THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 209907, June 23, 2021
CHARLO P. IDUL, Petitioner, v. ALSTER INT'L SHIPPING SERVICES, INC., JOHANN MKBLUMENTHAL GMBBH REEDEREI AND SANTIAGO D. ALMODIEL, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
HERNANDO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the May 14, 2013 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 119246, which reversed the December 14, 2010 Decision3 and the February 28, 2011 Resolution4 of the National Labor and Relations Commission (NLRC). In its September 20, 2013 Resolution,5 the CA did not reconsider its earlier pronouncement.
Antecedent Facts:
Petitioner Charlo P. Idul (Idul) was employed by Alster Int'l Shipping Services, Inc. (Alster Shipping) on behalf of its principal, Johann Mkbluementhal GMBBH Reederei, for a period of 12 months.6 On April 14, 2008, he boarded the vessel M/V IDA to commence his services as a bosun.
On December 4, 2008, Idul figured in an accident while working when the lashing wires broke and hit his left leg resulting to a fracture. He disembarked the vessel and underwent surgery in a hospital in France. Thereafter, he was repatriated back to the Philippines for further medical attention.
On December 11, 2008, he was referred by the company to Metropolitan Medical Center (MMC) under the care of Dr. Robert Lim (Dr. Lim), and orthopedic surgeon, Dr. William Chuasuan Jr. (Dr. Chuasuan). He was given medication and instructed to undergo rehabilitation therapy.7 He was also asked to come back for follow-up check-ups.
The company-designated physician issued medical reports dated February 2, 2009,8 March 9, 2009,9 March 30, 2009,10 June 15, 2009,11 and July 6, 2009.12 In the medical report dated July 6, 2009, Dr. Chuasuan gave Idul a Grade 10 disability rating due to "immobility of ankle joint in abnormal position."
Prior to this, or on March 16, 2009, Idul sought the opinion of his own doctor of choice, Dr. Venancio P. Garduce Jr. (Dr. Garduce). After a single consultation, Dr. Garduce assessed Idul to be totally and permanently disabled.13 Thereafter, Alster Shipping offered to pay Idul the amount of $10,750.00 as disability benefit in accordance with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA SEC). However, Idul rejected the offer and insisted that he was entitled to full disability benefits.
On June 3, 2009, Idul filed a complaint14 for total and permanent disability benefits with damages before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). During the preliminary mandatory conference, the parties failed to reach a settlement. In Idul's Position Paper,15 he claimed that he was entitled to full disability benefits since the injury he suffered rendered him incapable of performing his grueling duties as a bosun.
Due to the extent of his injury, he argued that he was entitled to a Disability Rating of Grade 1 or an equivalent of $60,000.00 in disability benefits. He posited that both doctors already concurred as to the extent and nature of his injury but Alster Shipping still failed to satisfy his claim. Additionally, he asked for sickness allowance and damages.
On the other hand, Alster Shipping denied liability for full disability benefits. It maintained that Idul was not eligible for full disability benefits considering that he was assessed by the company-designated physician to be suffering from a Grade 10 disability only. Thus, the parties are bound by such declaration of the company-designated physician in accordance with the POEA SEC. To support this assertion, it pointed out that Idul's condition did not even fall under Section 32 of the POEA SEC which enumerates Grade 1 disabilities.
Moreover, the disability rating by Dr. Chuasuan was issued within the 240-day period, negating any claim that the temporary total disability developed into a permanent total disability. Additionally, Alster Shipping belied any claim against Mr. Almodiel, who was merely their VP for operations. Lastly, it contended that Idul is not entitled to damages and attorney's fees for lack of factual and legal basis.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter:
The Labor Arbiter, in a May 31, 2010 Decision,16 ruled in favor of Alster Shipping. It gave more credence to the findings of Dr. Lim and Dr. Chuasuan who were able to monitor and observe Idul while he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation, rather than Dr. Garduce's assessment which was made after a single consultation. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Alster Shipping Services, Inc. and/or Johann Mkblumenthal Gmbh Reederei to pay in solidum complainant CHARLO P. IDUL the Philippine Peso equivalent at the time of payment of TEN THOUSAND SEVENTY-FIVE US DOLLARS (US$10,075.00) representing partial payment total disability compensation.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.17
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the appeal impressed with merit. Complainant-appellant is hereby declared to be permanently and totally disabled. Respondent-appellees are ordered to pay complainant-appellant the amount of US$60,000.00 or its peso equivalent at the exchange rate at the time of payment plus ten percent thereof as attorney's fees. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 31, 2010 is hereby MODIFIED accordingly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.20
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 14 December 2010 and Resolution dated February 28, 2011 rendered by the NLRC in NLRC LAC Case No. 09-000657-10, NLRC Case No. NCR(M) 06-0826209 are SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 31 May 2010 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.22
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
SECTION 2. Time for filing; extension — The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition.24
[S]ince the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the petition under Rule 65, any alleged errors committed by it in the exercise of its jurisdiction would be errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari. If the aggrieved party fails to do so within the reglementary period, and the decision accordingly becomes final and executory, he cannot avail himself of the writ of certiorari, his predicament being the effect of his deliberate inaction.
The appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, now Rule 45 and Rule 65, respectively, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 45 is clear that the decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceeding involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. Under Rule 45 the reglementary period to appeal is fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or denial of motion for reconsideration.
[x x x x]
For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to issue, a petitioner must show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against its perceived grievance. A remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency. In this case, appeal was not only available but also a speedy and adequate remedy.27
- The CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed decision and resolution when it ruled that petitioner is not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.
- The CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed decision and resolution when it solely gave credence to the certification of the company physician without considering the findings of petitioner's doctor of choice.29
[T]he seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA [SEC] and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition. (Emphasis supplied)
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 4-31.
2 CA rollo, pp. 240-255; penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez and concurred in by Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes
3 Id. at 38-47.
4 Id. at 56-57.
5 Id. at 256-257.
6 Id. at 85.
7 Id. at 87-88.
8 Id. at 89.
9 Id. at 90.
10 Id. at 91.
11 Id. at 92.
12 Id. at 93.
13 Id. at 112.
14 Id. at 58-60.
15 Id. at 95-105.
16 Id. at 49-54.
17 Id. at 54.
18 Id. at 133-146.
19Supra note 3.
20 Id at 46.
21Supra note 2.
22 Id. at 254.
23Supra note 1 at 5.
24 RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Secs. 1 and 2.
25Butuan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 808 Phil. 443, 451 (2017).
26Hanjin Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd v. Court of Appeals, 521 Phil. 224, 244-245 (2006).
27Asian Transmission Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 469 Phil. 496, 504 (2004). Citations omitted.
28Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 155, 179 (1997).
29Supra note 1 at 13.
30 531 Phil. 620 (2006).
31 Id. at 630. Citations omitted.
32 Id. at 631.
33Supra note 2 at 252.
34 588 Phil. 895 (2008).
35 680 Phil. 137 (2012).
36 686 Phil. 255 (2012).
37 694 Phil. 239 (2012).
38 692 Phil. 632 (2012)
39 702 Phil. 717 (2013)
40 G.R. No. 228684, March 6, 2019 citing Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar, 702 Phil. 717 (2013).
41Hernandez v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, G.R. No. 226103, January 24, 2018. Citations omitted.
42 Id.
43Multinational Ship Management, Inc. v. Briones, G.R. No. 239793, January 27, 2020 citing INC Shipmanagement, Inc. et al. v. Rosales, 744 Phil. 774, 787 (2014).
44Pacific Ocean Manning Inc. v. Solacito, G.R. No. 217431, February 19, 2020 citing INC Shipmanagement, Inc. et al. v. Rosales, 744 Phil. 774, 786-787 (2014).
45Magsaysay Maritime Corp. et al. v. Verga, G.R. No. 221250, October 10, 2018 citing Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Rapiz, 803 Phil. 266, 272 (2017).cralawredlibrary