G.R. No. 241036 - LUCILA DAVID AND THE HEIRS OF RENE F. AGUAS, NAMELY: PRINCESS LUREN D. AGUAS, DANICA LANE D. AGUAS, SEAN PATRICK D. AGUAS, SEAN MICHAEL D. AGUAS AND SAMANTHA D. AGUAS, Petitioners, v. CHERRY S. CALILUNG, Respondent.

This is a direct recourse to the Court, via a Petition for Review on Certiorari¹ under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, from the Orders dated November 24, 2017² and June 13, 2018³ of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 60, in Civil Case No. R-ANG-17-03316-CY, dismissing for lack of jurisdiction the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Rene F. Aguas (Rene) and Cherry S. Calilung (Cherry) filed by petitioners Lucila David (Lucila) and her children, namely: Princess Luren D. Aguas, Danica Lane D. Aguas, Sean Patrick D. Aguas, Sean Michael D. Aguas, and Samantha D. Aguas (collectively, the Aguas heirs).

Considering that the instant Petition involves a collateral attack on the validity of marriage of [Cherry] and [Rene], it does not fall within the jurisdiction of a [F]amily [C]ourt.

As per deliberations of the Supreme Court Committee on Revision of Rules:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory heirs of the spouse or the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek dissolution.

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to transmit the record of this case to the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Angeles City for re-raffle among courts of general jurisdiction.¹⁴ (Citations omitted; italics, emphasis and underscoring in the original)

In view of the foregoing, the petition filed by the petitioners Lucila David and the Heirs of Rene Aguas namely: Princess Luren D. Aguas, Danica Lane D. Aguas, Sean Patrick D. Aguas, Sean Michael D. Aguas and Samantha Mari S. Aguas against Cherry Calilung, is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.¹⁷

1. THE ABRUPT DISMISSAL BY THE LOWER COURT (RTC BRANCH 60) OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY [OF MARRIAGE] WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE PETITIONERS TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE ORDER OF TRANSMITTAL ISSUED BY RTC BRANCH 59 TO HAVE ELAPSED IS UNPROCEDURAL.
   
   
2. RTC BRANCH 60 ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REFERRAL OF THE CASE BACK TO THE FAMILY COURT IS AN IMPOSITION UPON A CO-EQUAL BRANCH.
   
   
3. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR OF LAW AND ACTED IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR NULLITY ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION.¹⁹

1. Whether it is Branch 59 or Branch 60 which has jurisdiction over the RTC petition for declaration of nullity of marriage;
   
   
2. Whether or not Branch 60 erred in dismissing the RTC petition for nullity of marriage; and
   
   
3. Whether or not the petitioners are the real parties-in-interest to file the subject RTC petition for nullity of marriage.

SEC. 3. Establishment of Family Courts. – There shall be established a Family Court in every province and city in the country. In case where the city is the capital of the province, the Family Court shall be established in the municipality which has the highest population.

x x x x

SEC. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have incurred.

The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code;"

b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, [habeas corpus] in relation to the latter;

c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof;

d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains;

e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;

f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines;"

g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent or neglected children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children; the suspension, termination, or restoration of parental authority and other cases cognizable under Presidential Decree No. 603, Executive Order No. 56, (Series of 1986), and other related laws;

h) Petitions for the constitution of the family home;

i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;

j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended by Republic Act No. 7658; and

k) Cases of domestic violence against:

	1)	Women – which are acts of [gender-based] violence that results, or are likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman's personhood, integrity and freedom movement; and
	2)	Children – which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development.

If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal proceedings and the corresponding penalties.

If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case pending in the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court. (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 17. Transitory Provisions. – Pending the establishment of such Family Courts, the Supreme Court shall designate from among the branches of the Regional Trial Court at least one Family Court in each of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Muntinlupa, Laoag, Baguio, Santiago, Dagupan, Olongapo, Cabanatuan, San Jose, Angeles, Cavite, Batangas, Lucena, Naga, Iriga, Legazpi, Roxas, Iloilo, Bacolod, Dumaguete, Tacloban, Cebu, Mandaue, Tagbilaran, Surigao, Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Davao, General Santos, Oroquieta, Ozamis, Dipolog, Zamboanga, Pagadian, Iligan, and in such other places as the Supreme Court may deem necessary.

Additional cases other than those provided in Sec. 5 may be assigned to the Family Courts when their dockets permit: Provided, That such additional cases shall not be heard on the same day family cases are heard.

In areas where there are no Family Courts, the cases referred to in Section 5 of this Act shall be adjudicated by the Regional Trial Court. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court Resolved to APPROVE the draft resolution designating certain branches of the Regional Trial Court as Family Courts, to wit:

DESIGNATION OF CERTAIN BRANCHES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS AS FAMILY COURTS

To implement the provisions of Section 17 of Republic Act No. 8369, otherwise known as the Family Courts Act of 1997," and in the interest of the expeditious, effective and efficient administration of justice, and subject to the guidelines herein set forth, the following branches of the Regional Trial Courts are hereby designated as Family Courts which shall exclusively try and decide the cases subject of Section 5 of said Act:cralawred

x x x x

THIRD JUDICIAL REGION

x x x x

Angeles City

(31) Br. 60, Judge Ofelia T. Pinto

A.M. No. 08-8-460-RTC (Re: Partial Report on the Judicial Audit of Pending Cases and Special Audit of Family Court Cases in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles City). - The Court resolves:

(1) To NOTE the aforesaid partial report;

(2) To REVOKE the designation of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles City, Pampanga presided over by Judge Ofelia Tuazon Pinto as special court for family court cases, effective immediately from receipt of notice;

x x x x

(4) To PREVENTIVELY SUSPEND Judge Ofelia Tuazon Pinto, Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Angeles City, and Officer-In-Charge Raquel L.D. Clarin, the same court, from office effective immediately from receipt of notice;

(5) To DESIGNATE the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, presided over by Executive Judge Angelita T. Paras-Quiambao, as special court to try and decide family court cases in lieu of Branch 60, same court[.]

4. Lucila and [Rene] entered into a marital union on November 24, 1981 in Mabacat, Pampanga.
   
   x x x x
   
   
5. Out of their marital union, Lucila and Rene begotten five children – Princess, Danica, Patrick, Michael and Samantha x x x.
   
   
6. On [December 10, 2003], Rene filed a Petition for Nullity of Marriage against Lucila before the [RTC], Branch 60 of Angeles City x x x. In the said Petition for Nullity, therein Petitioner Rene declared conjugal properties as follows:
   
   That the parties have amassed between them a parcel of land located at Sunset [Valley] Estate, Angeles City consisting of five hundred square meters, more or less. This is aside from the assets in business consisting mainly of merchandise inventory in [Rene's] pawnshop and RTW sales business.
   
   x x x x
   
   
7. The subject property is covered by [TCT] No. 045-90811 x x x and was indeed registered in the names of Spouses Rene F. Aguas and Lucila Aguas.
   
   
8. Without receiving any notice from the Court regarding the Petition for Nullity, Lucila learned sometime in the year 2007 that a Decision dated [December 22, 2005] has already been rendered by the RTC granting the said [Petition for Nullity] filed by Rene. x x x
   
   x x x x
   
   
9. The Decision above-mentioned, as well as its Certificate of Finality, was not registered with the Office of Registry of Deeds of Angeles City where the subject property is located. Thus, no annotation of said Decision on the title covering the subject property has ever been made.
   
   x x x x
   
   
10. On [October 7, 2006], Rene and Cherry entered into a marital union without the partition and liquidation of the subject property, and proper delivery of the prospective legitimes of Princess, Danica, Michael, Patrick and Samantha, who are children of the first marriage.
    
    x x x x
    
    
11. On [November 17, 2015], Rene died intestate.
    
    x x x x
    
    
12. Due to the failure of Rene and Cherry to comply with the express provision of the law, the subsequent marriage contracted by the deceased Rene with Cherry is null and void pursuant to Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code[.]²⁹

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.⁴² (Underscoring in the original)

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz.:

1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.⁴³ (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellita's interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.

The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.⁴⁶

While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father's marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Niñal recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. What we have before us belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner's marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.⁴⁸ (Citation omitted)

SEC. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied)

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño, the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity.⁵⁹ (Citations omitted; emphases supplied)

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.⁶⁰ (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title. (Emphases supplied)

[T]his general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.

First, the probate [or intestate] court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.⁶² (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 1. Actions which may and. which may not be brought against executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.

Endnotes:

^* Also referred to as "Samantha Mari" in some parts of the rollo.

¹Rollo, pp. 17-33.

² Id. at 34-36.

³ Id. at 37-39.

⁴ Id. at 91.

⁵ Id. at 103-108.

⁶ Id. at 93.

⁷ Id. at 95-102.

⁸ Id. at 110.

⁹ Respondent's Comment to the Petition, id. at 245.

¹⁰ Id. at 52-59.

¹¹See Aguas heirs' Comment/Opposition to the petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Rene, id. at 52-53.

¹² Id. at 70-75.

¹³ Id. at 113.

¹⁴ Id.

¹⁵ Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, dated March 4, 2003.

¹⁶ 560 Phil. 673 (2007).

¹⁷Rollo, p. 36.

¹⁸ Supra note 3.

¹⁹Rollo, p. 142.

²⁰Municipality of Pateros v. Court of Appeals, 607 Phil. 104, 116 (2009).

²¹Taglay v. Judge Daray, 693 Phil. 45, 54 (2012).

²² Approved on October 28, 1997.

²³People v. Clores, Jr., 475 Phil. 99, 112 (2004).

²⁴ CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 2, provides:
SEC. 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.

²⁵ Id. at Sec. 5, provides:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1)	Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2)	Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
	(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question, (b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto, (c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue, (d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher, (e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3)	Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
(4)	Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5)	Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6)	Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

²⁶ Id. at Art. VI, Sec. 30, provides:
SEC. 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.

²⁷Anama v. Citibanks N.A., 822 Phil. 630, 639 (2017).

²⁸Ku v. RCBC Securities, Inc., G.R. No. 219491, October 17, 2018.

²⁹ Supra note 12, at 71-73.

³⁰ SEC. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
x x x x
d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains[.]

³¹Goco v. Court of Appeals, 631 Phil. 394, 403 (2010).

³² See Pacaña-Contreras v. Rovila Water Supply, Inc., 722 Phil. 460, 477-478 (2013), on the difference between dismissal on the ground of failure to state cause of action and lack of cause of action.

³³ RULES OF COURT, Rule 9, Sec. 1, provides for only four instances when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action.

³⁴Pacasum, Sr. v. Atty. Zamoranos, 807 Phil. 783, 790 (2017).

³⁵Bilag v. Ay-Ay, 809 Phil. 236, 243 (2017).

³⁶ Cebu State College of Science and Technology v. Misterio, 760 Phil. 672, 684 (2015).

³⁷Aledro-Ruña v. Lead Export and Agro-Development Corporation, G.R. No. 225896, July 23, 2018.

³⁸ Id.

³⁹Medline Management. Inc. v. Roslinda, 645 Phil. 34, 50 (2010).

⁴⁰Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. F. Franco Transport, Inc., G.R. No. 191202, November 21, 2018.

⁴¹ Medline Management, Inc. v. Roslinda, supra.

⁴²Enrico v. Heirs of Spouses Medinaceli, supra note 16, at 682.

⁴³ Id. at 682-683, citing Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders.

⁴⁴See Comment to the Petition, rollo, p. 250; see also the 2005 Nullity Decision, supra note 7.

⁴⁵ 662 Phil. 203 (2011).

⁴⁶ Id. at 223-224.

⁴⁷ 384 Phil. 661 (2000).

⁴⁸Enrico v. Heirs of Spouses Medinaceli, supra note 16, at 681.

⁴⁹See Ablaza v. Republic, 642 Phil. 183, 190-191 (2010).

⁵⁰ RULES OF COURT, Rule 39, Sec. 6:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.

⁵¹ CIVIL Code, Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law; [and]
(3) Upon a judgment.
x x x x
ART. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligation declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final.

⁵²See Diaz, Jr. v. Valenciano, Jr., 822 Phil. 291, 311 (2017).

⁵³See Concurring Opinion, Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa.

⁵⁴ Supra note 11.

⁵⁵Unduran v. Aberasturi, 808 Phil. 795, 813 (2017).

⁵⁶ Id. at 814.

⁵⁷ 297 Phil. 642 (1993), cited and discussed by Justice Caguioa in his Concurring Opinion.

⁵⁸ 568 Phil. 724 (2008).

⁵⁹De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro, id. at 731-732.

⁶⁰Enrico v. Heirs of Spouses Medinaceli, supra note 16, at 683, citing the Rationale of the Rules.

⁶¹ 666 Phil. 452, 468-469 (2011).

⁶² Id. at 469; see also Pacioles, Jr. v. Chuatoco-Ching, 503 Phil. 707, 715 (2005).

CAGUIOA, J.:

The ponencia affirms the dismissal of Civil Case No. R-ANG-17- 03316-CV (RTC Petition) on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In so ruling, it characterizes the RTC Petition as one falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, the duly designated Family Court of said station.

I concur.

I submit this Concurring Opinion only to highlight the remedies which may be availed of by the petitioners herein to enforce the partition of property and delivery of presumptive legitimes ordered in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage filed by Rene F. Aguas (Rene) against petitioner Lucila David (Lucila).

For context, a brief restatement of the relevant facts is in order.

Lucila married Rene on November 24, 1981 in Mabalacat, Pampanga. They begot five children namely, petitioners Princess Luren D. Aguas (Princess), Danica Lane D. Aguas (Danica), Sean Patrick D. Aguas (Patrick), Sean Michael D. Aguas (Michael) and Samantha D. Aguas (Samantha) (collectively, the Aguas heirs).¹

On December 10, 2003, Rene filed a petition to declare his marriage with Lucila null and void on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity. Rene declared as conjugal property a 500-square meter parcel of land in Sunset Valley, Angeles City covered by TCT No. 045-90811 issued in the name of Rene and Lucila.²

On December 22, 2005, Rene and Lucila's marriage was declared null and void. Hence, the handling court ordered the division of the lot covered by TCT No. 045-90811 and the house thereon (Sunset Valley Estate), as well as the delivery of the presumptive legitimes of their common children.³ Despite this, the presumptive legitimes of the Aguas heirs were not delivered. As well, the partition of the Sunset Valley Estate had not been undertaken.⁴

On October 7, 2006, Rene contracted a second marriage with respondent Cherry Calilung (Cherry).⁵

On November 17, 2015, Rene died intestate.⁶

On May 24, 2017, Cherry filed Special Proceeding Case No. R-Ang 17-01449-SP entitled "In the Matter of the Petition for Letters of Administration and Settlement of Intestate Estate of Rene F. Aguas, Cherry Calilung-Aguas, Petitioner" (Settlement Proceeding). The Settlement Proceeding was raffled to RTC Branch 56.⁷

Lucila and the Aguas heirs (collectively, Petitioners) actively participated in the Settlement Proceeding. In their Comment/Opposition, they alleged:

1. The [Aguas heirs] are the legitimate children of the late [Rene] with [Lucila]. The marriage of [Rene] and [Lucila] was dissolved by virtue of the Decision of [RTC] Branch 60, dated [December 22, 2005] x x x.

2. Although the marriage was dissolved, there was no liquidation or separation of the properties acquired during their marriage in accordance with Article 102 of the Family Code.

3. Thus, when [Rene] married [Cherry] on [October 7, 2006], the properties of [Rene] acquired during the previous marriage should not [have been] included in their property regime pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code x x x

x x x x

4. Furthermore, Article 52 of the Family Code explicitly provides:cralawred

Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons.

5. Failure to comply with the requirements of Article 52 will have the effect of nullifying a subsequent marriage pursuant to Article 53 of the same Code, to wit:cralawred

Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.⁸ (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that the instant [RTC] Petition involves a collateral attack on the validity of marriage of [Cherry] and [Rene], it does not fall within the jurisdiction of a family court.

x x x x

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to transmit the record of this case to the Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Angeles City for re-raffle among the courts of general jurisdiction.¹¹ (Emphasis supplied; italics omitted)

It is apparent from the face of the petition that the same is hinged upon the issue of validity of marriage emanating from Articles 52 and 53 of the Family Code. Pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act 8369 otherwise known as the Family Courts Act of 1997[,] it is the Family Court who has jurisdiction over this case.

Considering that this court is no longer a Family Court, this court has no jurisdiction over the case.

It is noteworthy to discuss the case of Lolita D. Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli represented by Vilma M. Articulo, where the [Court] opined that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The [Court] emphasized that:

There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non indiget. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage.

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.

Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. x x x

In view of the foregoing, the petition filed by [Petitioners] is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.¹³ (Additional emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. — The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

x x x x

d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains[.]

4. Lucila and [Rene] entered into a marital union on [November 24, 1981] in Mabalacat, Pampanga.

x x x x

5. Out of their marital union, Lucila and Rene begotten five children – Princess, Danica, Patrick, Michael and Samantha x x x.

6. On [December 10, 2003], Rene filed a Petition for Nullity of Marriage against Lucila before the [RTC], Branch 60 of Angeles City x x x. In the said Petition for Nullity, therein Petitioner Rene declared conjugal properties as follows:

x x x x

14[.] That the parties have amassed between them a parcel of land located at Sunset [Valley] Estate, Angeles City consisting of five hundred square meters, more or less. This is aside from the assets in business consisting mainly of merchandise inventory in [Rene's] pawnshop and RTW sales business.

It is the desire of [Rene] that title to the aforementioned real property be transferred entirely to their common children while the commercial assets be retained under his administration, given that he still provides for their subsistence and education;

x x x x

7. The subject property is covered by [TCT] No. 045-90811 x x x and was indeed registered in the names of Spouses Rene F. Aguas and Lucila D. Aguas.

8. Without receiving any notice from the Court regarding the Petition for Nullity, Lucila learned sometime in the year 2007 that a Decision dated [December 22, 2005] has already been rendered by the RTC granting the said Petition [for Nullity] filed by Rene. The dispositive portion of the said Decision is herein reproduced as follows:cralawred

"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the marriage between petitioner Rene F. Aguas and respondent Lucila D. Aguas solemnized on November 24, 1981 is hereby declared null and void.

Their conjugal property consisting of a house and lot located at Sunset Valley Estate, Angeles City is ordered divided between them providing for the support and the delivery of the [presumptive] legitime to their children. Thereafter, the conjugal partnership of gains is ordered dissolved.

x x x"

x x x x

9. The Decision above-mentioned, as well as its Certificate of Finality, was not registered with the Office of Registry of Deeds of Angeles City where the subject property is located. Thus, no annotation of said Decision on the Title covering the subject property has ever been made.

x x x x

10. On [October 7, 2006], Rene and Cherry entered into a marital union without the partition and liquidation of the subject property, and proper delivery of the prospective legitimes of Princess, Danica, Michael, Patrick and Samantha, who are children [from] the first marriage.

x x x x

11. On [November 17, 2015], Rene died intestate.

12. Due to the failure of Rene and Cherry to comply with the express provision of the law, the subsequent marriage contracted by the deceased Rene with Cherry is null and void pursuant to Article 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code x x x[.]¹⁹ (Italics and underscoring omitted)

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the marriage between petitioner Rene F. Aguas and respondent Lucila D. Aguas solemnized on November 24, 1981 is hereby declared null and void.

Their conjugal property consisting of a house and lot located at Sunset Valley Estate, Angeles City is ordered divided between them providing for the support and delivery of the [presumptive] legitime (sic) to their children. Thereafter, the conjugal partnership of gains is ordered dissolved.

After the finality of this Decision, let a Decree of Declaration of Nullity of Marriage be issued in this case.

SO ORDERED.²²

ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no quarrel that the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent had long been declared an absolute nullity by reason of their psychological incapacity to perform their marital obligations to each other. The property relations of parties to a void marriage is governed either by Article 147 or 148 of the Family Code. Since the petitioner and the respondent suffer no legal impediment and exclusively lived with each other under a void marriage, their property relation is one of co-ownership under Article 147 of the Family Code. The said provision finds application in this case even if the parties were married before the Family Code took effect by express provision of the Family Code on its retroactive effect for as long as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Here, no vested rights will be impaired in the application of the said provision given that Article 147 of the Family Code is actually just a remake of Article 144 of the 1950 Civil Code.²⁴ (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.

ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;

(3) Upon a judgment.

x x x x

ART. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligation declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final. (Emphasis supplied)

Parties	Net Share in Sunset Valley Estate	Basis
Rene	One-fourth33	Article 147 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 888 of the Civil Code34
Lucila	One-fourth35	Article 147 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 888 of the Civil Code
Princess, Danica, Patrick, Michael and Samantha	One-tenth36 each (collectively, one-half of the entire Sunset Valley Estate)	Article 888 of the Civil Code

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied)

SECTION 599. Jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance shall have jurisdiction in all matters relating to the settlement of estates and probate of wills of deceased persons, the appointment and removal of guardians and trustees, and the powers, duties, and rights of guardians and wards, trustees and cestuis que trust. This jurisdiction shall be called probate jurisdiction.

SECTION 600. Where Resident's Estate Settled. — If an inhabitant of the Philippine Islands dies, whether a citizen or alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death.

SECTION 601. Where Nonresident's Estate Settled. — If a person resided out of the Philippine Islands at the time of his death, his will shall be allowed and recorded, and letters testamentary or of administration shall be granted in the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.

SECTION 602. The Court Once Taking, To Retain Jurisdiction. — When a Court of First Instance in any province has first taken cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, as mentioned in the preceding sections, such court shall have jurisdiction of the disposition and settlement of such estate, to the exclusion of all other courts.

SECTION 603. Jurisdiction, When May Be Contested. — The jurisdiction assumed by a Court of First Instance, for the settlement of an estate, so far as it depends on the place of residence of a person, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied)

Under Section 1 of Rule 73, [of the 1964 Rules of Court], "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." Pursuant to this provision, therefore all questions concerning the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson should be filed before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, then presided over by former Judge, now Justice of the Court of Appeals, Manuel Barcelona, where Special Proceedings No. 63866 for the settlement of the testate estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson was filed and is still pending.

This Court stated the rationale of said Section 1 of Rule 73, thus:

"x x x The reason for this provision of the law is obvious. The settlement of the estate of a deceased person in court constitutes but one proceeding. For the successful administration of that estate it is necessary that there should be but one responsible entity, one court, which should have exclusive control of every part of such administration. To entrust it to two or more courts, each independent of the other, would result in confusion and delay.

x x x x

"The provision of Section 602 [now Section 1, Rule 73 of the present Rules], giving one court exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement of the estate of a deceased person was not inserted in the law for the benefit of the parties litigant, but in the public interest for the better administration of justice. For that reason the parties have no control over it."

"On the other hand, and for such effects as may be proper, it should be stated herein that any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and every demand or claim which any heir, legatee, or party in interest in a testate or intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution and adjudication of the property to the interested parties, x x x."

This was reiterated in Maningat vs. Castillo, thus:

"x x x The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration. (See Rules 74 to 91, inclusive, Rules of Court.) In order to settle the estate of a deceased person it is one of the functions of the probate court to determine who the heirs are that will receive the net assets of the estate and the amount or proportion of their respective shares. x x x"

x x x x

Even in other cases, it is also a general principle that the branch of the court of first instance that first acquired jurisdiction over the case retains such jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other branches of the same court of first instance or judicial district and all other coordinate courts, x x x³⁹ (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A fair reading of the Rule – since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction – indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.⁴¹ (Italics in the original)

The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152^nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.

"B. Article 39. —

The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.

[Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa (Justice Caguioa)] remarked that the above provision should include not only void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision be modified as follows:

The validity of a marriage may be invoked only...

Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:

The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only...

On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only...

Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to read:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to produce the judgment.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:

The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41.

x x x x

Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase 'absolute nullity' can stand since it might result in confusion if they change the phrase to 'invalidity' if what they are referring to in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.

Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, which the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:

The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only on the basis of final judgment...

Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:

For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:

For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.

Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio.

After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original wording of the provision as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.⁴⁷ (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. x x x⁴⁸ (Emphasis supplied)

SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him. (Emphasis supplied)

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.

A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, we held:

"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title."⁵⁰ (Emphasis supplied; italics omitted)

Endnotes:

^* Also appears as "Samantha Mari" and "Samantha Marie" in some parts of the rollo.

¹Rollo, p. 21.

² Id.

³ Id. at 21-22.

⁴ Id. at 22.

⁵ Id.

⁶ Id.

⁷ Respondent's Comment, id. at 245.

⁸ Petitioners' Comment/Opposition to the Petition, id. at 52-53.

⁹Rollo, pp. 70-75.

¹⁰ Id. at 73.

¹¹ As quoted in the Petition, id. at 23.

¹²Rollo, pp. 34-36.

¹³ Id. at 35-36.

¹⁴ Id. at 37-39.

¹⁵ Id. at 38.

¹⁶ As explained by the ponencia, RTC Branch 60 was initially designated as the Family Court of Angeles City through A.M. No. 99-11-07-SC. However, this designation was revoked on September 10, 2008 through A.M. No. 08-8-460 RTC which designated Branch 59 as "special court to try and decide family court cases in lieu of Branch 60 x x x." Ponencia, p. 10.

¹⁷ AN ACT ESTABLISHING FAMILY COURTS, GRANTING THEM EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CHILD AND FAMILY CASES, AMENDING BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 129, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, October 28, 1997.

¹⁸ See Cabling v. Dangcalan, G.R. No. 187696, June 15, 2016, 793 SCRA 331, 341 [First Division, per C.J. Sereno].

¹⁹Rollo, pp. 71-73.

²⁰ Id. at 73.

²¹ Id. at 95-102.

²² Id. at 102.

²³ G.R. No. 213687, January 8, 2020 [First Division, per J. J.C. Reyes, Jr.].

²⁴ Id. at 11.

²⁵ FAMILY CODE, Art. 147.

²⁶ In case of unions governed by the system of absolute community

²⁷ In case of unions governed by the system of conjugal partnership.

²⁸ In case of unions governed by the rules on co-ownership under Article 147 or limited co-ownership under Article 148.

²⁹ While Lucila was served with summons by publication, she claims to have only learned of the 2005 Nullity Decision sometime in 2007. See Petition, rollo, p. 21.

³⁰ See Diaz, Jr. v. Valenciano, Jr., G.R. No. 209376, December 6, 2017, 848 SCRA 85, 102-103 [Second Division, per J. Peralta].

³¹ CIVIL CODE, Art. 1079.

³² See id., Art. 1089.

³³ One-half share (pursuant to Article 147) less presumptive legitimes (pursuant to Article 888).

³⁴ CIVIL CODE, Art. 888 states:cralawred

ART. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided.

³⁵ One-half share (pursuant to Article 147) less presumptive legitimes (pursuant to Article 888).

³⁶ Representing the sum of 1/20 from Rene's share and 1/20 from Lucila's share in the Sunset Valley Estate.

³⁷ AN ACT PROVIDING A CODE OF PROCEDURE IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, August 7, 1901.

³⁸ 150-A Phil. 603 (1972) [Second Division, per J. Makasiar].

³⁹ Id. at 611-612.

⁴⁰ 153 Phil. 115 (1973) [En Banc, per J. Teehankee].

⁴¹ Id. at 128.

⁴²Macias v. Kim, supra note 38, at 612, citing Maniñgat v. Castillo, 75 Phil. 532, 535 (1945).

⁴³ See id.

⁴⁴ ART. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.

⁴⁵ ART. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.
To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.

⁴⁶ 297 Phil. 642 (1993) [Third Division, per J. Romero].

⁴⁷ Id. at 649-652.

⁴⁸Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nidlity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders as cited in Enrico v. Heirs of Spouses Medinaceli, 560 Phil. 673, 683 (2007) [Third Division, per J. Chico-Nazario].

⁴⁹ 503 Phil. 707 (2005) [Third Division, per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez].

⁵⁰ Id. at 715-716.

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

I concur in the result. I agree for the most part in the reasons given by the learned Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos. It is my respectful submission though that the ponencia's pronouncement that "Aguas heirs can collaterally attack the validity of Rene and Cherry's marriage in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rene," does not bear the weight of ratio decidendi.

I find this portion of the ponencia to be a legal advice and an obiter dictum. To be sure, each of us is not prohibited from inserting obiter in our respective ponencia – indeed at times obiter is important for stylistic effect and overall impact of which I am guilty at times or even many a time. As well, the Court is unfettered to extend gratuitously legal advice that we deem to be guidance to the bench and bar. Besides, it is often necessary to point out the obvious because the obvious often gets lost midstream of a communicative act.

Nonetheless, I would like to impress upon the parties here this caution. In saying that the "Aguas heirs can collaterally attack the validity of Rene and Cherry's marriage in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Rene," what we mean is that procedurally this is allowed but it does not mean the challenge will succeed with certainty. I am constrained to add this caution because what is not said may actually say a lot either subtextually or metatextually.

Further, petitioners' basis for claiming the nullity of the marriage of Rene Aguas and Cherry Calilung is Article 53 of the Family Code which states:

ARTICLE 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after complying with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.

With regard to Lucila, it is interesting to note that Enrico and the Rationale of the Rules only mentioned compulsory or intestate heirs as the ones who could collaterally assail the validity of a marriage in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts in order protect their successional rights. This would mean then that said remedy or recourse under the law is not available to Lucila since she is not an heir of Rene, her marriage with the deceased having been declared null and void from the very beginning on ground of psychological incapacity in the 2005 Nullity Decision. Lucila is, therefore, considered as a stranger in the estate proceedings with no right to succeed as heir of Rene, thus, she has no standing to participate in the Settlement Proceeding.

Concomitantly, Lucila's claim cannot be filed in the Settlement Proceeding. It is well settled that a probate or intestate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. This is clearly elucidated in the case of Agtarap v. Agtarap (Agtarap)....

Equally important is the rule that the determination of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (probate, land registration, etc.) is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in essence a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived."

Such waiver introduces the exception to the general rule that while the probate court exercises limited jurisdiction, it may settle questions relating to ownership when the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment.

Such, waiver was evident from the fact that the respondents sought for affirmative relief before the court a quo as they claimed ownership over the funds in the joint account of their father to the exclusion of his co-depositor.

In this case, the Court notes that the parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the intestate court in settling the issue of the ownership of the joint account. While respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, which hypotheticaliy admitted all the allegations in Anita's petition, the same likewise sought affirmative relief from the intestate court. Said affirmative relief is embodied in respondents' claim of ownership over the funds in said joint account to the exclusion of Anita, when in fact said funds in the joint account was neither mentioned nor included in the inventory of the intestate estate of the late Reynaldo. Therefore, respondents impliedly agreed to submit the issue cf ownership before the trial court, acting as an intestate court, when they raised an affirmative relief before it. To reiterate, the exercise of the trial court of its limited jurisdiction is not jurisdictional, but procedural; hence, waivable.

Endnotes:

¹ 655 Phil. 1755 (2011).

² 824 Phil. 1061 (2018).