FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 249322, September 14, 2021
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUVENAL AZURIN Y BLANQUERA, Accused-Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CAGUIOA, J.:
This is an Appeal,1 filed pursuant to Section 1(a), Rule XI of the 2018 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan2 (Sandiganbayan Rules), from the Decision3 dated April 26, 2019 (assailed Decision) and Resolution dated August 14, 2019 (assailed Resolution), both of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, in SB 16-CRM-0127, which found accused-appellant Juvenal Azurin y Blanquera (Azurin) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave Threats under Article 282, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The accusatory portion of the Information against Azurin reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That on November 13, 2013, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused JUVENAL AZURIN y BLANQUERA, a public officer, being the Regional Director of Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)-Regional Office No. 2, Camo Adduru, Barangay Caggay, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, committing the offense herein charged in relation to his office and taking advantage of his position, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously threaten, without condition, his subordinate Jaime J. Clave with the infliction of a wrong amounting to a crime by uttering the following words during their telephone conversation: "Putang-ina mo Clave ha, putangina mo Bobot, papatayin kita", over office internal matters and conflict, which threatened the said Jaime J. Clave and causing the latter to fear for his life, believing that accused, as PDEA Regional Director, has the capacity and means to carry out the threat.Upon arraignment, Azurin pleaded "not guilty".5 Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Azurin repeated the remark, "Clave, papatayin kita" several times during the conversation. Clave suspected that Azurin was upset because Clave had sent a text message to the PDEA Deputy Director General for Administration (DDGA) regarding some office issues pertaining to operational funds. Clave feared for his life as he knew that Azurin, being a PDEA RD who had an office-issued firearm, a former Navy officer and a member of the Magdalo group, was capable of carrying out his threats.
Azurin : Clave, asan ka na? Clave : Andito na sa Tuguegarao, Sir. Azurin : Clave, may sama ka ba ng loob sa akin? Clave : Wala, Sir. Bakit, Sir? x x x x Azurin : Napagtagpi-tagpi ko na. Apat na tao na. Napagtagpi-tagpi ko na na ikaw lang ang may sama ng loob sa akin. Apat na tao na ang nakausap ko. x x x x Clave, Papatayin kita!6
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Juvenal B. Azurin GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave threats, as defined and penalized in Article 282, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and in default of any modifying circumstance in attendance, hereby sentences him to suffer a straight penalty of imprisonment of Two (2) months and a fine in the amount of Five Hundred Pesos ([P]500.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency[,] and to pay costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibraryThe Sandiganbayan found all three elements of grave threats (not subject to a condition) present. It gave credence to the version of facts of the prosecution and ruled that although the threats were only made in a telephone conversation, hence with no independent corroboration, the immediate reaction of Clave after the conversation coupled with the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on antecedent and succeeding events were sufficient to support a finding of guilt against Azurin.14
SO ORDERED.13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The proper mode of appeal from the Sandiganbayan's judgment nof conviction in the exercise of its original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court is via a Notice of Appeal pursuant to the Sandiganbayan Rules. |
The People challenges this mode of appeal taken by Azurin and asserts that the correct remedy is a petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules)24 and Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 160625 otherwise known as the Sandiganbayan Law. Rule 45 of the Rules provides:chanroblesvirtualawlibraryREVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS
Section 1. Methods of Review. -
(a) In General. - The appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal cases decided by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be by notice of appeal filed with the Sandiganbayan and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 7 of P.D. 1606,26 provides:chanroblesvirtualawlibraryRULE 45 Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other court s whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. x x x [The petition] shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC) (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. -Indeed, the foregoing legal provisions vary as to the mode of appeal of criminal cases decided by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Under the Sandiganbayan Rules, it is by notice of appeal filed with the Sandiganbayan while under the Rules and P.D. 1606, it is by petition for review on certiorari filed with the Court. Azurin took the former mode while the People argues it should be the latter. Which is correct?
x x x
Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case decided by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher is imposed, the decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in the Rules of Court. In case the penalty imposed is death review by the Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not the accused filed an appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that the [Sandiganbayan Rules] specifically provide for the modes of review of judgments and final orders of the Sandiganbayan, the Rules of Court can only apply in a suppletory manner and cannot supplant the procedure set forth in the [Sandiganbayan Rules] which were promulgated specifically to govern actions and proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. Neither can the procedure provided in P.D. No. 1606 nor in any of its amendatory laws prevail over that provided by this Court upon which no less than the fundamental law has bestowed exclusive power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.29Applying Talaue to the present case, the mode of appeal taken by Azurin of filing a notice of appeal with the Sandiganbayan pursuant to the Sandiganbayan Rules was proper. The Sandiganbayan Rules prevail over the Rules as it is a later set of rules and a special statute specifically providing for modes of review of judgments and final orders of the Sandiganbayan. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law.30 As it is, the Sandiganbayan Rules effectively amended the relevant provisions of the Rules and the latter apply only in a suppletory manner.31 Hence, Rule 45 of the Rules being invoked by the People is unavailing in the present case.
The Sandiganbayan correctly found Azurin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Grave Threats (without a condition) under Article 282, paragraph 2 of the RPC. |
ARTICLE 282. Grave Threats. - Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall suffer:The elements of the crime charged are that (1) the offender threatened another person with the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) the threat was not subject to a condition.35 This felony is consummated "x x x as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened."36
x x x
2. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the threat shall not have been made subject to a condition.
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.Indeed, it is well-settled that in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court, owing to the latter's peculiar position of observing, first hand, the witnesses as they testified.41
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court's finding, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
x x x x40
Although it may be said that the alleged threatening statements were only made during the telephone conversation between the [Azurin] and [ ] Clave, hence, with no independent corroboration, the immediate reaction of [ ] Clave after the conversation coupled with the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses showing antecedent events will show that the threats and the incident themselves must be given much credence. This is of course aside from the fact that the accused himself admitted the telephone conversation.These findings already address the factual issues raised by Azurin in the present Appeal. Additionally, the Court meets his claim that the prosecution's evidence consisting of the statements of IO2 Mendoza and IO1 Agleham are hearsay, thus inadmissible in evidence against him. To recall, IO2 Mendoza testified that Azurin told her after the incident, "namura ko si Bobot (Clave)" and "kung ano yong nangyari sa amin ni Bobot, personal na namin yon."43 On the other hand, IO1 Agleham testified that prior to the incident, he and Azurin had a conversation regarding the change of their team leader and that Azurin had mentioned that Clave was being relieved of his designation as team leader because of an incident that occurred between them.44
Aside from the testimony of [ ] Clave, this Court also gave sufficient weight to the statements of prosecution witness [ ] Cabalza, the then NDIS Administrator of the Intelligence and Investigation Section, PDEA-[RO II], in her Affidavits both dated November 19, 2013 (Exhs. "E" and "F"), where she had a conversation with [Azurin] on November 11, 2013 or prior to the incident in this case, showing [Azurin's] intense anger and propensity to kill the person behind the text message to the [DDGA].
x x x
The actual telephone conversation between [Azurin] and [ ] Clave was confirmed by [Azurin] himself to prosecution witness Cabalza during their meeting on December 3, 2013.
x x x
[Azurin] himself also talked about his anger at [ ] Clave with [IO2 Mendoza] and [IO1 Agleham], whom he summoned to his office on November 16, 2013. During this meeting, [Azurin] mentioned to the two (2) witnesses that "Namura ko si Bobot" and "Kung ano yong nangyari sa amin ni Bobot, personal na naming yon."
This Court further considered the demeanor displayed and the actions taken by [ ] Clave after the alleged threatening remarks. Not only did he immediately report the incident to the Tuguegarao City Police Station but also filed a criminal complaint for grave threats with the Office of the Ombudsman and an administrative complaint before the PDEA Internal Affairs. [ ] Clave also testified that he feared for his life every time he goes out of the house and did not even see [Azurin] or visited him in the office immediately after that incident.
These clearly demonstrate[] the normal reaction of a terrified person fearing for his life. It appears that the alleged threatening remarks even produced mental disturbance on [ ] Clave, knowing the capacity of [Azurin], being his superior, to execute the threat to kill and that the accused had firearms and connections, being a former navy officer and member of the Magdalo group.
We further found it unusual for [Azurin] to be calling [ ] Clave in the middle of the night to merely inform him of his relief/re-assignment from his current post. This information neither pertains to a serious matter nor requires urgent action. Of note is that the alleged call was made on November 13, 2013 while the Office Order for the relief of Clave was only prepared on November 15, 2013, to take effect on November 18, 2013.
The foregoing circumstances le[a]d Us to the conclusion that the real reason for the late night telephone call was for [Azurin] to confront [ ] Clave on [his] suspicion that [Clave] was the one who texted the [DDGA] regarding some issues on the operational funds of their office.
We also scrutinized the evidence of [Azurin]. However, much of it were either denials or substantially self-serving and uncorroborated.42
Thus, while it is true that the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. For this reason, the statement attributed to Dominga regarding the source of the funds used to purchase the subject property related to the court by Margarita is admissible if only to establish the fact that such statement was made and the tenor thereof.46Hence, from all of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to reverse the finding made by the Sandiganbayan that Azurin is guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt. However, the penalty of two (2) months imprisonment imposed by the Sandiganbayan must be amended. There being no modifying circumstance, as the Sandiganbayan had found, the penalty should be taken from the medium period of arresto mayor, which ranges from two (2) months and one (1) day to four (4) months. Hence, the Court deems it proper to modify the penalty of imprisonment to two (2) months and one (1) day. The fine, the subsidiary imprisonment and the order to pay the cost of suit are proper and are, thus, affirmed.
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 18-19.
2 A.M. No. 13-7-05-SB, promulgated on October 9, 2018.
3Rollo, pp. 8-17. Penned by Associate Justice Bernelito R. Fernandez and concurred in by Presiding Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang and Associate Justice Sarah Jane T. Fernandez.
4 Id. at 8-9.
5 Id. at 9.
6 Id. at 5-6.
7 Id. at 5-7.
8 Id. at 12.
9 Id. at 7-8.
10 Id. at 8.
11 Id. at 9.
12 Id. at 10-12.
13 Id. at 16. Emphasis in the original.
14 Id. at 14.
15 Id. at 27-34. Excluding Annexes.
16 Id. at 28.
17 Id. at 28-30.
18 Id. at 30.
19 Id. at 31-32.
20 A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC entitled, "RE: EXPANSION OF THF COVERAGE OF THE RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE," approved on September 24, 2002.
21Rollo, pp. 50-74.
22 Id. at 63-68.
23 Id. at 68-72.
24 Per Resolution of the Supreme Court in Bar Matter No. 803 adopted on April 8, 1997 and made ective on July 1, 1997.
25 Entitled, "REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1486 CREATING A SPECIAL COURT TO BE KNOWN AS 'SANDIGANBAYAN' AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," signed on December 10, 1978.
26 As amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7975 entitled "AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED," approved on March 30, 1995.
27 G.R. No. 248652, January 12, 2021, accessed at .
28 Otherwise known as the "REVISED GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE ACT OF 1997."
29People v. Talaue, supra note 27, at 11.
30Lopez, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 87119, April 16, 1991, 195 SCRA 777, 782.
31People v. Talaue, supra note 27.
32 Id.; see Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, 774 SCRA 431, 505; also see CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5.
33 G.R. Nos. 144760-61, August 2, 2017, 833 SCRA 614.
34 See People v. Talaue, supra note 27.
35Reyes v. People, Nos. L-21528 and L-21529, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 686, 691.
36Paera v. People, G.R. No. 181626, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 384, 389-390.
37Rollo, pp. 28-30.
38See People v. Talaue, supra note 27.
39 G.R. No. 197815, February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 639.
40 Id. at 643. Citations and emphasis omitted.
41 See People v. Gerola, G.R. No. 217973, 831 SCRA 469, 478.
42Rollo, pp. 14-16.
43 Id. at 8.
44 Id.
45People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 103547, July 20, 1999, 310 SCRA 621, 633.
46Comilang v. Burcena, G.R. No. 146853, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 342, 351-352.cralawredlibrary