EN BANC
G.R. No. 224720-23, February 02, 2021
RICHARD T. MARTEL, ALLAN C. PUTONG, ABEL A. GUIÑARES, VICTORIA G. MIER, AND EDGAR C. GAN, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
[G.R. Nos. 224765-68]
BENJAMIN P. BAUTISTA, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CAGUIOA, J.:
While the Constitution exacts a higher standard of accountability with respect to public officers, as indeed public office is a public trust, the constitutional right of presumption of innocence in criminal prosecutions is likewise enjoyed by public officers who stand accused. Therefore, in order to justify conviction, their guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, as with any other person who stands accused.
In criminal cases involving Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in relation to alleged irregularities in procurement committed by public officers, findings of violations of procurement laws, rules, and regulations, on their own, do not automatically lead to the conviction of the public officer under the said special penal law. It must be established beyond reasonable doubt that the essential elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 are present.
It is in this spirit that the Court proceeds to assess whether the conviction of petitioners under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 should be reversed and set aside.
The specifics on these purchases were detailed by the Sandiganbayan, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Motor Vchicle Brand and Make Purchase Price Date of Purchase Request Supplier Two units of Toyota Hilux P2,500,000.00 January 24, 2003 Toyota Davao City, Inc.(Toyota Davao) One unit of Mitsubishi L300 Exceed P878,919.50 February 18, 2003 Kar Asia, Inc. (Kar Asia) One unit of Ford Ranger P1,000,000.00 July 15, 2003 Ford Davao One unit of Ford Ranger P1,218,000.00 July 15, 2003 Ford Davao
The procurement covered in these cases were transacted through and justified as Direct Purchase covered under Sec. 366(d) [of the Local Government Code (LGC)], based on the tenor or as described in the supporting documents involved, such as the Purchase Requests, Purchase Orders, and Awards, in particular.Subsequently, a letter dated September 2, 2003 was filed by the Concerned Citizens for Good Governance (CCGG) before the Office of the Ombudsman in Mindanao (Ombudsman).9
The Purchase Request signed by Bautista for the two units of Toyota SR5 (Exhibit I) dated January 24, 2003, shows at the column Item Description the typewritten words: NOTE: Direct Purchase, and handwritten on the Purchase Order (Exhibit G) dated January 29, 2003, across Mode of Procurement: DIRECT PURCHASE, as well as stamped DIRECT PURCHASE at the bottom of the column Description. The Abstract of Canvass (Exhibit J) is stamped with the words "DIRECT PURCHASE" on the front of the form below the column Name and Description of Article and typewritten under the portion for JUSTIFICATION OF AWARD: SOLE DISTRIBUTOR. The Abstract form was signed by the accused Bautista, Guiñares, Martel, Putong, Mier and Gan.
For the Mitsubishi L300 EXCEED DX 2500 DIESEL, the Purchase Request (Exhibit RR) dated February 18, 2003 signed by Bautista, is stamped on the front with "DIRECT PURCHASE" and the Purpose for the request specified as "For the use of the Governor". On the Purchase Order dated February 26, 2003 is typewritten the letters opposite the portion Mode of Procurement: "D.P." The Abstract of Canvass (Exhibit SS) is also stamped Direct Purchase and under the Justification of Award: EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTOR, and signed by all the accused.
For the two units of Ford Ranger, only one Purchase Request dated July 15, 2003 signed by Bautista was used, designated as PR No. 2752, but one is marked as Exhibits MMM and the other Exhibit CCCC. It indicates under the column Item Description: "Vehicle preferably Ford Ranger XLT 4x4 M/T" at an estimated cost of P2,000,000.00 for both, and below it the words: DIRECT PURCHASE. The Purpose section indicated: "For the use of Governor Benjamin P. Bautista, Jr. and Vice Governor Romualdo C. Garcia". The same exhibits show different stamped entries, aside from the basic typewritten entries and the signatures of officials involved in the processing thereof.
For the vehicle reserved for accused Bautista, Purchase Order No. 2231 (Exhibit KKK), dated July 29, 2003, for one unit Ford Ranger in the amount of P1,000,000.00 was used. It indicates "Mode of Procurement: Public Bidding," but stamped on the document are the words "DIRECT PURCHASE." The DIRECT PURCHASE AWARD SHEET (Exhibit LLL), naming FORD DAVAO as supplier, contains the following statement: The Local Bids & Awards Committee hereby award the above item/s to FORD DAVAO being the Manufacturer/Exclusive or Sole of the said item/s. The award sheet was signed by all the accused.
The vehicle reserved for Vice Governor Garcia makes reference to Purchase Order/PO No. 2230 (Exhibit DDDD), dated July 21, 2003, for the amount of P1,218,000.00. The Mode of Procurement section was left blank, but stamped thereon are the words "DIRECT PURCHASE." The DIRECT PURCHASE AWARD SHEET (Exhibit EEEE) contains the same statement that it awards the purchase of one (1) unit vehicle preferably Ford Ranger XLT "4x4 M/T" for use of Vice-Gov. Romualdo C. Garcia to Ford Davao, "being the Manufacturer/Exclusive or Sole Distributor" thereof. The award sheet was signed by all the accused.
These five (5) vehicles were delivered to the Davao del Sur Provincial Government, and after inspection and acceptance by the concerned officials, check payments were issued to Toyota Davao, Ford Davao and Kar Asia, based on the disbursement vouchers admitted by the parties.8
For Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0241On January 24, 2013, each of the petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charges. Pre-trial was conducted on June 24, 2013. On August 5, 2013, the Sandiganbayan issued its Pre-Trial Order.17
That on or about 24 January 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Matti, Digos City, Davao del Sur, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, BENJAMIN P. BAUTISTA, JR., RICHARD T. MARTEL, ALLAN C. PUTONG, ABEL A. GUIÑARES, VICTORIA G. MIER, and EDGAR C. GAN, public officers being then the Governor, Accountant, General Services Officer, Treasurer, Budget Officer, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member, respectively and all members of the Local Bids and Awards Committee of the Provincial Government of Davao del Sur, while in the discharge of their official functions, conspiring and confederating with one another, with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or at the very least, gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally cause the procurement of two (2) units Toyota Hilux 4x4 through an unjustified direct purchase from TOYOTA Davao City, Inc. in the net amount of TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,5000,000.00), instead of the requisite public bidding, by specifying the brand name of the motor vehicle in the Purchase Request, in violation of the procurement laws, thereby denying the Provincial Government of Davao del Sur of the opportunity to find suitable substitutes of the same quality and obtain the most advantageous offer for the requisitioned item, and thus, giving unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference to TOYOTA Davao City, Inc., to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.13
For Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0242
That on or about 18 February 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Matti, Digos City, Davao del Sur, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, BENJAMIN P. BAUTISTA, JR., RICHARD T. MARTEL, ALLAN C. PUTONG, ABEL A. GUIÑARES, VICTORIA G. MIER, and EDGAR C. GAN, public officers being then the Governor, Accountant, General Services Officer, Treasurer, Budget Officer, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member, respectively and all members of the Local Bids and Awards Committee of the Provincial Government of Davao del Sur, while in the discharge of their official functions, conspiring and confederating with one another, with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or at the very least, gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally cause the procurement of one (1) unit of Mitsubishi L300 Exceed DX2500 Diesel through an unjustified direct purchase from Kar Asia, Inc. in the net amount of EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P878,919.50), instead of the requisite public bidding, by specifying the brand name of the motor vehicle in the Purchase Request, in violation of the procurement laws, thereby denying the Provincial Government of Davao del Sur of the opportunity to find suitable substitutes of the same quality and obtain the most advantageous offer for the requisitioned item, and thus, giving unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference to Kar Asia, Inc., to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.14
For Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0243
That on or about 15 July 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Matti, Digos City, Davao del Sur, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, BENJAMIN P. BAUTISTA, JR., RICHARD T. MARTEL, ALLAN C. PUTONG, ABEL A. GUIÑARES, VICTORIA G. MIER, and EDGAR C. GAN, public officers being then the Governor, Accountant, General Services Officer, Treasurer, Budget Officer, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member, respectively and all members of the Local Bids and Awards Committee of the Provincial Government of Davao del Sur, while in the discharge of their official functions, conspiring and confederating with one another, with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or at the very least, gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally cause the procurement of one (1) unit of Ford Ranger XLT 4x4 through an unjustified direct purchase from Ford Davao in the net amount of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), instead of the requisite public bidding, by specifying the brand name of the motor vehicle in the Purchase Request, in violation of the procurement laws, thereby denying the Provincial Government of Davao del Sur of the opportunity to find suitable substitutes of the same quality and obtain the most advantageous offer for the requisitioned item, and thus, giving unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference to Ford Davao to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.15
For Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0244
That on or about 21 July 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Matti, Digos City, Davao del Sur, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, BENJAMIN P. BAUTISTA, JR., RICHARD T. MARTEL, ALLAN C. PUTONG, ABEL A. GUIÑARES, VICTORIA G. MIER, and EDGAR C. GAN, public officers being then the Governor, Accountant, General Services Officer, Treasurer, Budget Officer, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member, respectively and all members of the Local Bids and Awards Committee of the Provincial Government of Davao del Sur, while in the discharge of their official functions, conspiring and confederating with one another, with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or at the very least, gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally cause the procurement of one (1) unit of Ford Ranger XLT 4x4 through an unjustified direct purchase from Ford Davao in the net amount of ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED EIGHTEEN PESOS (P1,218,000.00), instead of the requisite public bidding, by specifying the brand name of the motor vehicle in the Purchase Request, in violation of the procurement laws, thereby denying the Provincial Government of Davao del Sur of the opportunity to find suitable substitutes of the same quality and obtain the most advantageous offer for the requisitioned item, and thus, giving unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference to Ford Davao to the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.16
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment finding accused Benjamin P. Bautista, Jr., Richard T. Martel, Allan C. Putong, Abel A. Guiñares, Victoria G. Mier and Edgar C. Gan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violating section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in all of the cases covered herein, and therefore sentences them to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum, for each of the four (4) cases.The Sandiganbayan found that the procurement of the subject vehicles violated procurement laws and that all the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 were present when the procurement of the subject vehicles was undertaken by petitioners.
All of the accused are also perpetually disqualified from holding public office. There being no act or omission on which civil liability can be based on, none is pronounced.
Costs de oficio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.25
For their part, Martel, Putong, Guiñares, Mier, and Gan raised the following arguments in their petition:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
- THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE SHOWING MANIFEST PARTIALITY ON THE PART OF PETITIONER BAUTISTA. SPECIFYING THE BRAND OF THE SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLES DOES NOT NECESSARILY CONSTITUTE MANIFEST PARTIALITY.
- The brand and model of a particular motor vehicle is descriptive of its specifications, performance, and overall value.
- Petitioner Bautista's preference of the Subject Motor Vehicles did not restrict the BAC from determining the vehicle to be procured.
- THE RESORT TO DIRECT PURCHASE, WHICH IS ALLOWED BY LAW, IS NOT INDICATIVE OF ANY "MANIFEST PARTIALITY".
- THE DIRECT PURCHASE OF THE SUBJECT MOTOR VEHICLES DID NOT RESULT TO ANY UNWARRANTED BENEFIT, ADVANTAGE, OR PREFERENCE TO TOYOTA DAVAO, FORD DAVAO, AND KAR ASIA.
- Contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, being able to sell products at quoted prices without public bidding does not automatically result in giving unwarranted benefits to Toyota Davao, Ford Davao, and Kar Asia.
- The State failed to discharge the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that unwarranted benefits resulted in favor of Toyota Davao, Ford Davao, and Kar Asia.
- THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER BAUTISTA GUILTY OF GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES UNDER SECTION 3(E) OF R.A. 3019. THE RECORDS FAIL TO SHOW CRIMINAL INTENT ON THE PART OF PETITIONER BAUTISTA. ON THE CONTRARY, THE RECORDS SHOW THAT HE ACTED IN GOOD FAITH.28
The People of the Philippines, represented by the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed Comments48 for both petitions. In both Comments, the People maintain that petitioners violated the procurement rules in their resort to direct purchase without the conduct of a public bidding. By preselecting the vehicle models to be procured, petitioners are alleged to have acted with manifest partiality in favor of their preferred suppliers and accorded them unwarranted benefit and advantage, causing undue injury to the government. Their criminal intent and evident bad faith are apparent in their deliberate breach of their sworn duty to obey the laws by flouting procurement rules and procedures. Moreover, the People claim that petitioners are asking the Court to revisit evidentiary matters, which is beyond the pale of an appeal by certiorari.49
- THE PROCUREMENT FROM EXCLUSIVE PHILIPPINE AGENTS OR DISTRIBUTORS OF FOREIGN SUPPLIES AS AUTHORIZED IN SEC. 371 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE EXTENDS LIKEWISE TO PROCUREMENT FROM EXCLUSIVE DEALERS IN VIEW OF THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY WHERE EXCLUSIVE PHILIPPINE AGENTS OR DISTRIBUTORS OF VEHICLES OF FOREIGN ORIGIN TRANSACT BUSINESS ONLY WITH THEIR DEALERS.29chanrobleslawlibrary
A.1. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT A QUO THAT TOYOTA DAVAO, FORD DAVAO, AND KAR ASIA WERE NOT EXCLUSIVE DEALERS WERE CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.30 A.2. EVEN THE COA AUDIT TEAM CONFIRMED THAT TOYOTA DAVAO, FORD DAVAO, AND KAR ASIA WERE EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTORS OF TOYOTA, FORD, AND MITSUBISHI, RESPECTIVELY.31- THE PREPARATION OF A SUPPLEMENTARY PROCUREMENT PLAN, WHICH IS AUTHORIZED UNDER SEC. 11 OF COA CIRC. NO. 92-386, JUSTIFIED THE PROCUREMENT BY THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF THE FORD VEHICLES.32
- THE PETITIONERS CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OF THE REQUISITIONER IN SPECIFYING THE BRAND OF MOTOR VEHICLES IN THE PRS.33chanrobleslawlibrary
C.1. THE BRANDS SPECIFIED BY THE REQUISITIONERS IN THE PRS MERELY FORM PART OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS THAT WOULD FILL AND SATISFY THE NEEDS OF THE REQUISITIONERS.34 C.2. THE BRANDS SPECIFIED BY THE REQUISITIONERS IN THE PRS WERE MERELY RECOMMENDATORY TO THE BAC SINCE IT STILL BEHOOVED UPON THIS COMMITTEE TO DETERMINE, AFTER COMPLYING WITH THE RELEVANT LAWS, THE WINNING BIDDER.35 C.3. THE MERE SPECIFICATION OF THE BRANDS IN THE PRS CANNOT JUSTIFY A DECLARATION OF PARTIALITY TO THE BRANDS.36 C.4. THE SPECIFICATION OF THE BRANDS IN THE PRS DID NOT RESULT TO UNWARRANTED BENEFIT, ADVANTAGE, OR PREFERENCE TO ANY PARTY INCLUDING THE EXCLUSIVE DEALERS.37- THE RESORT BY THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT [TO] THE DIRECT PURCHASE OF THE VEHICLES SUBJECT OF THESE CASES, AS IT IS AUTHORIZED BY SEC. 371 OF R.A. NO. 7160, WAS JUSTIFIED.38
- THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT A QUO AS TO THE LIABILITY OF THE PETITIONERS WERE GROUNDED ON CONJECTURES AND PREMISED ON THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE.39
E.1. PETITIONER PUTONG, AS THE GENERAL SERVICES OFFICER AND AS MEMBER OF THE BAC, HAD NO DUTY TO FILL-UP THE PURCHASE REQUESTS.40 E.2. THE ACT OF THE REQUISITIONER IN SPECIFYING THE BRANDS TOYOTA, FORD, AND MITSUBISHI IN THE PRS CANNOT GIVE RISE TO A VALID CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONER PUTONG INTENDED TO BE PARTIAL TO TOYOTA, FORD, AND MITSUBISH1.41 E.3. THE SPECIFICATION OF THE BRANDS IN THESE CASES DID NOT PREJUDICE THE INTERESTS OF THE GOVERNMENT.42 E.4. THERE IS NO LAW THAT REQUIRES THE REQUISITIONER TO EXPLAIN HIS ACT IN SPECIFYING A BRAND IN THE PRIOR WHEN HE CALLS FOR A BRAND AT A HIGHER PRICE.43 E.5. THE ENSUING DECISION OF THE BAC TO PROCURE THE VEHICLES AS REQUESTED BY THE REQUISITIONER WAS ANCHORED ON THE RESULTS OF ITS STUDY AND NOT SOLELY ON THE "PARTICULAR NEEDS OF THE PROVINCE'S ROAD CONDITIONS."44 E.6. [AS FOR PETITIONERS MARTEL, GUIÑARES, MIER, AND GAN, THE] COURT <I>A QUO</I> FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO CONSPIRACY AMONG THE PETITIONERS WHICH ONLY FORTIFIES THE TRUTH THAT MARTEL, ET AL. WERE NOT MANIFESTLY PARTIAL TO THE BRANDS INDICATED IN THE PRS OR THAT THEY HAVE NOT GIVEN UNWARRANTED BENEFITS, ADVANTAGE, OR PREFERENCE TO THE DEALERS.45 E.7. THERE WAS MANIFEST MISTAKE IN THE INFERENCE OF THE COURT A QUO THAT PETITIONERS MARTEC, GUIÑARES, MIER, AND GAN WERE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT WHEN THEY ARRIVED AT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DIRECT PURCHASE CAN BE JUSTIFIED.46 E.8. THERE WAS PATENT MISTAKE IN THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT A QUO THAT PETITIONERS MARTEL, GUIÑARES, MIER, AND GAN HAD ACTED IN BAD FAITH.47
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;(S) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.54The petitions invoke the first, second, third, fourth, eighth, tenth, and eleventh exceptions above.55
There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.59Based on the foregoing definitions, the Court cannot uphold the conviction of the accused. A thorough review of the facts and evidence presented shows that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element for a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
Section 371. Procurement from Exclusive Philippine Agents or Distributors. - Procurement may, in the case of supplies of foreign origin, preferably be made directly from the exclusive or reputable Philippine distributors or agents, subject to the following conditions:chanroblesvirtualawlibraryUnder Section 10567 of COA Circular No. 92-386, a certification to the effect that the distributor has no subdealers selling at lower price must be secured from the principal and/or exclusive distributor.
(a) That the Philippine distributor has no subdealers selling at lower prices; and (b) That no suitable substitutes or substantially the same quality are available at lower prices.
JUSTICE LAGOS:Hence, the resort to direct contracting would have been legally permissible only if there were no other vehicles that may have served the general need of the Governor and Vice Governor for pick-up trucks aside from the specific vehicle brands and makes purchased.
So, what was the appropriation for? Was it for specific Toyota, Mitsubishi and Ford vehicles or a general need for pick-up trucks?
WITNESS:
General need, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LAGOS:
It's for a general need.
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor.70 (Underscoring supplied)
Violation of procurement laws does not ipso facto give rise to violation of R.A. 3019 |
More importantly, it must be emphasized that the instant case involves a finding of probable cause for a criminal case for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, and not for violation of R.A. No. 9184. Hence, even granting that there may be violations of the applicable procurement laws, the same does not mean that the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 are already present as a matter of course. For there to be a violation under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 based on a breach of applicable procurement laws, one cannot solely rely on the mere fact that a violation of procurement laws has been committed. It must be shown that (1) the violation of procurement laws caused undue injury to any party or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference; and (2) the accused acted with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence.79 (Emphasis supplied)In support of the ruling therein, the Court in Sabaldan cites the earlier case of Sistoza v. Desierto80 where the Court held:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Clearly, the issue of petitioner Sistoza's criminal liability does not depend solely upon the allegedly scandalous irregularity of the bidding procedure for which prosecution may perhaps be proper. For even if it were true and proved beyond reasonable doubt that the bidding had been rigged, an issue that we do not confront and decide in the instant case, this pronouncement alone does not automatically result in finding the act of petitioner similarly culpable. It is presumed that he acted in good faith in relying upon the documents he signed and thereafter endorsed. To establish a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, the prosecution must show not only the defects in the bidding procedure, a circumstance which we need not presently determine, but also the alleged evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality of petitioner in affixing his signature on the purchase order and repeatedly endorsing the award earlier made by his subordinates despite his knowledge that the winning bidder did not offer the lowest price. Absent a well-grounded and reasonable belief that petitioner perpetrated these acts in the criminal manner he is accused of, there is no basis for declaring the existence of probable cause.81 (Emphasis supplied)While these two cases involve the existence of probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the pronouncements therein are still applicable in this case. Accordingly, it is through the lens of the anti-graft and corruption law, and not the procurement laws, that the guilt of the accused for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 must be determined.
The prosecution failed to establish evident bad faith |
3.a Undeniably, a local government unit may dispense with the public bidding and procure directly from either an exclusive or reputable Philippine distributor or agent, subject only to the two conditions set forth in the law.As for why they chose the mode of direct purchase, the following statements of the petitioners are illuminating:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
3.b. It must be stressed that the vehicles subject of these cases were of foreign origin, i.e., Toyota Hilux 4x4 and Mitsubishi L300 Exceed DX2500 were from Japan, and the Ford Ranger XLT 4x4 from the United States. Albeit these brands of vehicles were specified by the requisitioners in the PRs, considering that it is only the requisitioner who can determine which specification will fill and satisfy the needs of his office, the BAC, cognizant that the specified brands were merely recommendatory, proceeded in making a study to determine whether the procurement in each of these cases would, among others, fall under Sec. 371 of R.A. No. 7160.90 (Underscoring supplied)
36. Prior to the direct purchase of the subject vehicles, the Provincial Government had already acquired seven vehicles through direct purchase and at no instance were these purchases of the seven vehicles questioned or the subject of AOM, NS, or ND by the COA despite the fact that the latter Office had been furnished copies of the documents pe1iinent to these transactions.As can be gleaned above, it cannot be said that petitioners were spurred by any ill or corrupt motive in resorting to direct purchase of the subject vehicles. After studying the previous procurement experiences of the Provincial Government, which were all not questioned by the COA despite having been done through direct purchase, petitioners deemed direct purchase to be a viable and allowed mode of procurement for the subject vehicles in this case.
37. In undertaking the direct purchase of the vehicles subject of these cases, the petitioners, acting as BAC, made a study of the surrounding circumstances of the earlier procured seven vehicles through direct purchase.37.a. The petitioners found out that before the seven vehicles were purchased, pubic bidding were held. However, the public bidding were all declared as failed bidding because only one bidder or no one would join the bidding. Thus, a second bid would be held but like the first, there was also a failure of bidding for the same reason that only one or no bidder would join the bidding. For these reasons, the previous BAC decided to propose the negotiated purchase of the seven vehicles. However, because the negotiated purchase would require a longer period of time as this would still require the "approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and several meetings of the BAC resulting to the delay in the delivery of the basic services, the BAC instead consulted the COA Auditor on this matter whose advice was to revisit the rules of COA, Sec. 015 of COA Circ. 92-386, Sec. 371 of R.A. No. 7160 and Art. 437 of the IRR of R.A. No. 7160.
37.b. With the advice of the COA, the seven vehicles were procured through direct purchase. The documents pertinent to the direct purchase of the vehicles were sent by the Province to the Office of the Provincial Auditor but the former never received any AOM, NS, or ND.91 (Underscoring supplied)
111. The lack of criminal intent on the part of Petitioner Bautista is likewise evident in the fact that in all the Direct Purchases in this case, Petitioner Bautista himself executed transmittal letters addressed to the Provincial Auditor to apprise the latter of the same. Also, the Province only prepared the Disbursement Vouchers around one (1) to two (2) months after the transmittal letters to the Provincial Auditor. This shows that the Province waited for any Notice of Disallowance or Notice of Suspension before making payments to the suppliers. Since the Provincial Auditor never issued any Notice of Disallowance or Notice of Suspension, the Disbursement Vouchers were approved and the corresponding checks were issued.Thus, the evidence does not support the conclusion that petitioners possessed a state of mind operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. Therefore, petitioners cannot be found guilty of committing Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 through evident bad faith.
112. The foregoing only shows that Petitioner Bautista had no malicious motives in the procurement of the Subject Motor vehicles. Nothing can be more indicative of good faith than his transparency to the Provincial Auditor and the chance he and the BAC afforded to the latter to object to or question the purchases. As testified by the Prosecutor's very own witness, no disallowance or suspension was issued because the Provincial Auditor found no irregularity regarding the transactions.92 (Underscoring supplied)
The prosecution failed to establish manifest partiality |
x x x Evidently, the Sandiganbayan failed to realize that the purchase of motor vehicles is no ordinary purchase, unlike the procurement of fungible goods or generic supplies which are practically homogenous regardless of the brand. Vehicle manufacturers have their own particular selling points and long-standing reputation and each brand alludes to a specific market or need, which differentiates it from other brands and models. x x xVerily, even the Sandiganbayan stated in its Decision that "[w]hether Bautista's signing the PRs specifying the brand of the vehicle was merely recommendatory or not, remains disputed."96 This further strengthens Bautista's claim that he did not insist on the preferred brands and left it to the BAC to determine whether these vehicles would satisfy the needs of the Province. In the course of its study, the BAC found, among others, that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
x x x Simply put, indicating the brand of the vehicle is the best way to describe the technical specifications of the motor vehicle. To be sure, Petitioner Bautista's x x x "partiality" to a particular brand of a motor vehicle does not necessarily mean "partiality" to the dealer or distributor. x x x The Toyota, the Ford, the Mitsubishi and other motor vehicle brands have been with us for years. Their performance is common knowledge and it is normal to have a brand preference as far as motor vehicles are concerned.95
a. The Ford Ranger was efficient for transporting goods and passengers on rough roads.Petitioners maintain that "the brands indicated in the PRs were eventually chosen by the BAC not because these brands had been specified by the requisitioner but for the reason that, on the basis of their study, this would fill and satisfy the needs of the requisitioner taking into consideration the provisions of R.A. No. 7160 and COA Circ. No. 92-386."98
b. The Toyota Hilux was efficient for transporting goods in well-paved roads.
c. The Mitsubishi L300 was efficient in transporting passengers in well-paved roads.
d. Toyota Davao, Ford Davao, and Kar Asia (for Mitsubishi) were the exclusive dealers of their respective brands of vehicles, which were all of foreign origin. There were no other sub-dealers selling the same type of vehicles at lower prices.
e. There were no other brands offering the same kind of vehicles at lower prices. The Subject Motor Vehicles had no reasonable substitutes of the same kind and quality available at lower prices that would adequately cater to the needs of the Province.
f. Although Isuzu and Suzuki sold pick-up trucks, the specifications and overall performance of these trucks fall short of the stringent requirements of the Province. Moreover, the dealers of these brands, along with other dealers in the Province, were not interested in joining any public bidding for the purchase of the Subject Motor Vehicles as participating in a public bidding was considered to entail a lot of expenses which would not be a worthy investment for a dealer.97
The prosecution failed to establish gross inexcusable negligence |
While there may be scant evidence of their conspiracy with Bautista and Putong, criminal liability on their part can be based on their being grossly negligent in arriving at the conclusion that direct purchase of these vehicles can be justified. As members of the BAC, these accused were duty-bound to follow the rules on procurement, to ensure that any exception to the general rule on bidding was justified. As admitted by them, they were tasked to make a study on the purchase of these vehicles. However, what they did was to conduct only a superficial interview of the dealers involved, to ask whether these dealers were open to a public bidding, in addition to inspecting the vehicles.102 (Underscoring supplied)The Sandiganbayan harps on the fact that the alleged study conducted by the BAC was not reduced into writing, that they were confined only to interviewing the dealers of the brands specified, and that there were no price matrices or comparisons for suitable substitutes.103 In this regard, petitioners counter:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
26.a. It was precisely because the petitioners knew that there were dealers for other brands of pick-up trucks and vans that they conducted a study for each PR to determine, inter alia, whether a public bidding can be held; whether the procurement would fall under Sec. 371 of R.A. 7160 and if the conditions stated therein could be complied ; and, whether the vehicles offered by the dealers had the same technical specifications as that requested by the requisitioner and which would fill and satisfy the needs of his office.Petitioners' averments are well-taken. The records show that petitioners, as BAC members, did conduct a study, albeit limited and not reduced to writing. Moreover, as earlier discussed, they no longer considered public bidding based on their past experiences and the belief that direct purchase was availing. While it is arguable that a more thorough study would have led petitioners to conclude that direct purchase was not proper for the subject procurements, their actions cannot be characterized as without even slight care and conscious indifference as to the compliance with their duties so as to make them liable for gross inexcusable negligence. Hence, they cannot be held liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 on this account.
26.b. As testified to by the petitioners, acting as BAC, their study yielded the following results: that no dealers would join the bidding; Sec. 371 of R.A. 7160 would apply and that the conditions set forth therein were present; and, that the vehicles specified in the PRs would fill and satisfy the needs of the ot1ice of the requisitioner.104
x x x
68.b. The lapses in the conduct of the study, if these can be characterized as such was not for the reason that there was an evil intent to cause damage to the government or to give benefit, advantage or preference to themselves or the dealers but for the reason that there were no specific laws to serve as guide in undertaking the study.
68.c. Petitioners humbly aver that they did not reduce in a formal written instrument the results of their study but this however, cannot amount to a finding that there were (sic) no actual study made by the BAC considering that, as earlier mentioned, there were no guidelines or directives either from the COA or the Local Government Code prescribing on the manner by which a study should be conducted by the BAC.
68.d. The fact is also underscored that the results of the study was not required as one of the attachments to facilitate the transaction relative to the direct purchase of the subject vehicles or to cause the payment to the dealers.105 (Underscoring supplied)
Violations of R.A. 3019 must be grounded on graft and corruption |
19.f To stress, State Auditor San Juan testified that there was no issue of overpricing in all these cases which only signifies the absence of benefit, much more of an unwarranted benefit, to the dealers of Ford, Toyota and Mitsubishi resulting from the procurement of the vehicles.109To reiterate, petitioners believed in good faith that direct purchase as the mode of procurement was justified under Section 371 of the LGC. Moreover, the procurement documents were transmitted to the Provincial Auditor of the COA prior to the procurement precisely to give the COA a chance to say if such procurement was not allowed. It was only when the COA did not give any adverse comment that the purchase proceeded. These circumstances strengthen the conclusion that petitioners were not animated by any corrupt motive.
x x x
6l.d. The "profit" earned by Toyota-Davao, Ford-Davao and KarAsia resulted from their delivery of the vehicles procured by the Provincial Government. Hence, it cannot be claimed that the profits they received were "unwarranted", i.e., it lacked adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. These companies were entitled to the return of their investments viz: "in all cases where a party enters into a contract with the government, he does so, not out of charity and not to lose money, but to gain pecuniarily. In the same vein, the Provincial Government cannot unjustly enrich itself at the expense of these dealers.110
x x x
63.d. Moreover, it must be noted that respondent had never put to the fore the issue that petitioners had colluded with the dealers so that benefit, advantage or preference may be extended to the latter. Equally significant is the truth that the respondent had not found any reason to include the dealers as accused in these cases thus, negating any claim that these dealers were the recipients of any form of benefits from the petitioners. Petitioners respectfully state that these facts, when properly appreciated, reinforce the claim of the petitioners that at no instance were they moved by an evil or criminal intent to extend benefit, advantage or preference to the dealers or to cause undue injury to the government.111 (Underscoring supplied)
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:Construing the foregoing provision, the Court, in People v. Bayotas,112 explained that "the term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him."113
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed , i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."Thus, applying these established rules in the instant case, the death of Gan pending the resolution of the instant appeal extinguished his criminal liability inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.115 Accordingly, the Court holds that the death of Gan results in the dismissal of the criminal case against him.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
x x x
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule III of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where, during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.114
Very truly yours, | |
EDGAR O. ARICHETA | |
Clerk of Court | |
By: | |
(SGD.) ANNA-LI R. PAPA-GOMBIO | |
Deputy Clerk of Court En Banc |
Endnotes:
1Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224720-23), pp. 118-229.
2 Id. at 13-54. Penned by Associate Justice Rafael R. Lagos, with Associate Justices Efren N. De La Cruz and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada concurring.
3 Id. at 109-115.
4Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224765-68), Vol. I, pp. 10-57.
5Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224720-23), p. 362.
6 Id. at 368.
7 Id. at 375.
8 Id. at 41-42. Emphas is in the original.
9Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224765-68), Vol. II, pp. 724-754. (Including attachments)
10Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224765-68), Vol. I, p. 21.
11Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224765-68), Vol. II, p. 755-790.
12 Id. at 795-807.
13 Id. at 796.
14 Id. at 799.
15 Id. at 802.
16 Id. at 805.
17Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224720-23), p. 16.
18 Id. at 17.
19 Id. at 26.
20 Id. at 390-398.
21Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224765-68), Vol. III, pp. 999-1090.
22 Id. at 1091-1092. Penned by Associate Justice Efren N. De La Cruz, with Associate Justices Rafael R. Lagos, and Napoleon E. Inoturan concurring.
23Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224720-23), pp. 27-28.
24 SECTION 371. Procurement from Exclusive Philippine Agents or Distributors. - Procurement may, in the case of supplies of foreign origin, preferably be made directly from the exclusive or reputable Philippine distributors or agents, subject to the following conditions:
(a) That the Philippine distributor has no subdealers selling at lower prices; and
(b) That no suitable substitutes of substantially the same quality are available at lower prices.
25Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224720-23), pp. 53-54.
26 Id. at 55-97.
27 Id. at 101-108.
28Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224765-68), pp. 31-33.
29Rollo(G.R. Nos. 224720-23), Vol. I, p. 137.
30 Id. at 140.
31 Id. at 144.
32 Id. at 146-147.
33 Id. at 153.
34 Id. at 155.
35 Id. at 159.
36 Id. at 161.
37 Id. at 166.
38 Id. at 169.
39 Id. at 176.
40 Id. at 177.
41 Id. at 182.
42 Id. at 187.
43 Id. at 189.
44 Id. at 192-193.
45 Id. at 200.
46 Id. at 203.
47 Id. at 216.
48 Id. at 458-492; Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224765-68), Vol. III, pp. 1227-1262.
49Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224765-68), Vol. III, pp. 1239 and 1332.
50 Id. at 1267-1289; Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224720-23), pp. 621-667.
51Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224720-23), p. 431.
52Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224720-23), pp. 486-488; Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224765-68). Vol. III, pp. 1256-1259.
53 RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Sec. 1.
54De Castro v. Office of the Ombudsman, 810 Phil. 31, 44-45 (2017).
55Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224720-23) p. 122; Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224765-68), Vol. III, pp. 1282-1283.
56Cruz v. People, G.R. Nos. 197142 & 197153, October 9, 2019, accessed at .
57 Id.
58Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 228154, October 16, 2019, accessed at .
59Tiongco v. People, G.R. Nos. 218709-10, November 14, 2018, accessed at .
60 See Thunder Security and Investigation Agency v. NFA, 670 Phil. 351 (2011).
61 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Sec. 355.
62 SECTION 383. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Chairman of the Commission on Audit shall promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to effectively implement the provisions of this Title, including requirements as to testing, inspection, and standardization of supply and property.
63 Note: while the Repealing Clause of R.A. 9184, i.e., Section 76, expressly repealed E.O. 40, E.O. 262, s. 2000, E.O. 302, s. 1996, and Presidential Decree No. 1594, Title VI, Book II of the LGC was merely amended.
SECTION 76. Repealing Clause. - This law repeals Executive Order No. 40, series of 2001 x x x. This law amends Title Six, Book Two of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991"; the relevant provisions of Executive Order No. 164, series of 1987, entitled "Providing Additional Guidelines in the Processing and Approval of Contracts of the National Government"; and the relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7898 dated February 23, 1995, entitled "An Act Providing for the Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and for Other Purposes." Any other law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, proclamation, charter, rule or regulation and/or parts thereof contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)
64 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Sec. 356.
65 R.A. 9184, Sec. 10.
66 R.A. 9184 IRR-A, Sec. 48.2.
67 SECTION 105. When Procurement from Exclusive Philippine Agent or Distributors may be Made. - Procurement of supplies or property of foreign origin may preferably be made directly from the exclusive or reputable Philippine distributors or agents subject to the following conditions:
a. the Philippine distributor has no subdealers selling at lower prices; and
b. no suitable substitutes of substantially the same quality are available at lower prices.
Provided, That certification to the effect that the distributor has no subdealers selling at lower price is secured from the principal and/or exclusive distributor.
68 COA Circular No. 92-386, Sec. 4.
69 Transcript and Stenographic Notes (TSN) dated October 20, 2014, p. 10. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224765-68), Vol. III, p. 1134.
70 TSN dated May 25, 2014, p. 41. Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224765-68), Vol. I, p. 213.
71 COA Circular No. 386-92, Sec. 4.
72 COA Circular No. 386-92, Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 4.
73Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224720-23), p. 362.
74 Id. at 368.
75 Id. at 375.
76Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224720-23), p. 158.
77 COA Circular No. 386-92, Sec. 38.
78 G.R. No. 238014, June 15, 2020, accessed at .
79 Id.
80 437 Phil. 117 (2002).
81 Id. at 133.
82Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, 308 Phil. 660, 693 (1994).
83Fuentes v. People, 808 Phil. 586, 594 (2017).
84Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 82.
85 Supra note 80 at 130. (Italics in the original)
86Air France v. Carrascoso, 124 Phil. 722, 737 (1966).
87Reyes v. People, 641 Phil. 91, 104 (2010).
88Republic v. Desierto, 516 Phil. 509, 516 (2006).
89Collantes v. Marcelo, 556 Phil. 794 (2007).
90Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224720-23), p. 138.
91 Id. at 169-170.
92Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224765-68), Vol. I, pp. 52-53.
93Uriarte v. People, 540 Phil. 477, 494 (2006).
94 SECTION 54. Bids on Brand-Names Other Than Those Specified. - Whenever reference to a manufacturer's brand-name is indicated in the call for bids, it shall be intended to be descriptive, not restrictive, and shall be understood to merely indicate to prospective bidders that brand-names other than those specified, if of equal quality, may be considered, regardless of whether or not a statement to that effect is made in the tender, provided that the bidder shall give full description of his offer accompanied with catalog, literature, and/or sample. An offer guaranteeing to deliver an "equal" or "equivalent" without acceptable proof shall not be considered.
95Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224765-68), Vol. I, p. 36.
96 Id. at 96. (Underscoring supplied)
97 Id. at 15-16.
98Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224720-23), pp. 201-202.
99 Article 3, Act No. 3815 as amended, otherwise known as the REVISED PENAL CODE (RPC).
100Calimutan v. People, 517 Phil. 272, 289 (2006), citing LUIS B. REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE 33-34 (13th Ed., 1993).
101Sistoza v. Desierto, supra note 80 at 122.
102Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224765-68), Vol. I, p. 100.
103 Id. at 96.
104Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224720-23), p. 161.
105Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224720-23), p. 206.
106 Senate Deliberations of R.A 3019 dated July 1960.
107 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (9th ed. 2009).
108Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224720-23), p. 209.
109 Id. at 152.
110 Id. at 197.
111 Id. at 199.
112 306 Phil. 266 (1994).
113 Id. at 270, citing People v. Castillo and Ocfemia, No. 22211-R, November 4, 1959, 56 O.G. No. 23, p. 4045.
114 Id. at 282-283.
115 See People v. Egagamao, 792 Phil. 500 (2016).
116 CONSTITUTION Art. XI, Sec. 1.
117 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 14(2).
118See Section 65 on Offenses and Penalties.
119 806 Phil. 649 (2017). The Ombudsman found Martel, Guiñares, Mier, and Putong administratively liable, but only Martel and Guiñares appealed the Decision to the CA and eventually the Court. The Ombudsman relieved Gan of his administrative liability in view of his reelection (following the condonation doctrine) while Bautista was not included in the administrative case.
PERALTA, C.J.:
Absence of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence |
Absence of unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference |
[A]n accused has in his/her favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his/her guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he/she must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution, which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his/her behalf, and he/she would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.As the evidence presented by the prosecution in this case failed to pass the test of moral certainty required to warrant petitioners' conviction, such failure of the prosecution to overcome petitioners' right to be presumed innocent entitles them to an acquittal.
Endnotes:
1 Also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
2Miranda v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 815 Phil. 123, 154 (2017).
3Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224765-68, Vol. I), pp. 101-102.
4Felipe B. Sabaldan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, G.R. No. 238014, June 15, 2020.
5Rollo (G.R. No. 224765-68, Vol. I), pp. 32-39.
6Rollo (G.R. No. 224720-23, Vol. I), p. 155.
7 The Government Procurement Reform Act.
8Felipe B. Sabaldan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, supra note 4.
9Id.
10Simeon Gabriel Rivera, et al. v. People, G.R. No. 228154, October 16, 2019.
11Id.
12Felipe B. Sabaldan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, supra note 4.
13Office of the Ombudsman v. Venancio G. Santidad, G.R. Nos. 207154 & 222046, December 5, 2019.
14 a) that the Philippine distributor has no subdealers selling at lower prices; and (b) that no suitable substitutes or substantially the same quality are available at lower prices.
15 These vehicles are: Mitsubishi Strada Pick-up, Mitsubishi Adventure, Toyota Revo, and lsuzu Frontier Pick-up.
16Rollo (G.R. No. 224765-68), Vol. I, p. 98.
17Felipe B. Saba/dan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, supra note 4.
18Ambil, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 669 Phil 32, 53 (2011).
19Rollo (G.R. Nos. 224765-68, Vol. I), p. 101.
20Mahilum v. Spouses Ilano, 761 Phil. 334, 353 (2015).
21Simeon Gabriel Rivera, et al. v. People, supra note 10.
22 G.R. Nos. 233155-63, June 23, 2020.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:As may be gleaned above, the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are as follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.1While the ponencia is correct in stating that violations of RA 3019 (and necessarily all its elements) must be grounded on graft and corruption,2 I deem it apt to elucidate on the distinction between the second and third elements so as not to confuse the two concepts with each other. Again, as I have stated, the second element pertains to the mode of commission, while the third element pertains to the result of the infraction.
Endnotes:
1Rivera v. People, 749 Phil. 124, 143 (2014).
2 See ponencia, p. 29.
3 Meanwhile, in view of petitioner Edgar C. Gan's supervening death, the criminal case must be dismissed. See id. at 31-32.
LEONEN, J.:
SECTION 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:To convict under Section 3(e), the prosecution must establish the following elements:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
....
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
It is undisputed that petitioners former Governor Benjamin P. Bautista, Jr. (Bautista), Provincial Accountant Richard T. Martel (Martel), General Services Officer Allan C. Putong (Putong), Provincial Treasurer Abel A. Guiñares (Guiñares), and Provincial Budget Officer Victoria G. Mier (Mier), and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member Edgar G. Gan (Gan) were members of the Provincial Bids and Awards Committee when they committed the offense.2
1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2) He [or she] must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and 3) That his [or her] action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.1 (Citation omitted)
There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.6 (Citations omitted)In its assailed decision, the Sandiganbayan found Bautista and Putong manifestly partial, while Martel, Guiñares, Mier, and Gan were held grossly negligent in their procurement of vehicles for the governor's use.
The Purchase Request signed by Bautista for the two units of Toyota SRS (Exhibit I) dated January 24, 2003, shows at the column Item Description the typewritten words: NOTE: Direct Purchase, and handwritten on the Purchase Order (Exhibit G) dated January 29, 2003, across Mode of Procurement: DIRECT PURCHASE, as well as stamped DIRECT PURCHASE at the bottom of the column Description. The Abstract of Canvass (Exhibit J) is stamped with the words "DIRECT PURCHASE" on the front of the form below the column Name and Description of Article and typewritten under the portion for JUSTIFICATION OF AWARD: SOLE DISTRIBUTOR. The Abstract form was signed by the accused Bautista, Guiñares, Martel, Putong, Mier and Gan.Petitioners are members of the Bids and Awards Committee specifically tasked to conduct public bidding for acquisition of goods and services. With the Purchase Requests bearing specific vehicle brands at the outset, it is readily apparent that petitioners were manifestly partial and grossly negligent in the performance of their official functions. There is glaring preference to acquire the Toyota Hilux, Ford Ranger, and Mitsubishi L300 which the requisitioner, the then Governor, specifically named.
For the Mitsubishi L300 EXCEED DX 2500 DIESEL, the Purchase Request (Exhibit RR) dated February 18, 2003 signed by Bautista, is stamped on the front with "DIRECT PURCHASE" and the Purpose for the request specified as "For the use of the Governor". On the Purchase Order dated February 26, 2003 is typewritten the letters opposite the portion Mode of Procurement: "D.P." The Abstract of Canvass (Exhibit SS) is also stamped Direct Purchase and under the Justification of Award: EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTOR, and signed by all the accused.
For the two units of Ford Ranger, only one Purchase Request dated July 15, 2003 signed by Bautista was used, designated as PR No. 2752, but one is marked as Exhibits MMM and the other Exhibit CCCC. It indicates under the column Item Description: "Vehicle preferably Ford Ranger XLT 4x4 M/T" at an estimated cost of P2,000,000.00 for both, and below it the words: DIRECT PURCHASE. The Purpose section indicated: "For the use of Governor Benjamin P. Bautista, Jr. and Vice Governor Romualdo C. Garcia". The same exhibits show different stamped entries, aside from the basic typewritten entries and the signatures of officials involved in the processing thereof.
For the vehicle reserved for accused Bautista, Purchase Order No. 2231 (Exhibit KKK), dated July 29, 2003, for one unit Ford Ranger in the amount of P1,000,000.00 was used. It indicates "Mode of Procurement: Public Bidding," but stamped on the document are the words "DIRECT PURCHASE." The DIRECT PURCHASE AWARD SHEET (Exhibit LLL), naming FORD DAVAO as supplier, contains the following statement: "The Bids and Awards Committee hereby award the above item/s to FORD DAVAO being the Manufacturer/Exclusive or Sole Distributor of the said item/s." The award sheet was signed by all the accused.
The vehicle reserved for Vice Governor Garcia makes reference to a Purchase Order/PO No. 2230 (Exhibit DDDD), dated July 21, 2003, for the amount of P1,218,000.00. The Mode of Procurement section was left blank, but stamped thereon are the words "DIRECT PURCHASE." The DIRECT PURCHASE AWARD SHEET (Exhibit EEEE) contains the same statement that it awards the purchase of one (1) unit vehicle "preferably Ford Ranger XLT 4x4 M/T" for use of Vice-Gov. Romualdo C. Garcia to Ford Davao, "being the Manufacturer/ Exclusive or Sole Distributor" thereof. The award sheet was signed by all the accused.
These five (5) vehicles were delivered to the Davao del Sur Provincial Government, and after inspection and acceptance by the concerned officials, check payments were issued to Toyota Davao. Ford Davao and Kar Asia, based on the disbursement vouchers admitted by the parties.13
Under the laws, the Bids and Awards Committee shall, among others, conduct the evaluation of bids, and recommend award of contract to the head of the procuring entity. It shall ensure that the procuring entity abides by the standard set forth by the procurement law. In the LGUs, the committee on awards shall decide the winning hids on procurement.Here, there were evident badges of fraud which we simply cannot ignore:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Accordingly, as members of the PBAC, the respondents were not bound by the recommendation of the PGSO to determine th e mode of procurement. As an independent committee, the PBAC was solely responsible for the conduct of the procurement and could not pass the buck to others. As correctly stated by the CA, the PBAC had control over the approval of the mode of procurement and the respondents could not wash their hands from liability thereof. Their role in choosing the mode of procurement was clearly an active action, and not a passive one as the respondents would want to convey.
A scrutiny of the records would show that the respondents committed other violations of the procurement laws and regulations. The Purchase Request, with a stamp of direct purchase on its face, stated the specific brand of the vehicles to be purchased, instead of the technical specifications needed by the procuring entity, in clear violation of Section 24 of COA Circular No. 92-386. Section 18 of [Republic Act No. 9184] plainly provides that reference to brand names for the procurement of goods shall not be allowed. The underlying policy behind this prohibition is to prevent undue preference on certain goods or products and ensure fair and equal competition among the bidders. In spite of the glaring display of the vehicles' brand names on the purchase request, the PBAC still approved the same. The CA observed that the PBAC itself made the bidding impossible because it pre-determined the suppliers as it indicated the preferred brand of the vehicles.
Another violation committed by the respondents was that they allowed the governor of Davao del Sur to purchase and use more than one vehicle, which was evidently contrary to COA Circular No. 75-6. The said provision dictates that a government official or employee is not allowed to use more than one service vehicle, to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibraryIII. Officials entitled to use of more than one motor vehicle - With the exception of the President, no government official and employee authorized to use any vehicle operated and maintained from the funds appropriated in the decree shall be allowed to use more than one such motor vehicle; PROVIDED, HOWEVER that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may be allowed to use two motor vehicles.Notwithstanding these glaring violations of the procurement laws and the illegal approval of the vehicles' procurement by the PBAC, Martel and Guiñares actively participated in the acquisition of the same by signing the disbursement vouchers as Provincial Accountant and Provincial Treasurer, respectively. Hence, due to the acts of the respondents, the government disbursed public funds for illegally procured service vehicles.15 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In this case, respondents Martel and Guiñares, as members of the PBAC, being the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Auditor, respectively, committed the following transgressions:Not only did they resort to direct purchase without any proper justification, the members of the Bids and Awards Committee even named a specific make and model in their purchase request to preclude other vehicles. They also sanctioned the use of excess service vehicle for the governor.
1. They failed to conduct a public or competitive bidding as a mode of procurement.
2. Without any basis in law, they allowed the resort to negotiated procurement in violation of Sections 35, 48, 50 and 53 of R.A. No. 9184: Sections 356, 366 and 369 of R.A. No. 7160; and COA Circular No. 92-386.
3. In the direct purchase of the vehicles, they specified the brand name of the units they wanted to procure, instead of technical descriptions only, which violated Section 18 of R.A. No. 9184.
4. They approved the purchase of more than one service vehicle for the use of the governor, in violation of COA Circular No. 75-6.
5. They signed and issued the disbursement vouchers for the vehicles despite their illegal procurement.16
[n]ot once in the purchase of the five (5) vehicles involved, belonging to different brands and on various dates, did the accused even attempt, i.e., take steps, such as make a call for bids bad publication or giving notice thereof, among others, as starting point in the procurement of the subject vehicles. Such disregard of a very fundamental requirement in public procurement is the most incriminating aspect of these cases which makes all their excuses and/or justification legally untenable.17Instead, it gives credence to petitioners' claims that they were "honest, although mistaken" in assuming they can directly acquire their preferred make and model18 and that they allegedly conducted studies that justified their resort to direct purchase of specific vehicles.19
[B]asic is the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance.Further, the two studies petitioners harp on having conducted, which the majority accepts, remain unsubstantiated claims before this Court.
We cannot exculpate an individual from liability for an illicit act when he or she pleads ignorance of what the law is. We have all the more reason not to condone a local chief executive's illegal and unauthorized exercise of power, especially when it is because of some patently erroneous personal view that he has the authority. It must he underscored that as a local chief executive, petitioner implements the law in his municipality's territorial jurisdiction.21 (Emphasis supplied)
a. The Ford Ranger was efficient for transporting goods and passengers on rough roads.Even disregarding that these are self-serving, bare claims, these findings hardly demonstrate an exercise of due diligence. That petitioners' preferred make and model of vehicles can efficiently transport passengers do not mean much in the context of procurement rules which requires equal and fair competition among various bidders. In reality, there were no "stringent requirements of the Province"24 to speak of, considering that no technical description was provided for the vehicles petitioner Bautista had specifically requested. Hence, I respectfully maintain that petitioners' claim that "on the basis of their study, this would fill and satisfy the needs of the requisitioner"25 is without basis.
b. The Toyota Hilux was efficient for transporting goods in well-paved roads.
c. The Mitsubishi L300 was efficient in transporting passengers in well-paved roads.
d. Toyota Davao, Ford Davao, and Kar Asia (for Mitsubishi) were the exclusive dealers of their respective brands of vehicles, which were all of foreign origin. There were no other sub-dealers selling the same type of vehicles at lower prices.
e. There were no other brands offering the same kind of vehicles at lower prices. The Subject Motor Vehicles had no reasonable substitutes of the same kind and quality available at lower prices that would adequately cater to the needs of the Province.
f. Although Isuzu and Suzuki sold pick-up trucks, the specifications and overall performance of these trucks fall short of the stringent requirements of the Province. Moreover, the dealers of these brands, along with other dealers in the Province, were not interested in joining any public bidding for the purchase of the Subject Motor Vehicles as participating in a public bidding was considered to entail a lot of expenses which would not be a worthy investment for a dealer.23
Hence, the resort to direct contracting would have been legally permissible only if there were no other vehicles that may have served the general need of the Governor and Vice Governor for pick-up trucks aside from the specific vehicle brands and makes purchased.The petitioners could not have validly procured suitable vehicle substitutes of the same quality at a lesser price since they were already set on a specific make and model. As Martel underscored, referring to brands at an early stage such as the Purchase Request, pre-determined the suppliers, which essentially precluded bidding.32 The Bids and Awards Committee itself made it impossible for there to be other offers for a substitute, when it specifically named the vehicle it was procuring.
In asserting that there are no other suitable vehicles that satisfy the abovementioned purpose petitioners primarily relied on certifications issued by the three suppliers of the subject vehicles, i.e., Toyota Davao, Kar Asia, and Ford Davao.
However, at most, these certifications merely state that the aforesaid car dealers are the exclusive dealers of Toyota Hilux, Mitsubishi L300 Exceed, and Ford Davao. These certifications do not purport to show whatsoever that there are no other suitable and more affordable vehicle brands and makes that may serve as viable service vehicles of the Governor and Vice Governor.31
Endnotes:
1Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 237172, September 18. 2019, [Per J. Leonen, Third Division] citing Soriano v. Marcelo, 610 Phil. 72, 80 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
2 Ponencia, p. 3.
3Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 237172, September 18, 2019, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65745> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
4Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, 308 Phil. 660, 693 (1994) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
5 599 Phil. 439 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
6 Id. at 450-451.
7 Republic Act No. 9184 (2003), sec. 3(a).
8 Republic Act No. 9184 (2003), sec. 3(b).
9 Republic Act No. 9184 (2003), sec. 3(d).
10 Government Procurement Reform Act.
11 Republic Act No. 9184 (2003), sec. 18.
12 806 Phil. 649 (2017) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
13Rollo (G.R. No. 224720-23), pp. 43-44. People v. Martel, Criminal Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0241 to SB-12-CRM-0244, February 24, 2016. pp. 29-30.
14 806 Phil. 649 (2017) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
15 Id. at 660-662.
16 Id. at 663.
17Rollo (G.R. No. 224720-23), pp. 113.
18 Ponencia, p. 24.
19 Id. at 24-25.
20 G.R. Nos. 233155-63, June 23, 2020, [Per C.J. Peralta, En Banc].
21 Id.
22 Ponencia, pp. 27-29.
23 Id. at 25-26.
24 Id. at 26.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 25.
28 Id. at 25.
29 Id. at 29.
30Albert v. Sandiganbayan, 599 Phil. 439, 451 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
31 Ponencia, pp. 17-18.
32Ombudsman-Mindanao v. Martel, 806 Phil. 649 (2017) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
33Sabio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 233853-54, July 15, 2019, [Per CJ. Peralta, First Division].
34 CONST., art. XI, sec. 1.
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
Elements of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) |
Malice as element of evident bad faith, manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence |
As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer - iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the [RPC], there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.4Like the crime of physical injuries, the consummation of Section 3(e) demands two criminal intents - the general criminal intent and the specific criminal intent. Where a woman slaps a male suitor, the general criminal intent of slapping the suitor is presumed from the perpetration of such act. But to constitute physical injuries, there must also be the specific intent to injure him. This specific criminal intent may be inferred from the facts or circumstances contextualizing the slap, and if proved beyond reasonable doubt, is the same as the dolus malus.
Violations of procurement provisions per se not probative of criminal intent |
No evidence of injury to the Government or a private party, no evidence of unwarranted benefits and advantage to the dealers of the specifically preferred vehicles |
x x x Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3(e) cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established. Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury, or the giving of any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is required that the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.However, I do not agree that the dealers of the directly purchased vehicles did not get benefits and advantage from the direct purchase. A sale is still a sale, a business is appreciated precisely because business was consummated. The question is whether the benefits and advantage from the direct purchase were unwarranted.
In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as "actual damage." Undue has been defined as "more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal;" and injury as "any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property [; that is, the] invasion of any legally protected interest of another." Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law.
In turn, actual or compensatory damages is defined by Article 2199 of the Civil Code as follows:
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
It naturally follows that the rule that should likewise be applied in determining undue injury is that in determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding specific facts that could afford some basis for measuring compensatory or actual damage.
....
Complainant's testimony regarding her family's financial stress was inadequate and largely speculative. Without giving specific details, she made only vague references to the fact that her four children were all going to school and that she was the breadwinner in the family. She, however, did not say that she was unable to pay their tuition fees and the specific damage brought by such nonpayment. The fact that the "injury" to her family was unspecified or unquantified does not satisfy the element of undue injury, as akin to actual damages. As in civil cases, actual damages, if not supported by evidence on record, cannot be considered.
In the present case, petitioner claims that the form of injury he suffered from the act of Garcia in referring his case to the DOJ is the resultant delay in the resolution of his Complaint against Palad. However, other than such assertion, petitioner failed to adduce evidence of the actual loss or damage he suffered by reason of the delay. While it is not necessary that a specific amount of the damage be proven with absolute certainty, there must be some reasonable basis by which the court can measure it. Here, petitioner utterly failed to support his bare allegation of undue injury
Villarosa v. People not on all fours with the facts in the case at bar |
There can be no good faith where the circumstances point to the necessary mental element of the offense charged - manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence. As noted, our case law has already settled the legal impact of petitioner's feigned ignorance of the utter lack of power to issue extraction permits. Petitioner gave out extraction permits repeatedly, albeit he had no authority to do so under the clear and unequivocal provision of Section 138 of the Local Government Code, Section 43 of the Philippine Mining Act, and Provincial Ordinance No. 2005-004. As a result, petitioner's unlawful act benefited and gave advantage to private parties that used the unduly permits to illegally extract resources. Despite petitioner's actual or at least strongly presumed knowledge of his lack of power to do so, he disputed, nay breaded the plain and categorical language of the Local Government Code, the Philippine Mining Act, and the Provincial Ordinance No. 2005-004. His actions manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence.In Villarosa, petitioner there was several times overruled about his asserted authority to issue extraction permits. Several times, too, he ignored the overruling of his issuance. His acts gave enormous benefits to contractors. These benefits were unwarranted - had he followed the law on the proper authority to issue the extraction permits, he would not have been able to issue these permits and the favored contractors would not have been favored after all. These glaring facts in Villarosa make it an unworthy precedent to be followed here. The facts are different; these facts distinguish one from the other.
Endnotes:
1Sabaldan Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, G.R. No. 238014, June 15, 2020.
2 G.R. No. 238014, June 15, 2020.
3 US Legal.com at https://definitions.uslegal.com/d/dolus-malus/ (last accessed January 7, 2021): "Dolus malus is a Latin phrase which means "bad or evil deceit." It refers to a fraudulent design or intent; an unjustifiable deceit. In short it is the evil design with which an act is accomplished to the injury of another; or it may be the evil design with which an act is omitted that ought to be done."
4Jabalde v. People, 787 Phil. 255, 273 (2016) quoting Villareal v. People, 680 Phil. 527 (2012).
5Alvarez v. People, 692 Phil. 89 (2012); Guadines v. Sandiganbayan, 665 Phil. 563, 577 (2011); Soriano v. Marcelo, 597 Phil. 308, 317-319 (2009); Uriarte v. People, 540 Phil. 477, 497 (2006); Santos v. People, 520 Phil. 58, 71 (2006); Llorente Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 350 Phil. 820, 837-839 (1998).
6 G.R. Nos. 233155-63, June 23, 2020.cralawredlibrary