G.R. No. 256288 - ATTY. ROMEO M. ESMERO, Petitioner, v. HIS EXCELLENCY, HONORABLE PRESIDENT, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, Respondent.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 256288, June 29, 2021
ATTY. ROMEO M. ESMERO, Petitioner, v. HIS EXCELLENCY, HONORABLE PRESIDENT, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
ZALAMEDA, J.:
By this Petition for Mandamus,1 petitioner Atty. Romeo M. Esmero (petitioner) seeks the issuance of a writ to compel respondent President Rodrigo R. Duterte (President Duterte) to comply with his constitutional duty to defend the national territory, which includes the West Philippine Sea, against Chinese incursions2 Specifically, petitioner asserts that:
The petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
Our ruling in De Lima v. Duterte12 is clear: the President is immune from suit during his incumbency, regardless of the nature of the suit filed against him. Petitioner named President Duterte as the sole respondent in this case. For this reason, this suit should be dismissed outright.
Even if, for the sake of argument, the Court was inclined to overlook this fatal flaw and consider the case filed against the Executive Secretary, as the representative of the President,13 if only to save the petition from perfunctory dismissal, a writ of mandamus would still not lie in petitioner's favor.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a mandamus petition may be resorted to when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.14
Mandamus is used merely to compel action and to coerce the performance of a pre-existing duty;15 it does not lie to control discretion.16 For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition is a ministerial act or duty on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.17 It falls on the petitioner to show that his clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act.18
This Court, in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council,19 distinguished a ministerial act from one that is discretionary: "A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.20
Indeed, the President is the guardian of the Philippine archipelago, including all the islands and waters embraced therein and all other territories over which it has sovereignty or jurisdiction.21 By constitutional fiat and the intrinsic nature of his office, the President is also the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country.22
In Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr.,23 this Court had occasion to discuss the President's foreign affairs power:
As the sole organ of our foreign relations and the constitutionally assigned chief architect of our foreign policy, the President is vested with the exclusive power to conduct and manage the country's interface with other states and governments. Being the principal representative of the Philippines, the Chief Executive speaks and listens for the nation; initiates, maintains, and develops diplomatic relations with other states and governments; negotiates and enters into international agreements; promotes trade, investments, tourism and other economic relations; and settles international disputes with other states.
Xxxx
This rule does not imply, though, that the President is given carte blanche to exercise this discretion. Although the Chief Executive wields the exclusive authority to conduct our foreign relations, this power must still be exercised within the context and the parameters set by the Constitution, as well as by existing domestic and international laws.24 [Emphasis supplied.]
The Court thereafter proceeded to list the following constitutional restrictions to the President's foreign affairs powers:
a. The policy of freedom from nuclear weapons within Philippine territory;
b. The fixing of tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, which must be pursuant to the authority granted by Congress;
c. The grant of any tax exemption, which must be pursuant to a law concurred in by a majority of all the Members of Congress;
d. The contracting or guaranteeing, on behalf of the Philippines, of foreign loans that must be previously concurred in by the Monetary Board;
e. The authorization of the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country must be in the form of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate; and
f. For agreements that do not tall under paragraph 5, the concurrence of the Senate is required, should the form of the government chosen be a treaty.25
In addition to treaty-making, the President also has the power to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls;26 receive ambassadors and other public ministers duly accredited to the Philippines;27 and deport aliens.28
Petitioner submits that it is the ministerial duty of the President, as part of his mandate to enforce the laws and see to their faithful execution, to "defend" the national territory by going before the United Nations (UN) to ask the latter to send "UN Patrol Boats x x x to protect our fishermen."29 It is also petitioner's view that the Philippines should "sue China with (sic) the International Court of Justice [(ICJ)] and demand that China should pay for the Kalayaan Islands which it took from us for trillions of Dollars in damages."30
For all his posturing, however, petitioner has failed to point to any law that specifically requires the President to go to the UN or the ICJ to sue China for its incursions into our exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Neither has he shown a clear and unmistakable constitutional or statutory provision which prescribes how the President is to respond to any threat (actual or imminent) from another State to our sovereignty or exercise of our sovereign rights.31
Petitioner himself noted that a case had in fact been filed by the Philippines to vindicate its rights in the West Philippine Sea. In 2013, after years of unsuccessful attempts to reach a settlement through political and diplomatic channels and amid rising tensions in the region, Former President Benigno S. Aquino decided to avail of the legal mechanism under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).32 He was under no obligation, certainly not one coercible via a writ of mandamus, to file a case against China. Taking China to binding arbitration was risky, as it could potentially damage relations with a major trading partner. On 12 July 2016, the arbitral tribunal issued an Award overwhelmingly in favor of claims by the Philippines and ultimately bringing some clarity to the overlapping claims in the area.33
If President Duterte now sees fit to take a different approach with China despite said ruling, this does not by itself mean that he has, as petitioner suggests, unlawfully abdicated his duty to protect and defend our national territory, correctible with the issuance by this Court of the extraordinary writ of mandamus. Being the Head of State, he is free to use his own discretion in this matter, accountable only to his country in his political character and to his own conscience.34
Ultimately, the decision of how best to address our disputes with China (be it militarily, diplomatically, legally) rests on the political branches of government.35 While we are loath to give a "blank check" especially where the risk of grave abuse of discretion may be high, we cannot have an "entrammeled executive" who will be ill-equipped to face the "amorphous threat[s] and perpetrators whose malign intent may be impossible to know until they strike."36 The Constitution vests executive power, which includes to duty to execute the law, protect the Philippines, and conduct foreign affairs, in the President- not this Court. Barring violations of the limits provided by law and the Constitution, we should take care not to substitute our exercise of discretion for his. As "the branch that knows least about the national security concerns that the subject entails," we cannot, in the words of Justice Scalia, just simply "blunder in."37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, C.J., Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, Hernando, Carandang, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, M. Lopez, Delos Santos, Gaerlan, Rosario, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., concur. See separate concurring opinion.
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on June 29, 2021 a Resolution copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on November 16, 2021 at 11:45 a.m.
Clerk of Court
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 3-24.2 Id. at 22.
3 Id. at 7-8.
4 Id. at 9-12.
5 Id. at 13.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 14-20.
8 Id. at 21.
9 Supplement to the Petition, p. 2.
10 Id. at 6.
11 Id. at 8.
12 G.R. No. 227635, 15 October 2019.
13See Manila international Airport Authority v. Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association Incorporated, 508 Phil. 354, 374 (2005).
14See also Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No. 238467, 12 February 2019.
15Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, 701 Phil. 365, 386 (2013).
16GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc., 338 Phil. 507, 527 (1997).
17Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, 442 Phil. 139, 189 (2002).
18Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, supra note 15, at 386-387.
19 629 Phil. 629 (2010).
20 Id. at 706.
21See Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., 791 Phil. 277, 302 (2016).
22RAYAN v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 663 (2000); see also Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 501 Phil. 303, 313 (2005).
23 777 Phil. 280 (2016).
24 Id. at 380, 389.
25 Id. at 389-390.
26 CONSTITUTION, Art. VII, Sec. 16. See also Bernas, Joaquin G. (2003). The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. A Commentary. Rex Printing Company, Inc., p. 909.
27 CONSTITUTION (1973), art. VII, Sec. 16. See also The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary. Id. at 910.
28Tan Tong v. Deportation Board, 96 Phil. 934, 936 (1955), where the Court upheld the President's deportation power "subject only to the regulations prescribed under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code or to such future legislation as may be promulgated on the subject." In Qua Chee Gan v. The Deportation Board, 118 Phil. 868 (1963), where the Court clarified that the legislature may limit the substantive grounds for deportation to causes enumerated by law. See also The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary. Rex Printing Company, Inc., Id. at p. 911.
29 Supplement to the Petition, p. 7.
30 Id. at 8.
31See I-Popefrancis v. Department of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 206689 (Minute Resolution), 24 August 2016.
32 Statement: The Secretary of Foreign Affairs on the UNCLOS Arbitral Proceedings against China, 22 January 2013, taken from <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/2013/01/22/statement-the-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-on-the-unclos-arbitral-proceedings-against-china-january-22-2013>, last accessed 17 June 2021.
33 A copy of the Award can be accessed at <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/>, last accessed 18 June 2021.
34Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166 (1803).
35Vinuya v. Romulo, 633 Phil. 538, 569 (2010).
36 Breyer, Stephen. (2015). The Court and the World: American Law and the New Global Realities. Alfred A. Knopf.
37 Tribe, Laurence & Matz, Joshua. (2014) Uncertain Justice: The Roberts Court and the Constitution. Picador. Citing United States Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonin Scalia's Dissent in Boumediene v. Bush, 551 U.S. 723 (2008).
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I agree with the ponencia that matters within the President's discretion cannot be the subject of a writ of mandamus. However, I take exception to its allusion that a sitting President cannot be the subject of any type of suit.
Petitioner Romeo Esmero, through this Petition for Mandamus, asks this Court to compel President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to defend the West Philippine Sea, which, he states, is part of the Philippine territory pursuant to the Constitution and as confirmed by the favorable ruling of the United Nations Arbitral Tribunal.1 He insists that the President is bound to do so, citing pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions:
(1) Primary function of the President — As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested (Sec. 1), the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in exi[s]ting laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. [B]efore assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, "execute its laws". (Sec. 5). Now, he "shall insure, that the law be faithfully executed." (Sec. 17). In the exercise of this function, the president, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country (Sec. 18, par. 1), including the Philippine National Police (Art. XVI, Sec. 6) under the Department of Interior and Local Government ([Republic Act] No. 6975).2
Preceded by the purported "verbal dispute"3 between President Duterte and former Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and former Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert F. Del Rosario over the presence of Chinese maritime vessels in the West Philippine Sea, petitioner relates the ensuing antecedents:
As regards this position of our Excellency, Honorable Associate Justice Antonio Carpio replied that our country do[es] not need to go to war against [C]hina.
There are other remedies, peaceful in its approach such as going again to the [United Nations] Arbitral Body and complain that [its] Arbitral Ruling that the West Philippine Sea belongs to our beloved country, all of its natural resources on its seabed including the giant clams that were hoisted there by China [belong] to our beloved country were ignored and not respected by China.
Likewise, as regards our alleged [d]ebt of gratitude towards [C]hina, some experts say that not all Sinovac [v]accines that we received from [C]hina are donated.
Most of those Sinovac [v]accines were paid for by us.
Likewise, renunciation or abdication of our [country's] sovereign rights on the West Philippine Sea is not the proper way for him to act as our [P]resident. As President, he should encourage our people that he is doing everything on our country 's position on this matter.4
Petitioner further argues the following:
In his Supplemental Petition,12 petitioner stresses the importance of a purported "collective voice" among all the nations against China's invasion of our national territory. Allegedly, our diplomatic protest is but a "solitary voice" of an aggrieved country directed against an aggressor and not a "defense by our country on the issue of the West Philippine Sea."13 Thus, petitioner proposes the following actions:
The ponencia held that the Petition should be dismissed outright for naming the President as the lone respondent. Citing De Lima v. Duterte,15 it explained that "the President is immune from suit during his incumbency, regardless of the nature of the suit filed against him."16 It further held that even if this Court were to consider the case filed as against the President's representative or the executive secretary, a writ of mandamus would still not lie in petitioner's favor as he fell short of proving a clear right to the relief asked for:
Mandamus is used merely to compel action and to coerce the performance of a pre-existing duty; it does not lie to control discretion. For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition is a ministerial act or duty on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. It falls on the petitioner to show that his clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act.
This Court, in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, distinguished a ministerial act from one that is discretionary. "A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
Indeed, the President is the guardian of the Philippine archipelago, including all the islands and waters embraced therein and all other territories over which it has sovereignty or jurisdiction. By constitutional fiat and the intrinsic nature of his office, the President is also the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country.
. . . .
Petitioner submits that it is the ministerial duty of the President, as part of his mandate to enforce the laws and see to their faithful execution, to "defend" the national territory by going before the United Nations (UN) to ask the latter to send "UN Patrol Boats. . . to protect our fishermen." It is also petitioner's view that the Philippines should "sue China with (sic) the International Court of Justice [(ICJ)] and demand that China [ ] pay for the Kalayaan Islands which it took from us for trillions of Dollars in damages."
For all his posturing, however, petitioner has failed to point to any law that specifically requires the President to go the UN or the ICJ to sue China for its incursions into our exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Neither has he shown a clear and unmistakable constitutional or statutory provision which prescribes how the President is to respond to any threat (actual or imminent) from another State to our sovereignty or exercise of our sovereign rights.17 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
I agree with the ponencia that the President is immune from suit, whether administrative, civil, or criminal, during their incumbency.18
However, I cannot agree with the ponencia's statement that the President can never be sued "regardless of the nature of the suit filed against him."19 As I have stated in my separate opinion in De Lima v. Duterte,20 "[p]residential immunity, as it is currently understood, is not absolute." It is merely immunity from liability, not accountability. The liability itself is not absolved, but merely deferred until the end of their tenure in office.
In Estrada v. Desierto,21 this Court delineated the extent of presidential immunity to ascertain whether then President Joseph Estrada can invoke the privilege as regards his criminal charges before the Office of the Ombudsman despite his ouster in 2001. In rejecting such contention, this Court explained that a non-sitting president cannot be afforded immunity from suit for criminal acts perpetrated while in office:
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.
Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. It declared as a state policy that "(t)he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption." It ordained that "(p)ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." It set the rule that "(t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel." It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court. It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "(i)nvestigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy. These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.22 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
In resolving the relevant motion for reconsideration in Estrada, this Court remained firm in its ruling. It reiterated that the protection afforded by the privilege only extends during the president's tenure:
Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. His arguments are merely recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of the debate o n the subject. In our Decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends and turns up to the present time. We held that given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioner's rehashed arguments including their thinly disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention that he is still President, albeit, a President on leave. His stance that his immunity covers his entire term of office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the reality that he has relinquished the presidency and there is now a new de jure President.
Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit during his term of office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the president shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?
Fr. Bernas:
The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit.Mr. Suarez:
So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas:
There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez:
On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President.
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification."
Petitioner, however fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.23 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
The privilege of presidential immunity does not shield the president from any wrongdoing. It merely guarantees that the performance of their functions is free from interruptions, "considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention."24 In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo:25
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during [their] tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he [or she] can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he [or she] be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable [them] to fully attend to the performance of [their] official duties and junctions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his [or her] usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon [them] by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.26 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Moreover, the scope of presidential immunity only covers immunity from liability during incumbency. It is not an immunity against accountability. Public office is a public trust. The president, as with any other public official, is accountable to the people at all times.27
Actions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of amparo and habeas data are not "[actions] to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings."28 This Court has stated that "since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing."29
The president should not be immune from suits that demand accountability from the respondent. Thus, the privilege of presidential immunity should not apply to actions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of amparo and habeas data.
This case, however, involves a Petition for Mandamus to compel the President to request the United Nations to assist us in defending the West Philippine Sea from foreign incursion. While the President does have the sworn duty to preserve and defend the Constitution, matters within the President's discretion are not compellable by mandamus. "As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs."30 As such, the direction of the country's foreign policy is political in nature and subject to the discretion of our political branches. Absent any grave abuse of discretion, this Court should not interfere, regardless of whether the privilege of presidential immunity was invoked.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
Endnotes:
1 Supplemental Petition, p. 8 (Amended Prayer); see also Petition, p. 20.2 Petition, p. 9.
3 Id. at 2.
4 Id. at 2-4.
5 Id. at 5, citing CONST., art. II, sec. 4, which reads as follows:
SECTION 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.
6 Id. at 6.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 6-9.
9 Id. at 11.
10 Id. at 12-18, citing CONST., art. 1, which reads as follows:
ARTICLE 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
11 Id. at 19.
12 Esmero's Supplemental Petition is captioned as "Supplement to the Petition for Mandamus[,] The Solution to the West Philippine Territorial Sea Issue[,] The U.N. Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950."
13 Supplemental Petition, p. 2.
14 Id. at 6-8.
15 G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019 [Per C.J. Bersamin, En Banc].
16 Ponencia, p. 2.
17 Id. at 2-5.
18Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 627 Phil. 37, 62 (2010) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc], citing David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
19 Ponencia, p 2.
20 J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in De Lima v. Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, November 3, 2020 [Unsigned, En Banc].
21 406 Phil. 1 (2001) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
22 Id. at 75, 78.
23Estrada v. Desierto, 408 Phil. 194, 242-244 (2001) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
24Soliven v. Makasiar, 249 Phil. 394, 400 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
25 522 Phil. 705, 763-764 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].
26 Id. at 764.
27See CONST., art. XI, sec. 1.
28Secretary of Defense v. Manalo, 589 Phil. 1, 41 (2008) [Per C.J. Puno, En Banc], citing Deliberations of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, August 10, 2007; August 24, 2007; August 31, 2007; and September 20, 2008.
29Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 676 Phil. 84, 105 (2011) [Per J. Sereno, En Banc].
30Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 501 Phil. 303, 313 [Per J. Puno, En Banc].cralawredlibrary
