SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 248306, June 28, 2021
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SCIENCE PARK OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., REP. BY ITS EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT AND GEN. MANAGER, MR. RICHARD ALBERT I. OSMOND, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
A representative of the Office of Municipal Assessor of Malvar confirmed this sequence based on the tax declarations issued in relation to the property. The oldest tax declaration on file was dated 1955 in the name of Segunda Kalaw.
January 29, 1944: Segunda Kalaw sold the land to her sister Micaela Kalaw November 5, 1953: After Micaela passed, her heirs sold the land to Crisanto Laydia and his wife Agrifina Arcillas through a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa June 26, 1996: Antonio A. Aranda bought the land from Crisanto through a deed of absolute sale. January 6, 2014: Respondent bought the land form Antonio A. Aranda9
x x x x
Lot 3394, Psc-47, Malvar Cadastre is inside alienable and disposable zone as per Project No. 39, L.C. Map No. 3601 certified on December 22, 1007 as per CERTIFICATION approved by Laudemir S. Salac, OIC, CENR Officer of Batangas City on Jul 21, 2014.x x x x
WHEREFORE, the foregoing discussion considered, upon confirmation of the Order of General Default, this Court resolves to adjudicate and decree Lot No. 3394, Psc-47, Malvar Cadastre, Ap-04-016437 with an area of FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (5,255) SQUARE METERS in favor of and in the name of SCIENCE PARK OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC, with office address at 17th Floor, Robinsons Summit Center, 6783 Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.It found respondent's evidence to have sufficiently proved that it has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of a parcel of land classified to be within the alienable and disposable zone of the public domain since June 12, 1945 or earlier.23
SO ORDERED.
Respondent applied for registration of title under Section 14(1) of PD 1529 |
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may tile in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines45 aptly drew the distinctions between the first and the second grounds, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws. (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws. (4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law. (emphases added)
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.In fine, an applicant invoking Section 14(1) of PD 1529 needs to prove the following elements: (a) the property forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain at the time of the filing of the application for registration; (b) it has been, by itself or through its predecessors-ininterest, in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the property; and (c) the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.46(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.(a) Patrimonial property is private proper1y of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person's uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. (emphases and underscoring added)
Respondent failed to
establish that it has been, by itself or through its
predecessors-ininterest, in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property since June 12, 1945 or earlier |
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of PD 1529 proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the application. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property. Possession is: (a) open when it is patent visible, apparent, notorious, and not clandestine; (b) continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken, and not intermittent or occasional; (c) exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and (d) notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.Verily, the Court deemed Nelia's testimony insufficient for purposes of establishing the nature and extent of possession required by law. For she testified on events which supposedly happened when she was only about seven (7) years old. At any rate, the planting and harvesting of crops she allegedly witnessed merely amounted to casual cultivation and did not rise to the level of exclusivity and notoriety of possession required by law. Notably, too, the earliest tax declarations offered by respondent in G.R. No. 237714 was dated 1955 - short of the reckoning point required under Section 14(1) of PD 1529.
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier, SPPI presented, among others, the testimony of Nelia Linatoc-Cabalda (Nelia). Nelia, who was born in 1936, claimed to have known of Gervacio's ownership and cultivation of the subject land when she was about seven (7) years old, xxx However, such testimony was insufficient to establish possession in the nature and character required by law that would give right to ownership. In a number of cases, the Court has repeatedly held that to prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of owner, the claimant must show the nature and extent of cultivation on the subject land, or the number of crops planted or the volume of the produce harvested from the crops supposedly planted thereon; failing in which, the supposed planting and harvesting of crops in the land being claimed only amounted to mere casual cultivation which is not the nature of possession and occupation required by law. Consequently, SPPI failed to satisfy the requisite exclusivity and notoriety of its claimed possession and occupation of the subject land because exclusive dominion and conspicuous possession thereof were not established.
Furthermore, SPPI's evidence were insufficient to prove that its possession and occupation were for the duration required by law. The earliest tax declaration in Gervacio's name presented by SPPI, i.e., Tax Declaration (TD) No. 6243, dates back to 1955 only, short of the requirement that possession and occupation under a bona tide claim of ownership should be since June 12, 1945 or earlier. xxx The payment of realty taxes and declaration of the subject land in the name of Gervacio in 1955 gives rise to the presumption that he claimed ownership and possession thereof only in that year.
ln sum, the Court finds that SPPI's unsubstantiated and selfserving assertions of possession and occupation do not constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject land of the nature and duration required by Section 14(1) of PD 1529. Accordingly, the CA erred in affirming the MCTC's grant of SPPI's application for original registration of its imperfect title over the subject land. (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. (Emphases supplied)In fine, the present application for land registration should also be dismissed.
Endnotes:
* Designated as additional member per S.O. No. 2822 dated April 7, 2021.
1Rollo, pp. 16-36.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Germano Francisco D. Legaspi, with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Edwin D. Sorongon, concurring; id. at 37-44.
3Id. at 45-46.
4 Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
5 Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 6-93-A dated November 15, 1995; rollo, p. 38.
6Id.
7Id. at 59.
8Id. at 38.
9Id.
10Id. at 63-64.
11Id. at 63.
12Id. at 116-117.
13Id. at 117.
14Id. at 63 and 117.
15Id. at 117.
16Id. at 117-118.
17 Marked Exhibit "L"; Original Record, p. 106.
18 Marked Exhibit "O"; id. at 108.
19 Marked Exhibit "II"; id. at 324.
20 Approved by Chief of Regional Surveys Division Edgar S. Barraca of the DENR Land Management Services, Calabarzon Region and Atty. Marlou Pelayo Alutaya, OIC, Regional Technical Director For Lands.
21 Penned by Presiding Judge Charito M. Macalintal-Sawali.
22Rollo, pp. 57-65.
23Id. at 63.
24Id. at 20.
25 Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of a lienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.x x x x
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.
26 CA rollo, p. 40, citing Buenaventura v. Republic, 546 Phil. 101 (2007):
"From the aforesaid provisions of the Property Registration Decree, we can deduce that there are three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under the first category, to wit: (1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The second classification relates to the acquisition of private lands by prescription."
27 CA Decision, p. 4.
28 CA rollo, pp. 43-44.
29 ART. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall for in part of the patrimonial property of the State.
30 CA rollo, pp. 67-86.
31Id. at 77-79.
32Id. at 79-81.
33 Penned by Associate Justice Germano Francisco D. Legaspi, with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Edwin D. Sorongon, concurring.
34 Article 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. (34la).
35 Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.36Rollo, p. 43.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws. x x x
37Id. at 40-42.
38Id. at 16-36.
39Id. at 23-25.
40Id. at 26-29.
41Id. at 144-155.
42Id. at 148.
43Id. at 148-149.
44Id. at 151-154.
45 605 Phil. 244, 284-286 (2009).
46 See Espiritu, Jr. v. Republic, 811 Phil. 506, 517 (2017); and Republic v. Estate of Santos, 802 Phil. 800, 811-812 (2016).
47Republic v. Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation, 730 Phil. 263, 275 (2014).
48 The general rule for petitions filed under Rule 45 admits exceptions, to wit: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record; Miano v. Manila Electric Co., 800 Phil. 118, 123 (2016).
49 G.R. No. 237714, November 12, 2018 [Per Second Division, (now SAJ) Perlas-Bernabe].
50Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Insular Life, 735 Phil. 287, 291 (2014), citing Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation, 573 Phil. 320. 337 (2008), citing Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, 511 Phil. 510, 520-521 (2005).
51Id.
52 Penned by Associate Justice Germano Francisco D. Legaspi, with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Edwin D. Sorongon, concurring; rollo, pp. 37-44.
53Id. at 45-46. cralawredlibrary