "AN ACT TO RECOGNIZE, PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES/INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, CREATING A NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, ESTABLISHING IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on October 29, 1997.
3lent v. Tullett Prebon (Philippines), Inc., 803 Phil. 163, 185-186 (2017); citation omitted.
4 According to case law, Section 77 punishes two (2) separate offenses. See Revaldo v. People, 603 Phil. 332, 342 [2009]).
5 The declaration of State ownership and control over natural resources in the 1935 Constitution was reiterated in both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
6 See Professor Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (now Supreme Court Associate Justice), The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act: An Overview of Its Contents, 4 [13] The PHILJA Judicial Journal 53-79, (2002): "Look at the provision in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution: x x x There is a qualifier to land, but no qualifier to timber. It does not say timber planted on private land, or public or private timber, unlike in other systems in different parts of the world. In our jurisdiction, timber is always public domain; it cannot be alienated as timber. Of course, rights to timber can be alienated, but the timber itself cannot be alienated. And that is, the justification for the Forestry Code's allowance to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR] to grant a permit for tree-cutting. If it stands on private land, there is the special tree-cutting permit[.]" (pp. 63-64)
7 See Justice Kapunan's opinion in, Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904, 1064 (2000).
8 In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. CA (327 Phil. 214, 235 [1996]), the Court stated that while the Revised Forestry Code does not define timber, "[i]t is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we. Ubilex non distinguitnecnosdistingueredebemus."
9 Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "timber" as "growing trees or their wood" and "dita" as "a forest tree (Alstoniascholaris) of eastern Asia and the Philippines the bark of which was formerly used as an antiperiodic."
10 See Justice Kapunan's opinion in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 7, at 1066-1070: "While as previously discussed, native title to land or private ownership by Filipinos of land by virtue of time immemorial possession in the concept of an owner was acknowledged and recognized as far back during the Spanish colonization of the Philippines, there was no similar favorable treatment as regards natural resources. The unique value of natural resources has been acknowledged by the State and is the underlying reason for its consistent assertion of ownership and control over said natural resources from the Spanish regime up to the present." "Having ruled that the natural resources which may be found within the ancestral domains belong to the State, the Court deems it necessary to clarify that the jurisdiction of the NCIP with respect to ancestral domains under Section 52 [i] of IPRA extends only to the lands, and not to the natural resources therein." See also Justice Panganiban's statement in IPRA - Social Justice or Reverse Discrimination, The PHILJA Judicial Journal 157-203 (2002) that "in all the Opinions rendered, there seems to be a general understanding that natural resources within ancestral domains were 'not bestowed' by IPRA on the indigenous people." p. 172.
11 See Section 22, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: "The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development." See also Section 17, Article XIV thereof, to wit: "The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies."
12 See Ha Datu Tawahig v. Lapinid, G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019.
13 UNHCR, CCPR General Comment No. 23: Article 27 (Rights of Minorities), 8 April 1994, CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.5, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fc0.html (last accessed on August 26, 2020).
14 Id. See also J.G.A. Diergaardt (late Captain of the Rehoboth Baster Community) et al. v. Namibia, Communication No. 760/1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997 (2000).
15 See Ha Datu Tahdwig v. Lapinid, supra note 12. See also Section 4, Chapter III of RA 8371.
16 See Section 3(a) of the IPRA.
17 Id.
18 Section 3(o) of the IPRA.
19 Section 7 of the IPRA recognizes and protects IPs' rights to the ancestral domains including the right to develop lands and natural resources.
20 See paragraph 3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
21 For one, the law establishing the government of Benguet has allowed IPs there to use timber and firewood for domestic purposes, particularly for cooking food, warming their houses, constructing their houses, or fencing plots of cultivating grounds. (See Section 20 of the Establishment of a Civil Government for Benguet, Act No. 49, November 23, 1900.) In 2001, the Northern Sierra Madre Natural Park (NSMNP) Act was enacted mandating the non-restriction of the IPs' use of the resources in the NSMNP for their "domestic needs or for their subsistence" and disallowance of the use of timber only if for livelihood purposes. See Section 19, RA 9125, entitled, AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE NORTHERN SIERRA MADRE MOUNTAIN RANGE WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF ISABELA AS A PROTECTED AREA AND ITS PERIPHERAL AREAS AS BUFFER ZONES, PROVIDING FOR ITS MANAGEMENT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
22 RA 11038, June 22, 2018, amending RA 7586.
23 See Section 20 of the ENIPAS, as amended.
24 Section 29 of the ENIPAS reads:cralawredSEC. 29. Construction and Interpretation. - The provisions of this Act shall be construed liberally in favor of the protection and rehabilitation of the protected area and the conservation and restoration of its biological diversity, x x x Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed as a x x x derogation of ancestral domain rights under the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997."25 Section 20 (c) of the ENIPAS reads thus:cralawred"(c) Cutting, gathering, removing or collecting timber within the protected area including private lands therein, without the necessary permit, authorization, certification of planted trees or exemption such as for culling exotic species; except, however, when such acts are done in accordance with the duly recognized practices of the IPs/ICCs for subsistence purposes." (Emphases and underscoring supplied)26 The relevant portion of the provision states:cralawredSEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Products without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)27Kare v. Platon, 56 Phil. 248, 250 (1931), citing Black's Interpretation of Laws.
28 603 Phil. 332 (2009).
29 Id. at 342.
LEONEN, J.:
I concur that petitioners should be acquitted of the crime charged. I contribute to the discussion of the erudite ponente, Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, a disquisition on the pre-colonial experience and historical backdrop of the Filipino tribal groups' rights over their ancestral lands and domains, including the resources found there.
Petitioners are Iraya-Mangyans who reside in Barangay Baras, Baco, Oriental Mindoro.2 They were indicted for violating Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, after they cut down a dita tree without a license or permit issued by the proper authority.3 Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 705 states:
SECTION 77. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
Furthermore, it has been held that this Court may reevaluate the lower court's factual findings "when certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal."10
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.9 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
Conviction in criminal actions demands proof beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states:cralawredSection 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.While not impelling such a degree of proof as to establish absolutely impervious certainty, the quantum of proof required in criminal cases nevertheless charges the prosecution with the immense responsibility of establishing moral certainty, a certainty that ultimately appeals to a person's very conscience[.]12
Hence, the definitive identification of the area allegedly possessed and planted to sugarcane and bananas by Edward Pasiteng is imperative. There is on record a survey plan of the 512 square-meter area claimed by Edward but there are no indications therein of the exact area involved in this case. This omission of the prosecution to definitively delineate the exact location of the place where Erkey allegedly harvested Edward's plants has punctured what appeared to be its neat presentation of the case. Proof on the matter, however, is important for it means the identification of the rightful owner of the stolen properties. It should be emphasized that to prove the crime of theft, it is necessary and indispensable to clearly identify the person who, as a result of a criminal act, without his knowledge and consent, was wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him.15 (Citation omitted, emphasis supplied)
PO3 Ranee's testimony, that they did not personally witness petitioners cut the tree, casts reasonable doubt on petitioners' guilt. That he saw petitioners holding a chainsaw without them using it cannot suffice to hold them liable for the act for which they are being indicted for.
Q Mr. Witness, if you remember during the previous hearing, you stated that at the time that you arrived at the (discontinued). Mr. Witness during the previous hearing, you stated that at that time that you arrived at the alleged scene of the crime, you already saw the cut tree, is that correct? A Yes Ma'am. Q As such the tree was already cut at the time that you arrived, is that correct Mr. Witness? A Yes ma'am. Q How could you then say that one of the accused was the one operating the chainsaw when at the time that you arrived, the tree has already been fell? A Before I arrived at the alleged crime scene some of my companions already arrived ahead of me, ma'am. Q As such Mr. Witness, you cannot be testifying on the identity of the person who actually operated the said chainsaw, is that correct? A When I arrived he'was the person holding the chainsaw ma'am. Q Holding the chainsaw Mr. witness but not actually using the chainsaw to cut the tree, is that correct? AHe was just holding it ma'am[.]18 (Emphasis in the original)
An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.24 (Citations omitted)I share the observation of Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe that laws passed after the Revised Forestry Code cast reasonable doubt as to the criminal liability of the accused.25
Upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the State's attitude towards indigenous people shifted from integration to maintaining and preserving the indigenous people's identity. "[I]t commits to not only recognize, but also promote, 'the rights of indigenous cultural communities.'"28 In addition, the 1987 Constitution affirms to "protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being."29
SECTION 11. The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of state policies.
SECTION 9. Ancestral Lands. — For purposes of this Act, ancestral lands of each indigenous cultural community shall include, but not be limited to, lands in the actual, continuous and open possession and occupation of the community and its members: Provided, that the Torrens System shall be respected.
The right of these communities to their ancestral lands shall be protected to ensure their economic, social and cultural well-being. In line with the principles of self-determination and autonomy, the systems of land ownership, land use, and the modes of settling land disputes of all these communities must be recognized and respected.
SECTION 13. Ancestral Lands and Rights Over Them. — Ancestral lands and customary rights and interest arising therefrom shall be accorded due recognition. The DENR shall prescribe rules and regulations to govern ancestral lands within protected areas: Provided, That the DENR shall have no power to evict indigenous communities from their present occupancy nor resettle them to another area without their consent: Provided, however, that all rules and regulations, whether adversely affecting said communities or not, shall be subjected to notice and hearing to be participated in by members of concerned indigenous community.
SECTION 16. Opening of Ancestral Lands for Mining Operations. — No ancestral land shall be opened for mining operations without the prior consent of the indigenous cultural community concerned.
SECTION 27. Illegal Acts. — Unless otherwise allowed in accordance with this Act, it shall be unlawful for any person to willfully and knowingly exploit wildlife resources and their habitats, or undertake the following acts:
(a) killing and destroying wildlife species, except in the following instances;
(i) when it is done as part of the religious rituals of established tribal groups or indigenous cultural communities[.]
SECTION 18. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7586 is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 20. Prohibited Acts. — Except as may be allowed by the nature of their categories and pursuant to rules and regulations governing the same, the following acts are prohibited within protected areas'.
(c) Cutting, gathering, removing or collecting timber within the protected area including private lands therein, without the necessary permit, authorization, certification of planted trees or exemption such as for culling exotic species; except, however, when such acts are done in accordance with the duly recognized practices of the IPs/ICCs for subsistence purposes[.]
The intricate knowledge of the Iraya-Mangyans in terms of the tropical ecosystem indicates the existence of practices and traditions which date back to the pre-colonial period. These practices and traditions serve as a material basis of their cultural integrity. In this regard, the IPRA takes into account the ICCs/IPs cultural well-being, among others, by recognizing the following rights: (1) the applicability of their customary laws relating to property rights or relations; (2) the significance of their culture, traditions and institution on formulating national laws and policies; and (3) the assurance that ICCs/IPs benefit equally with respect to opportunities which the laws and education, health, and other services beneficial to ICCs/IPs.47
In choosing their fields, they consider the floral composition of the site to determine soil properties. They avoid the headwaters of streams to protect the water source. In the kaingin, a fireline is made so that the fire will not spread. Instead of starting from the lower portion, the burning is started from the top. Then, the lower portion is burned. In such case, the fire could not spread upward, preventing the other areas from getting burned. Before, there was no necessity to make a fireline in the kaingin because of the abundance of trees. Now that the trees are getting depleted, the elders encouraged the community to use a fireline to protect the forest.
Big trees are covered with saha ng saging (banana trunks) so that heat will not destroy them if the same is within the Kaingin area. They also do not use explosives and high-powered inflammable substances. During the early times, they use stones and/or bamboos rubbed against each other to create fire. Lately, they resorted to the use of matches.46
Having exclusive dominion over the lands in the Philippines, the Spanish government began issuing royal grants and concessions which effectively distributed land rights to the Spaniards and loyal Spanish subjects. This notwithstanding, the Law of the Indies, and the subsequent laws enacted by the Spanish government, made it clear that the distribution of land rights and interests should not impair the rights and interests of the natives in their holdings.69
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium. This was the foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian Doctrine" or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the Spanish Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:cralawred
"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designate at such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to be disposed of at our will."68 (Citations omitted, emphasis in the original)
The title to all agricultural lands which were capable of adjustment under the Royal Decree of 1880, but the adjustment of which has not been sought at the time of promulgation of this Decree... will revert to the State.The Maura law imposed a unilateral registration deadline79 to all natives for their customary claims over their lands, otherwise, their land will be taken away or confiscated by the Crown.80 In a sense, it was the first law which empowered the Spanish government to deny legal recognition of the native's customary property rights. It was a manifestation of "the colonial regime's insensitivity to the plight and potentials of the masses."81
Any claim to such lands by those who might have applied for adjustment of the same but have not done so at the time of the above-mentioned date, will not avail themselves in any way or at any time.78
The remaining portions of the private domain belonged to hundreds of thousands of people who held, or were believed to hold, undocumented customary rights or some local variation of a customary/colonial right which lacked proper documentation.86
The Taft Commission disregarded not only President McKinley's instruction, but likewise its predecessor's findings, and claimed that "Article VIII vested ownership of 92.3% of the'total Philippine land mass, or approximately 27,694,000 hectares, in the U.S. Government."88 This percentage included forest lands and mineral resources, which were considered part of the public domain. In effect, the Taft Commission's estimate discounted the undocumented property rights possessed by Filipino groups over their respective ancestral lands and domains.89
[T]o impose, regardless of custom, "upon every branch and division of the colonial government" the "inviolable" constitutional mandates that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law and that just compensation be paid for all private property taken for public use[.]87 (Citation omitted)
The Torrens system registers and guarantees the legal rights of private land owners. The system was devised during the 1830s by Sir Robert Torrens who had served as commissioner of customs in South Austria before becoming a land registrar of deeds. ..
The Torrens system promotes the use of land as a marketable commodity. Unlike customary systems, a Torrens title holder need have no relation to the land other than what is stated in the Torrens document. A Torrens title holder is also generally free to convey his or her rights to anyone, regardless of whether or not they belong to the community where the land is located or whether they intend to use the land or leave it idle.100
SECTION 32. Any native of the Philippine Islands now as occupant and cultivator of unreserved, unappropriated agricultural public land, as defined by the Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, who has continuously occupied and cultivated such land, either by himself or through his ancestors, since August first, eighteen hundred and ninety; or who prior to August first, eighteen hundred and ninety eighty continuously occupied and cultivated such land for three years immediately prior to said date, and who has been continuously since July fourth, nineteen hundred and two, until the date of the taking effect of this Act, an occupier and cultivator of such land, shall be entitled to have a patent issued to him without compensation for such tract of land, not exceeding sixteen hectares, as hereinafter in this chapter provided.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law and it is essentially the same as Act 2874. The main difference between the two relates to the transitory provisions on the rights of American citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth period at par with Filipino citizens and corporations.114 (Citation omitted)
SECTION 1. A new paragraph is hereby added to Section 44 of Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred forty-one, to read as follows:
"SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, nineteen hundred and twenty-six or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares."A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the tight granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law."
SECTION 2. A new sub-section (c) is hereby added to Section 48 of the same Act to read as follows:cralawred
"(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof." (Underscoring supplied)
Members of cultural minorities may apply for confirmation of their title to lands of the public domain, whether disposable or not; they may therefore apply for public lands even though such lands are legally forest lands or mineral lands of the public domain, so long as such lands are in fact suitable for agriculture. The rest of the community, however, "Christians" or members of mainstream society may apply only in respect of "agricultural lands of the public domain," that is, "disposable lands of the public domain" which would of course exclude lands embraced within forest reservations or mineral land reservations.117 (Emphasis in the original.)
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
SECTION 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles throughout an important part of the island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce.138
Cariño established the notion that Igorots and, by analogy, other groups with similar customs and long associations, have constitutionally protected native titles to their respective ancestral lands.140 It also emphasized that, based on native custom and long association, there exists a legal foundation that the ancestral lands of some native groups within the Philippine archipelago are owned pursuant to private, communal title.141
In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long association — one of the profoundest factors in human thought — regarded as their own.
It is true that, by section 14, the government of the Philippines is empowered to enact rules and prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public lands where some, but not all, Spanish conditions had been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for not more than 16 hectares of public lands actually occupied by the native or his ancestors before August 13, 1898. But this section perhaps might be satisfied if confined to cases where the occupation was of land admitted to be public land, and had not continued for such a length of time and under such circumstances as to give rise to the understanding that the occupants were owners at that date. We hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare every native who had not a paper title a trespasser, and to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat. It is true again that there is excepted from the provision that we have quoted as to the administration of the property and rights acquired by the United States, such land and property as shall be designated by the President for military or other reservations, as this land since has been. But there still remains the question what property and rights the United States asserted itself to have acquired.
Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to go no further than the necessities of decision demand* every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. Whether justice to the natives and the import of the organic act ought not to carry us beyond a subtle examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even beyond the attitude of Spanish law, humane though it was, it is unnecessary to decide. If, in a tacit way, it was assumed that the wild tribes of the Philippines were to be dealt with as the power and inclination of the conqueror might dictate, Congress has not yet sanctioned the same course as the proper one "for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof."139
The appellees are Igorrots [sic], and it is found that, for fifty years, and probably for many more, Fianza and his ancestors have held possession of these mines. He now claims title under the Philippine act of July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, 45, 32 Stat, at L. 691. This section reads as follows:cralawred'That where such person or association, they and their grantors, have held and worked their claims for a period equal to the time prescribed by the statute of limitations of the Philippine Islands, evidence of such possession and working of the claims for such period shall be sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto under this act, in the absence of any adverse claim; but nothing in this act shall be deemed to impair any lien which may have attached in any way whatever prior to the issuance of a patent.'It is not disputed that this section applies to possession maintained for a sufficient time before and until the statute went into effect. . . . The period of prescription at that time was ten years. . . Therefore, as the United States had not had the sovereignty of the Philippines for ten years, the section, notwithstanding its similarity to Rev. Stat. 2332, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1433, must be taken to refer to the conditions as they were before the United States had come into power. Especially must it be supposed to have had in view the natives of . . . the islands, and to have intended to do liberal justice to them. By 16, their occupancy of public lands is respected and made to confer rights. In dealing with an Igorrot [sic] of the provinee of Benguet, it would be absurd to expect technical niceties, and the courts below were quite justified in their liberal mode of dealing with the evidence of possession and the possibly rather gradual settling of the precise boundaries of the appellees' claim. . . At all events, they found that the appellees and their ancestors had held the claim and worked it to the exclusion of all others down to the bringing of this suit, and that the boundaries were as shown in a plan that was filed and seems to have been put in evidence before the trial came to an end.146
SECTION 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains. — The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided, finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract.
(a) Firstly, enumerating the civil and political rights of all members of indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples, regardless of their relation to ancestral lands or domains;
(b) Secondly, enumerating the social and cultural rights of all members of indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples;
(c) Thirdly, recognizing a general concept of indigenous property right and granting title thereto; and
(d) Finally, creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) to act as a mechanism to coordinate implementation of the law as well as a final authority that has jurisdiction to issue Certificates of Ancestral Domain/LandTitles."158
a) Ancestral Domains,— Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
b) Ancestral Lands — Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of tKe ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots[.]"166
Ownership under the New Civil Code is defined under Articles 427 and 428. It is understood as either: "... the independent and general power of a person over a thing for purposes recognized by law and within limits established thereby," or "a relation in private law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by public law or the concurrence with the rights of another." Moreover, ownership is said to have the attributes of jus utendi, fruendi, abutendi, disponendi et vindicandi. One therefore is said to own a piece of land when s/he exercises, to the exclusion of all others, the rights to use, enjoy the fruits and alienate or dispose of it in any manner not prohibited by law.168
SECTION 5. Indigenous Concept of Ownership. - Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that ancestral and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICC's/IP's private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights.169
Endnotes:
1See Bantayog ng mga Bayani, DULAG, Macli-ing, October 15, 2015, < http:// www.bantayog.org/dulag-macli-ing/ (last accessed on January 5, 2021). See also Martial Law Museum, The Heroes Who Fought Martial Law: Macli-ing Dulag, https://martiallawmuseum.ph/magaral/martial-law-heroes-macli-ing-dulag/ (last accessed on January 5, 2021).
2Ponencia, p. 9.
3 Id. at 3-4.
4 Id. at 9.
5Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 182 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
6 Id.
7People v. Quintos, 746 Phil. 809, 820 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]
8 269 Phil. 225 (1990) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division]
9 Id. at 232.
10Pit-og v. People, 268 Phil. 413, 420 (1990) [Per C.J. Fernan, Third Division].
11 807 Phil. 102 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
12 Id. at 117-118.
13 268 Phil. 413 (1990) [Per C.J. Fernan, Third Division].
14 Id. at 422.
15 Id. at 422-423.
16Ponencia, p. 3.
17Rollo, p. 18, Petition citing TSN dated May 4, 2020.
18 Id. at 18-19.
19 Id. at 18.
20 Id. at 85-86.
21Rollo, pp. 162-163. Reply.
22 Ponencia, p. 40 citing https://www.doe.gov.ph/sites/default/files/pdf/eicc/cadt-region04.pdf.
23 320 Phil. 324 (1995) [Per J. Davide, Jr., First Division].
24 Id. at 325.
25See J. Perlas-Bernabe Separate Concurring Opinion, pp. 4-7.
26 Pres. Decree No. 705 (1975), sec. 2(d).
27 See Ha Datu Tawahig v. Lapinid, G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019, https:// elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65145 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
28Ha Datu Tawahig v. Lapinid, G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019, https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65145 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
29 CONST, art. XII, sec. 5.
30See Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: An Overview of Recent Developments in Policy, 1998 phil. peace & hum. rts. rev. 159, 161 (1998).
31See C.J. Peralta Separate Opinion, pp. 16-23.
32 DENR-NCIP JAO NO. 2008-01, sec. 10 (10.1).
33People v. Asis, 439 Phil. 707, 728 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
34People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 231787, August 19, 2019, https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65645 [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].
35Ponencia, p. 38.
36 Id. at 41.
37 Portia M. Panegro and Francia C. Bulatao, Claims and Counterclaims in the Mt. Halcon and Mt. Calavite Ranges: The Iraya Peoples' Assertion of Rights to Their Ancestral Domains, 47 ATENEO L. J. 624, 626 (2002).
38Ponencia, p. 9.
39 Portia M. Panegro and Francia C. Bulatao, Claims and Counterclaims in the Mt. Halcon and Mi. Calavite Ranges: The Iraya Peoples' Assertion of Rights to Their Ancestral Domains, 47 ATENEO L. J. 624, 627 (2002).
40 John Jerico Laudet Balisnomo, Ancestral Domain Ownership and Disposition: Whose land, Which Lands, 42 ATENEO L. J. 159, 203 (1997). Portia M. Panegro and Francia C. Bulatao, Claims and Counterclaims in the Mt. Halcon and Mt. Calavite Ranges: The Iraya Peoples' Assertion of Rights to Their Ancestral Domains 41 ATENEO L. J. 624, 632-633 (2002).
41 Portia M. Panegro and Francia C. Bulatao, Claims and Counterclaims in the Mt. Halcon and Mt. Calavite Ranges: The Iraya Peoples' Assertion of Rights to Their Ancestral Domains 47 ATENEO L. J. 624, 632—633 (2002).
42 Id. at 633-634.
43 Id. at 634.
44 Id. at 629.
45 Id. at 635.
46 Id.
47 Republic Act No. 8371 (1997), sec. 2 provides:
SECTION 2. Declaration of State Policies. — The State shall recognize and promote all the rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) hereunder enumerated within the framework of the Constitution:
a) The State shall recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of national unity and development;
b) The State shall protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains to ensure their economic, social and cultural well being and shall recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain;
c) The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national laws and policies;
d) The State shall guarantee that members of the ICCs/IPs regardless of sex, shall equally enjoy the full measure of human rights and freedoms without distinction or discrimination;
e) The State shall take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned, to protect their rights and guarantee respect for their cultural integrity, and to ensure that members of the ICCs/IPs benefit on an equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other members of the population; and
f) The State recognizes its obligations to respond to the strong expression of the ICCs/IPs for cultural integrity by assuring maximum ICC/IP participation in the direction of education, health, as well as other services of ICCs/IPs, in order to render such services more responsive to the needs and desires of these communities.
Towards these ends, the State shall institute and establish the necessary mechanisms to enforce and guarantee the realization of these rights, taking into consideration their customs, traditions, values, beliefs, interests and institutions, and to adopt and implement measures to protect their rights to their ancestral domains.
48 Republic Act No. 8371 (1997), sec. 29.
SECTION 29. Protection of Indigenous Culture, Traditions and Institutions. — The State shall respect, recognize and protect the right of ICCs/IPs to preserve and protect their culture, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation and application of national plans and policies.
49See June Prill-Brett, Indigenous Land Rights and Legal Pluralism among Philippine Highlanders, 28 Law and Society in Southeast Asia 687, 691-692 (1994).
50 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey, 57 PHIL. L. J. 268, 272(1982).
51 Id.
52 Marvic M.V.F Leonen, Law at Its Margins: Questions of Identity, Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Ancestral Domains and the Diffusion of Law, 83 PHIL. L. J. 787, 807 (2009).
53 Id.
54 John Jerico Laudet Balisnomo, Ancestral Domain Ownership and Disposition: Whose land, Which Lands, 42 ATENEO L. J. 159, 202 (1997).
55 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey, 57 PHIL. L. J. 268, 272 (1982).
56 Owen James Lynch, Jr., The Philippine Indigenous Law Collection: An Introduction and Preliminary Bibliography, 58 PHIL. L. J. 457, 459 (1983).
57 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey, 57 PHIL. L. J. 268, 272 (1982).
58 Owen James Lynch, Jr., The Philippine Indigenous Law Collection: An Introduction and Preliminary Bibliography, 58 Phil. L.J. 457, 459 (1983).
59 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey, 57 Phil. L.J. 268, 272-273 (1982).
60 Id.
61 J. Puno, Separate Opinion in Cruz v. Secretary of Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904, 953-954 (2000) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
62 Id. at 954.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Owen James Lynch, Jr., The Legal Bases of Philippine Colonial Sovereignty: An Inquiry, 62 PHIL. L. J. 279, 286 (1987).
66 J. Puno, Separate Opinion in Cruz v. Secretary of Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904, 934 (2000) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
67 Owen James Lynch, Jr., The Legal Bases of Philippine Colonial Sovereignty: An Inquiry, 62 phil. L. J. 279,286(1987).
68 J. Puno, Separate Opinion in Cruz v. Secretary of Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 932, 934-935 (2000) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
69 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey, 57 PHIL. L. J. 268, 274 (1982).
70 Id. at 274—275.
71 Id. at 275.
72 John Jerico Laudet Balisnomo, Ancestral Domain Ownership and Disposition: Whose Land, Which Lands, 42 ATENEO L. J. 159, 174 (1997).
73 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey, 57 PHIL. L. J. 268, 275 (1982). See also John Jerico Laudet Balisnomo, Ancestral Domain Ownership and Disposition: Whose Land, Which Lands, 42 ATENEO L. J. 159, 174 (1997).
74 Id.
75 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Land Rights, Land Laws and Land Usurpation: The Spanish Sea (1565-1898), 63 PHIL. L. J. 82, 107 (1988).
76 Id. at 108.
77 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey, 57 PHIL. L. J. 268,275 (1982).
78 As cited in John Jerico Laudet Balisnomo, Ancestral Domain Ownership and Disposition: Whose Land, Which Lands, 42 ATENEO L. J. 159, 174 (1997).
79 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Land Rights, Land Laws and Land Usurpation: The Spanish Sea (1565-1898), 63 PHIL. L.J. 82, 108 (1988).
80 John Jerico Laudet Balisnomo, Ancestral Domain Ownership and Disposition: Whose Land, Which Lands, 42 ATENEO L. J. 159, 174 (1997).
81 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Land Rights, Land Laws and Land Usurpation: The Spanish Sea (1565-1898), 63 PHIL. L.J. 82, 109 (1988).
82 Id.
83 Owen James Lynch, Jr., The Legal Bases ofPhilippine Colonial Sovereignty: An Inquiry, 62 PHIL. L. J. 279, 294 (1987) citing g. dewey, autobiography of george dewey, admiral of the navy, 222 (1913).
84 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey, 57 PHIL. L. J. 268, 276 (1982). See also Owen James Lynch, Jr., Invisible Peoples and a Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary Philippine Land Laws (1900-1913), 63 PHIL. L. J. 249 (1988).
85 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Invisible Peoples and a Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary Philippine Land Laws, 63 PHIL. L. J. 249, 250 (1988).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 250-251.
88 Id. at 251.
89 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Invisible Peoples and a Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary Philippine Land Laws, 63 PHIL. L. J. 249, 250 (1988).
90 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey, 57 PHIL. L.J. 268, 276 (1982).
91 Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902, sec. 13 provides:
SECTION 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this Act and except as herein provided, shall classify according to its agricultural character and productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and regulations shall not go into effect or have the force of law until they have received the approval of the President, and when approved by the President they shall be submitted by him to Congress at the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless disapproved or amended by Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period have the force and effect'of law in the Philippine Islands: Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen hectares in extent.
92 Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902, sec. 14 provides:
SECTION 14. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title; and the Philippine Commission is authorized to issue patents, without compensation, to any native of said Islands, conveying title to any tract of land not more than sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands and had been actually occupied by such native or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
93 Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902, sec. 16 provides:
SECTION 16. That in granting or selling any part of the public domain under the provisions of the last preceding section, preference in all cases shall be given to actual occupants and settlers; and such public lands of the United States in the actual possession or occupancy of any native of the Philippine Islands shall not be sold by said Government to any other person without the consent thereto of said prior occupant or settler first had and obtained: Provided, That the prior right hereby secured to an occupant of land, who can show no other proof of title than possession, shall not apply to more than sixteen hectares in any one tract.
94 Owen James Jr. Lynch, Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey, 57 PHIL. L.J. 268, 276 (1982).
95 Act No. 496, sec. 2 provides:
SECTION 2. A court is hereby established to be called the "Court of Land Registration," which shall have the exclusive jurisdiction of all applications for the registration under this Act of title to land or buildings or an interest therein within the Philippine Islands, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications, and also have jurisdiction over such other questions as may come before it under this Act, subject, however, to the right of appeal, as hereinafter provided. The proceedings upon such applications shall be proceedings in rem against the land and the buildings and improvements thereon, and the decrees shall operate directly on the land and the buildings and improvements thereon, and vest and establish title thereto.
96 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey, 57 PHIL. L. J. 268,281 (1982).
97 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Invisible Peoples and a Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary Philippine Land Laws, 63 PHIL. L. J. 249, 281 (1988).
98 Id. at 282.
99 J. Puno, Separate Opinion in Cruz v. Secretary of Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904, 941 (2000) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
100 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Invisible Peoples and a Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary Philippine Land Laws, 63 PHIL. L. J. 249, 282 (1988).
101 Republic Act No. 2874, sec. 128 provides:
Section 128. Act Numbered Nine hundred and twenty-six known as the "Public Land Act," and all acts and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, are hereby repealed.
102See J. Puno, Separate Opinion in Cruz v. Secretary of Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904, 940 (2000) [Per Curiam, En Banc],
103 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Invisible Peoples and a Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary Philippine Land Laws, 63 PHIL. L. J. 249, 272 (1988).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 273.
106 Id. at 274.
107 Id. at 276.
108 Id. at 277.
109 Id. at 278.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Com. Act No. 141, sec. 11.
113 400 Phil. 904, 941 (2000) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
114 Id.
115 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey, 57 PHIL. L. J. 268, 290 (1982).
116Republic v. Court of Appeals, 278 Phil. 1, 15 (1991) [Per J. Feliciano, Third Division],
117 Id.
118 Pres. Decree No. 1073, sec. 4 provides:
SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
119 official Gazette, The Commonwealth of the Philippines, available at https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/the-commonwealth-of-the-philippines/ (last accessed on January 5, 2020).
120See J. Puno, Separate Opinion in Cruz v. Secretary of Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904, 942 (2000)[Per Curiam, En Banc].
121 Id.
122 J. Caguioa, Separate Opinion, pp. 5-6.
123 Id. at 6-8.
124 Id. at 8-9.
125 Id. at 13-14.
126See J. Caguioa, Separate Opinion, p. 16 citing J. Puno, Separate Opinion in Cruz v. Secretary of Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904 (2000) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
127 J. Perlas-Bernabe, Separate Opinion, pp. 3-1.
128 J. Brion, Separate Opinion in La Tondena, Inc. v. Republic, 765 Phil. 795, 823 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
129 J. Leonen, Separate Opinion in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 111 Phil. 141, 203-209 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
130 J. Leonen, Separate Opinion in Republic v. Tan, 780 Phil. 764, 776-778 (2016) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
131 J. Leonen, Separate Opinion in Maynilad Water Services, Inc. v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. Nos. 202897, 206823 & 207969, August 6, 2019 https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65416 [Per J. Hernando, En Banc].
132 J. Leonen, Separate Opinion in Republic v. Tan, 780 Phil. 764, 776 (2016) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
133Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 456 (1909).
134 J. Leonen, Separate Opinion in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 717 Phil. 141, 208-209 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
135 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey, 57 PHIL. L.J. 268, 276 (1982).
136Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 456 (1909).
137Cariño v. Insular Government, 7 Phil. 132 (1906) [Per J. Willard, En Banc].
138Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 458 (1909).
139 Id. at 458-460.
140 Owen James Lynch, Jr., Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey, 57 PHIL. L. J. 268, 278 (1982).
141 Id. at 279.
142 215 U.S. 16 (1909). See also Dominique Gallego, Indigenous Peoples: Their Right to Compensation Sui Generis for Ancestral Territories Taken, 43 ATENEO L. J. 43, 55 (1998).
143Fianza v. Reavis, 7 Phil. 610, 613-614 (1907) [Per J. Willard, En Banc].
144 Id. at 614.
145 Id. at 615.
146 215 U.S. 16 (1909).
147 Dominique Gallego, Indigenous Peoples: Their Right to Compensation Sui Generis for Ancestral Territories Taken, 43 ATENEO L. J. 43, 55 (1998).
148See J. Puno, Separate Opinion in Cruz v. Secretary of Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904, 932-1016 (2000) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
149 CONST., art. II, sec. 22 provides:
SECTION 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.
150 CONST., art. VI, sec. 5(2) provides:
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
151 CONST., article XII, sec. 5 provides:
SECTION 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.
152 CONST., art. XIII, sec. 6 provides:
SECTION 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands. The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
153 CONST., art. XIV, sec. 17 provides:
SECTION 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies.
154 CONST., art. XVI, sec. 12 provides:
SECTION 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from such communities.
155 J. Puno, Separate Opinion in Cruz v. Secretary of Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904, 960 (2000) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
156 Id. at 963.
157 Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: An Overview of Recent Developments in Policy, 1998 PHIL. PEACE & HUM. RTS. REV. 159, 160 (1998).
158 Republic Act No. 8371 (1997), sec. 21.
SECTION 21. Equal Protection and Non-discrimination of ICCs/IPs. — Consistent with the equal protection clause of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights including the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and International Human Rights Law, the State shall, with due recognition of their distinct characteristics and identity, accord to the members of the ICCs/IPs the rights, protections and privileges enjoyed by the rest of the citizenry. It shall extend to them the same employment rights, opportunities, basic services, educational and other rights and privileges available to every member of the society. Accordingly, the State shall likewise ensure that the employment of any form of force or coercion against ICCs/IPs shall be dealt with by law.
The State shall ensure that the fundamental human rights and freedoms as enshrined in the Constitution and relevant international instruments are guaranteed also to indigenous women. Towards this end, no provision in this Act shall be interpreted so as to result in the diminution of rights and privileges already recognized and accorded to women under existing laws of general application.
160 Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: An Overview of Recent Developments in Policy, 1998 PHIL. PEACE & HUM. RTS. REV. 159, 161 (1998).
161 Id. at 162.
162 Id. at 170.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 171.
165 Id. at 176-177.
166 REP. ACT No. 8371, sec. 3 (a) and (b).
167 Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: An Overview of Recent Developments in Policy, 1998 PHIL. PEACE & HUM. RTS. REV. 159, 178 (1998).
168 Id. at 178.
169 Republic Act. 8371 (1997), sec. 5.
170 Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: An Overview of Recent Developments in Policy, 1998 PHIL. PEACE & HUM. RTS. REV. 159, 179 (1998).
171 John Jerico Laudet Balisnomo, Ancestral Domain Ownership and Disposition whose; land, which lands, 42 ATENEO L. J. 159, 166 (1997).
CAGUIOA, J.:
The factual backdrop of the case is simple and quite straightforward: petitioners, who are members of the Iraya-Mangyan indigenous community and residing within their ancestral domain in the hinterlands of Baco, Oriental Mindoro, within the contemplation of the Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA), felled one dita1 tree for the construction of a communal toilet, without having first secured a permit from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) pursuant to Section. 772 of the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines (Presidential Decree No. [P.D.] 705), as amended. The factual context of the case covers a breadth of interwoven legal issues that bear upon the foremost question of whether or not herein petitioners may be rightly convicted.
If peered from a constitutional law angle, the view is fraught with reluctance and equal but contrary propositions exist, in part due to the fact that our laws have evolved with inexactness, and have become open to a plurality of persuasions. The lens of constitutional determination may invite that the case be seen from a "State v. Indigenous Peoples" point of view, on the one hand, or a "healthful ecology" framing, on the other. To my mind, neither viewpoint invalidates the other, for the socio-historically complex relation between indigenous peoples' rights and environmental laws are so inextricably linked that any imprecise step in one direction or another may cost highly for both separate but joined causes.
I would be remiss if I fail to recognize the very valid points raised by Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta in his Dissenting Opinion, not the least of which is the overarching reasonable fear that the position I espouse, if followed to its logical conclusion, may open the gates for abuse and perhaps facilitate the ease of pillaging our forest covers. Although I maintain my position that these fears, although grounded, may not be the apt cornerstone from which to best reference the resolution of the present issues, I recognize that the Chief Justice raises real and valid apprehensions, which tell me that this case does not lend itself most suited for the adjudication of these deeply contested questions of law, which may be, for now, best left to the wisdom and clarification of the legislature.
I further submit that the present case may be resolved without needing a constitutional determination or conclusive harmonization of laws. From the more immediate standpoint of criminal law, the facts of this case are clear. I concur with the ponencia's finding that petitioners here do not incur any criminal liability. From the lens of criminal law, the determination of whether the Court has sufficient basis to find that the accused here are guilty of the act betrays gray areas of interpretations and legislative intents behind the penal provision, specifically the acts included in the violation under P.D. 705, one of which was levelled against petitioners. These equivocal areas must, therefore, and until conclusively determined, color the present prosecution with reasonable doubt, which must be resolved in favor of herein accused.
I thus maintain the non-culpability of petitioners for the following reasons: first, petitioners may not be found guilty of violating P.D. 705, Sec. 77 as the lands enumerated therein do not include ancestral domains; and second in any event, the petitioners' act of cutting the dita tree was undertaken with the required "authority." As Sec. 77 itself provides, petitioners' act of cutting a single dita tree for the purpose of building a toilet for the use of their community is well within the rights granted to Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) or Indigenous Peoples (IPs) under the IPRA, and is therefore beyond the ambit of the crimes penalized therein, with its authority rising from no less than the Constitution and the bedrock rationale of the IPRA itself.
To be sure, this Opinion does not assert that members of the ICCs/IPs be wholly exempted from the reach of the courts' jurisdiction over criminal offenses. Rather, it submits that there can be no finding of a crime having been committed where none was intended by laws. This Opinion does not look at P.D. 705 with the intention of subverting it and granting sweeping, unmerited exemptions in favor of members of the ICCs/IPs. Plainly, no exemption is being carved out for petitioners, for one cannot be exempted from a law that did not contemplate them, to begin with.
In the ultimate analysis, while I maintain my position that petitioners cannot be held criminally liable for violating P.D. 705, I likewise recognize the reasonable points raised by the Chief Justice in his dissent. I, too, recognize that at least three other members of the Court have also given their positions as regards this case. These opinions are in addition to those espoused by the ponencia. Evidently, interpreting the law as it affects the concerns of IPs and the environment invites diverse points of view which hinders the Court from finding accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The ramifications of laying down definitive pronouncements in this case that go beyond the criminal liability of the accused may indeed have far-reaching consequences that are already beyond what is necessary in resolving the instant case.
That being said, I shall lay down the bases for my position that petitioners are not liable under P.D. 705.
Petitioners did not violate P.D.
Section 77. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
This provision punishes two distinct and separate offenses:
(1) cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and
(2) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.3
The undersigned Prosecutor, under oath, accuses DIOSDADO SAMA y HINUPAS, DEMETRIO MASANGLAY y ACEVEDA, BANDY MASANGLAY y ACEVEDA, residents of Barangay Baras, Baco, Oriental Mindoro with the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of March 2005, at Barangay Calangatan, Municipality of San Teodoro, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, without any authority as required under existing forest laws and regulations and for unlawful purpose, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another did and then-and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly cut with the use of unregistered power chainsaw, a Dita tree, a forest product, with an aggregate volume of 500 board feet and with a corresponding value of TWENTY THOUSAND (Php 20,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.4
(1) Act of cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing
- Timber or forest products from any forest land, or
- Timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land; and
(2) Absence of any authority to do such act.
[Penal laws] are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused."9
x x x If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its'provisions is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them such. Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its intendment.10
SECTION 3. Definitions. —
a) Public forest is the mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purposes and which are not.
b) Permanent forest or forest reserves refers to those lands of the public domain which have been the subject of the present system of classification and declared as not needed for forest purposes.
x x x x ,
g) Forest reservations refer to forest lands which have been reserved by the President of the Philippines for any specific purpose or purposes. (Underscoring supplied)
SECTION 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.
Through the IPRA, the State recognized the rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by virtue of native title, and such formal recognition is through the Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), if obtained at the election of the ICCs/IPs themselves.18Native title is defined in the IPRA as "pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest."19
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
a) Ancestral Domains — Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators [.] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to go no further than the necessities of decision demand, every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt. Whether justice to the natives and the import of the Organic Act ought not to carry us beyond a subtle examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even beyond the attitudes of Spanish law, humane though it was, it is unnecessary to decide. If, in a tacit way, it was assumed that the wild tribes of the Philippines were to be dealt with as the power and inclination of the conqueror might dictate, Congress has not yet sanctioned the same course as the proper one "for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof."21
xxx [O]ur legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian Doctrine as reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution xxx
x x x x
[But] decisional law has made exception to the doctrine.
As early as 1909, in the case of Cariño vs. Insular Government, the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the cultural communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed "native title." This ruling has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in subsequent cases.
But the executive department of the government since the American occupation has not implemented the policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its observance, its wanton disregard shown during the period of the Commonwealth and the early years of the Philippine Republic when government "organized and supported massive resettlement of the people to the land of the ICCs.22
Ancestral lands are covered by the concept of native title that "refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest." To reiterate, they are considered to have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way.25
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/Ips['] private but community property. It is private simply because it is not part of the public domain. But its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, are presumed to be communally held. These communal rights, however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the Civil Code. Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand partition of the property held in common. The Civil Code expressly provides that "[n]o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing in common, insofar as his share is concerned. To allow such a right over ancestral domains may be destructive not only of customary law of the community but of the,very, community itself.
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property, much less corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist only for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject to an extension of another fifty years in any single instance. Every stockholder has the right to disassociate himself from the corporation. Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily.
Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land but extends to all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the domain. This is the reason why the ancestral domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed to other persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.27
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as a source of law. Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in cases where no codal provision is applicable. In other words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities.
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land registration.
x x x x
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness" to the land, being people of the land — by sheer force of having sprung from the land since time beyond recall, and the faithful nurture of the land by the sweat of one's brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation to the land — the possession of stewardship through perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of blessings between man and land; from man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man.29
SECTION 10. Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion. — Unauthorized and unlawful intrusion upon, or use of any portion of the ancestral domain, or any violation of the rights hereinbefore enumerated, measures to prevent non-ICCs/IPs from taking advantage of the ICCs/IPs customs or lack of understanding of laws to secure ownership, possession of land belonging to said ICCs/IPs. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SECTION 72. Punishable Acts and Applicable Penalties. — Any person who commits violation of any of the provisions of this Act, such as, but not limited to, unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon any ancestral lands or domains as stated in Sec. 10, Chapter III, or shall commit any of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sections 21 and 24, Chapter V, Section 33, Chapter VI hereof, shall be punished in accordance with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, That no such penalty shall be cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment: Provided, further, That neither shall the death penalty or excessive fines be imposed. This provision shall be without prejudice to the right of any ICCs/IPs to avail of the protection of existing laws. In which case, any person who violates any provision of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment of not less than nine (9) months but not more than twelve (12) years or a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) or both such fine and imprisonment upon the discretion of the court. In addition, he shall be obliged to pay to the ICCs/IPs concerned whatever damage may have been suffered by the latter as a consequence of the unlawful act. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SECTION 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains. — The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five" (25) years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided. finally. That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract.30 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
[the indigenous] concept of ownership sustains the view that ancestral and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICC's/IP's private hut community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights."31
Article 20
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities.
2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development are entitled to just and fair redress!
Article 26
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.
SECTION 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains. — The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights shall include:
a) Right of Ownership. — The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. — Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights[.] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for future generations, "benefit and share" the profits from their allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration "for the purpose of "ensuring ecological and environmental protection and conservation measures. " It must be noted that the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural resources covers only their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend to the exploitation and development of natural resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPS' rights over the natural resources take the form of management or stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources within their ancestral domains are conserved for future generations and that the "utilization" of these resources must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to national and customary laws.
The limited rights of "management and use " in Section 7 (b) must be taken to contemplate small-scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale utilization of natural resources is expressly allowed in the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition of the plight of forest dwellers, gold partners, marginal fishermen and others similarly situated who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and survival." Section 7 (b) also expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and ensure environmental and ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by their very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.38
SECTION 69. Cutting, Gathering, and/or Collection of Timber or Other Products. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium period and a fine of five (5) times the minimum single forest charge on such timber and other forest products in addition to the confiscation of the same products, machineries, [equipment,] implements and tools used in the commission of such offense; and the forfeiture of improvements introduced thereon, in favor of the Government, shall be imposed upon any individual, corporation, partnership, or association who shall, without permit from the Director, occupy or use or cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any public forest, proclaimed timberland, municipal or city forest, grazing land, reforestation project, forest reserve of whatever character; alienable or disposable land: Provided, That if the offender is a corporation, partnership or association, the officers thereof shall be liable.
The same penalty above shall also be imposed on any licensee or concessionaire who cuts timber from the license or concession of another without prejudice to the cancellation of his license or concession, as well as his perpetual disqualification from acquiring another such license or concession. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Products without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code; Provided, That in the case of partnership, association or corporation, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering or collecting shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or forest products to cut, gathered, collected or removed, and the machinery, equipment, implements and tools used therein, and the forfeiture of his" improvements in the area.
The same penalty plus cancellation of his license agreement, lease, license or permit and perpetual disqualification from acquiring any such privilege shall be imposed upon any licensee, lessee, or permittee who cuts timber from the licensed or leased area of another, without prejudice to whatever civil action the latter may bring against the offender. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:cralawredSection 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without License. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or "forest products are found. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
P.D. 389 (1974) P.D. 705 (1975) E.O. No. 277 (1987) "permit from the Director" "any authority under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit" "any authority"
[o]nly those persons, offenses, and penalties, clearly included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be considered within the statute's operation. They must come clearly within both the spirit and the letter of the statute, and where there is any reasonable doubt, it must be resolved in favor of the person accused of violating the statute; that is, all questions in doubt will be resolved in favor of those from whom the penalty is sought.44
Endnotes:
1 Scientific name: Alstonia scholaris. Also known as devil's tree (English), rite (Indonesian), pulai (Malay), among others. See: < http://apps.worldagroforestry.org/treedb/aftpdfs/ alstonia_scholaris.PDF
2 SECTION 77. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
3Bon v. People, 464 Phil. 125 (2004); Lalican v. Hon. Vergara, 342 Phil. 485 (1997); Revaldo v. People, 603 Phil. 332 (2009).
4Rollo, pp. 48-49.
5 Id.
6 G.R. No. 134217, May 11, 2000,331 SCRA 697.
7 Id. at 704.
8 G.R. No. 113092, September 1, 1994, 236 SCRA 197.
9 Id. at 205. (Emphasis and underscpring supplied)
10 Id. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
11 Id. at 205-206.
12 P.D. 705, Sec. 3(d).
13 Section 5 of PD 705 affirms this view: "[t]he Bureau [of Forest Development] shall have jurisdiction and authority over all forest land, grazing lands, and all forest reservations including watershed reservations presently administered by other government agencies or instrumentalities."
14 Section 3(c) defines this as "those lands of the public domain which have been the subject of the present system of classification and declared as not needed for forest purposes x x x."
15 P.D. 705, Sec. 3(mm). (Underscoring supplied)
16 IPRA, Sec. 3.
17 Id.
18 Section 11 of the IPRA:
SECTION 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights. — The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.
19 IPRA, Section 3 (1).
20 41 Phil. 935 (1909).
21 Id.
22 Sponsorship Speech of Senator Flavier, Legislative History of SBN 1728, II RECORD SENATE 10TH CONGRESS 2ND SESSION 253 (October 16, 1996).
23 Interpellation of August 20, 1997, 6:15 p.m., I RECORD HOUSE 10TH CONGRESS 3RD SESSION 514 (October 20, 1997):MR. OSMENA. But you are vesting economic rights upon this community. This is where my whole problem is. Because a Christian Filipino who wants to mine chrome, iron ore, or whatever, has to go to the Department of Energy and Natural Resources and apply for mineral sharing agreements and file a lot of papers. In our Constitution, natural resources are national patrimony. But in this bill, you have - in face, I do not know how is the constitutionality of this provision, you are now giving mineral rights to the members of a cultural community. Is that a correct interpretation, Your Honor?24Republic v. Cosalan, G.R. No. 216999, July 4, 2018, 870 SCRA 575.
MR. ANDOLANA. Yes, to some extent, it may be interpreted that way. In fact, the committee has considered that vested prior rights must be respected in a claim of mineral or natural resources. MR. OSMENA. Again, Your Honor..
MR. ANDOLANA. But when we are going to recall a decision of the US Supreme Court when we were still under the United States of America, in the case of Cariño vs. Insular Government, these rights are already vested even before the establishment of the Republic of the Philippines and even before the Spanish regime. (Emphasis supplied)
25 Id. at 587. (Emphasis supplied)
26 G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000, 347 SCRA 128.
27 Id. at 222-223. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, italics omitted)
28 Id. at 223.
29 Id. at 224-225. (Emphasis supplied, italics omitted)
30 IPRA, Sec. 57.
31 IPRA, Sec. 5.
32 IPRA, Sec. 3(o).
33 Although non-binding as it 4s merely a UNGA Declaration, it constitutes evidence of state practice on the matter. The United Nations describes UNDRIP as the "most comprehensive international instrument on the rights of indigenous peoples" as 144 states have voted in its favor, including the Philippines, and the 4 countries that initially voted against it have "reversed their position and now support the Declaration." See: https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights of-indigenous-peoples.html
34 UNDRIP, preambular clauses.
35 IPRA, Section 3(o). (Emphasis and italics supplied)
36 IPRA, Sec. 5. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
37 Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 3 of which states that "[t]he Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons."
38 Separate Opinion of Justice Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 26 at 233-235. (Italics in the original, emphasis supplied)
39 Again, the parameters of the IPRA are sustainable use "in accordance with their indigenous knowledge, beliefs, systems and practices."
40 R.A. 7161 provides:cralawredSECTION 7. Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, as numbered herein, is hereby repealed.41People v. Temporada, 594 Phil. 680 (2008).
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 dated July 25, 1987, and Sections 68-A and 68-B of Presidential Decree No. 705, as added by Executive Order No. 277, are hereby renumbered as Sections 77, 77-A and 77-B.
42Association of Non-Profit Clubs, Inc. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 228539, June 26, 2019, accessed at https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65316.
43 This should not be taken to mean that mere ownership, especially as understood in civil law, already constitutes the "authority" required by Sec. 77, P.D. 705. As discussed, the ownership exercised by the IPs over their ancestral domains is different from the civil law understanding of ownership.
44People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651, 686 (1950).
45 Chief Justice Peralta's Dissenting Opinion, pp. 22-23.
46 Id.
47 Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, p. 40.
48 As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section, 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
ZALAMEDA, J.:
Petitioners are before this Court seeking their acquittal from the offense punished under Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (P.D. 705), specifically the offense of cutting down a tree without the requisite permit or authority. Petitioners, who are members of the Iraya-Mangyan indigenous cultural community (ICC), averred that they are not criminally liable because they were merely exercising their legitimate right to use and enjoy the natural resources within their ancestral domains, and were acting in accordance with their elders' directions.
The People, however, argued that petitioners violated the law when they logged the dita tree, for which violation they must be held accountable. They further argue that petitioners, even as members of an indigenous cultural group, enjoy no right more special or distinct from the rest of the Filipino people. Petitioners' mere act of cutting a tree without permit is sufficient for conviction.
I concur in the result reached by my distinguished colleague, J. Lazaro-Javier, in her ponencia.
Section 771 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, criminalizes two (2) distinct and separate offenses, namely: (a) the cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and (b) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing laws and regulations.2
Indisputably, jurisprudence has consistently declared the offenses under Section 77 of P.D. 705 to be mala prohibita3 In this regard, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, is correct in arguing that criminal liability attaches once the prohibited acts are committed, and criminal intent is irrelevant for purposes of conviction.4
The malum prohibitum nature of an offense, however, does not automatically result to a conviction. The prosecution must still establish that the accused had intent to perpetrate the act.5
Intent to perpetrate has been associated with the actor's volition, or intent to commit the act.6 Volition or voluntariness refers to knowledge of the act being done.7 In previous cases, this Court has determined the accused's volition on a case to case basis, taking into consideration the prior and contemporaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances.8
In the early case of U.S. v. Go Chico,9 the accused was convicted of violating Section 1 of Act No. 169610 prohibiting the display of any flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippines against the United States. In affirming the conviction, this Court rejected the accused's defense that proof of criminal intent is a pre-requisite for conviction under Act, No. 1696. The Court explained that there are crimes, such as those punishable under Act No. 1696, where the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. The act itself, without regard to the intention of the doer, produces the evil effects sought to be prevented.
The Court then proceeded to distinguish between intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act, viz:
In People v. Bayona,11 this Court was faced with determining whether the accused's intention for carrying a firearm within 50 meters from the polling place is material to ruling on the propriety of his conviction. In that case, the accused argued that he had no intention to go inside the polling place, much less to vote or campaign for anybody. The Court found that the accused's intent to perpetrate the act had been sufficiently established. However, it clarified that a man with a revolver, who merely passes along a public road on election day within 50 meters of a polling place does not violate the provision of law in question. For the same reason, a peace officer who pursues a criminal, as well as residents within 50 meters of a polling place who merely clean or handle their firearms within their own residences on election day cannot be considered carrying firearms within the contemplation of the legal prohibition.
Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself— intent and all. The wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are inseparable. The act is the crime. The accused intended to put the device in his window. Nothing more is required to commit the crime.
Native title rights and interests must be understood as what has been called "a perception of socially constituted fact" as well as "comprising various assortments of artificially defined jural right" And an important aspect of the socially constituted fact of native title rights and interests that is recognised by the common law is the spiritual, cultural and social connection with the land. Regulating particular aspects of the usufructuary relationship with traditional land does not sever the connection of the Aboriginal peoples concerned with the land (whether or not prohibiting the exercise of that relationship altogether might, or might to some extent). That is, saying to a group of Aboriginal peoples, "You may not hunt or fish without a permit", does not sever their connection with the land concerned and does not deny the continued exercise of the rights and interests that Aboriginal law and custom recognises them as possessing. (Emphasis ours)
Although the nature of the practice which founds the aboriginal right claim must be considered in the context of the pre-contact distinctive culture of the particular aboriginal community, the nature of the right must be determined in light of present-day circumstances. As McLachlin C.J. explained in R. v. Marshall, "[l]ogical evolution means the same sort of activity, carried on in the modern economy by modern means." It is the practice, along with its associated uses, which must be allowed to evolve. The right to harvest wood for the construction of temporary shelters must be allowed to evolve into a right to harvest wood by modern means to be used in the construction of a modern dwelling. Any other conclusion would freeze the right in its pre-contact form.
Before this Court, the Crown submitted that "[l]arge permanent dwellings, constructed from multidimensional wood, obtained by modern methods of forest extraction and milling of lumber, cannot resonate as a Maliseet aboriginal right, or as a proper application of the logical evolution principle", because they are not grounded in traditional Maliseet culture. I find this submission to be contrary to the established jurisprudence of this Court, which has consistently held that ancestral rights may find modern form: Mitchell, at para. 13. In Sparrow, Dickson C.J. explained that "the phrase 'existing aboriginal rights' must be interpreted flexibly so as to permit their evolution over time." Citing Professor Slattery, he stated that "the word 'existing' suggests that those rights are 'affirmed in a contemporary form rather than in their primeval simplicity and vigour.' In Mitchell, McLachlin C.J. drew a distinction between the particular aboriginal right, which is established at the moment of contact, and its expression, which evolves over time. L'Heureux-Dube J. in dissent in Van der Peet emphasized that "aboriginal rights must be permitted to maintain contemporary relevance in relation to the needs of the natives as their practices, traditions and customs change and evolve with the overall society in which they live." If aboriginal rights are not permitted to evolve and take modern forms, then they will become utterly useless. Surely the Crown cannot be suggesting that the respondents, all of whom live on a reserve, would be limited to building wigwams. If such were the case, the doctrine of aboriginal rights would truly be limited to recognizing and affirming a narrow subset of "anthropological curiosities," and our notion of aboriginally would be reduced to a small number of outdated stereotypes. The cultures of the aboriginal peoples who occupied the lands now forming Canada prior to the arrival of the Europeans, and who did so while living in organized societies with their own distinctive ways of life, cannot be reduced to wigwams, baskets and canoes. (Emphasis ours)
As for the Mangyans, their challenges in availing learning facilities and accessing information are well documented.33 The location of their settlements in the mountainous regions of Mindoro, though relatively close to the nation's capital, is not easily reached by convenient modes of transportation and communication. Further, the lack of financial resources discourages indigenous families to avail and/or sustain their children's education.34 Certainly, by these circumstances alone, Mangyans cannot reasonably be compared to those in the lowlands in terms of worldview and behavior.
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream. They are non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a system of self- government not dependent upon the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as different from those of the rest of the population. The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial threat worked well to their advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode their customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had become peripheral to colonial administration, represented, from a cultural perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture. The political systems were still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of power and authority. The economic activities were governed by the concepts of an ancient communalism and mutual help. The social structure which emphasized division of labor and distinction of functions, not status, was maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying the varieties of social courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant.
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no traditional concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of land more accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only belong to the present generation but the future ones as well.
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the gods and spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere stewards. Customary law has a strong preference for communal ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of individuals or families who are related by blood or by marriage, or ownership by residents of the same locality who may not be related by blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under customary laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly collectivized mode of economic production.
Endnotes:
1 SECTION 77. Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, removed timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment,
implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
2Monge v. People, G.R. No. 170308, 07 March 2008; 571 Phil. 472-481 (2008).
3Crescencio v. People, G.R. No. 205015, 19 November 2014; 747 Phil. 577-589 (2014); Villarin v. People, G.R. No. 175289, 31 August 2011; 672 Phil. 155-177 (2011); Revaldo v. People, G.R. No. 170589, 16 April2009; 603 Phil. 332-346 (2009).
4Id
5 See Fajardo v. People, G.R. No. 190889, 10 January 20ll; 654 Phil. 184-207 (2011).
6ABS-CBN Corp. v. Gozon, G.R. No. 195956, 11 March 2015; 755 Phil. 709-782 (2015).
7Id.
8Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, 11 January 2016; 776 Phil. 653-701 (2016).
9 G.R. No. 4963, 15 September 1909; 14 Phil. 128-142 (1909).
10 The Flag Law (1907).
11 G.R. No. 42288, 16 February 1935; 61 Phil. 181-186 (1935).
12 G.R. No. 96132, 26 June 1992; 285 Phil. 983-993 (1992).
13 G.R. Nos. 102009-10, 06 July 1994; 304 Phil. 118-138 (1994).
14 G.R. No. 84857, 16 January 1998; 348 Phil. 173-189 (1998).
15 G.R. No. 144640, 26 June 2006; 525 Phil. 613-624 (2006).
16 G.R. No. 95630, 18 June 1992; 285 Phil. 555-566 (1992).
17 G.R. No. 190889, 10 January 2011; 654 Phil. 184-207 (2011).
18 G.R. No. 210603, 25 November 2015; 773 Phil. 614-630 (2015).
19 Home Development Mutual Fµnd Law of 1980.
20 G.R. No. 209387, 11 January 2016; 776 Phil. 653-701 (2016).
21 G.R. No. 234196, 21 November 2018.
22Supra at note 13.
23Supra at note 22.
24United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (U.S. March 27, 1922); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S. Ct. 240 (1952).
25United States v. Allard, 397 F. Supp. 429 (D. Mont. July 21, 1975).
26 355 U.S. 225, 78 S. Ct. 240 (1957).
27 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53245 (S.D.N.Y. 23 July 2007).
28 498 U.S. 192 (U.S. 8 January 1991).
29 [1999] HCA 53, 07 October 1999, http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/l999/53.html (visited on 15 August 2020).
30 [2013] HCA 33, 07 August 2013, http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/cases/cth/HCA/2013/33.html ; (visited 16 Augbst 2020).
31 2006 SCC 54, https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/2329/index.do?q=R.+v.+Sappier (visited 16 August 2020).
32 G.R. No. 135385, 06 December 2000: 400 Phil. 904-1115 (2000).
33Dong-Hwan Kwon, "The Role of Protestant Mission and the Modernization among Mangyans in the Philippines", A Journal of Holiness Theology for Asia-Pacific Contexts, ASIA-PACIFIC NAZARENE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, Volume IX, Number 2, December 2013; See also Cepeda, Cody, "Mundong Mangyan: How Mindoro's Alangan Mangyan face land disputes, lack of teachers, child marriages", Published in inquirer.net on 27 November 2019,
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1194726/mundong-mangyan-how-mindoros-alangan-mangyan-face-land-disputes-lack-of-teachers-childhood-marriages (visited 06 July 2020).
34Ramschie, Cornelis, The Life and Religious Beliefs of the Iraya Katutubo: Implications for Christian Mission, INFO Vol 11 No 2 (2008), https://internationalforurn.aiias.edu/images/volllno02/cramschie.pdf (visited 18 August 2020); See also Caparoso, Jun, Evangelista, Luisito and Quiñones, Viktor, The Use of Traditional Climate Knowledge by the Iraya Mangyans of Mindoro, (2018).
35Miyamoto, Masaru, "The Hanunoo-Mangyan: Society, Religion and Law Among A Mountain People of Mindoro Island", Vol. 2. pp. iii-240. (1988). < http://scholar.google.com.ph/scholar/url?url=https://minpaku.repo.nii.ac.jp/%3Faction%3Drepository_action_common_download%26item_id%3D3249%26item_no%3D1 %26attribute_id%3D18%26file_no%3D1&h1=en&sa=X&scisig=AAGBfm2KgOucyQPHeh5miR8ho59QV1xnAw&noss1=l&oi=scholarr (visited on 01 June 2020).
36Id.
37Miyamoto, Masaru, "Hanunoo-Mangyan Social World", Masaru Miyamoto, Vol. 2. pp. 147-195. (1979). http://scholar.google.com.ph/scholar_url?url/https://minpaku.repo.nii.ac.jp/%3Faction%3Drepository_action_common_download%26item_id%3 D3483%26item_no%3D1%26attribute_id%3D18%26file_no%3D1&h1=en&sa=X&scisig=AAGBfm3pY16BTL3FnBQw7litRsjPAC6MaA&noss1=1&oi=scholarr (visited on 01 June 2020).
38 See Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws (ALRC Report 31). https://www.alrc.gov.au/publication/recognition-of-aboriginal-customary-laws-alrc-report-31/18-aboriginal-customary-laws-and-substantive-criminal-liability/ (visited on 07 July 2020).
39 Bawagan, Aleli, Custommy Justice System Among the Iraya Mangyans of Mindoro. 29th Annual Conference Ugnayang Pang-Aghamtao, Inc., 25-27 October 2007. Zamboanga (2007). https://pssc.org./ph/wp-content/pssc-archives/Aghamtao/2009/06_customary%20Justice%20System%20among%20the%20Iraya%20Mangyan's%20ofyo20Mindoro.pdf (visited 11 September 2020).
40 Calara, Alvaro. Ethnicity and Social Mobility in the Era of Globalization: The Journey of the SADAKI Mangyan-Alangans." Philippine Sociological Review, vol. 59, 2011, pp. 87-107. JSTOR, < www.jstor.org stable/43486371 (visited 11 September 2020).
41 G.R. No. L-51368, 06November 1981, 195 Phil. 604-612.
42 27 Phil. 97.
43 Walpole, Peter W., and Dallay Annawi. Where Are Indigenous Peoples Going?: Review of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act 1997 Philippines, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, 2011, pp. 83-117, Critical Review Of Selected Forest-Related Regulatory Initiatives: Applying A Rights
Perspective, www.jstor.org stable/resrep00846.10 (visited l3 September 2020).
44Supra at note 36.
45 G.R. No. 193964, 02 December 2015.
46 G.R. No. 181274, 23 June 2010, 635 Phil. 541-554.
47See Ha Datu Tamahig v. Lapinid, G.R. No. 221139, 20 March 2019.
48See Cunneen, Chris, Sentencing, Punishment and Indigenous People in Australia, Journal of Global Indigeneity, 3(1), 2018,< http://ro_uow.edu.au/jgi/vol3/iss1/4 (visited on 07 July 2020); See also footnote 157 of Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, 08 August 2017, 815 Phil. 1067-1174 (2017).
49Zafray Dechosa v. People, G.R. No. l90749, 25 April 2012. 686 Phil. 1095-1110.
"By April 1, 1993, however, the RMDH had been devolved to the Provincial or Local Government of Zamboanga del Norte. Thus, all financial transactions of the hospital were carried out through the Office of the Provincial Governor. The petitioners, therefore, had legal basis to believe that the duty to set aside funds and to effect the HDMF remittances was transferred from the hospital to the provincial government. Hence, the petitioners should not be penalized for their failure to perform a duty which were no longer theirs and over which they were no longer in control.x x x x
The devolution of the hospital to the provincial government, therefore, was a valid justification which constituted a lawful cause for the inability of the petitioners to make the HDMF remittances for March 1993."4 (Emphases supplied.)
SEC. 60. Exemption from Taxes. — All lands certified to be ancestral domains shall be exempt from real property taxes, special levies, and other forms of exaction except such portion of the ancestral domains as are actually used for large-scale agriculture, commercial forest plantation and residential purposes or upon titling by private persons: Provided, That all exactions shall be used to facilitate the development and improvement of the ancestral domains.
SEC. 37. Protection of all Resources. — All measures shall be taken to protect the forest resources from destruction, impairment and depletion.
SEC. 38. Control of Concession Area. — In order to achieve the effective protection of the forest lands and the resources thereof from illegal entry, unlawful occupation, kaingin, fire, insect infestation, theft, and other forms of forest destruction, the utilization of timber therein shall not be allowed except through license agreements under which the holders thereof shall have the exclusive privilege to cut all the allowable harvestable timber in their respective concessions, and the additional right of occupation, possession, and control over the same, to the exclusive of all others, except the government, but with the corresponding obligation to adopt all the protection and conservation measures to ensure the continuity of the productive condition of said areas, conformably with multiple use and sustained yield management.
x x x x
SEC. 39. Regulation of Timber Utilization in all Other Classes of Lands and of Wood-Processing Plants.The utilization of timber in alienable and disposable lands, private lands, civil reservations, and all lands containing standing or felled timber, including those under the jurisdiction of other government agencies, and the establishment and operation of saw-mills and other wood-processing plants, shall be regulated in order to prevent them from being used as shelters for excessive and unauthorized harvests in forest lands, and shall not therefore be allowed except through a license agreement, license, lease or permit. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains. — The ICCs/IPs shall have the priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non- member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided, finally, That the all extractions shall be used to facilitate the development and improvement of the ancestral domains. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 9. Responsibilities of ICCs/IPs to their Ancestral Domains. — ICCs/IPs occupying a duly certified ancestral domain shall have the following responsibilities:
a. Maintain Ecological Balance- To preserve, restore, and maintain a balanced ecology in the ancestral domain by protecting the flora and fauna, watershed areas, and other reserves;
b. Restore Denuded Areas- To actively initiate, undertake and participate in the reforestation of denuded areas and other development programs and projects subject to just and reasonable remuneration; x x x.
Relevant to the first element under Section 77 is Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State, x x x.
x x x x
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
As explicitly stated, all "natural resources are owned by the State." While categories of lands (i.e. lands of public domain and agricultural lands) were therein provided, there is no qualifier created for timber and other natural resources. Moreover, while the provision allows the alienation of agricultural lands, it prohibits the alienation of natural resources. Accordingly, Section 77 punishes the cutting of timber - a natural resource - regardless of the character of the land where the tree was once situated.
Consistent with the State's ownership of natural resources, Section 57 of the IPRA accords IPs mere "priority rights" in the utilization of natural resources is clear from the congressional deliberations therefor:
HON. DOMINGUEZ: Mr. Chairman, if I may be allowed to make a very short Statement. Earlier, Mr. Chairman, we have decided to remove the provisions on natural resources because we all agree that belongs to the State. Now, the plight or the rights of those indigenous communities living in forest and areas where it could be exploited by mining, by dams, so can we not also provide a provision to give little protection or either rights for them to be consulted before any mining areas should be done in their areas, any logging done in their areas or any dam construction because this has been disturbing our people especially in the Cordilleras.
Based on the foregoing, the subject timber or dita tree in this case was owned by the State even if it stood within an ancestral domain. Considering that petitioners admitted that they cut the dita tree found within the ancestral domain, the first element of Section 77 is present.7 (Citations omitted.)
Appellant, however, prays for a lenient approach in consideration of his being an ignorant and semi-uncivilized offender, belonging to a cultural minority, the two separate circumstances to be joined together to constitute the alternative circumstance of lack of instruction to mitigate his liability x x x.x x xx
Some later cases which categorically held that the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction does not apply to crimes of theft and robbery leave us with no choice but to reject the plea of appellant. Membership in a cultural minority does not per se imply being an uncivilized or semi-uncivilized state of the offender, which is the circumstance that induced the Supreme Court in the Maqui case, to apply lack of instruction to the appellant therein who was charged also with theft of large cattle. Incidentally, the Maqui case is the only case where lack of instruction was considered to mitigate liability for theft, for even long before it, in U.S. vs. Pascual, a 1908 case, lack of instruction was already held not applicable to crimes of theft or robbery, x x x.12
We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, but we are opinion that in imposing the penalty the trial court should have taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance the manifest lack of "instruction and education" of the offender. It does not clearly appear whether he is or not an uncivilized Igorot, although there are indications in the record which tend to show that he is. But in any event, it is very clear that if he is not a member of an uncivilized tribe of Igorots, he is a densely ignorant and untutored fellow, who lived in the Igorot country, and is not much, if any, higher that are they in the scale of civilization. The beneficent provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code as amended by Act No. 2142 of the Philippine Legislature [Now Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code] are peculiarly applicable to offenders who are shown to be members of these uncivilized tribes, and to other offenders who, as a result of the fact that their lives are cast with such people far away from the centers of civilization, appear to be so lacking in "instruction and education" that they should not be held to so high a degree of responsibility as is demanded of those citizens who have had the advantage of living their lives in contact with the refining influences of civilization.14
The Maqui case was decided in 1914, when the state of civilization of the Igorots has not advanced as it had in reaching its present state since recent years, when it certainly can no longer be said of any member of a cultural minority in the country that he is uncivilized or semi-uncivilized.15
As a matter of fact, the DENR, together with the NCIP, had already effectively harmonized these interests found in the provisions of P.D. No. 705 and the IPRA when it issued DENR-NCIP Joint AO No. 2008-01. By virtue of the joint order, the State duly recognized the inherent right of the IPs to self-governance as well as their contribution to the conservation of the country's environment and natural resources, ensuring equitable sharing benefits thereof.
Evidently, a reasonable balance between IP rights under the IPRA and protection of forest resources under P.D. No. 705 is already in place. Pursuant to the joint order above, the State expressly recognizes and adheres to the Sustainable Traditional and Indigenous Forest Resources Management Systems and Practices (STIFRMSP) of IPs as well as their Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Practices (IKSP) under their customary laws. Said order mandates all concerned stakeholders consisting of the IPs, the DENR, NCIP, Local Government Units (LGU) to come into an agreement which shall explicitly employ these customary IP practices consistent with their own traditions and cultures to govern their resource utilization within subject forest areas. It is after a rigorous and comprehensive process of consultation and dialogue between and among the parties that the DENR shall issue a forest resource utilization permit upon registration of their STIFRMSP as well as the Joint Implementing Rules and Regulations aimed not only at institutionalizing indigenous and traditionally managed forest practices but, at the same time, utilizing said practices for the protection of the natural resources found in managed forest lands.18Ultimately, the IPs are not being deprived of their rights under the IPRA over the ancestral domains and the natural resources. Their preferential right over the natural resources found within their ancestral domains is neither taken away from them nor trampled upon by the government. What is merely required is that they secure documentation or permit, through their leaders or representatives, and with the guidance and cooperation of the NCIP and the DENR, before executing their logging activities. This is to ensure that the government may keep track of the areas they are allowed to log, that the purpose of their logging is within the bounds of IPRA, and, ultimately, to preserve the Philippine forestry. This is the most prudent thing that the State must do as parens patriae not only for this generation but for the future Filipino generations to come.
It must be noted that property rights are always subject to the State's police power, or the authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare.20 Indeed, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of policy power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.21
The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this country, considering that the deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling our lives and properties, more specifically, by causing rampaging floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the rights of an accused must be favored in the interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when the general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven in the prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a solution only after a fair and just balancing of interests.19 (Emphasis supplied.)
Endnotes:
1 SECTION. 77. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. — Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: x x x
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
2 Republic Act No. 8371; approved on October 29, 1997.
3 773 Phil. 614(2015).
4Id. at 627-628 (2015).
5 230 Phil. 59 (1986).
6Id. at 64, citing Francisco, Statutory Construction, p. 304, citing 69 C.J., Section 643, pp. 1092-1093
7 Separate Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perias-Bernabe, pp. 2-4.
8 DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21; See https://forestry.denr.gov.ph/index.php/fmb-product-and-services/private-land-timber-permit , accessed last August 20, 2020
9 DENR Administrative Order No. 2000-21, See https://forestry.denr.gov.ph/index.php/fmb-product-and-services/special-private-land-timber-permit , accessed last August 20, 2020
10 Chain Saw Act of 2002, Republic Act No. 9175, November 7, 2002 Section 2 thereof provides:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State, consistent with the Constitution, to conserve, develop and protect the forest resources under sustainable management. Toward this end, the State shall pursue an aggressive forest protection program geared towards eliminating illegal logging and other forms of forest destruction which are being facilitated with the use of chain saws. The State shall therefore regulate the ownership, possession, sale, transfer, importation and/or use of chain saws to prevent them from being used in illegal logging or unauthorized clearing of forests.
11 195 Phil 604 (1981).
12Id. at 609-610.
13 27 Phil. 97(1914).
14Id. at 100-101.
15Supra note 10, at 610.
16Republic v. Yahon, 736 Phil. 397, 410 (2014).
17Valera v. Tuason, Jr., 80 Phil. 823, 827 (1948), citing Statutory Construction, Crawford, p. 634.
18 Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, pp. 12-14.
19Lalican v. Hon. Vergara, 342 Phil 485, 498 (1997).
20Acosta v. Ochoa, G.R. Nos. 211559, 211567,212570 & 215634, October 15, 2019.
21Manila Memorial Park, Inc. v. Sec. of the Dep't. of Social Welfare and Dev't., 722 Phil. 538, 568 (2013).
22 Art. 5. Duty of the Court in Connection with Acts Which Should Be Repressed but Which are Not Covered by the Law, and in Cases of Excessive Penalties. — Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.
23Idanan v. People, 783 Phil. 429, 440 (2016).
24 The Court, in the landmark case of Oposa v. Hon. Factoran, Jr, 296 Phil. 694 (1993), pronounced:
"While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, x x x." Id. at 713.
25Id.
26Id.
27 The whereas clause of PD No. 705 provides:
WHEREAS, proper classification, management and utilization of the lands of the public domain to maximize their productivity to meet the demands of our increasing population is urgently needed;
WHEREAS, to achieve the above purpose, it is necessary to reassess the multiple uses of forest lands and resources before allowing any utilization thereof to optimize the benefits that can be derived therefrom;
WHEREAS, it is also imperative to place emphasis not only on the utilization thereof but more so on the protection, rehabilitation and development of forest lands, in order to ensure the continuity of their productive condition;
WHEREAS, the present laws and regulations governing forest lands are not responsive enough to support re-oriented government programs, projects and efforts on the proper classification and delimitation of the lands of the public domain, and the management, utilization, protection, rehabilitation, and development of forest lands;
28 See Aquino v. People, 611 Phil. 442 (2009).
29 Id., citing People v. Bayona, 61 Phil. 181, 185 (1935); People v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488, 500 (1910); and U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, 132 (1909); Ramon C. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1987 ed., pp. 52-54.