THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 227933, September 02, 2020
BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES, INC. AND FRED.* OLSEN CRUISE LINES, Petitioners, v. ROBERTO F. CASTILLO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
GAERLAN, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the Decision2 dated May 31, 2016 in CA-G.R. SP No. 141635, and its Resolution3 dated October 21, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The CA dismissed the appeal of herein petitioners from the Decision4 of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) which directed them to pay Robert T. Castillo (respondent) the amount of US$90,000.00 as disability benefit plus 10% of the total amount as attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, premise[s] considered, respondents BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES and/or FRED[.]OLSEN CRUISE LINES, are hereby directed to jointly and severally pay complainant Roberto T. Castillo, the amount of Ninety Thousand US Dollars (US90,000.00) as disability benefits, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment plus ten percent of the total amount as attorney's fees.A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners which was later denied by the NCMB for lack of merit.17
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO DECIDED.16
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.19
I.
THE TIMELINESS OF THE APPEAL BY HEREIN PETITIONERS TO THE CA.
II.
ENTITLEMENT OF RESPONDENT TO PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS UNDER THE CBA AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
In the exercise of its power to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, an implementing agency, such as the Department of Labor, is restricted from going beyond the terms of the law it seeks to implement; it should neither modify nor improve the law. The agency formulating the rules and guidelines cannot exceed the statutory authority granted to it by the legislature.Consequently, it was settled that the 10-day period stated in Article 276-A should be understood as the period within which the party adversely affected by the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Arbitrators may file a motion for reconsideration. Only after the resolution of the motion for reconsideration may the aggrieved party appeal to the CA by filing a petition for review within 15 days from notice under Section 4 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.27
By allowing a 10-day period, the obvious intent of Congress in amending Article 263 to Article 262-A is to provide an opportunity for the party adversely affected by the VA's decision to seek recourse via a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court filed with the CA. Indeed, a motion for reconsideration is the more appropriate remedy in line with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. For this reason, an appeal from administrative agencies to the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court requires exhaustion of available remedies as a condition precedent to a petition under that Rule.
The requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted is based on the doctrine that in providing for a remedy before an administrative agency, every opportunity must be given to the agency to resolve the matter and to exhaust all opportunities for a resolution under the given remedy before bringing an action in, or resorting to, the courts of justice. Where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs, guided by congressional intent.
By disallowing reconsideration of the VA's decision, Section 7, Rule XIX of DO 40-03 and Section 7 of the 2005 Procedural Guidelines went directly against the legislative intent behind Article 262-A of the Labor Code. These rules deny the VA the chance to correct himself and compel the courts of justice to prematurely intervene with the action of an administrative agency entrusted with the adjudication of controversies coming under its special knowledge, training and specific field of expertise. In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative agencies with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review, is indispensable. In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court 26 (Emphasis in the original)
Disability:
A seafarer who suffers injury as a result of an accident from any cause whatsoever whilst in the employment of the Owners/Company, regardless of fault, including accidents occurring whilst traveling to or from the Ship and whose ability to work is reduced as a result thereof, shall in addition to sick pay, be entitled to compensation according to the provisions of this Agreement.[x x x x]
Degree of Disability Rate of Compensation
Groups 2 & 3 Group 1 % USD USD 100 90,000 110,000[x x x x]
Regardless of the degree of disability, an injury which results in loss of profession will entitle the Seafarer to the full amount of compensation, USD ninety-thousand (90,000) for Ratings (Groups 2 & 3) and USD one-hundred and ten thousand (110,000) for Officers (Group 1). For the purpose of this Article, loss of profession means when the physical condition of the Seafarer prevents a return to sea service, under applicable national and international standards or when it is otherwise clear that the Seafarer's condition will adversely prevent the seafarer's future of comparable employment on board ships. (Emphasis ours)
Black's Law Dictionary defines "accident" as "[a]n unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated, x x x [a]n unforeseen and injurious occurrence not attributable to mistake, negligence, neglect or misconduct."30In NFD International Manning Agents, a "snap on the back" was categorically declared as not an accident within the definition of the word but an injury sustained by the seafarer from carrying heavy objects.33 Similarly, although respondent may not have expected the click on his back when he reached for the napkin, still, it is common knowledge that leaning forward to reach for an object way below, like carrying heavy objects, can cause back injury.34 The click on respondent's back when he leaned forward to reach for a napkin is not an accident. Hence, his condition cannot be said to be a result of an accident, that is, an unlooked for mishap, occurrence, or fortuitous event.35 His injury cannot be viewed as unusual under the circumstances, and is not synonymous with the term "accident" as defined above. More importantly, it was found that his condition was degerative, thus, it is conclusively not caused by an accident.
The Philippine Law Dictionary defines the word "accident" as "[t]hat which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen."31
"Accident," in its commonly accepted meaning, or in its ordinary sense, has been defined as:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
[A] fortuitous circumstance, event, or happening, an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual and unexpected by the person to whom it happens x x x.
The word may be employed as denoting a calamity, casualty, catastrophe, disaster, an undesirable or unfortunate happening; any unexpected personal injury resulting from any unlooked for mishap or occurrence; any unpleasant or unfortunate occurrence, that causes injury, loss, suffering or death; some untoward occurrence aside from the usual course of events.32 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Condition is degenerative disorder which can be brought about by aging, injury/trauma, "wear and tear" on the spine bv virtue o(heavv work, lifting/pulling/pushing heavy objects and can be work-related if the nature of his job involves such risk factors."43 (Emphasis supplied)Contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, the findings of the company-designated physician did not include a conclusion that the condition is not work-related. In truth, the medical report stated that respondent's degenerative condition can be brought about by the wear and tear on the spine by virtue of heavy work, lifting/pulling/pushing heavy objects. It also expressed that his condition is work-related if the nature of his job involves the risk factors. But the petitioners, to avoid the payment of disability benefits to the respondent, claimed that his job did not entail lifting/pulling/pushing heavy objects.
The 120-day period mandated in Section 20(B) of the POEA-SEC, within which a company-designated physician should declare a seafarer's fitness for sea duty or degree of disability, should be harmonized with Article 198 [192](c)(1) of the Labor Code, in relation with Book IV, Title II, Rule X of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, or the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation. Book IV, Title II, Article 198 [192](c)(l) of the Labor Code, as amended, reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibraryUnder the law and jurisprudence, the company-designated physician's failure to issue a final and definitive medical assessment within the 240-day extended period transforms respondent's disability to permanent and total disability.48Article 198. [192] Permanent total disability. - x x x
x x x
(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:
(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided for in the Rules;
x x x
Meanwhile, Rule X, Section 2 of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, reads:
Section 2. Period of entitlement.-(a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System.47 (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITSUnder the schedule of disability in Section 32 of the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions, permanent total disability is classified as Grade l. Thus, respondent's disability benefit should be computed as follows:
x x x
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
x x x
6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.52 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:Respondent incurred legal expenses after the petitioners denied him his disability benefits and was thus forced to file an action to recover the same. Considering that he was constrained to litigate with counsel in all the stages of this proceeding, this Court considers 10% of the total monetary award as appropriate and commensurate under the circumstances of this petition.54
x x x
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
Endnotes:
* Spelled as Fred in some parts of the rollo.
1Rollo, pp. 3-33.
2 Id. at 39-47; penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Elihu A. Ybanez and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a Member of this court).
3 Id. at 49-50.
4 Id. at 51-70; signed by Chairman AVA Renato O. Bello, with the concurrence of Members AVA Virginia Elbinas and AVA Herminigildo C. Javen.
5 Id. at 51-52.
6 Id. at 52-53.
7 Id. at 53-54.
8 Id. at 54.
9 Id. at 6.
10 Id. at 54.
11 Id. at 55.
12 Id. at 57-58.
13 Id. at 58.
14 Id. at 67-68.
15 Id. at 65.
16 Id. at 70.
17 Id. at 71-72.
18 Id. 44-46.
19 Id. at 46.
20 Id. at 49-50.
21 794 Phil. 686 (2014).
22 Art. 262-A. PROCEDURES. - x x x
x x x
Unless the parties agree otherwise, it shall be mandatory for the Voluntary arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators to render an award or decision within twenty (20) calendar days from the date of submission of the dispute to voluntary arbitration.
The award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall contain facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties.
Upon motion of any interested party, the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators or the Labor Arbiter in the region where the movant resides, in case of the absence or incapacity of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, for any reason, may issue a writ of execution requiring either the sheriff of the Commission or regular courts any public official whom the parties may designate in the submission agreement to execute the final decision, order or award. (Emphasis ours.)
23Rollo, p. 46.
24 G.R. No. 188492, August 28, 2018, 878 SCRA 362.
25 649 Phil. 460 (20 I 0).
26Guagua National Colleges v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra note 24 at 383-384.
27 Id. at 381.
28Fil-Star Maritime Corporation, et al. v. Rosete, 677 Phil. 262, 274-275 (2011).
29 646 Phil. 244 (2010).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 260.
33 Id. at 260-261.
34 Id. at 261.
35 Id. at 260
36 Id. at 7.
37 Id. at 62.
38 Id. at 25.
39Phil-man Marine Agency, Inc. et al. v. Dedace, Jr., G.R. No. 199162, July 4, 2018, 870 SCRA 445, 459.
40Romana v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, et al., 816 Phil. 194, 203-204 (2017).
41 Id. at 204.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 7.
44 <https://www.allcruisejobs.com/i11031/laundryman/;http://www.windrosenetwork.com/Jobs-onCruise-Ships-Laundry-Department;https://www.cruiseshipjob.com/mvc/j121?/Norwegian-Cruise Line-jobs-Laundry-Attendant. > (visited July 15, 2020).
45Orient Hope Agencies. Inc.. et al. v. Jara, G.R. No. 204307, June 06, 2018, 864 SCRA 428, 443.
46 Id. at 260
47 Id. at 260 at 441-442.
48 Id. at 440.
49Fil-Star Maritime Corporation, et al. v. Rosete, supra note 28 at 274.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 275.
53 Id. at 276.
54Sharpe Sea Personel Inc., et al. v. Mabunay, Jr., G.R. No. 206113, November 6, 2017, 844 SCRA 18.cralawredlibrary