FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 200772, February 17, 2021
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. RAMON G. ASUNCION, PEDRO G. ASUNCION, CANDIDA ASUNCION SANTOS, LEONORA ASUNCION HENSON, ARISTON G. ASUNCION, AND ANNABELLE ASUNCION-PERLAS, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GAERLAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court against the November 11, 2011 Decision1 and the February 23, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89386, which affirmed the July 10, 2001 Decision3 of Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, in LRC (Land Registration Case) No. 3681-M.
The spouses Felipe and Paciencia Gonzales Asuncion (the spouses Asuncion) were the registered owners of a parcel of land in Bambang, Bulakan,4 Bulacan. The parcel, which is located on the banks of the Wawang Dapdap River, has an area of 273,819 square meters and was covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-423 (later Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. RT-30648).
On December 29, 1976, Paciencia Gonzales Asuncion (Paciencia) and her children5 filed an application for original registration of title over nine parcels of land located in Bambang, Bulakan, Bulacan and denominated as follows: Psu-133934, Psu-138316, Psu-115369 (Lots 1 & 2), Psu-115615 (Lots 1 & 2), Psu-118984 (Lots 1 & 2), and Psu-115616 (Lot 2), with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. They claimed fee simple ownership of the aforementioned lands by inheritance, accretion, and open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession under color of title for at least 30 years.6 The application was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 3681-M.
The application was opposed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General, on the ground that the lands covered by the application were unclassified forest lands within the public domain;7 and by Juanita M. Enriquez, Antonio M. Enriquez, Vicente M. Enriquez, Ignacio M. Enriquez, Juan M. Enriquez, Asuncion M. Enriquez, Jacinto C. Molina II, Juan C. Molina, Jr., and Josefina C. Molina (collectively referred to as the Molina- Enriquez group), on the ground that certain parts of the lands covered by the application belong to them and their predecessors-in-interest.8
Due to several postponements and repeated motions to reset filed by the parties' counsels, the case did not progress until April 29, 1986, when Paciencia and her children moved to amend their application to include another lot denominated as Psu-121255.9 Their motion was granted in an Order dated February 22, 1988.10 The notice of initial hearing was issued on October 5, 198811 and published in the Official Gazette on November 14, 1988.12 Paciencia and her children, through counsel, then established the jurisdictional requirements before the trial court.13 Pre-trial was suspended in view of a compromise agreement.14 On May 19, 1989, Paciencia died15 and was substituted by her children (hereinafter referred to as the Asuncions).16
On August 30, 1996, the Asuncions entered into a compromise agreement with the Molina-Enriquez group whereby the former withdrew certain parcels of land from their application in exchange for the withdrawal of the latter's opposition thereto.17 Accordingly, the Asuncions withdrew Lots 5478-A, 5477-B, 5472 (which were all portions of Psu-121255), and Lot 5471 (a portion of Psu-101023 and Lot 1 of Psu-11561) from their application.18 The compromise agreement was submitted to the trial court on November 5, 1996, copy furnished the Republic.19 Thereafter, the Solicitor General manifested that the compromise agreement did not bind the Republic.20 On March 22, 1999, the trial court approved the compromise agreement;21 hence, the Molina-Enriquez group's opposition was ordered withdrawn.22
In view of the amendment to the application, another notice of initial hearing was published in the Official Gazette and posted in accordance with the rules on applications for original certificates of title23 Thereafter, presentation of evidence ensued. The Asuncions called three witnesses: Pedro G. Asuncion (Pedro), who testified on the possession of lands by their predecessors-in-interest and on the allegation of accretion;24 Roberto M. Valdez (Roberto), an employee of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), who brought and presented the tracing cloth plan of the claimed parcels and testified that the original plans submitted for the Asuncions' application were true and faithful reproductions thereof;25 and Carlos G. Martinez (Carlos), who testified that, as overseer of the Asuncions' fishponds since 1944, he was able to witness how the claimed parcels were formed through accretion.26
On November 8, 2000, the Asuncions manifested that the settlement of Paciencia's estate had been finalized; and pursuant to such settlement, her interest in the parcels covered by the application were transferred to her children and grandchildren.27 Consequently, the Asuncions prayed that they, along with their children, be substituted as applicants in lieu of Paciencia 28 The trial court granted the motion.29
On June 27, 2001, the trial court admitted the Asuncions' formal offer of evidence.30 On the date of the Republic's presentation of evidence on June 29, 2001, its sole witness from the Regional Office III of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources failed to appear despite the issuance of a subpoena.31 The trial prosecutor, on the Republic's behalf, manifested that with the absence of the witness, it had no choice but to close its presentation of evidence and submit the case for decision, to which the trial court obliged.32
As earlier stated, the trial court rendered its Decision on July 10, 2001, in favor of the Asuncions. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, conforming the Order of General Default entered on December 16, 1988, the Court hereby orders the registration of the following parcels of land, all of which are located in Banio Bambang, Municipality of Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, together with their corresponding Technical Descriptions and all improvements existing thereon in this wise, to wit:The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration on August 2, 2001,34 which was denied in an order dated February 26, 2002.35 The subsequent events are recounted in a September 15, 2006 Decision of this Court:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1) Psu-115369 - to Martina C. Asuncion, Filipino, single of Merville Park Subd., Paranaque City; Juan Andres A. Henson, filipino, single, of New Manila, Quezon City; Jose Jorge A. Henson, filipino, single, of New Manila, Quezon City; Rosanna Leonora A. Henson, filipino, single, of New Manila, Quezon City; Felipe Paulo H. Asuncion, filipino, single, of 608 Gen. Malvar St., Malate, Manila; Bettina Leticia H. Asuncion, filipino, single, of 608 Gen. Malvar St., Malate, Manila; Ramon Asuncion, Jr. filipino, single, of 608 Gen. Malvar St., Malate, Manila in equal shares.
2) Psu-115615 - to Gerardo Pio Moises H. Asuncion; filipino, single, of 608 Gen. Malvar St., Malate, Manila; Johanna Melissa A. Perlas, filipino, single, of Zobel Roxas, Makati City and Bernardino Felipe A. Perlas, filipino, single, of Zobel Roxas, Makati City in equal shares.
3) Psu-115616 - to Felipe Paulo H. Asuncion, filipino, single, of 608 Gen. Malvar St., Malate, Manila; Bettina Leticia H. Asuncion, filipino, single, of 608 Gen. Malvar St., Malate, Manila; Ramon Asuncion, Jr. filipino, single, of 608 Gen. Malvar St., Malate, Manila; Juan Andres A. Henson, filipino, single, of New Manila, Quezon City; Jose Jorge A. Henson, filipino, single, of New Manila, Quezon City and Rosanna Leonora A. Henson, filipino, single, of New Manila, Quezon City in equal shares.
4) Psu-118984 - to Ramon G. Asuncion, married to Eva Henson of 608 Gen. Malvar St., Malate, Manila, Pedro G. Asuncion, married to Elizabeth Guasch of 606 Gen. Malvar St., Malate, Manila; Candida Asuncion-Santos, married to Arcadio Santos, Jr. of 1860 Sagu St, Dasmarinas Village, Makati City; Leonora Asuncion-Henson, married to Celestino Henson, Jr. of 22 Wood St., Capitol Golf Hills, Diliman, Quezon City; Aristo G. Asuncion, married to Teresita Campos of 15 Rome St., Merville Park Subd., Paranaque City; Annabelle Asuncion-Perlas, [married] to Ramos Perlas of 17 Teofilo Sison St., BF Homes, Paranaque City 1/4 share each; and to Maria Socorro Perpetua H. Asuncion, filipino, single of 608 Gen. Malvar St., Malate, Manila; Marco Philippe Martin G. Asuncion, filipino, single of 606 Gen. Malvar St., Malate, Manila; Arcadio Juan A. Santos III, filipino, single of Dasmarinas Village, Makati City; Celestino Luis Gregorio A. Henson, filipino, single, of New Manila, Quezon City; Francis Felipe Jesus Mark G. Asuncion, filipino, single, of Merville Park Subd., Paranaque City, and Patricia Anne Perlas, filipino, single, of Zobel Roxas, Makati City 1/6 of 8/14 share each.
5) Psu-121255, Amended - to Ramon G. Asuncion, married to Eva Henson of 608 Gen. Malvar St., Malate, Manila, Pedro G. Asuncion, married to Elizabeth [Guasch] of 606 Gen. Malvar St., Malate, Manila; Candida Asuncion-Santos, married to Arcadio Santos, Jr. of 1860 Sagu St., Dasmarinas Village, Makati City; Leonora Asuncion-Henson, married to Celestino Henson, Jr. of 22 Wood St, Capitol Golf Hills, Diliman, Quezon City; Ariston G. Asuncion, married to Teresita Campos of 15 Tome [sic] St., Merville Park Subd., Paranaque City; Annabelle Asuncion-Perlas, married [sic] to Ramos Perlas of 17 Teofilo Sison St., BF Homes, Paranaque City, with an area of 20,509 square meters, in equal shares.
After this decision has become final, let the corresponding decree be issued accordingly.
SO ORDERED.33chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The trial court ruled that the Solicitor General was in effect seeking a new trial and that the motion for reconsideration was pro forma since it lacked an affidavit of merit required by the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.After the CA denied its motion for reconsideration, the Republic sought recourse with this Court and prayed that the February 26, 2002 and April 26, 2002 orders of the trial court be set aside or that its appeal be given due course. As earlier stated, this Court in its Decision dated September 15, 2006,37 ordered the trial court to give due course to the Republic's appeal. On November 9, 2006, the trial court gave due course to the Republic's appeal.38
The Solicitor General received the Order of denial on March 13, 2002, and filed a notice of appeal on March 20, 2002. On April 26, 2002, the trial court dismissed the notice of appeal for being filed out of time.
The Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking the annulment of the Orders dated February 26, 2002 and April 26, 2002. The appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The appellate court considered the Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration as a motion for new trial and held that the case cannot be reopened because the motion was filed after judgment. The appellate court also held that the motion for reconsideration was fatally defective without an affidavit of merit. Further, the motion was pro forma since it merely reiterated the Solicitor General's previous arguments. Thus, the motion for reconsideration did not toll the reglementary period to appeal. The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the Solicitor General's prayer to present evidence and to file an appeal.36
[I.] THE TRIAL COURT AND THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED INThese errors boil down to a single issue: can the parcels of land in question be registered in favor of the Asuncions?
GRANTING [THE ASUNCIONS'] APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION OF TITLE DESPITE GOVERNMENT FINDINGS
THAT THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND ARE INALIENABLE FOREST LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SINCE 1927.
PL] THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OVER THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND ON THE GROUND OF ACCRETION.
[HI.] [THE REPUBLIC] WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE TRIAL COURT HASTILY ISSUED ITS ORDERS AND DECISION IN FAVOR OF [THE ASUNCIONS].45
x x x
On March 20, 2001, acting on the applicants' Formal Offer of Evidence dated February 17, 2001, the Court directed the Trial Prosecutor, in representation of the Office of the Solicitor General, to submit within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order her comment thereon/opposition thereto, after which the offer of evidence shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
In Rep. of the Phils, v. Sps. Gimenez,48 we clarified that the rules on the formal offer of evidence and objections to evidence are a manifestation of the right to due process:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On April 16, 2001, the Court Issued an Order which reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary"Acting on the applicants' Formal Offer of Evidence and there being no objection interposed thereto by the Trial Prosecutor representing the Office of the Solicitor General, all exhibits are hereby admitted either as independent evidence or as part of the testimony of the witnesses.On April 27, 2001, the Court issued an Order of the following tenor:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Accordingly, let Hie continuation or trial be set on April 27, 2001 at 10:00 A.M.""In the continuation of trial today, the Public Prosecutor manifested that she has not yet received the copy of Formal Offer of Exhibits, as well as the Annexes appended thereto, for which purpose, she requested for time to study the same and submit her comment regarding the Exhibits. There being no objection interposed thereto by the applicants, she is hereby given until May 7, 2001 to manifest whether or not to adduce evidence on behalf of the State.On June 1, 2001, the Court issued another Order which runs thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Subject to the comment that maybe submitted by the Trial Prosecutor, this case is hereby tentatively re-scheduled to May 25, 2001 at 10:00 AM.""Acting on the Manifestation and Motion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the counsel for the applicants is hereby directed to furnish the former as well as the Trial Prosecutor with copies of their Formal Offer of Evidence with complete attachments thereof three (3) days upon receipt of this Order, whereas the state is given a period of fifteen (15) days to comment/or oppose the same, afterwhich [sic]; the incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution."On June 27, 2001, the Court "admitted all the exhibits adduced in the trial by the applicants". The Order to that end is reproduced in full hereunder:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary"The Solicitor General not having appeared to interpose any objections, whereas the Trial Prosecutor manifested that the applicants' documentary evidence maybe entertained only as part of the testimonies of the witnesses, this Court admitted all the exhibits adduced in the trial by the applicants: whereupon, the applicant through Atty. Pedro Asuncion, rested their case.On June 29, 2001, the Court issued the following Order:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On the part of the State, the Trial Prosecutor informed the Court that she caused to be subpoenaed Abraham P. Mariano of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga to testify as witness, but was not available; and she thus requested for deferment in the adducement of their evidence. There being no objection thereto, this case is hereby reset for hearing on June 29, 2001 at 10:30 A.M.""In the continuation of trial today, since the person of Abraham P. Mariano subpoenaed by this Court to testify on behalf of the State did not appear; by virtue thereof, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that she has no recourse except to close their evidence and requesting for the submission of this case for decision. In view thereof, this case is now deemed submitted for decision as of today.On July 10, 2001, the Court rendered the Decision now sought to be reconsidered by the Republic.
Incidentally, this Court caused to be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General copies of the Order issued earlier regarding the scheduling of this case to accommodate [sic] the Government witnesses. Copy of the Order was received by the OSG on June 28, 2001.
Let a copy of this Order be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General for its guidance and information."
The Republic's Motion for Reconsideration is predicated on two (2) grounds, viz.:
Firstly, that this "Court deprived the
Republic of its right to present
evidence."
The contention is far from accurate, to say the least. To be more precise, the records of the case readily disclose that, on a number of occasions, the Court had bent backwards more than enough in allowing the Republic ample opportunity to adduce evidence in its behalf controverting that of the applicants. On this score, one only has to refer to the aforequoted Orders which, albeit couched in simple yet understandable language, eloquently speak for themselves on the latitude of liberality afforded the Republic by this Court in that regard.
Truth to tell, the Republic neglected to present its evidence due, in large measure, to lack of earnestness (to put it kindly) on the part of the public functionaries tasked to protect the Republic's cause in the instant case. That pronouncement is reinforced by, inter alia, the allegations in paragraph 6 of the Motion for Reconsideration to the effect that the Republic filed on July 13, 2001 a motion for reconsideration of the Orders dated June 27 and 29, 2001 "as the Republic was still seeking confirmation from the Bureau of Forest
Management the current legal status of the land subject of the application, in order that the Republic may compile its comment to applicants' formal offer of voluminous and detailed evidence and determine the final form of the evidence it will present in support of its Opposition." So there. Notwithstanding the lapse of more than two decades since the institution of the petition at bar way back in 1976, and the vast resources available at its command for purposes of collating and crystallizing its evident in support of its Opposition thereto, the Republic as of July, 2001 was still in the process of "fishing" evidence, so to speak.
Jurisprudence has it that litigations must at some time be terminated. More so should the case at bar now come to an end, going by the considerable stretch of time it had been pending trial before this level of the judicial system.
x x x x47chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The rule on formal offer of evidence is intertwined with the constitutional guarantee of due process. Parties must be given the opportunity to review the evidence submitted against them and take the necessary actions to secure their case Hence, any document or object that was marked for identification is not evidence unless it was "formally offered and the opposing counsel [was] given an opportunity to object to it or cross- examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it."Consequently, Rule 132, Section 38 of the Rules of Court requires the trial court to rule upon objections to evidence "immediately after the objection is made," or after taking "reasonable time to inform itself on the question presented"; provided that the ruling must be made during the trial and "at such time as will the party against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situation presented by the ruling." The improper admission of evidence is a ground for new trial,50 unless it is shown that the improperly admitted evidence will not change the outcome of the case.51 In People v. Singh,52 this Court affirmed a trial court decision which was rendered despite the pendency of the accused's motion to strike out a certain testimony, viz.:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This court explained further the reason for the rule:
The Rules of Court provides that "the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.
To consider a party's evidence which was not formally offered during trial would deprive the other party of due process. Evidence not formally offered has no probative value and must be excluded by the court.49chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It appears that after this testimony had been received without objection, counsel for the defendant moved that it be stricken from the record on the ground that it had not been shown affirmatively by direct evidence that the confession had been made freely and voluntarily. The court took the motion under advisement and counsel asserts that it has never been ruled upon and that this has resulted to the defendant's prejudice, inasmuch as he has had no opportunity to rebut the evidence of the confession.In the case at bar, the trial court, after receiving the OSG's manifestation that it had not yet received a copy of the Asuncions' formal offer, ordered the Asuncions to furnish a copy of the same to the OSG. The OSG received a copy of the formal offer on June 15, 2001.54 Thus, per the trial court's June 1, 2001 order, the OSG had fifteen days from June 15, 2001, or until June 30, 2001, to comment on the formal offer. However, before the lapse of said period, the trial court rendered its June 27, 2001 order "admitting] all the exhibits adduced in the trial by the applicants", for the apparent reason that "[t]he Solicitor General not having appeared to interpose any objections, whereas the Trial Prosecutor manifested that the applicants' documentary evidence may be entertained only as part of the testimonies of the witnesses," which is absurd, since it gave the OSG until June 30, 2001, to interpose its objections. The trial court's subsequent June 29, 2001 order glosses over this fact and considers the case to have proceeded to the next phase, i.e., presentation of the oppositor's evidence. Nevertheless, the OSG eventually submitted its comment dated July 24,2001,55 which the trial court received on August 6, 200156
xxx The fact that the court, in its decision, takes the confession Into consideration must be regarded as a denial of the motion to strike it from the record and if the defendant desired to introduce further evidence rebuttal, the matter should have been brought to the attention of that court through the appropriate motion will not now reopen the case for a new trial.53
Furthermore, the foregoing findings are echoed in the 1956 CFI Decision, which categorically states that the disputed lands
Survey Plan and Date Location of Shoreline and RiverMouth 1938 plan of mother property Along Lot 1, Psu-115369 Psu-115369 (1943)89 Along Lot 2, Psu-115369 Psu-115615 (1944)90 Along Psu-115615 Psu-118984 (1948)91 Along Psu-118984
had been formed gradually by sediments deposited by the waters of the Wawang Dapdap River and the Manila bay and that it adjoins on the East the land of the plaintiffs [spouses Asuncion] which is covered by their Original Certificate of Title No. 6-423. That it was really formed by accretion is supported by the fact that when the aforementioned plaintiffs' registered property was surveyed in the month of August, 1937, the northeastern comer thereof still adjoined the shore of the Manila Bay, thereby showing that it (the land in litigation) was still under water but had been gradually growing up and pushing the shoreline of Manila Bay westward and the north bank of the Wawang Dapdap River southward.Courts do not have the power to declare the alienable-and-disposable status of lands of the public domain.93 However, as wielders of the judicial power,94 they can nevertheless determine the nature and character of lands under litigation in order to determine the existence of rights and obligations pertinent to said lands.95 While the 1956 CFI Decision's finding on the alienable-and-disposable status of the disputed land is not binding on the present case, its finding as to the nature and status of the disputed lands as accretions upon the Asuncion's mother property constitutes res judicata. It must be emphasized that the 1956 CFI Decision arose from the grant of a foreshore lease by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources over part of the disputed lands. Claiming ownership and possession over the same, the spouses Asuncion sued the grantee, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and the Director of Lands, in order to annul the foreshore lease.96 The CFI ruled for the spouses Asuncion and revoked the foreshore lease, holding inter alia that the Asuncions were able to prove that the disputed lands are accretions upon the mother property.97 Consequently, the conclusions of the CFI on the issue of accretion are binding upon all subsequent litigations on the land, moreso upon the Republic, which was represented in the said case by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Lands, in their capacities as the heads of agencies which are directly responsible for the management of lands of the public domain. Furthermore, the other pieces of testimonial and documentary adduced by the Asuncions to prove gradual accretion since 1933 overwhelmingly preponderate over the Republic's utter lack of proof in support of its assertion that the disputed lands are unclassified forest lands that have been in existence since before 1927.
x x x
Inasmuch as it was found and admitted by the parties that the land in controversy had been formed by the gradual accretions of soil deposited by the Wawang Dapdap river and by the waters of the Manila Bay, the question to be determined is whether said land is still part of the public domain.
x x x x92chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is undisputed that applicants-appellants [private respondents] owned the land immediately adjoining the land sought to be registered. Their property which is covered by OCT No. 6830 is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay and Bulacan rivers come from inland flowing downstream towards the Manila Bay. In other words, between the TalisayOn appeal, this Court reinstated the trial court decision denying title application for registration, viz.:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
River and the Bulacan River is the property of applicants with both rivers acting as the boundary to said land and the flow of both rivers meeting and emptying into the Manila Bay. The subject land was formed at the tip or apex of appellants' [private respondents'] land adding thereto the land now sought to be registered.
This makes this case quite unique because while it is undisputed that the subject land is immediately attached to appellants' [private respondents'] land and forms the tip thereof, at the same time, said land immediately faces the Manila Bay which is part of the sea. We can understand therefore the confusion this case might have caused the lower court, faced as it was with the uneasy problem of deciding whether or not the subject land was formed by the action of the two rivers or by the action of the sea. Since the subject land is found at the shore of the Manila Bay facing appellants' [private respondents'] land, it would be quite easy to conclude that it is foreshore and therefore part of the patrimonial property of the State as the lower court did in fact rule . . . .107chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, the title of petitioners' own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary to be Manila Bay. Petitioners' land, therefore, used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of the two rivers whose torrential action, petitioners insist, is to account for the accretion on their land. In fact, one of the petitioners, Sulpicio Pascual, testified in open court that the waves of Manila Bay used to hit the disputed land being part of the bay's foreshore but, after he had planted palapat and bakawan trees thereon in 1948, the land began to rise.Clearly, our ruling therein is premised on three crucial facts: first, the mother property is essentially peninsular, being surrounded by waters on three sides; second, the accretion was abetted in part by the owner, who planted patapat and mangroves on the foreshore, facilitating the deposition of material from the waves; and third, the accretion developed not on the banks of the two rivers but along the shore facing the bay.
Moreover, there is no dispute as to the location of: (a) the disputed land; (b) petitioners' own tract of land; (c) the Manila Bay; and, (d) the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers. Petitioners' own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front of their land on the northern side lies now the disputed land where before 1948, there lay the Manila Bay. If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers, the alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries of petitioners' own tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof which is adjacent to the Manila Bay. Clearly lacking, thus, is the third requisite of accretion, which is, that the alluvium is deposited on the portion of claimant's land which is adjacent to the river bank.
Second, there is no dispute as to the fact that petitioners' own tract of land adjoins the Manila Bay. Manila Bay is obviously not a river, and jurisprudence is already settled as to what kind of body of water the Manila Bay is.
x x x
The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.108chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 43-56; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with the concurrence of Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Florito S. Macalino
2 Id. at 58-60.
3 CA rollo, pp 108-118; penned by Judge Cesar M. Solis.
4 Chapter II, Section 15 of the New Provincial Administrative Code of Bulacan (Provincial Ordinance No. C-004, February 19, 2007) provides:
Section 15. BULACAN PROVINCE DISTINGUISHED FROM BULAKAN TOWN: - Bulacan spelled with the letter "C" stands for the province while Bulakan spelled with the letter "K" stands for the town/municipality.
5 Herein respondents Ramon G. Asuncion, Pedro G. Asuncion, Candida Asuncion Santos, Leonora Asuncion Henson, Ariston G. Asuncion, and Annabelle Asuncion-Perlas.
6 Records (vol. 1), pp. 1-4.
7 Id. at 65-68.
8 Id. at 104-107.
9 Id. at 170, 177-181.
10 Id. at 216.
11 Id. at 251-258.
12 Id. at 332.
13 Id. at 269.
14 Id. at 169, 222, 369, 417, 425.
15 Id. at 323-324, 345-348.
16 Id. at 345-348, 362.
17 Id. at 434-435, 469-475.
18 Id. at 473.
19 Id. at 453.
20 Id. at 478-480.
21 Id. (vol. 2), pp. 559-562.
22 Id. at 562.
23 Id. at 630-632, 638, 644.
24 Id. at 582-600, 610-629, 653-660, 663-669, 674-679, 689-697, 712-717.
25 Id. at 720-735.
26 Id. at 738-743.
27 Id. at 765-786.
28 Id. at 765-772.
29 Id. at 791.
30 Id. at 792, 813, 1147-1165.
31 Id. at 815.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 843-844.
34 Id. at 866-882.
35 Id. at 1016-1022.
36Republic of the Phils. v. Asuncion et al., 533 Phil. 435, 439-440 (2006). Citaions omitted. A copy of the decision is fund in Records (vol. 2), pp.1094-1103. The decision was penned by Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing with the concurrence of Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Conchita Carpio Morales, Dante O. Tinga, and Presbitero J. Velasco (all retired). The CA decision (found in Records, vol. 2, pp. 1048-1055) was penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a retired Member of this Court) with the concurrence of Presiding Justice Justice Cancio C. Garcia (now a retired member of this Court) and Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr.
37 Id. The Decision became final and executory upon the denial of the Asuncions' motion for reconsideration. Supreme Court Resolution dated December 13, 2006, records (vol. 2), p. 1133.
38 Records (vol. 2), p. 1105.
39 CA rollo, pp. 110-111, 113-115.
40 Id. at 112; Evidence folder, pp. 91-95.
41 Id. at 116, Records (vol. 1), pp. 49-53.
42 49-53.Decision in Civil Case No. 766, captioned "Felipe F. Asuncion and Paciencia Gonzales vs. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, The Director of Lands, and Simplicio C. Adriano", penned by Judge Eulogio Mencias. Records (vol. 1), pp. 276-288. Hereinafter referred to as the "1956 CF1 Decision".
43 CA rollo, pp. 206-216.
44Rollo, pp. 58-60.
45 Id. at 19.
46 Records (vol. 2), pp. 1016-1022; penned by Judge D. Roy A. Masadao, Jr.
47 Id. at 1016-19, Underlining in the original, citations omitted.
48 776 Phil. 233 (2016).
49 Id. at 256-257.
50 7 Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines (Part II) 532-533 (1973), citing Figueras v. Vy-Tiepco, 2 Phil. 488-489 (1903) and United States v. Villanueva, 18 Phil. 593 (1911).
51 2 Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 875 (2008) [please verily year of publication], citing People v. Bands, 50 Phil. 37, 41 (1927).
52 45 Phil. 676 (1924).
53 Id. at 678-679.
54Rollo, p. 33.
55 53 Records (vol. 2), pp. 847-863.
56 Id. at 847.
57 While the trial court was able to receive the OSG's Motion for Extension to file its comment prior to its rendition of the assailed decision, the trial court did not act on the motion because it was of the opinion that the same was "rendered moot and academic by the Order of the Court dated June 27, 2001. RTC Decision, p. 6, in Records (vol. 2), p. 839.
58 Among the reasons given by the OSG for the delay was the "voluminous nature of the documentary exhibits" submitted by the Asuncions (Records, vol. 2., p. 816), and crucially, that the Republic, as of July 13, 2001, was "still seeking confirmation from the appropriate office of the Bureau of Forest Development for Region III of the current status of the recommendation to the Bureau Director to release the lands subject of the application x x x to be disposed of in accordance with the Public Land Act as contained in the First Indorsement x x x of the OIC District Forester [of Bulacan] and in the Second Indorsement x x x of the Regional Director, DENR-BFD" submitted by the Asuncions [Records (vol. 2), p. 875]. Given the Republic's powers and resources, the 24-year delay in obtaining such confirmation is improbable and unjustifiable.
59 Id. at 723-730.
60 Id. at 724, 728.
61 Evidence folder, pp. 91-92.
62 Id. at 68-69.
63 Id. at 70.
64 Records (vol. 1), pp. 49-53, 116; Records (vol. 2), p. 1150.
65 Evidence folder, p. 99.
66 Id. at 94-95.
67 Evidence folder, pp. 114-133. '
68 Records (vol. 1), p. 77.
69 Records (vol. 2), pp. 569-570.
70 Id. at 592-593.
71 Id. at 593-595, 613.
72 Id. at 657.
73 Id. at 593-595, 613, 622, 655, 694, 697.
74 Id. at 614, 624, 665.
75 Id. at 623-624, 655.
76 Evidence folder, p.
77 Records (vol. 2), p. 739.
78 Id. at 740.
79 According to Martinez, the term for accretion in the Bulakan area is sabang or palanas. Id.
80 Id. at 740-741.
81 Id. at 741.
82 Exhibit "G" for the Asuncions, Evidence folder, p. 51.
83 Exhibit "E" for the Asuncions, id. at 45.
84 Exhibit "F" for the Asuncions, id. at 46.
85 Records (vol. 1), pp. 50-51.
86 Id. at 52:
87 Id. at 49.
88 This area measures 216, 767 square meters in both maps.
89 Records (vol. 1), p, 49.
90 Id. at 50-51.
91 Id. at 52.
92 Records (vol. 1), pp. 282, 285.
93Heirs of Rafael Gozo v. Philippine Union Mission Corp. of the Seventh Day Adventist Church (PUMCO), et al., 765 Phil. 829, 838 (2015); Secretary of the DENR, et al. Mayor Yap, et al., 589 Phil. 156, 182-183 (2008); Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 258-A Phil. 492, 495 (1989); Bureau of Forestry v. Court of Appeals, 237 Phil. 342, 348 (1987); Director of Lands, et al. v. CA, et al., 214 Phil. 606, 609(1984).
94 "The phrase "judicial power" is not capable of a precise definition which would be applicable to all cases. The term has been variously defined as the authority to determine the rights of persons or property by arbitrating between adversaries in specific controversies at the instance of a party thereto; the authority exercised by that department of government which is charged with the declaration of what the law is and its construction so far as it is written law; the authority or power vested in the judges or in the courts; the authority vested in some court, officer, or persons to hear and determine when the rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication; the power belonging to or emanating from a judge as such; the power conferred upon a public officer, involving the exercise of judgment and discretion in the determination of questions of right in specific cases affecting the interest of persons or property, as distinguished from ministerial power or authority to carry out the mandates of judicial power or the law; the power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them, or some matter incidental thereto, and of which they have jurisdiction; the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment; the power which adjudicates upon and protects the right and interests of individual citizens, and to that end construes and applies the law. "Judicial power" implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. It includes the power to hear and determine but not everyone who may hear and determine has judicial power. The term "judicial power" does not necessarily include the power to hear and determine a matter that is not in the nature of a suit or action between the parties." Santiago, Jr. v. Bautista, 143 Phil. 209 (1970), citing 34 C.J. 1183-1184.
95 See e.g., Salas, etc., et al. v. Hon. Jarencio, et al., 150-B Phil. 670, 680 (1972), where the Court had to decide if the disputed land is patrimonial or for public use; Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., inc. v. Judge Bercilles, 160 Phil. 1155 (1975), where the courts had to determine if the disputed land has become private; and Heirs of Navarro v. IAC, 335 Phil. 537 (1997), where the Court determined whether the land is the product of alluvial (hence, registrable) or littoral (hence, unregistrable) accretion.
96 Records (vol. 1), pp. 276-278.
97 Id. at 282, 285,288.
98 Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. "[Alluvial] accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Land Registration Act." C.N. Hodges v. Garcia, 109 Phil. 13, 136 (1960). Republic v. Santos III, 698 Phil. 275 (2012); Payatas Estate Improvement Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55, 57 (3929); Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567 (1908); Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408 (1907); 2 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines (1972) 125.
100Heirs of Navarro v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 95 at 550; 2 Jose B.L. Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, An Outline of Philippine Civil Law 51 (1967), citing Grande, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 115 Phil. 521, 524-525 (1962).
101Heirs of Narvasa, Sr. v. Imbornal, 740 Phil. 541 (2014); Reynante v. Court of Appeals, 284 Phil. 84, 90 (1992).
102Heirs of Narvasa, Sr. v. Imbornal, supra; Payatas Estate Improvement Co. v. Tuason, supra note 101. Section 14(3) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes this principle when it uses the term "private lands".
103Daclison v. Baytion, 784 Phil. 257, 265-266 (2016), citing Republic of the Philippines v. CA, 217 Phil. 483, 489 (1984); Fernando v. Acuna, 673 Phil. 129 (2011); Heirs of Navarro v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra note 95.
104Heirs of Navarro v. Intermediate Appellate Court, id. at 555; Republic of the Phils, v. Vda. de Castillo, 246 Phil. 294 (1988), citing Ignacio v. Director of Lands and Valeriano, 108 Phil. 335, 338-339 (1960).
105Baguio v. Heirs of Abello, G.R. Nos. 192956 & 193032, July 24, 2019; Public Land Act. Secs. 58, 59, & 61.
106 Supra note 95.
107 Id. at 544-545.
108 Id. at 550-551.
109 Records (vol. 2), p. 741.
110 Id. at 623-624, 655.
111 Daclison v. Baytion, supra note 103; Rep. of the Phils, v. CA, et al, 217 Phil. 483, 490-491 (1984); Cortes v. City of Manila, supra note 99.
112 Records (vol. 2), pp. 657, 693-694.
113 The provision states: Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof. Heirs of Navarro, supra note 94.cralawredlibrary