FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 229440, July 14, 2021
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., DONNA CUETO, ARTEMIO T. ENGRACIA, JR., AND ABELARDO S. ULANDAY, Petitioners, v. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CAGUIOA, J.:
On December 4, 2001, the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on its front page a news article with the heading: "PCGG: no to coconut levy agreement" co-written by [Cueto] and [Pazzibugan].
In the said news article, the following statements were made:In her public statement since the controversy on the settlement erupted last week, Yorac said the settlement would allow Marcos cronies, who had benefited from the coco levy fund, particularly businessman Eduardo "Danding" [Cojuangco], Jr., Zamboanga City Mayor Maria Clara Lobregat and former Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, to keep their plundered loot.
x x x
The present terms of the compromise agreement brokered by Dante Ang for an unknown client will neither provide economic relief for millions of coconut farmer nor attain the equally important policy of recovering ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses, Danding Cojuangco, Clara Lobregat, Juan Ponce Enrile and the Accra lawyers who helped them plunder the coco levy fund, Yorac said.
After reading the news article, [Enrile], through his counsel[,] wrote to Commissioner Yorac to confirm whether she uttered the defamatory words attributed against her.
In response, Commissioner Yorac issued a Letter dated 6 December 2001 denying the statements attributed to her by the Inquirer and claimed that "There was not a single instance in all interviews or even in discussions with the President that the name of Mr. Juan Ponce Enrile was mentioned. I have nothing to do with the statements that were attributed to me relative to Mr. Ponce Enrile in the entire story."
In another Letter dated 6 December 2001, Commissioner Yorac called the attention of the Inquirer to correct the news article. She mentioned, among others, that, "Your reporters did not interview me either in person or by telephone. I did not issue a statement, or cause one to be issued or consent to the issuance of any statement and the words quoted are not mine. Please make the proper correction."
Consequently, on 6 December 2001, [Enrile,] through his counsel[,] sent a Letter dated 4 December 2001 to Defendants-Appellants5 demanding that they rectify the wrong committed against him and to apologize publicly. However, his demand was left unheeded.
On 10 December 2001, Commissioner Yorac sent another Letter addressed to Mr. Raul Palabrica of the Inquirer, reiterating that a correction be made regarding the news article on the coco levy fund.
In a follow-up Letter dated 12 December 2001 addressed to the Inquirer, Commissioner Yorac clarified that the source of the news article was not an official statement from the PCGG, to wit:The supposed PCGG statement of December 2, 2001 was not a Commission statement. There were no consultations with, advice to or clearance from me or the majority of the Commissioners on the statement or the issuance of the same.
December 2, 2001 was a Sunday and there was no one in the office. This should have cautioned your reporter to verify the character of the statement; with me or the Commissioners.
[Enrile] repeatedly demanded that the news article be corrected but his demands proved futile as no correction was made. Left with no recourse, he filed a Complaint for Damages against Defendants-Appellants alleging that the news article imputed upon him defamatory acts of (a) having benefited from [the] coco levy fund, (b) accumulating ill-gotten wealth, and (c) being a Marcos crony.
In their Answer, Defendants-Appellants contended that the Complaint failed to state a cause of action against them. They claimed that if the questioned paragraphs in the news article are to be read in its entirety, it will disclose that it did not impute any crime, anomaly or wrongdoing against [Enrile] They insisted that the news article only narrates or reports what the PCGG, through its Commissioner[,] has stated to be the reason for objecting to, or finding as unacceptable, the reported compromise agreement on the coconut levy funds. The mention of [Enrile]'s name along with the other persons, was merely incidental to the PCGG's explanation of its position against the compromise agreement. Defendants-Appellants added that the news article is a true and fair report on a matter of public interest and concern, and hence, privileged in nature.6
At the time of writing the said news reports, she has had no commercial, personal and social business with plaintiff Senator Juan Ponce Enrile. When she was writing the article, she was not even thinking of [Enrile] as her only concern was about the coconut levy settlement and that she needs to meet the deadline. She wrote the subject news report because the issue is a matter of public interest and as a journalist, she has the responsibility to write it, being the one assigned to PCGG. Thereafter, one of her editors called her up seeking clarification on the matter because Commissioner Yorac was denying that she made those statements and because [Enrile] was threatening to file a libel suit.
After hearing this, she was surprised because she thought all the while that Commissioner Carranza had the go signal of Commissioner Yorac. She then confronted Commissioner Carranza and asked him why did this happen. He told her not to worry and that he was going to make a sworn affidavit. He assured her that there would be no problem and the case will be later on dismissed because it was privileged communication. She recorded this conversation with Commissioner Carranza, who knew he was being recorded because the tape recorder was in front of him. As far as he knows, the said press statement was used by Estrella Torres of Today newspaper and Sheila Crisostomo of The Philippine Star.
x x x
On the continuation of her cross-examination, she testified that in 2001 when the subject article was printed and published, defendant [Inquirer] was already one of the leading newspapers in the country; that [Inquirer] is known to be a credible newspaper that if a story is published in [Inquirer], there is a great chance that people will believe it; that as a journalist, her job is to report the truth and verify the facts that she reports; that "plundering or looting government funds" is a very serious accusation; that Commissioner Carranza handed her the press statement on Sunday and she submitted the draft on the article on Monday afternoon the next day; that on Monday morning she called up the office of Commissioner Yorac to verify the press statement but she was told that the latter was in a meeting in Malacanang regarding the coconut levy settlement; that she waited for Commissioner Yorac but until the deadline time, the latter didn't return to the PCGG office; that she did not call Commissioner Avena because she was told that the latter was not involved in the coconut levy settlement; that it was Commissioner Carranza who requested her to immediately release the said press statement and that what she verifies in writing a news report is whether the facts came from a certain government official and not the contents thereof.
She likewise testified that in practice, they usually rely on the statements or announcements given by a government official if the news report is not an investigative item; that she did not verify the truth of the statement that [Enrile] "has plundered loot" or that he benefited from the coconut levy fund because her basis was the PCGG statement; that she had no reason to doubt the PCGG press statement because it was handed to her by Commissioner Carranza; that her editor asked her if they can attribute the statement to Commissioner Yorac and in turn, she asked Commissioner Carranza if she can use the name of Commissioner Yorac instead of PCGG; that she did not interview [Enrile] before and after writing the subject article; that [Inquirer] later published an article saying that the PCGG's statement that was used in the subject article was not Yorac's words but that it came from a high government official and that she was not sure if there was an apology in the article that was subsequently printed.7
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING the defendants Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc., Donna S. Cueto, Letty Jimenez-Magsanoc, Artemio T. Engracia, Jr. and Abelardo S. Ulanday to JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY pay the plaintiff the following:
(a) Moral damages in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) (b) Exemplary damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00); and (c) Attorney's fees and costs of suit in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00)
x x x
SO ORDERED.9 (Emphasis in the original)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 30 October 2013 and Order dated 25 April 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Civil Case No. 02-348 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in so far as:
(1) Moral damages is REDUCED from P2,000,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 (2) Exemplary damages is REDUCED from P500,000.00 to P200,000.00 and; (3) Attorney's fees is REDUCED from P250,000.00 to P100,000.00
SO ORDERED.16
In libel cases, the question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what the words used by him mean.
Here, the defamatory character of the phrases used by Defendants-Appellants are undeniably defamatory for they attributed upon [Enrile] several dishonorable acts and condition. No amount of explanation can hide, much less erase, the negative impression already created in the minds of the readers towards him who at that time was neither charged nor convicted for any crime involving the coco levy fund.
For these reasons, we agree with the trial court that the subject news article is defamatory for it imputed upon [Enrile] a discreditable act and condition thereby exposing him to public contempt and ridicule.18
In her public statement since the controversy on the settlement erupted last week, Yorac said the settlement would allow Marcos cronies, who had benefited from the coco levy fund, particularly businessman Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, Jr., Zamboanga City Mayor Maria Clara Lobregat and former Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile, to keep their plundered loot."
x x x
The present terms of the compromise agreement brokered by Dante Ang for an unknown client will neither provide economic relief for millions of coconut farmer nor attain the equally important policy of recovering ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses, Danding Cojuangco, Clara Lobregat, Juan Ponce Enrile and the Accra lawyers who helped them plunder the coco levy fund, Yorac said.28
A careful reading of the relevant portions of the subject article shows that it called several persons, included [Enrile], a "Marcos crony"; that it stated that such persons benefited from the coco levy fund; that the proposed settlement will allow said persons [to] "keep their plundered loot" and that [the] terms of the compromise agreement will not attain the policy of recovering ill-gotten wealth from said persons and that such persons "helped them plunder coco levy fund".
Clearly, the subject articles contain defamatory imputations as they all exposed [Enrile] to public contempt and ridicule, for they imputed to him a discreditable act (the act of plundering or benefitting from plunder of the coco levy fund) and condition (him labeled as a Marcos crony).30
The Court cannot sustain the findings of the RTC and the CA that this article was libelous. Viewed in its entirety, the article withholds the finding that it impeaches the virtue, credit, and reputation of Domingo. The article was but a fair and true report by Batuigas based on the documents received by him and thus exempts him from criminal liability x x x[.]
x x x
The article cannot be considered as defamatory because Batuigas had not ascribed to Domingo the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, or any act or omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit the latter. The article was merely a factual report which, to stress, [was] based on the letter of the Waray employees reiterating their earlier complaints against Domingo and other co-workers at the DTI Region VIII. "Where the words imputed [are] not defamatory in character, a libel charge will not prosper. Malice is necessarily rendered immaterial."34 (Emphasis supplied)
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.45
[t]he rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press x x x [which] constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in the statute punishing libels.54
[a] rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code, it would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a self-governing community. Without free speech and assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. As Justice Brandeis has said, "public discussion is a political duty" and the "greatest menace to freedom is an inert people."60
A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a "public personage." He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person.65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this case, while it is undisputed that the questioned news article deals with matters of public interest, the relevant portion of which were shown to have been written and published with the knowledge that they are false.
As borne by the records, Defendants-Appellants knew that neither the PCGG nor Commissioner Yorac issued any statement regarding the serious criminal imputations, vices or defects against [Enrile].
x x x
Furthermore, the trial court aptly ruled that Defendants-Appellants published the news article with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Although Defendants-Appellants claim that the news article was based from a PCGG statement, they failed to prove that it was indeed an official statement of the PCGG.
As keenly observed by the trial court, the alleged PCGG statement does not even bear the official letterhead of the PCGG. Upon further scrutiny, it is apparent that it was not signed by any official of the PCGG and the purported date of its issuance was a non-working day. Clearly the presence of these irregularities should have raised serious doubts on Defendants-Appellants and impelled them to verify the truth of the statement.
However, no attempt was made by Defendants-Appellants to ascertain much less counter check its veracity. What is more, they adamantly refused to correct the false statement despite the clarification made by Commissioner Yorac that the same is not an official statement of the PCGG.73
In the instant case, we find no conclusive showing that the published articles in question were written with knowledge that these were false or in reckless disregard of what was false or not. According to Manila Bulletin reporter Edgardo T. Suarez, he got the story from a fellow reporter who told him that the disqualification case against petitioner was granted. PDI [(Philippine Daily Inquirer)], on the other hand, said that they got the story from a press release the very same day the Manila Bulletin published the same story. PDI claims that the press release bore COMELEC's letterhead, signed by one Sonia Dimasupil, who was in- charge of COMELEC press releases. They also tried to contact her but she was out of the office. Since the news item was already published in the Manila Bulletin, they felt confident the press release was authentic. Following the narration of events narrated by respondents, it cannot be said that the publications were published with reckless disregard of what is false or not.
Nevertheless, even assuming that the contents of the articles turned out to be false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy.
A newspaper, especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for malice or damages, i.e., libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community.
Likewise, in our view, respondents' failure to counter-check their report or present their informant should not be a reason to hold them liable. While substantiation of the facts supplied is an important reporting standard, still, a reporter may rely on information given by a lone source although it reflects only one side of the story provided the reporter does not entertain a "high degree of awareness of [its] probable falsity." Petitioner, in this case, presented no proof that respondents entertained such awareness. Failure to present respondents' informant before the court should not be taken against them.
Worth stressing, jurisprudence instructs us that a privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds for malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.76 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
ATTY. MEDINA: At any rate your Honor, just to expedite the proceedings, we are willing to stipulate and admit to the fact that Commissioner Caranza in fact submitted a piece of paper, copy of which was marked as Exhibit "1", to the witness your Honor. COURT: Alright, so, admitted. Then there's no need to prove. ATTY. PAGDANGANAN: That Caranzan (sic) gave her the statement. ATTY. MEDINA: Only that part your Honor, that Commissioner Caranza. COURT: That Commissioner Caranza handed the statement allegedly.78
On petitioner's claim for damages, we find no evidence to support their award. Indeed, it cannot be said that respondents published the questioned articles for the sole purpose of harassing petitioner. Proof and motive that the publication was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate petitioner has not been clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the petitioner to damages. There remains unfulfilled the need to prove that the publications were made with actual malice — that is, with the knowledge of the publications' falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
x x x
Damages, in our view, could not simply arise from an inaccurate or false statement without irrefutable proof of actual malice as element of the assailed publication.79 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The questioned portion of the news article, while unfortunately not quite accurate, on its own, is insufficient to establish the element of malice in libel cases. We have held that malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.
The lack of malice on the part of the PDI Staff in the quoting of Mendoza's allegation of a sexual harassment suit is furthermore patent in the tenor of the article: it was a straightforward narration, without any comment from the reporter, of the alleged mauling incident involving Judge Cruz.81 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
We must however take this opportunity to likewise remind media practitioners of the high ethical standards attached to and demanded by their noble profession. The danger of an unbridled irrational exercise of the right of free speech and press, that is, in utter contempt of the rights of others and in willful disregard of the cumbrous responsibilities inherent in it, is the eventual self-destruction of the right and the regression of human society into a veritable Hobbesian state of nature where life is short, nasty and brutish. Therefore, to recognize that there can be no absolute "unrestraint" in speech is to truly comprehend the quintessence of freedom in the marketplace of social thought and action, genuine freedom being that which is limned by the freedom of others. If there is freedom of the press, ought there not also be freedom from the press? It is in this sense that self-regulation as distinguished from self-censorship becomes the ideal mean for, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has warned, "[W]ithout x x x a lively sense of responsibility, a free press may readily become a powerful instrument of injustice."
Lest we be misconstrued, this is not to diminish nor constrict that space in which expression freely flourishes and operates. For we have always strongly maintained, as we do now, that freedom of expression is man's birthright — constitutionally protected and guaranteed, and that it has become the singular role of the press to act as its "defensor fidei" in a democratic society such as ours. But it is also worth keeping in mind that the press is the servant, not the master, of the citizenry, and its freedom does not carry with it an unrestricted hunting license to prey on the ordinary citizen.83
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good.86
Endnotes:
1Quisumbing v. Lopez, 96 Phil. 510, 515 (1955).
2Rollo, pp. 10-42.
3 Id. at 44-59. Penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez (now a Member of this Court) with Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Leoncia R. Dimagiba concurring.
4 Id. at 61-63.
5 Herein petitioners, and also Jimenez-Magsanoc and Isagani Yambot.
6Rollo, pp. at 45-46.
7 Id. at 117-119.
8 Id. at 110-127. Penned by Presiding Judge Benjamin T. Pozon.
9 Id. at 126-127.
10 Id. at 120.
11 Id. at 124.
12 Id. at 124-125.
13 Id. at 128-142.
14 Id. at 143.
15 Supra note 3.
16Rollo, p. 58.
17 Id. at 51.
18 Id. at 52.
19 Id. at 55.
20 Id. at 55.
21 Id. at 56
22 Supra note 4.
23 Id. at 69-83.
24 Id. at 98-106
25Rollo, p. 73.
26Villanueva v. Philippine Daily Inquirer, G.R. No. 164437, May 15, 2009, 588 SCRA 1, 11-12.
27Yambot v. Tuquero, 661 Phil. 599, 608 (2011).
28Rollo, p. 45.
29 Id. at 74.
30 Id. at 121
31 Id. at 51.
32Manila Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Domingo, 813 Phil. 37, 56 (2017).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 58-59.
35 Supra note 1, at 513.
36Rollo, p. 50.
37Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp., G.R. No. 184315, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 684.
38 Id. at 709
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44Villanueva v. Philippine Daily Inquirer, supra note 26, at 12.
45 Id., citing REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 354.
46Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp., supra note 37, at 710.
47Borjal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999, 301 SCRA 1, 21.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp., supra note 37, at 710.
52Yambot v. Tuquero, supra note 27, at 611.
53 Supra note 44.
54 Id. at 22.
55Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp., supra note 37, at 710.
56 (1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; (2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions; (3) fair commentaries on matters of public interest; and (4) fair reports on matters of public interest.
57 Id. at 710-711.
58 Id. at 714.
59 G.R. No. 118971, September 15, 1999, 314 SCRA 460.
60 Id. at 477.
61Rollo, p. 123.
62 679 Phil. 508 (2012).
63 Id. at 603-604.
64 G.R. No. 82380, 82398, April 29, 1988, 160 SCRA 861.
65 Id. at 874-875.
66 Id. at 876.
67Villanueva v. Philippine Daily Inquirer, supra note 26, at 13.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70Borjal v. Court of Appeals, supra note 47, at 28.
71 Id.
72Rollo, p. 54, citing Villanueva v. Philippine Daily Inquirer, supra note 26.
73 Id. at 55-56.
74Manila Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Domingo, supra note 32, at 67.
75 Supra note 26.
76 Id. at 14-16.
77 Id. at 15.
78 TSN dated September 8, 2008, p. 25, rollo, p. 167.
79Villanueva v. Philippine Daily Inquirer, supra note 26, at 17-18.
80 Supra note 27.
81 Id. at 609-610.
82 Supra note 47, at 10.
83 Id. at 31-32.
84 Supra note 1.
85 37 Phil. 731 (1918).
86 Id. at 740-741.cralawredlibrary