FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 230934, December 02, 2020
HEIRS OF THE LATE APOLINARIO CABURNAY, NAMELY, LYDIA CABURNAY, LETECIA NAVARRO, EVANGELINE CRUZ, JERRY CABURNAY, ZENAIDA C. ANCHETA, LIWAYWAY C. WATAN, GLORIA GUSILAN, APOLINARIO CABURNAY, JR., Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF TEODULO SISON,* NAMELY, ROSARIO SISON, OFELIA SISON, TEODULO SISON, JR., BLESILDA** SISON, ARMIDA SISON, CYNTHIA SISON, JESUS SISON AND PERLA*** SISON, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners Heirs of the late Apolinario Caburnay (petitioners) assailing the Decision2 dated November 11, 2016 and Resolution3 dated April 12, 2017 of the Court of Appeals4 (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 106010. The CA Decision denied the appeal of petitioners and affirmed the Decision5 dated November 16, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 38 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 19135. The CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The instant case stemmed from a complaint filed by [petitioners] against [respondents Heirs of Teodulo Sison (respondents)] for specific performance, declaration of nullity of document and title and damages.Petitioners appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
[Petitioners] alleged that on September 23, 1994, [respondents'] predecessor-in-interest Teodulo Sison [(Teodulo)] sold a parcel of land to [petitioners'] predecessor-in-interest Apolinario Caburnay [(Apolinario)]. The [subject] property was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 8791 with an approximate area of 7,768 square meters. The parties agreed that Apolinario would pay P40,000.00 as initial payment of the total purchase price of P150,000.00, the rest of which was to be paid in installments. The receipt of the initial payment was acknowledged by Teodulo in a handwritten receipt, also dated September 23, 1994. Consequently, Apolinario's family occupied the property.
[At the time of the sale in 1994, Teodulo's first wife, Perpetua Sison (Perpetua), had died in 1989 and he had married in 1992 his second wife, Perla (Perla) Sison, who did not give her consent to the sale.6
The second installment in the amount of P40,000.00 was paid by Apolinario on August 14, 1996 and, another handwritten receipt was executed by Teodulo. The third installment was made on October 20, 1999 in the amount of P40,000.00, as reflected in the handwritten receipt which also stated that Teodulo would start processing the transfer of the title upon payment of the remaining balance of P30,000.00.
However, Teodulo passed away [on December 22, 20007 before the balance of the purchase price could be paid. Consequently, Apolinario informed Teodulo's heirs, herein [respondents], about the sale and payment of his remaining balance. [Respondent] Jesus Sison [(Jesus)] told Apolinario that they could not locate the certificate of title and they agreed to settle the amount once the TCT was found.
Due to Apolinario's advanced age and failing memory, no followup was made thus, the purchase price remained unpaid until his death in April 2005.
Upon Apolinario's death, his heirs tried to pay the balance of the purchase price but Jesus x x x rejected the payment. [Petitioners] later discovered that [respondents] had executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of [the] Estate[s] of Teodulo and his wife Perpetua and the same included the subject property which was given to Jesus x x x.
As a result of the extrajudicial settlement, Jesus x x x effected the cancellation of TCT No. 8791 and caused the issuance of TCT No. 22388 in his favor. Thus, [petitioners] prayed that the document captioned Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate be declared null and void and consequently, nullify TCT [N]o. 22388 in the name of Jesus x x x. They also asked that Jesus x x x be compelled to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor upon payment of the remaining balance of P30,000.
x x x x [Respondents], on the other hand, denied the execution of the sale between Teodulo and Apolinario, averring that there was no deed of sale recorded at the Registry of Deeds thus, the subject property was free from encumbrances when the same was included in the partition of the estate of Teodulo and Perpetua x x x.
It was further claimed that Apolinario was a mere caretaker of the property thus, Teodulo and his family consented to his occupation thereof. Upon the transfer of the property to Jesus x x x, he demanded that [petitioners] vacate the same but they refused.
[Respondents] also argue that the action was barred by prescription and that the receipts only showed that there was a contract to sell and not one of sale.
x x x
After weighing the arguments and evidence presented before it, the trial court rendered the [Decision] dated November 16, 2015. While it found the receipts issued by Teodulo x x x to Apolinario to be genuine, the sale in favor of Apolinario was however, declared null and void because the property is presumed to be conjugal and there was no evidence of the consent to the sale by Teodulo's wife, Perpetua. Thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibraryWHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the instant complaint for lack of merit.
Costs against [petitioners].
SO ORDERED.8
In the instant case, there is no showing that [respondent] Perla gave her consent to the sale of Teodulo's share of the subject property. Accordingly, the sale is void in its entirety, contrary to the claim of [petitioners].15The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED. The Decision, dated November 16, 2015, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 38 in Civil Case No. 19135 is AFFIRMED.chanroblesvirtualawlibraryPetitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,17 which the CA denied in its Resolution18 dated April 12, 2017.
SO ORDERED.16
Art. 105. x x xAlso, it is undisputed that the subject property was acquired during the marriage of Teodulo and Perpetua. As such, the subject property was their conjugal property.
The provisions of this Chapter [Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to conjugal partnership of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (399)Aside from the dissolution of the marriage between Perpetua and Teodulo and their conjugal partnership, Perpetua's death triggered the transfer of her inheritance or hereditary estate to her legal heirs pursuant to Article 777 of the Civil Code, which provides: "The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." Since there is no mention of any will that she left, Perpetua died intestate.
ART. 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.Parenthetically, a similar provision (Article 103) governs with respect to the absolute community property regime. Three methods of liquidation of the conjugal property are mentioned in the above-quoted provision: (1) judicial settlement in a testate or intestate proceeding; (2) judicial action, or ordinary action for partition; and (3) extrajudicial settlement. Any of the three should be resorted to within one year from the death of the deceased spouse.40
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extrajudicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of said period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)
If no liquidation is made within the one-year period, the law says, "any disposition or encumbrance involving the [conjugal partnership] property of the terminated marriage shall be void." The validity of the alienation or encumbrance can be challenged by the heirs of the deceased spouse. Such alienation or encumbrance, however, shall be valid to the extent of what is allot[t]ed in the property involved, in the final partition, to the vendor or mortgagor. So if the property sold or mortgaged is finally allot[t]ed to the vendor or mortgagor as his share, the alienation or encumbrance shall be valid. It shall also be valid if the surviving spouse is the only heir of the deceased spouse.After Perpetua's death, there was no liquidation of the conjugal property of Teodulo and Perpetua within the one-year period provided in Article 130. It must be recalled that respondents executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estates of Teodulo and Perpetua only after Teodulo's demise wherein the subject property was given to Jesus. As it stands, the subject property is now registered in the name of Jesus.
x x x If no liquidation of the first marriage property has taken place and the surviving spouse re-marries, this article imposes a mandatory regime of separation of properties for the subsequent marriage. We see no logical reason for this. If after the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the heirs of the deceased spouse succeed to get a partition of the properties of the first marriage, why should the regime of separation of property continue for the second marriage? The spouses in the new marriage may want to establish a system of community [property]; but it would be too late to have a marriage settlement.41
x x x Upon Marta's death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending x x x its liquidation. The ensuing implied ordinary co-ownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code x x x.The second case, Domingo v. Molina44 (Domingo), merely adopted the formulation in Heirs of Go.
x x x
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta's share in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta's share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta's share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other coowners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a coowner of Marta's share. This result conforms to the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest).
Article 105 of the Family Code x x x expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This provision gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely void. Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of the sale.x x xIn the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her. The following observations of Justice Paras are explanatory of this result, viz.:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
x x x
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent [was] not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. x x x""x x x [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would pertain to the share of the surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If it turns out that there really would be, after liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole transaction is null and void. But if it turns out that half of the property thus alienated or mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the estate of the wife, then that corresponding to the husband is valid, and that corresponding to the other is not. Since all these can be determined only at the time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a disposal made by the surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale of conjugal properties cannot be made by the surviving spouse without the legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse (except of course as to that portion of the husband's share inherited by her as the surviving spouse). The buyers of the property that could not be validly sold become trustees of said portion for the benefit of the husband's other heirs, the cestui que [trustent]. x x x (See Cuison, et al. v. Fernandez, et al., L-11764, Jan. 31, 1959.)"43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; emphasis in the original omitted)
x x x Consequently, Anastacio's sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of the other co-owners was not totally void, for Anastacio's rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred, making the spouses Molina a co-owner of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio's interest. This result conforms with the wellestablished principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest).47 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Finally, in Uy v. Estate of Vipa Fernandez48 ( Uy) which also involved the sale of the undivided interest of the surviving spouse in a conjugal property, the Court merely adopted the ruling in Domingo, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Levi and Vipa were married in March 24, 1961 and in the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of conjugal partnership of gains governs their property relations. It is presumed that the subject property is part of the conjugal properties of Vipa and Levi considering that the same was acquired during the subsistence of their marriage and there being no proof to the contrary.The Court's ruling in Heirs of Go, Domingo, and Uy to the effect that the undivided share of the disposing co-owner is effectively transferred to the buyer based on the maxim quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere protest can be traced to the 1944 en banc case of Lopez v. Vda. de Cuaycong, et al.50 (Lopez), to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
When Vipa died on March 5, 1994, the conjugal partnership was automatically terminated. Under Article 130 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership property, upon its dissolution due to the death of either spouse, should be liquidated either in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased or, in the absence thereof, by the surviving spouse within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. That absent any liquidation, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property is void. x x x
x x x
Article 130 of the Family Code is applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established between the spouses prior to the effectivity of the Family Code pursuant to Article 105 thereof x x x.
x x x x Rafael bought Levi's one-half share in the subject property in consideration of P500,000.00 as evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated December 29, 2005. At that time, the conjugal partnership properties of Levi and Vipa were not yet liquidated. However, such disposition, notwithstanding the absence of liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, is not necessarily void.
It bears stressing that under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife are co-owners of all the property of the conjugal partnership. Thus, upon the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains due to the death of either spouse, the surviving spouse has an actual and vested one-half undivided share of the properties, which does not consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and partition of the conjugal partnership. With respect, however, to the deceased spouse's share in the conjugal partnership properties, an implied ordinary co-ownership ensues among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.
Thus, upon Vipa's death, one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved in favor of the surviving spouse, Levi, as his share in the conjugal partnership. The other half, which is Vipa's share, was transmitted to Vipa's heirs - Grace Joy, Jill Frances, and her husband Levi, who is entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child. The ensuing implied co-ownership is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Codex x x.
x x x
Although Levi became a co-owner of the conjugal partnership properties with Grace Joy and Jill Frances, he could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion thereof without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
Nevertheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Levi had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest. Thus, the sale by Levi of his one-half undivided share in the subject property was not necessarily void, for his right as a co-owner thereof was effectively transferred, making the buyer, Rafael, a co-owner of the subject property. It must be stressed that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest).49 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the first question, we believe the consent of the three daughters above named was not necessary to the validity of the sale in question. Each co[-]owner may alienate his undivided or ideal share in the community.With respect to Uy, the Court notes that it applied Article 130 of the Family Code since the concerned spouse died during the effectivity of the Family Code while Heirs of Go and Domingo did not apply the said Article because the death of the spouse occurred during the effectivity of the Civil Code, or prior to August 3, 1988, and Article 130's retroactive application would purportedly impair vested rights under the Civil Code. According to Heirs of Go: "such a declaration [of nullity] prejudices the rights of Servacio [(the buyer)] who had already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito [(the surviving spouse and a legitimate son of the deceased spouse)] in the property subject of the sale."55 But, in Heirs of Go, the disputed sale happened in 1999 such that Servacio's right as co-owner was acquired during the effectivity of the Family Code. In Domingo, the disputed transaction happened in 1978. That being the situation, the buyer of the surviving spouse's undivided interest became co-owner of the subject property and the buyer's vested right would be prejudiced if Article 130 would be applied retroactively.
Articles 39251 and 39952 of the [old] Civil Code provide:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary"Article 392. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of a thing or of a right belong undivided to different persons.Manresa has the following to say on this subject:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x
"Article 399. Each one of the co-owners shall have the absolute ownership of his part and that of the fruits and profits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore sell, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage with respect to the coowners shall be limited to the share which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership."x x xManresa further says that in the alienation of his undivided or ideal share, a co-owner does not need the consent of the others. (Vol. 3, pp. 486-487, 3rd Ed.)
"Each co-owner owns the whole, and over it he exercises rights of dominion, but at the same time he is the owner of a share which is really abstract, because until the division is effected, such share is not concretely determined. The rights of the co-owners are, therefore, as absolute as dominion requires, because they may enjoy and dispose of the common property, without any limitation other than that they should not, in the exercise of their right, prejudice the general interest of the community, and possess, in addition, the full ownership of their share, which they may alienate, convey or mortgage; which share, we repeat, will not be certain until the community ceases. The right of ownership, therefore, as defined in Art. 348 of the present Civil Code, with its absolute features and its individualized character, in exercised in co-ownership, with no other differences between sole and common ownership than that which is rightly established by the Portuguese Code (Arts. 2175 and 2176), when it says 'that the sole owner exercises his rights exclusively, and the co-owner exercises them jointly with the other co-owners'; but we shall add, to each co-owner pertains individually, over his undivided share, all the rights of the owner, aside from the use and enjoyment of the thing, which is common to all the co-owners." x x x
Sanchez Roman also says ("Estudios de Derecho Civil", vol. 3, pp. 174-175):chanroblesvirtualawlibraryx x xAccording to Scaevola (Codigo Civil, vol. 7, pp. 154-155):chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"Article 399 shows the essential integrity of the right of each co-owner in the mental portion which belongs to him in the co-ownership or community.
x x x
"To be a co-owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every recognition of the disposal of the thing, of the free use of his right within the circumstantial conditions of such juridical status, nor is it necessary, for the use and enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that the previous consent of all the interested parties be obtained. x x x"x x xIt follows that the consent of the three daughters Maria Cristina, Josefina and Anita Cuaycong to the sale in question was not necessary.
"2nd. Absolute right of each co-owner with respect to his part or share. - With respect to the latter, each co-owner is the same as an individual owner. He is a singular owner, with all the rights inherent in such condition. The share of the co-owner, that is, the part which ideally belongs to him in the common thing or right and is represented by a certain quantity, is his and he may dispose of the same as he pleases, because it does not affect the right of the others. Such quantity is equivalent to a credit against the common thing or right, and is the private property of each creditor (co-owner). The various shares ideally signify as many units of thing or right, pertaining individually to the different owners; in other words, a unit for each owner."
x x x
The second question is: What rights did the intervenor acquire in this sale? The answer is: the same rights as the grantors had as co-owners in an ideal share equivalent in value to 10,832 square meters of the hacienda. No specific portion, physically identified, of the hacienda has been sold, but only an abstract and undivided share equivalent in value to 10,832 square meters of the common property. What portion of the hacienda has been sold will not be physically and concretely ascertained until after the division. This sale is therefore subject to the result of such partition, but this condition does not render the contract void, for an alienation by the co-owner of his ideal share is permitted by law, as already indicated. If in the partition this lot 178-B should be adjudicated to the intervenor, the problem would be simplified; otherwise, the sellers would have to deliver to the intervenor another lot equivalent in value to Lot No. 178-B. Incidentally, it should be stated that according to Rule 71, sec. 4, of the new Rules of Court, regarding partition of real estate, the commissioners on partition shall set apart the real property "to the several parties in such lots or parcels as will be most advantageous and equitable, having due regard to the improvements, situation and quality of the different parts thereof." x x x Consequently, without deciding that the commissioners on partition must assign Lot 178-B to intervenor, we deem it proper to state that if in the partition proceedings, the commissioners should set apart said lot to intervenor, they would be acting within the letter and spirit of the provision, just quoted, of Rule 71, sec. 4; and that they will probably make such adjudication.
In the Sentence of December 29, 1905, the Supreme Tribunal of Spain declared that the alienation, by a co-owner, of either an abstract or a concrete part of the property owned in common does not mean the cessation of the ownership. Said sentence held:chanroblesvirtualawlibraryx x xApplying the above doctrine to the instant case, it cannot be said that the sale of Lot 178-B to the intervenor had the effect of partitioning the hacienda and adjudicating that lot to the intervenor. It merely transferred to the intervenor an abstract share equivalent in value to 10,832 square meters of said hacienda, subject to the result of a subsequent partition. The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portion of the hacienda does not render the sale void, for it is a well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. "Quando res non valeat ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest." ("When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force as it can have.") It is plain that Margarita G. Vda. de Cuaycong and her children of age intended to sell to intervenor no more than what they could legally and rightfully dispose of, and as they could convey only their ideal share, equivalent in value to 10,832 square meters of the hacienda, that ideal share alone must be deemed to have been the subject-matter of the sale in question. They are presumed to know the law that before partition, conventional or judicial, no co[-]owner may dispose of any physically identified portion of the common property; and that any conveyance by a co[-]owner is subject to the result of a subsequent partition. This interpretation of the contract does no harm to the minor daughters, as the sale in question is subject to the result of the partition which intervenor may demand.
"The first assignment of error cannot be sustained, because such legal status does not disappear, nor is it impaired, with respect to the co-owners between themselves simply because both or either of them executed acts which may be considered as beyond the powers inherent in administration, the only powers which by mutual agreement had been conferred as to certain properties, inasmuch as although every co-owner may alienate, grant, or mortgage the ownership of his share, the effect of such alienation is limited, with reference to the co-owners, to the portion which may be adjudicated to him later, according to Art[.] 399 of the Civil Code, and does not imply the cessation of the community, whether the sale refers to an abstract part of the property, or to a concrete and definite part thereof, because though in the latter case the form and conditions of the subsequent partition may be effected, nevertheless, the juridical situation of the collective owners is not in any way altered so long as the partition of the common property is not carried out, which is declared not to have taken place." x x x
As a successor in interest to an abstract or undivided share of the sellers, equivalent in value to 10,832 square meters of the property owned in common, the intervenor has the same right as its predecessors in interest to demand partition at any time, according to article 40053 of the [old] Civil Codex x x[.]54 (Italics in the original)
x x xWhen a complete or total separation of property governs the property relations, no portion of the properties of the marriage will be common, and the fruits of the properties of either spouse, as well as his or her earnings from any profession, work or industry, will belong to him or her as exclusive property.56 Each spouse owns the property which he or she brings to the marriage or which he or she may acquire during the marriage by onerous or gratuitous title.57
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)
ART. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate, without need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or her separate property. (214a)Given that complete separation of property governed the subsequent marriage of Teodulo and Perla, the 9/16 undivided share or interest in the subject property of Teodulo belonged to him and remained with him as his separate property when he married Perla. Thus, he could have disposed of this without need of consent from Perla.
ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001. (946a)In this scenario, the surviving spouse becomes the sole owner of the conjugal property and the proviso of Article 130 of the Family Code necessarily yields to Article 145.
Sale, being a consensual contract, is perfected by mere consent and from that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance. The essential elements of a contract of sale [are]: (1) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; (3) cause of the obligation which is established.Based on the elements of sale, the transaction between Teodulo and Apolinario is indeed a contract of sale. There was a meeting of the minds: Teodulo agreed to transfer ownership of and to deliver the subject property and Apolinario agreed to pay the purchase price of P150,000.00. The object is the subject property, which is determinate and licit. For Teodulo, the cause or consideration was the receipt of the payment of the purchase price while for Apolinario, it was the transfer of ownership and delivery of the subject property to him.
The perfection of a contract of sale should not, however, be confused with its consummation. In relation to the acquisition and transfer of ownership, it should be noted that sale is not a mode, but merely a title.
A mode is the legal means by which dominion or ownership is created, transferred or destroyed, but title is only the legal basis by which to affect dominion or ownership. Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, "ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition." Contracts only constitute titles or rights to the transfer or acquisition of ownership, while delivery or tradition is the mode of accomplishing the same. Therefore, sale by itself does not transfer or affect ownership; the most that sale does is to create the obligation to transfer ownership. It is tradition or delivery, as a consequence of sale, that actually transfers ownership.
Explicitly, the law provides that the ownership of the thing sold is acquired by the vendee the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in Article 1497 to 1501. The word "delivered" should not be taken restrictively to mean transfer of actual physical possession of the property. The law recognizes two principal modes of delivery, to wit: (1) actual delivery; and (2) legal or constructive delivery.
Actual delivery consists in placing the thing sold in the control and possession of the vendee. Legal or constructive delivery, on the other hand, may be had through any of the following ways: the execution of a public instrument evidencing the sale; symbolical tradition such as the delivery of the keys of the place where the movable sold is being kept; traditio longa manu or by mere consent or agreement if the movable cannot yet be transferred to the possession of the buyer at the time of the sale; traditio brevi manu if the buyer already had possession of the object even before the sale; and traditio constitutum possessorium, where the seller remains in possession of the property in a different capacity.65
The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the Civil Code. Thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibraryThis pronouncement of the Court was reiterated in Spouses Del Campo v. Court of Appeals,69 to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibraryArt. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. [Italics supplied.]As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale [Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common. [Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)]. x x x68
x x x Since the co-owner/vendor's undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.Furthermore, Lopez supports the validity of the disposition to the extent of the undivided share of the disposing co-owner despite the lack of consent from the other co-owners.
x x x We have ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said co-owner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.70
(1) | The Heirs of Apolinario Caburnay, namely, Lydia Caburnay, Letecia Navarro, Evangeline Cruz, Jerry Caburnay, Zenaida C. Ancheta, Liwayway C. Watan, Gloria Gusilan, Apolinario Caburnay, Jr. and Maelin Caburnay are declared and recognized co-owners, share and share alike, of the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22388 to the extent of 9/16 thereof; |
(2) | Jesus Sison is declared and recognized co-owner of the said property to the extent of 7/16 thereof; and |
(3) | Upon finality of this Decision, the proper Register of Deeds is directed to enter and register this Decision in the primary entry book, annotate the same in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22388, and issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22388 in the names of the parties mentioned in (1) and (2) above as co-owners in the proportions indicated therein. |
Endnotes:
* Also Teodulo Sison, Sr. in some parts of the rollo.
** Also Blesislda in some parts of the rollo.
*** Also Perlas in some parts of the rollo.
1Rollo, pp. 20-40, excluding Annexes.
2 Id. at 42-47. Penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio, with Associate Justices Romeo F. Barza and Danton Q. Bueser concurring.
3 Id. at 57-59. Penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza, with Associate Justices Danton Q. Bueser and Socorro B. Inting concurring.
4 Special First Division and Special Former Special First Division.
5Rollo, pp. 77-86. Penned by Presiding Judge Teodoro C. Fernandez.
6 Id. at 30, 45.
7 Id. at 83.
8 Id. at 43-45.
9 Supra note 2.
10 Id. at 46.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 G.R. No. 193038, March 11, 2015, 752 SCRA 602.
14Rollo, p. 46.
15 Id. at 47.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 48-55.
18 Supra note 3.
19 Id. at 92-99.
20 Id. at 101-105.
21 Id. at 28.
22 In denying the execution of the sale between Apolinario and Teodulo and in asserting there was no deed of sale registered with the Register of Deeds, respondents, which include the children of Teodulo from the first marriage, could not be deemed to have given their consent to the sale. Rollo, p. 44.
23Rollo, pp. 28-30.
24 Id. at 31.
25 Id. at 30. Note that petitioners did not include respondent Jesus Sison in their enumeration of the legitimate children of the late spouses Teodulo and Perpetua.
26 Id. at 31-32.
27 Id. at 32.
28 Id. at 35-36.
29 Id. at 36.
30 Id. at 93.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 94.
33 Id.
34 See records, pp. 66 and 236.
35 FAMILY CODE, Article 126 provides:
ART. 126. The conjugal partnership terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or,
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (175a)
36 See Arturo M. Tolentino, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (Volume One with The Family Code of the Philippines, 1990 ed.), pp. 472-474.
37 See id. at 394.
38 Id. at 394-395.
39Rollo, p. 36.
40 Arturo M. Tolentino, supra note 36, at 403.
41 Id. at 403-404.
42 G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011, 657 SCRA 10. Rendered by the First Division; penned by Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin and concurred in by Chief Justice Renata C. Corona and Associate Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Mariano C. Del Castillo and Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
43 Id. at 15-19. Citations omitted.
44 G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016, 791 SCRA 47. Rendered by the Second Division; penned by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion and concurred in by Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Jose C. Mendoza and Marvic M.V.F. Leonen.
45 Id. at 59. Emphasis in the original.
46 Id. at 56-59.
47 Id. at 59.
48 G.R. No. 200612, April 5, 2017, 822 SCRA 382. Rendered by the Third Division; penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Lucas P. Bersamin, Francis H. Jardeleza, and Noel G. Tijam.
49 Id. at 395-398. Citations omitted.
50 74 Phil. 601 (1944).
51 CIVIL CODE, Art. 484.
52 Id., Art. 493.
53 CIVIL CODE, Art. 494.
54Lopez v. Vda. de Cuaycong, et al., supra note 50, at 603-609. The Court notes that in the 1968 en banc case of Estoque v. Pajimula, No. L-24419, July 15, 1968, 24 SCRA 59, where a co-owner sold a specific one-third portion of the co-owned property without the consent of the other two co-owners and afterwards the selling co-owner became the sole owner thereof, the Court pronounced that while on the date of the sale, "said contract may have been ineffective, for lack of power in the vendor to sell the specific portion described in the deed, the transaction was validated and became fully effective when the next day x x x the vendor x x x acquired the entire interest of her remaining co-owners x x x and thereby became the sole owner [thereof]." The Court cited Article 1434 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[w]hen a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee," as justification. As to the effect of the sale of specific one-third portion prior to the seller's acquisition of the shares of the other co-owners, the Court observed that granting the seller could not have sold that particular portion of the lot owned by her and her two brothers, by no means did it follow that the seller intended to sell her 1/3 undivided interest in the property as there was nothing in the deed of sale to justify the inference and pursuant to the maxim, ab posse ad actu non valet illatio. The ruling of the Court in Estoque v. Pajimula is not necessarily inconsistent with the Court's statement in Lopez that the sale of a concrete portion of the co-owned property does not render the sale void based on the principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so, following the maxim: Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest. The peculiar circumstance in Estoque v. Pajimula that the selling co-owner subsequently acquired the sole ownership of the property apparently impelled the Court to treat the previous sale of the specific portion ineffective so that it could be validated upon the acquisition by the seller of the interests of the other co-owners. Whereas, if the co-ownership subsists after the sale by a co-owner of a specific portion of the co-owned property without the consent of the others, the sale will be recognized as valid only up to the extent of the undivided share of the disposing co-owner, and in addition to the maxim: Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest, estoppel will bar the seller from disavowing the sale to the prejudice of the buyer who relied upon the former's action.
55Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr. and Marta Barola v. Servacio, supra note 42, at 17.
56 Arturo M. Tolentino, supra note 36, at 489.
57 Id. at 490.
58 See Hector S. De Leon and Hector M. De Leon, Jr., COMMENTS AND CASES ON PROPERTY (Fourth Edition 2003), p. 234.
59Rollo, p. 46.
60 ART. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry shall form part of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property. (201a)
61Rollo, p. 46.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 78, 81.
64 G.R. No. 124242, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 99.
65 Id. at 113-114. Citations omitted.
66 See note 63.
67 No. L-78178, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 738.
68 Id. at 744-745.
69 G.R. No. 108228, February 1, 2001, 351 SCRA 1.
70 Id. at 7-8, citing Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124262, October 12, 1999, 316 SCRA 502, 509.
71 Petitioners claim that 1/5 of the other half of the subject property is Teodulo's share in the estate of Perpetua, which is her conjugal half. However, they have not explained how they arrived at the said fraction, 1/5 presupposes that Teodulo and Perpetua had 4 children. They had 7 children. There are 8 respondents and one of them is Perla, Teodulo's second wife. Thus, the correct fraction, as computed, is 9/16 [1/2 or 8/16 plus 1/8 (1/2) or 1/16].
72Rollo, p. 36. cralawredlibrary