FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 224863, December 02, 2020
SUSAN CO DELA FUENTE, Petitioner, v. FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE CO., INC. Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARANDANG, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) assailing the Decision2 dated February 17, 2016 and the Resolution3 dated May 26, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 105012 filed by petitioner Susan Co Dela Fuente (Susan).
In case of death of the Insured by self-destruction within (2) years from the Policy Date or date of last reinstatement of this Policy, the pertinent provisions of the Insurance code, as amended, shall apply. Where the death of the Insured by selfdestruction is not compensable, we shall refund the premiums actually paid less indebtedness.9On March 28, 2011, Susan invested P12,000,000.00 in Reuben's lending business.10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff SUSAN CO DELA FUENTE and against the defendant FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE CO., INC. ordering the latter to pay the former the following:The RTC found no merit in the contention of Fortune that the information Randolph gave to Dr. Pagayatan is an exception to the hearsay rule for being part of res gestae. For the RTC, the statement cannot be treated as spontaneous because a considerable amount of time had lapsed from the moment the deceased was found bleeding and the time the alleged statement was given to Dr. Pagayatan at the hospital. The RTC declared that such considerable amount of time was more than enough for Randolph to deliberate on the matter which rendered the information given regarding the case of Reuben's death fall beyond the ambit of spontaneity.27
1. FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (Php 15,000,000.00) plus interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from May 18, 2011 until fully paid;
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php 50,000.00) as and by way of attorney's fees; and
3. Costs of suit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.26 (Emphasis in the original)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated February 27, 2015 of the RTC, Branch 133, Makati City is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered ordering the DISMISSAL of the complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibraryThe CA held that the evidence on record proved that Reuben committed suicide. The photos taken at the crime scene did not show any cleaning kit which would have proved the claim of Susan that Reuben was cleaning his gun before his death. Not even a piece of cloth was found at the scene of the crime, as confirmed by the statement of PO3 Serquena and SPO1 Rico Caramat.37
SO ORDERED.36 (Emphasis in the original)
Fortune is now barred from raising the belated filing of the motion for reconsideration in its Comment to Susan's petition filed in this Court. |
Section 1. Period for filing. - A party may file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof, with proof of service on the adverse party.A motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution should be filed within 15 days from notice. The 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible and if no appeal or motion for reconsideration is timely filed, the judgment or final resolution shall be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgment as provided under Section 10, Rule 51 of the same Rules.
The burden of proving an excepted risk or condition that negates liability lies on the insurer and not on the beneficiary. |
An insurer who seeks to defeat a claim because of an exception or limitation in the policy has the burden of establishing that the loss comes within the purview of the exception or limitation. If loss is proved apparently within a contract of insurance, the burden is upon the insurer to establish that the loss arose from a cause of loss which is excepted or for which it is not liable, or from a cause which limits its liability.59In the context of life insurance policies, the burden of proving suicide as the cause of death of the insure to avoid liability rests on the insurer. Therefore, Fortune must prove suicide to defeat Susan's claim.
Dr. Pagayatan's testimony on the statement Randolph allegedly gave moments after Reuben was brought to the hospital is inadmissible. |
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance may be received as part of the res gestae.In People v. Dianos60 the Court explained that the exclamations and statements contemplated in this exception are:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime, immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements constitute nothing but spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion there being no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement become admissible in evidence against the otherwise hearsay rule of inadmissibility.61 (Emphasis supplied; italics in the original)Here, Dr. Pagayatan was neither a participant, victim, or spectator to the death of Reuben. He merely repeated in court what was relayed to him by Randolph who was also not a participant, victim or spectator to the act in controversy. He is not the declarant envisioned by the Rules as he had no personal knowledge of the fact that Reuben took his own life. Nobody witnessed Reuben take his own life. The information Randolph relayed to Dr. Pagayatan, which the latter testified on during trial, cannot be admitted as proof of the veracity of said information. This is not the res gestae statement contemplated by the Rules. Thus, the CA committed error in admitting and giving credence to Dr. Pagayatan's testimony on the matter.
The testimony of Dr. Fortun failed to prove that Reuben's death was caused by suicide. |
Fortune failed to refute the findings of Dr. Nulud. Fortune even furnished Dr. Fortun the report prepared by Dr. Nulud so that she can form her own opinion on the cause of Reuben's death.
26. Q. So according to you, the cause of the death of Reuben Protacio is gunshot wound whose point of entry was left anterior mid-line with an area of smudging, measuring c6x5 cm., 115 cm from the heel, directed posterior-ward, upward and medialward, fracturing the sternum of the level of 5th thoracic rib and 8th thoracic vertebra, lacering the pericardial sac, right ventricle of the heart and thoracic aorta, making a point of exit at the vertebra region, measuring 1.8 x 1 cm., along the posterior midline, 118 cm from the heel and exited at the vertebra region along the posterior mid-line. Based on those findings of your, can you tell whether said wound was self inflicted or not? A. It is not self inflicted. 27. Q. What made you say that? A Based on my experience, I could categorically say that the wound is not self-inflicted, due to the following reason: (1) the distance range of the firearm from the wound's point of entry which resulted in the absence of muzzle imprinting of the gun barrel on the skin; (2) the direction/trajectory of the bullet in the victim[']s body; (3) and the negative result of the paraffin exam on the victim's hands.69
However, when Dr. Fortun was pressed about the implication of the trajectory of the bullet, she did not disregard the possibility that the shooting was accidental as shown in the following exchange:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
75. Q: Earlier during the testimony of Dr. Nulud he made an illustration of the trajectory, can you confirm the accuracy of the said illustration? A: Yes. This illustration is consistent with the description of Dr. Nulud. 76. Earlier marked as Exhibit 35. 77. Q: Dr. Nulud is his testimony also stated that the trajectory of the bullet in the victim's body indicates that the wound was not self-inflicted, what is your opinion on this? A: The trajectory of a bullet describes its path inside the body in reference to a person in an anatomic position i.e. standing straight, legs apart and arms away from the trunk with palms forward. Trajectory alone does not indicate whether a gunshot wound is self-inflicted or not. In Mr. Protacio's case however the bullet went straight front to the back supporting a deliberate selfinflicted shot, not random gunfire such as in an accident.72 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Noticeably, Dr. Fortun contradicted her own statement that trajectory alone does not indicate that a gunshot wound is self-inflicted by hastily concluding that the trajectory of the bullet in Reuben's case showed that it was not an accident.
Q. In question no. 77 according to you, in the case of Mr. Protacio because the bullet went straight from the front to the back it is indicative of a deliberate self-inflicted shot? A. Yes, sir. Q. Are you saying that it is impossible for an accidental shooting for the bullet to go through from the front to back? A. Not impossible sir.73
The Final Investigation Report78 prepared by PO3 Rico P. Caramat (PO3 Caramat), the investigator on the case, made the following conclusion:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q. Do you agree that there are people whose duties include the determination of the presence of gun powder nitrate such as a forensic chemical officer? A. Yes, sir. Q. And are you a forensic chemical officer? A. No, sir, forensic chemistry is not my line.77 (Emphasis supplied)
1. Based on the foregoing facts and the forensic examination conducted, and the absence of direct witness who actually saw what had transpired inside the bedroom of the deceased, the fact remains that prior to the death of REUBEN PROTACIO, he told his brother that he is cleaning his gun after which a shot rang out and REUBEN was discovered with a gunshot wound on his body, thus his death. With this it could be surmised that REUBEN PROTACIO died of an accidental gunshot wound.In the Judicial Affidavit of PO3 Caramat which was adopted as his direct-examination, PO3 Caramat identified the Final Investigation Report marked as Exhibit U that he prepared and adopted his findings therein.80 PO3 Caramat concluded that Reuben died of an accidental gunshot based on the absence of an eye witness and the information Reuben gave to Randolph prior to the incident. When pressed on how he arrived at his conclusion, PO3 Caramat explained that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2. As far as this office is concerned[,] this case is considered close[d], without prejudice should new evidence surfaces (sic) to prove otherwise.79 (Emphasis supplied)
Taking into consideration all the evidence presented, We are convinced that Reuben's death was caused by an accident and not a deliberate self-inflicted gunshot. We are inclined to give more credence to the testimonies and reports prepared by the police investigators and medico-legal officer, Dr. Nulud than the testimony of Dr. Fortun, since they personally examined Reuben, the scene of the incident, and the weapon used.
THE WITNESS: A: Sir, my conclusion arriving to this statement of the brother that he saw his brother cleaning the gun. ATTY. OCO: Q: So, your report merely based on the testimonies of the brother, the drivers and the house helper of the deceased. Correct? A: Yes, sir.81
Susan is entitled to the value of Reuben's outstanding obligation. |
Nowhere in the Endorsement Letter88 is it stated that the insurer shall only be liable to the beneficiary for the amount owing to Susan at the time the policy took effect. Instead, what is clear is that Susan, as the creditor of Reuben and the designated beneficiary of his policy, is entitled to her claim up to the extent of his indebtedness.
Policy Number : 61761 Insured : REUBEN M. PROTACIO This certifies that the above policy contract is assigned to SUSAN CO DELA FUENTE-UG7 Megaplaza Bldg. ADB Ave. Ortigas Ctr. Pasig as creditor, up to the extent of the indebtedness, the balance if any, to the designated beneficiaries. Done at Makati City, Philippines, this 25th day of March, 2011.87 (Emphasis supplied)
Section 10. Every person has an insurable interest in the life and health:Therefore, a debtor may name his creditor as a beneficiary on a life insurance policy taken out in good faith and maintained by the debtor. Likewise, a creditor may take out an insurance policy on the life of his debtor. However, there are marked differences in the implication of these two scenarios.
x x x
(c) Of any person under a legal obligation to him for the payment of money, or respecting property or services, of which death or illness might delay or prevent the performance; and
x x x x89 (Emphasis supplied)
x x x [I]f a policy of insurance be taken out by a debtor on his own life, naming a creditor as beneficiary, or with a subsequent assignment to a creditor, the general doctrine is that, on payment of the debt, the creditor loses all interest therein, and the policy becomes one for the benefit of the insured, and collectible by his executors or administrators.91Professor Sulpicio Guevara, an eminent author in insurance law, highlighted the differences between a policy taken by a creditor on the life of his debtor and a policy taken by the debtor on his own life and made payable to his creditor. Reconciling the case of Crotty and Philippine insurance law, Professor Guevara explained that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x [A] distinction should be made between a policy taken by a debtor on his life and made payable to his creditor, and one taken by a creditor on the life of his debtor. Where a debtor in good faith insures his life for the benefit of his creditor, full payment of the debt does not invalidate the policy; in such case, the proceeds should go to the estate of the debtor.92Meanwhile, in a situation where an insurance is taken by a creditor on the life of his debtor, Professor Guevara adopted the ruling in Godsall v. Boldero93 and rationalized that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x [T]he insuring creditor could only recover such amount as remains unpaid at the time of the death of the debtor, - such that, if the whole debt has already been paid, then recovery on the policy is no longer permissible.94Noticeably, the actual investment of Susan at the time of Reuben's death is P16,000,000.00 of P1,000,000.00 more than the face value of the policy. The intention of the parties in entering into several memoranda of agreement reflecting the investment contracts, and in taking out an insurance policy on the life of Reuben with Susan as the beneficiary is to secure Reuben's debt. To Our mind, in taking out a policy on his own life and paying its premium, Reuben intended to use it as a collateral for his debt at least to the amount of the policy's face value. The insurable interest of Susan is not limited to just what Reuben owed her at the time the policy took effect. Instead, she becomes entitled to the value of Reuben's outstanding obligation at the time of his death the maximum recoverable amount of which is the face value of the policy.
Limiting the extent of Fortune's liability to Susan is consistent with the ruling in the case of Crotty.100 Though the case of Crotty may not be on all fours with the one at bar, its principle is instructive in resolving Susan's claim. Having already received P2,000,000.00 of the P16,000,000.00 Susan invested in Reuben business, she can now only recover up to the balance of his outstanding obligation, P14,000,000.00.
Investment on February 17, 201195 Php 2,000,000.00Investment on March 3, 201196 1,000,000.00Investment on March 14, 201197 1,000,000.00Investment prior to effectivity date of policy Php 4,000,000.00Add: Investment on March 28, 201198 6,000,000.00Investment on March 28, 201199 6,000,000.00Total Investment of Susan Php 16,000,000.00Less: Amount paid by Rossana Ajon to Susan Dela Fuente ( 2,000,000.00)Total outstanding obligation of Fortune to Susan Php 14,000.000.00
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:Applying the guidelines in the case of Nacar to the present case, 12% interest rate per annum shall be imposed on the principal amount due from the time of judicial demand, i.e., from the time of the filing of the complaint, until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, from July 1, 2013, until full satisfaction of the monetary award, the interest rate shall be 6% per annum.
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. And in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed therein.102 (Emphasis and italics in the original; citation omitted)
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 8-20.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla (Former Member of this Court) and Socorro B. Inting; id. at 105-117.
3 Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla (Former Member of this Court) and Melchor Quirino C. Sadang; id. at 131.
4 Records, pp. 32-33, 107-108.
5 Id. at 109-110.
6 Id. at 5.
7 Id. at 111-112.
8 Id. at 6-9, 410.
9 Id. at 9.
10 Id. at 36-39.
11 Id. at 534.
12 Id. at 10.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 372.
15 Id. at 297, 326.
16 Id. at 320-322.
17 Id. at 414.
18 Id. at 415.
19 Id. at 418.
20 Id. at 1-4.
21 Id. at 31-33.
22 Id. at 19-27.
23 Id. at 22-23, 36-39.
24 Id. at 24-25.
25 Penned by Presiding Judge Elpidio R. Calis; rollo, pp. 37-45.
26 Id. at 45.
27 Id. at 44.
28 Id.
29 Records, pp. 540-542.
30 Id. at 542.
31 Id.
32 Penned by Presiding Judge Elpidio R. Calis; id. at 608.
33 Id. at 548-577.
34 Id. at 608.
35 Supra note 2.
36Rollo, p. 116.
37 Id. at 110.
38 Id. at 112-113.
39 Id. at 114.
40 Id. at 118-128.
41 Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with the concurrence Associate Justices Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla (Former Member of this Court) and Melchor Quirino C. Sadang; id. at 131-132.
42 Id. at 8-20.
43 Id. at 12-13.
44 Id. at 13-15.
45 Id. at 16-18.
46 Id. at 18.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 135-141.
49 Id. at 135.
50 Id. at 137-138.
51 Id. at 138.
52 Id. at 138-139.
53 Id. at 139-140.
54 Id. at 146-152.
55 Id. at 146-147.
56 Id. at 149-150.
57Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, 805 Phil. 964, 971 (2017).
58 690 Phil. 734, 747-748 (2012).
59 Id.
60 357 Phil. 871, 885 (1998).
61 Id.
62 Records, pp. 358, 421.
63 Id. at 372.
64 Id. at 422-424.
65 TSN dated July 8, 2013, p. 8.
66 Id. at 8-9; records, p. 135.
67 TSN dated December 1, 2014, pp. 8-10.
68 Records, pp. 14, 24.
69 Id. at 136-137.
70 Id. at 370-371.
71 Id. at 392-394.
72 Id. at 62-63.
73 TSN dated December 1, 2014, p. 17.
74 Id. at 18.
75 Id. at 19.
76 Records, p. 541.
77 TSN dated December 1, 2014, p. 15.
78 Records, pp. 187-189.
79 Id. at 189.
80 TSN dated February 17, 2014, pp. 10-11.
81 Id. at 29.
82 Id. at 22.
83 Id. at 23.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 107-112.
86 Id. at 429.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Republic Act No. 10607, Section 10.
90 144 U.S. 621.
91 Id.
92 Guevara, Sulpicio, The Philippine Insurance Law 4th Edition (1961), p. 35.
93 9 East 72 (1807).
94 Id.
95 Records, pp. 32-33, 107-108.
96 Id. at 109-110.
97 Id. at 111-112.
98 Id. at 36-37, 113-114.
99 Id. at 38-39.
100 144 U.S. 621.
101 716 Phil. 267, 278-279 (2013).
102 Id. cralawredlibrary