THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 202542, December 09, 2020
ANGONO MEDICS HOSPITAL, INC., Petitioner, v. ANTONINA Q. AGABIN, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
HERNANDO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the April 27, 2012 Decision2 and June 27, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. S.P. No. 114001.
The CA reversed and set aside the December 16, 20094 and February 26, 20105 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. LAC No. 02-000595-09 which declared that the computation for the award of separation pay and backwages in favor of respondent, Antonina Q. Agabin (Agabin), should be limited in view of a rejected previous offer of reinstatement.
The Antecedents:
Agabin was hired by Angono Medics Hospital Inc. (AMHI) on September 1, 2002 as a staff midwife with a monthly salary of P3,500.00. While working, she was allowed by Andres Villamayor (Villamayor), the former President of AMHI, and Antoinette E. Antiojo (Antiojo), the Chief Nurse, to study nursing simultaneously.
On June 23, 2007, Agabin requested permission to go on leave without pay from June 29, 2007 to September 15, 2007 as she needed to work as an affiliate in Mariveles, Bataan as part of her school requirement. Antiojo approved the request on the same day.
On September 15, 2007, Agabin returned to AMHI to inform Antiojo that she was ready to report back to work. Consequently, Agabin was included in the Schedule of Duty for the period September 16 to 30, 2007 with a 10:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M. shift and off-duty days on September 23 and 30, 2007.
However, on September 19, 2007, Villamayor berated Agabin for coming in to work and told her to go home and take a vacation. Agabin explained to Villamayor that Antiojo approved her leave of absence but Villamayor ignored her explanation and retorted that she should go home since she had been away from work for a long time. Villamayor also told Agabin that she would not be compensated for her work rendered on September 17 and 18, 2007.
The next day, Antiojo informed Agabin that as per Villamayor's instructions, Agabin should not report for work anymore. Thus, Agabin filed a Complaint6 for illegal dismissal, separation pay, backwages and other monetary claims.
AMHI denied dismissing Agabin. It claimed that the latter simply failed to report for work after June 28, 2007 for unspecified reasons.
Ruling of the Executive Labor Arbiter (Arbiter): |
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding that complainant [Agabin] was illegally dismissed, and ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay complainant [Agabin] the following:
a. Backwages from September 19, 2007 until the finality of the Decision in her favor, tentatively computed until December 19, 2008 in the amount of P97,890.00;
b. 13th month pay of P8,157.50;
c. Separation pay at one month pay for every year [of] service to be computed from September 2, 2002 until the finality of the Decision in her favor, tentatively computed until December 19, 2008 in the amount of P39,156.00;
d. Service Incentive Leave Pay for three (3) years in the amount of P3,745.00;
e. Salary from September 17 & 18,2008 of P502.00;
f. Thirteenth (13th ) month pay for 2007 in the amount of P3,745.00;
g. Attorney's fee at ten (10%) percent of the total award in the amount of P15,416.00.
SO ORDERED.11
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission: |
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is partly GRANTED and the Decision dated 19 December 2008 is MODIFIED by limiting the period of the award of separation pay from 01 September 2002 until 16 January 2008 and the backwages from 19 September 2007 until 16 January 2008. Accordingly, complainant-appellee [Agabin] is entitled to P33,800.00 separation pay and P29,070.10 backwages.
The other parts of the Decision [STAND].
SO ORDERED.16
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The December 16, 2009 and February 26, 2010 Resolutions of the NLRC in NLRC Case No. RAB IV-11-25748-07-RI 00-01-00499-06 (LAC No. 02-000595-09) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the December 19, 2008 Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-11-25748-07-RI is hereby ordered REINSTATED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.35
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT [ITS] JULY 19, 2010 DECISION IN CA-GR SP NO. 113939, WHICH AFFIRMED IN FULL THE RESOLUTIONS DATED DECEMBER 16, 2009 AND FEBRUARY 26, 2010 OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION IN NLRC LAC NO. 02-000595-09 ENTITLED "ANTONINA Q. AGABIN VS. ANGONO MEDICS HOSPITAL" WHICH PARTLY GRANTED THE APPEAL OF PETITIONER FROM THE EARLIER DECISION DATED DECEMBER 19, 2008 OF THE LABOR ARBITER IN NLRC CASE NO. RAB-IV-11-25748-07-RI, CONSTITUTES AS A BAR TO ANY SUBSEQUENT CONTRARY DECISION IN CA-GR SP NO. 114001.38
WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT MODIFIED THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER DATED DECEMBER 19, 2008 BY LIMITING THE AWARD OF BACKWAGES TO PETITIONER ONLY FROM SEPTEMBER 19, 2007 UNTIL JANUARY 16, 2008 INSTEAD OF FROM SEPTEMBER 19, 2007 UNTIL THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION.
WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ITS RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 16, 2009.43
As a rule, 'a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it. Any attempt on the part of the ... entities charged with the execution of a final judgment to insert, change or add matters not clearly contemplated in the dispositive portion violates the rule on immutability of judgments.' An exception to this rule is the existence of supervening event which refer to facts transpiring after judgment has become final and executory or to new circumstances that developed after the judgment acquired finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in existence at that time.44
Res judicata means 'a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.' It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.45
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. -
The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
x x x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised [or missed] in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
x x x (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47 (b); and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47 (c). Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation47 differentiated between the two rules of res judicata:
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or any other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to the matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as 'conclusiveness of judgment.' Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. xxx Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect as a 'bar by prior judgment' would apply. If as between the two cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as 'conclusiveness of judgment' applies.48
The first is that part of the decision that cannot now be disputed because it has been confirmed with finality. This is the finding of the illegality of the dismissal and the awards of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, backwages x x x.
The second part is the computation of the awards made. x x x53
The computation of backwages depends on the final awards adjudged as a consequence of illegal dismissal, in that:
First, when reinstatement is ordered, the general concept under Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, computes the backwages from the time of dismissal until the employee's reinstatement. The computation of backwages (and similar benefits considered part of the backwages) can even continue beyond the decision of the labor arbiter or NLRC and ends only when the employee is actually reinstated.55
Second, when separation pay is ordered in lieu of reinstatement (in the event that this aspect of the case is disputed) or reinstatement is waived by the employee (in the event that the payment of separation pay, in lieu, is not disputed), backwages is computed from the time of dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering separation pay.
Third, when separation pay is ordered after the finality of the decision ordering the reinstatement by reason of a supervening event that makes the award of reinstatement no longer possible (as in the case), backwages is computed from the time of dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering separation pay.
The above computation of backwages, when separation pay is ordered, has been the Court's consistent ruling. In Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division, we explained that the finality of the decision becomes the reckoning point because in allowing separation pay, the final decision effectively declares that the employment relationship ended so that separation pay and backwages are to be computed up to that point.
We may also view the proper computation of backwages (whether based on reinstatement or an order of separation pay) in terms of the life of the employment relationship itself.
When reinstatement is ordered, the employment relationship continues. Once the illegally dismissed employee is reinstated, any compensation and benefits thereafter received stem from the employee's continued employment. In this instance, backwages are computed only up until the reinstatement of the employee since after the reinstatement, the employee begins to receive compensation from his resumed employment.
When there is an order of separation pay (in lieu of reinstatement or when the reinstatement aspect is waived or subsequently ordered in light of a supervening event making the award of reinstatement no longer possible), the employment relationship is terminated only upon the finality of the decision ordering the separation pay. The finality of the decision cuts-off the employment relationship and represents the final settlement of the rights and obligations of the parties against each other. Hence, back wages no longer accumulate upon the finality of the decision ordering the payment of separation pay since the employee is no longer entitled to any compensation from the employer by reason of the severance of his employment.56
a. FULL BACKWAGES, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent from the time these were withheld from her on September 19, 2007 until finality of this judgment; and
b. SEPARATION PAY IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT at one month salary for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months considered as one whole year computed from the date of the start of her employment on September 2, 2002 until finality of judgment;
Endnotes:
* Designated as additional Member per raffle dated November 23, 2020 vice J. Inting who recused due to his sister's (then Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals Socorro B. Inting) prior participation in the Court of Appeals.
1Rollo, pp. 9-20.
2 Id. at 22-30; penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting and concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Mario V. Lopez (now a Member of this Court).
3 Id. at 32-33.
4 CA rollo, pp. 16-25; penned by Commissioner Pablo C. Espiritu and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Alex A. Lopez and Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog III.
5 Id. at 27-28.
6 Id. at 37.
7 Id. at 30-36; penned by Executive Labor Arbiter Generoso V. Santos.
8 Id.
9 ART. 219 212Definitions. x x x
x x x
(e) "Employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or any of its officers or agents except when acting as employer.
10 CA rollo, pp. 34-35.
11 Id. at 35-36.
12 Id. at 86-93.
13 CA rollo, pp. 16-21.
14 Id. at 22-23.
15 Id. at 23.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 95-102.
18 Id. at 104-107.
19 Id. at 27-28.
20 Id. at 3-14.
21 Not appended in the records but mentioned by Agabin in her Comment dated June 10, 2010 to AMHI's petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 113939.
22Rollo, pp. 35-53; penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Michael P. Elbinias.
23 Id. at 43-44.
24 Id. at 50.
The dispositive portion of the appellate court's July 19, 2010 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 113939 reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
25 CA rollo, pp. 149-152.
26Rollo, pp. 55-56; penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Michael P. Elbinias.
27 CA rollo, pp. 174-188.
28Rollo, p. 57.
29 Id. at 58.
30 Id. at 59.
31 Id. at 22-30.
32 Art. 279. Security of Tenure. - In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
33Rollo, pp. 27-28.
34 Id. at 28-29.
35 Id. at 29.
36 Id. at 32-33.
37 Id. at 9-18.
38 Id. at 14.
39 Id. at 14-15.
40 Id. at 68.
41 Id. at 69.
42 CA rollo, p. 8.
43Rollo, p. 27.
44Bani Rural Bank, Inc. v. De Guzman, 721 Phil. 84, 97 (2013).
45Monterona v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 209116, January 14, 2019 citing Spouses Selga v. Brar, 673 Phil. 581, 591 (2011).
46 Id.
47 Id., citing Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, 441 Phil. 551, 564 (2002).
48 Id.
49Peak Ventures Corp. v. Heirs of Villareal, 747 Phil. 320-337 (2014) citing St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. v. Notario, 648 Phil. 285 (2010).
50 Id.
51 Id., citing Capili v. National Labor Relations Commission, 337 Phil. 210, 216 (1997), Buhain v. Court of Appeals, 433 Phil. 94, 102-103 (2002), and St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. v. Notario, supra.
52 624 Phil. 612 (2010).
53 Id. at 625.
54 Supra, note 44.
55 Id. citing Javellana, Jr. v. Belen, 628 Phil. 241 (2010).
56 Id. at 101-103.
57 716 Phil. 267, 280-283 (2013). See Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.
58 Id. cralawredlibrary