EN BANC
G.R. No. 196359. May 11, 2021
ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL, Petitioner, v. MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
Given the variability and intensity of intimate human relationships, Article 36 of the Family Code on psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage was intended to be humane and evolved on a case-to-case basis, but resilient in its application. However, diametrically opposed to this intent, this Court's interpretation of the provision—beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals1 and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina2 —has proven to be restrictive, rigid, and intrusive on our rights to liberty, autonomy, and human dignity.
It is time to restate the current doctrine in light of the evolution of science, subsequent cases, and other contemporary circumstances.
This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision4 and Resolution5 The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Decision6 of the Regional Trial Court that voided the marriage between Rosanna L. Tan-Andal and Mario Victor M. Andal due to psychological incapacity. The trial court likewise awarded the sole custody of the parties' daughter, Ma. Samantha, to Rosanna.
Mario Victor M. Andal (Mario) and Rosanna L. Tan (Rosanna) married on December 16, 1995 at the Saints Peter and Paul Parish in Poblacion, Makati City.7 On July 27, 1996, Rosanna gave birth to Ma. Samantha, the only child of the parties.8 The family lived in a duplex in Parañaque City, with Rosanna's parents living in the other half of the duplex.9
After four years of marriage, Mario and Rosanna separated in 2000.10 Rosanna has since kept the sole custody of Ma. Samantha.11
On December 18, 2001, Mario filed a Petition12 for custody of Ma. Samantha before the Regional Trial Court. Mario argued that he and his wife had equal rights to the custody of Ma. Samantha, thus praying that he be allowed to exercise parental authority over his daughter.13
On August 6, 2003, Rosanna filed a Petition14 for declaration of nullity of her marriage, claiming that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to her.
The Regional Trial Court ordered the prosecutor to report on the parties' possible collusion in filing the Petition.15 In a February 18, 2004 Report,16 Prosecutor Gil V. Savedia declared that he found no signs of collusion between Mario and Rosanna.
The cases for custody and declaration of nullity were then consolidated in a September 2, 2004 Order.17
According to Rosanna, she first met Mario in 1975 through the Legion of Mary at the Saints Peter and Paul Parish in Makati.18 They wrote each other letters until 1978, when they lost contact with each other.19
The parties reconnected in 1995 when Mario sought out Rosanna through their childhood friends.20 When they finally met again, Mario was in the Philippines for a two-month vacation from his work in Italy.21 He then persisted in asking out Rosanna for a date. As Mario was set to leave in June 1995, Rosanna agreed to have dinner with him.22
Mario then courted Rosanna, declaring that he had been in love with her for the past 20 years.23 Rosanna eventually fell in love with Mario and agreed to be his girlfriend.24
Mario did not leave for Italy in June, giving him more time to spend with Rosanna.25 On June 17, 1995, Mario proposed and Rosanna agreed to marry him in December that year.26
While they were together, Rosanna noticed that there were times when Mario "would be unaccounted for a whole night or an entire day[.]"27 When asked where he went, Mario would allegedly say that he was working.28
Mario also kept postponing his trip back to Italy. When asked why, Mario would either say that he was with friends or that he was "preparing for [his and Rosanna's] future."29 Since Mario was allegedly affectionate whenever they were together, Rosanna believed him.30
According to Rosanna, Mario once told her of a plan to blow up a ship to get back at a Taiwanese national who had cheated on his friend in a business deal.31 Rosanna first thought that Mario had been joking, but when Mario appeared serious about his plan, she said that she did not want to get involved in any of his "shady deals."32
In July 1995, Mario finally left for Italy, promising Rosanna that he would be back by November for their December wedding.33 However, Mario was back by September, barely two months after he had left. It turned out that Mario had quit his job.34
After Mario's return, Rosanna noticed that Mario always went out at night and would come back home at dawn, either alone or with his friends.35 He also had difficulty in managing his finances, with his siblings allegedly calling Rosanna and telling her that their brother was financially incapable of supporting a family.36 However, Rosanna was already deeply in love with Mario, so she told his sisters that she accepted Mario for who he was.37
Nevertheless, there were times when Mario would allegedly be extremely irritable and moody, causing Rosanna to have second thoughts about marrying him.38 However, by November 1995, Rosanna was already pregnant with their child.39 When Rosanna told Mario about it, he became more eager to marry her. He even gave Rosanna US$1,000.00, the only money he had, before their wedding.40
Instead of spending the US$1,000.00 for their wedding, Rosanna returned the money to Mario and encouraged him to open a current account for his personal expenses. Mario accepted the money back.41 The parties eventually married on December 16, 1995.42
Since Mario had no work, Rosanna taught him to run Design and Construction Matrix, the construction firm she had set up before she married Mario. She also introduced Mario to firm clients and brought him with her to client meetings.43
Mario, however, continued with his "emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, irritability, and psychological imbalance."44 He would leave their house for several days without informing Rosanna of his whereabouts. Once he returned home, he would refuse to go out and would sleep for days.45 Mario was also "hyper-active"46 late at night.
Rosanna confronted Mario about his behavior. To Rosanna's shock, Mario admitted that he was using marijuana, although he claimed that he was not addicted and that he could stop anytime.47 He then promised to stop using it.48
Not keeping his promise, Mario continued with his drug use.49
The day after Rosanna gave birth to Ma. Samantha, Mario allegedly did not assist Rosanna. He left her in the hospital, knowing that she could not move until the effects of the spinal anesthesia had worn off. He only returned to the hospital later that evening to sleep.50
When Rosanna and Ma. Samantha were discharged from the hospital, Mario showed symptoms of paranoia. He thought everyone was out to attack him and, at times, would hide Ma. Samantha from those he thought were out to hurt them.51
Mario would also take large cash advances from Design and Construction Matrix every week.52 Rosanna only learned of Mario's numerous cash advances when an accounting personnel informed her that the firm could no longer pay the construction workers' salaries.53
Rosanna eventually got tired of Mario. She left him, brought Ma. Samantha with her, and stayed in an inn. She called up Mario to tell him of her and Ma. Samantha's whereabouts. Mario followed them to the inn and pleaded Rosanna to give him another chance. After Mario's pleas, Rosanna returned home with Ma. Samantha.54
Later, an employee at the firm handed Rosanna a packet of shabu that the employee allegedly found among Mario's office belongings. When she checked, Rosanna herself found packets of shabu among Mario's possessions.55
When Rosanna again confronted Mario about his drug use, he explained that it was the only way he could normally function due to the heavy pressures of work at the firm.56
In October 1998, Ma. Samantha had dengue fever and had to be confined at the hospital. Mario was not home and could not be reached. He arrived at the hospital only later that evening. He would then run around the different floors of the hospital, checking the medications prescribed to other dengue fever patients. He would also prevent the nurses from administering the prescribed medications to Ma. Samantha. When Ma. Samantha vomited, Mario, who was just sleeping by his daughter's side, would not clean her up. He would instead ignore the ill child, turn to the other side, and continue sleeping.57
Having had enough of Mario, Rosanna drove him out of the house. After several days, Mario returned home and pleaded Rosanna for another chance. Rosanna accepted Mario back, but kept a close eye on him.58
Later in November, Mario allegedly asked one of their helpers to prepare some clothes, feeding bottles, and milk for Ma. Samantha. Ma. Samantha's nanny noticed the helper fixing the bag, so she asked Rosanna where they would take the child. Rosanna, who was then working in their home office, rushed to Mario and asked him where he was bringing Ma. Samantha. Mario replied that he would only bring the child to Manila Memorial Park.59
Rosanna prohibited Mario from bringing Ma. Samantha out. She then called up Mario's siblings for help. Mario got furious, threatened everyone in the house, and left without returning home.60
After he had left, Mario made purchases using his supplementary credit card. Rosanna discovered that Mario used up the P10,000.00 credit limit of his Citibank Mastercard and the P8,000.00 credit limit of his Bank of the Philippine Islands card. Mario also purchased an P11,000.00 necklace at the Landmark Department Store in Makati.61
Several days after he had left home, Mario tried to return, but Rosanna turned him away. Mario banged the door, shouting, "Buksan niyo ito kundi sisirain ko ito!"62 Fearing Mario, Rosanna called her parents and beeped Mario's sisters for help. When Rosanna's parents and Mario's sisters arrived, however, Mario had already left.63
Later that day, Mario was found loitering near the house. With him were some travel documents, cash, and a checklist of European countries with the respective visa requirements for entry of a child for each country.64
After the door-banging incident, Mario's siblings brought him to the Medical City for detoxification. On November 29, 1998, Mario was committed for treatment at the Medical City for 14 days. After conducting tests on Mario, the doctors found him positive for drug use. Mario's siblings were then advised to commit him to a drug rehabilitation center for treatment. However, defying the doctor's orders, they had him discharged from the hospital without bringing him to a drug rehabilitation facility.65
Rosanna eventually closed Design and Construction Matrix due to financial losses. Mario's access to the company funds for his drug use allegedly used up the funds.66 To sustain her and her family's needs, Rosanna searched for a job and eventually worked as an executive assistant at the Government Service Insurance System Financial Center.67
Rosanna decided to have a duplex built on a lot in Parañaque City that her aunt, Rita M. Tan, had donated on August 25, 1998.68 Rosanna, Mario, and Ma. Samantha would live in one apartment, and Rosanna's parents would live in the other apartment.69
To save rent on the Makati apartment where they used to live, Mario, Rosanna, and Ma. Samantha moved into the unfinished Parañaque duplex. At first, Mario hesitated to move in, but he eventually agreed and asked that a four-square meter room at the back of the duplex be constructed. The small room would allegedly be Ma. Samantha's playroom. Rosanna opposed Mario as the room would be too small to be a playroom, but Mario insisted on its construction.70
The four-square meter room was eventually constructed, and Mario had an air conditioning unit installed inside. He also brought in a television set, a computer table, and some personal belongings into the room. He would then spend days in the room alone and, at times, would even bring Ma. Samantha with him. He even tinkered with the electrical wires of the duplex.71
In July 1999, an electrician working on the wires of the house opened the door to the small room. He found Mario and Ma. Samantha inside, with the room filled with smoke that did not quite smell of cigarettes. The electrician informed Rosanna of what he saw, and Rosanna knew that Mario relapsed into his drug use.72
Rosanna confronted Mario and pleaded with him to get treated. However, Mario got furious and Ma. Samantha, who saw her parents fighting, started crying. To protect Ma. Samantha, Rosanna brought the child to her parents on the other side of the duplex.73
Mario followed them to his parents-in-laws' house, forcing himself in to get Ma. Samantha. Rosanna had to call for police assistance to pacify Mario.74
Mario eventually calmed down when the police arrived. The police then searched Mario, finding packets of shabu in his person. They were about to bring Mario to the police station for detention when Rosanna pleaded with them not to take Mario. The police agreed, but they released Mario to his sister, Ma. Socorro.75
The next day, Rosanna tried to call Ma. Socorro to ask about Mario, but her calls were unanswered. Rosanna later learned that Mario had escaped from Ma. Socorro's house earlier that morning.76
It was after these incidents that Rosanna petitioned77 the Regional Trial Court to voluntarily commit Mario for drug rehabilitation at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation Center, and, eventually, at the Seagulls Flight Foundation (Seagulls).78
On February 14, 2000, Mario escaped from Seagulls,79 returning home and pleading with Rosanna to take him in again. Rosanna took her husband in, but Mario would again relapse into his drug use. He was also jobless and could not support his family.80
In June 2000, Ma. Samantha had to be rushed to the hospital for frequent vomiting. Mario, who was at home, did nothing, and Rosanna had to absent herself from work to rush the child to the hospital. Rosanna, who had no money with her that time, had to borrow money from Ma. Samantha's nanny. Rosanna's parents and siblings also shared in the child's hospital bills.81
In August 2000, Ma. Samantha again had severe upper respiratory tract infection and frequent vomiting. When her nanny was about to give her medicine, Mario prevented the nanny from doing so, saying that mangoes would cure Ma. Samantha.82
Two days later, Mario insisted on bringing Ma. Samantha to Makati Medical Center. Rosanna suggested that they instead bring Ma. Samantha together the next day, which was a Saturday. Mario suddenly yelled out, "Magnanakaw!" Rosanna, already exasperated, drove Mario out of the house. Mario, however, dashed to the second floor, still yelling, "Magnanakaw! Magnanakaw!"83
Police officers later arrived at their home, having been called by Rosanna and Mario's neighbors who had heard the screams coming from their house. Rosanna explained that it was her husband who was yelling and that he was a drug dependent who failed to complete his rehabilitation program. The police then brought Mario to the police station for questioning.84
Ma. Samantha saw her father screaming and the police taking him with them. The child cried and had to be brought to her grandparents' house to be pacified.85
Already at a loss with what to do, Rosanna phoned the director of Seagulls, who recommended that Mario be recommitted to the rehabilitation center to complete his rehabilitation program.86
Thus, Rosanna informed the trial court of Mario's relapse, causing the trial court to order87 Mario's recommitment to Seagulls. Mario remained confined there until December 24, 2000, when the rehabilitation center released Mario without completing his rehabilitation program.88
Rosanna wrote the trial court as to Mario's premature release from the rehabilitation center.89 Since Mario's release on December 24, 2000, Rosanna and Mario had separated and had not lived together. Mario also failed to give support to Rosanna and Ma. Samantha.90
These events, according to Rosanna, showed Mario's psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to her. Rosanna contended that Mario's drug use was the manifestation of a grave personality disorder "deeply rooted within [Mario's] adaptive system."91 She thus prayed that the trial court nullify their marriage and that she be declared the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land donated to her by her aunt as well as the duplex built on it.92
To prove Mario's psychological incapacity, Rosanna presented Dr. Valentina Del Fonso Garcia (Dr. Garcia), a physician-psychiatrist, as expert witness.
In her Judicial Affidavit,93 Dr. Garcia declared that she interviewed Rosanna and gathered data on Rosanna's family, educational, and employment history. She likewise conducted mental status examinations on Rosanna.
For data on Mario's social, sexual, and marital history, Dr. Garcia interviewed Rosanna, Ma. Samantha, and Jocelyn Genevieve L. Tan (Jocelyn Genevieve), Rosanna's sister.94
After evaluating the data, Dr. Garcia found Rosanna "psychologically capacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations."95 According to Dr. Garcia, Rosanna "has adequate social, interpersonal and occupational functioning."96
As for Mario, Dr. Garcia diagnosed him with narcissistic antisocial personality disorder and substance abuse disorder with psychotic features. Dr. Garcia characterized the disorder as:
... an abnormality in behavior known to have a pervasive pattern of grandiosity in fantasy or behavior, need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early childhood. People suffering from this disorder may have a grandiose sense of self-importance or may be preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success and power. They likewise believe that they are special and can be understood or should associate with high-status people. They also require excessive admiration, have a sense of entitlement and are envious of others or believe that others envyMario's narcissistic antisocial personality disorder, which Dr. Garcia found to be grave, with juridical antecedence, and incurable, allegedly rendered Mario psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to Rosanna. Dr. Garcia testified that Mario's personality disorder was grave and "deeply rooted" in his character.98 Dr. Garcia added that persons suffering from personality disorders are "impermeable to any form of psychiatric therapeutic modality"99 because of "the presence of denial and cognizance on the basic pathology of the person [suffering from the disorder]."100
them.97
It was clearly shown from [Mario's] actuations that he never really cared about the well-being of his family. He never commiserated with [Rosanna] during her difficult times. Despite [Rosanna's efforts] to keep the marriage intact, [Mario] showed no interest in mending his ways. These acts, to the mind of the Court, manifested [Mario's] total disregard of the basic tenets of marriage.123The trial court thus voided Mario and Rosanna's marriage. It awarded the custody of Ma. Samantha to Rosanna, with Mario having visitation rights. As to the Parañaque duplex, the trial court declared Rosanna as its sole and absolute owner, including the parcel of land on which it was built. The dispositive portion of the May 9, 2007 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit to the petition, judgment is hereby rendered:Mario moved125 for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its August 29, 2007 Order.126On the matter of suspension of respondent's parental authority over Ma. Samantha T. Andal, the Court holds that there is no sufficient ground in granting the same.
- Declaring null and void ab initio the marriage between ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL and MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL solemnized on DECEMBER 16, 1995 in Makati City on the ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent;
- Ordering the Local Civil Registrars of Makati City and the National Statistics Office to cancel the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent as appearing in their respective Registry of Marriage;
- Allowing petitioner to resume the use of her maiden name;
- Awarding petitioner the absolute custody of the parties' only child, Ma. Samantha T. Andal, with visitation rights given to the respondent; and
- Declaring the petitioner to be the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land with improvements covered by TCT No. 139811.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of Makati City and Para[ii]aque City, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the Civil Register General (National Statistics Office) and the Office of the City Prosecutor, Para[ñ]aque City.
SO ORDERED.124 (Emphasis in the original)
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed May 09, 2007 decision is SET ASIDE, and the marriage between Mario Victor M. Andal and Rosanna L. Tan-Andal is hereby declared as VALID and SUBSISTING.Rosanna moved132 for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its April 6, 2011 Resolution.133
SO ORDERED.131 (Emphasis in the original)
a. Whether or not the guidelines for deciding cases for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity, as laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,146 violate the right to liberty, personal autonomy, and human dignity of Filipinos;Second, whether or not half of the duplex and the lot on which it is situated are community properties of Mario and Rosanna; and
b. Whether or not, as characterized in Santos v. Court of Appeals,147 psychological incapacity has juridical antecedence and its root cause medically or clinically identifiable at the time of the celebration of the marriage. If it is so identifiable, then:
i. should it be grounded on a particular psychological illness;
ii. may it be established without a psychological assessment or clinical diagnosis;
iii. may it be established on the basis of testimonial evidence attesting to the behavioral pattern of the spouse with the psychological incapacity during the marriage;
c. Whether or not, as characterized in Santos, psychological incapacity is truly incurable. If it is, must it be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable to warrant a declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code;
d. Whether or not Article 36 of the Family Code is violative of the separation of Church and State;
e. Whether or not the expert opinion on a party's psychological incapacity is competent evidence if it is solely based on collateral information from the other spouse;
f. Whether or not the existence of grounds for legal separation precludes a finding of psychological incapacity on the part of one or both of the spouses;
g. Whether or not psychological incapacity may be relative to each couple.
ARTICLE 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.Article 36 was first interpreted in Santos v. Court of Appeals,174 a case where the wife, after three years of marriage, left for the United States, never to return to her husband and son. Despite the wife's abandonment of the family, this Court in Santos refused to void the marriage after outlining the history of the provision and defining the term "psychological incapacity."
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.The Molina guidelines were applied in subsequent cases.182 Since Molina's promulgation in 1997 until 2008, only Antonio v. Reyes183 was found to have satisfied all the requirements of Molina.184 Antonio involved a wife whose pathological lying rendered her psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.181 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the [Office of the Solicitor General's] exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.187 (Citations omitted)In its 2015 Resolution in Kalaw v. Fernandez,188 this Court made a similar statement:
The [Molina] guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."189 (Citation omitted)This Court's statements in Ngo-Te and Kalaw notwithstanding, the tendency to rigidly apply the Molina guidelines continued. Apart from Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,190 Antonio v. Reyes,191 Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,192 and Kalaw v. Fernandez,193 only the parties in Azcueta v. Republic,194 Halili v. Santos-Halili,195 Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes,196 Aurelio v. Aurelio,197 Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente,198 Republic v. Javier,199 and Republic v. Mola Cruz200 were granted a decree of nullity by this Court via a signed decision or resolution since the Family Code was signed into law.201 That only a few cases were found to have satisfied the Molina guidelines is, supposedly, in accordance with the Constitution on the inviolability of marriage,202 to the extent that this Court often reversed the factual findings of psychological incapacity by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.203
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every internment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28.) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.208 (Citation omitted)As with any presumption—such as the presumption of regularity in the issuance of public documents,209 regularity in the performance of duty,210 of good faith,211 or of sufficient consideration212 —it can only be rebutted with clear and convincing evidence.
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.Reflecting a similar sentiment, this Court in Ngo-Te214 said:
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.213 (Emphasis supplied)
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.215 (Citations omitted)In the Kalaw Resolution,216 this Court said that "[i]n declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, ... the Courts really assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is thereby made all the more strong and solid."217
The Family Code provides that the "nature, consequences, and incidents [of marriage] are governed by law and not subject to stipulation," but this does not go as far as reaching into the choices of intimacy inherent in human relations. These choices form part of autonomy, protected by the liberty and human dignity clauses. Human dignity includes our choices of association, and we are as free to associate and identify as we are free not to associate or identify.
Our choices of intimate partners define us — inherent ironically in our individuality. Consequently, when the law speaks of the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage governed by law, this refers to responsibility to children, property relations, disqualifications, privileges, and other matters limited to ensuring the stability of society. The state's interest should not amount to unwarranted intrusions into individual liberties.219 (Citations omitted)
ARTICLE 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (Justice Perlas-Bernabe) makes an enlightening point in her opinion that the essential marital obligations are limited to those between the spouses, as these are the only provisions "relevant to the finding of a spouse's psychological incapacity [with respect to] to his or her specific partner."244 She cites the legal definition of marriage, which is primarily a contract between a man and a woman. Therefore, according to her, if a marriage is to be declared void "due to psychological incapacity, it must be so primarily due to the failure to assume the essential marital obligations as a spouse, and only incidentally, as a father or mother."245
ARTICLE 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
ARTICLE 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties.
ARTICLE 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.
....
ARTICLE 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;ARTICLE 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.
....
ARTICLE 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.
Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:This persuasive effect is especially true in cases where the Catholic Church had already voided the canonical marriage, because it is the explicit intent of the Code Committee to solve "the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law."258 In Antonio, this Court even reproached the Court of Appeals for failing to consider the prior church annulment of the parties' marriage as indicative of the void nature of the secular marriage. This Court even called the error a "deliberate ignorance."259
1) those who lack the sufficient use of reason;
2) those who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and duties mutually to be handed over and accepted;
3) those who are not able to assume the essential obligations of marriage for causes of a psychic nature.257
... something in the psyche or the psychic constitution of a person which impedes his [or her] capacity to assume three (3) general obligations of marriage: (1) consortium of whole life between a man and a woman; (2) a consortium which is directed towards the good of the spouses; and (3) towards the procreation and upbringing of children.273From this discussion, the concept under the first paragraph of Canon 1095 is explicitly outside the realm of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code as envisioned by the Code Committee. To recall, the Code Committee did not view psychological incapacity as a mental disorder.
In summary, there is a Partner Relational Problem (code V61.1), which is secondary to the psychopathology of Mario Victor M. Andal who gravely failed in providing his family the love, support, dignity, understanding and respect. He has the essential features of a personality disorder as per criteria set in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV).Dr. Garcia reiterated these findings in her Judicial Affidavit,275 with Mario's counsel cross-examining her on her statements.
His psychopathology has its root causes. There were childhood and adolescent precursors which had led to the development of his psychological deficits.
Mario, the youngest in a brood of eight was born on December 7, 1961. His sedate father, a known businessman died when Mario was 6 years old. His mother, (sic) had to take over the family business; however, she was unable to cope so they had to sell the company. She became a top performer as a sales executive. She migrated to the U.S. His maternal grandmother, who lived with Mario and his siblings, played favorites and was very obvious about it.
His eldest brother, Alfonso the favored grandson was dominant and opinionated. Alfonso had to quit schooling due to his father's death. Alfonso was supposed to take charge of the family business but he was heavy on alcohol intake. He possessed a temper that would lead to the physical abuse of the two youngest siblings (Mario and Alberto). Another brother was also physically aggressive like Alfonso, (sic) was unable to complete college because of his heavy alcohol intake. The intelligent, generous and the talented Socorro stood as the mother to the younger siblings. Alberto, who was unable to complete his college degree in UST, is a substance user who is jobless and irresponsible.
The older siblings had difficulty coping with the change from a relatively prosperous life to a life of near poverty and difficulty coping with major responsibilities like running a company which they were not prepared for. Mario was their baby. His sisters were extra loving and patient with him. Mario is athletic and excels in swimming, football/soccer, and basketball. But[,] he is an introvert[,] i.e.[,] he wasn't vocal about his innermost feelings. He was the obedient son who was made to do errands. He adores his mother and is demonstrative of his affections towards her.
Mario, (sic) is an "electronics [whiz]" whose intelligence matches the eldest brother's. He completed his primary and secondary education with the highest honors. But he messed up his third year in UP. He had very few friends in his college days. He hang (sic) around with a buddy who was heavy into drugs and alcohol even when he was still in high school. He could not concentrate on his job; although there were periods when he worked as a technician in a wire company in Switzerland. He was heart-broken when he returned to Manila in 1995.
To sum up, Mario does not have enough ego strength to effectively self-regulate and face the marital the (sic) tasks and relational stressors. Indeed, there were substrates in his development which made him feel inadequate and bitter; thus[,] the need to have power over others to save face.
Mario has a narcissistic-antisocial personality disorder. He exhibits chronic irresponsibility, impulsivity and lack of genuine remorse, Jack of empathy and a sense of entitlement. In addition, he has the propensity to be emotionally constricted and evasive. Superimposed on his personality disorder is substance use disorder with psychotic features (paranoid delusions and bizarre behavior) and aggression against people in his environ[ment]. While he may have satisfactorily endeared himself to his lone child, be miserably failed to comply with his vital marital obligations.274 (Emphasis in the original)
SECTION 49. Opinion of expert witness. — The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.Standards for admitting expert opinion were discussed in Tortona v. Gregorio.282 In Tortona, a parcel of land was extrajudicially partitioned based on a deed of absolute sale bearing the thumbmark of the purported seller. The seller's heirs contested the deed for being a forgery because the seller, allegedly illiterate, could not have executed it without the knowledge and assistance of her children. As evidence, they presented the expert opinion of fingerprint examiner Eriberto B. Gomez, Jr. (Gomez) of the National Bureau of Investigation, who testified that the thumbmark on the deed of absolute sale, indeed, did not belong to the purported seller.
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.293For a time, the general acceptance test in Frye had been the standard for admitting expert opinion, until 1993, when it was overturned in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.294 Daubert involved minors Jason and Eric Daubert who, assisted by their parents, sued Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the manufacturer of a prescription anti-nausea drug called Bendectin. According to them, they were born with serious birth defects caused by the drug, which their mother ingested while pregnant with them.295
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.301The United States Supreme Court noted how Rule 702 does not require general acceptance for admissibility of expert opinion. Instead, the rule requires the following: first, the "knowledge" testified on must be "scientific," that is, it must be "more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation";302 second, the specialized knowledge must be of such character that the trial judge is "able to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue";303 and third, the trial judge, like a "gatekeeper," must take a firsthand look on "the scientific validity ... [or] the evidentiary relevance and reliability ... of the principles that underlie"304 the testimony being offered as expert opinion. "The focus ... must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate."305
... [Mario] is incapable of performing his marital obligations, particularly to observe love and respect for his wife and to render mutual help and support. [Mario] had shown utter disregard for his wife. Throughout their life together, it was [Rosanna] who mostly provided for the needs of the family. [Mario] hardly contributed to their expenses because he never bothered to look for a job. [Mario] was also using prohibited drugs. A responsible husband would not commit acts which will bring danger, dishonor or injury to [his spouse or to his family]. (Art. 72, Family Code of the Philippines). The safety and security of the family at all times is a primordial duty of the spouse.321Even assuming that Mario has since lived a drug-free life, he only did so after separating from Rosanna. This confirms Dr. Garcia's finding that his psychological incapacity was enduring relative to his long-estranged wife322 and can manifest again if he is forced to stay with her.
ARTICLE 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.On the other hand, Article 148 provides:
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendant, each vacant share shall belong to their respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
ARTICLE 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.On what "capacitated" in Article 147 means, this Court in Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City325 said:
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
The term "capacitated" in [Article 147] (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.326 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)Article 37327 refers to incestuous marriages, while Article 38328 refers to void marriages due to public policy.
ARTICLE 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.In Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto,339 this Court held that the "separation of parents" contemplated in Article 213 may either be legal separation or separation in fact.340 In deciding cases involving custody of a minor, the courts must consider, among others, "the previous care and devotion shown by each of the parents; their religious background, moral uprightness, home environment and time availability; [and] the [child's] emotional and educational needs."341
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Endnotes:
1 310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
2 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
3 Rollo, pp. 8-450.
4 Id. at 71-90. The February 25, 2010 Decision was penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso and was concurred in by Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Rodil V. Zalameda (now a Justice of this Court) of the Special Seventeenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
5 Id. at 92. The April 6, 2011 Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso and was concurred in by Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Rodil V. Zalameda (now a Justice of this Court) of the Former Special Seventeenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
6 Id. at 93-102. The May 9, 2007 Decision was penned by Presiding Judge Jaime M. Guray of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260.
7 Id. at 73. Court of Appeals Decision.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 15-16. Petition for Review.
10 Id. at 302. Psychiatric Evaluation.
11 Id. at 108. Petition for Custody.
12 Id. at 107-109. Petition for Custody, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-0228.
13 Id. at 108.
14 Id. at 138-164. Docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0384.
15 Id. at 182. Report.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 190.
18 Id. at 138. Petition.
19 Id. at 139.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 140.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 141.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 141-142.
39 Id. at 142.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 73.
43 Id. at 143.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 143-144.
48 Id. at 144.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 144-145.
53 Id. at 145.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 145-146.
56 Id. at 146.
57 Id. at 146-147.
58 Id. at 147.
59 Id. at 147-148.
60 Id. at 148.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 149.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 297. Psychiatric Evaluation.
68 Id. at 150. Petition. See also Deed of Donation of Real Property and Acceptance Thereof, rollo, pp. 268-271.
69 Id. at 150. Petition.
70 Id. at 150-151.
71 Id. at 151.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 151-152.
74 Id. at 152.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 126. Petition for Confinement of a Drug Dependent in a Center.
78 Id. at 128. July 28, 1999 Letter.
79 Id. at 130. August 4, 2000 Order.
80 Id. at 154-155. Petition.
81 Id. at 156.
82 Id. at 157.
83 Id. at 157-158.
84 Id. at 158.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 130. August 4, 2000 Order.
88 Id. at 158. Petition.
89 Id. at 131. January 11, 2001 Letter.
90 Id. at 159. Petition.
91 Id. at 160.
92 Id. at 163.
93 Id. at 283-288.
94 Id. at 296-297. Psychiatric Evaluation.
95 Id. at 286. Judicial Affidavit.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 287.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 CA rollo, pp. 1286 and 1292-1293. Original Transcript of Stenographic Notes.
105 Id. at 1281-1282.
106 Rollo, p. 166. Answer.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 166-167.
110 Id. at 167.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 168.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 168-169.
115 Id. at 169.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 169 170.
118 Id. at 170-171.
119 Id. at 170.
120 Id. at 171.
121 Id. at 172-173.
122 Id. at 93-102.
123 Id. at 99-100.
124 Id. at 100-101.
125 Id. at 331-336.
126 Id. at 370-371.
127 Id. at 84.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 86 and 88.
130 Id. at 71-90.
131 Id. at 89.
132 CA rollo, pp. 251-286.
133 Rollo, p. 92.
134 Id. at 8-450.
135 Id. at 463-478.
136 Id. at 479-494.
137 Id. at 523-524.
138 Id. at 557-558. September 24, 2019 Resolution.
139 Id. at 567-570. November 5, 2019 Resolution.
140 Dean Estrada-Claudio is the Dean of the University of the Philippines College of Social Work and Community Development.
141 Professor Sta. Maria is the Dean of the Far Eastern University Institute of Law and Professor of Civil Law at the Ateneo Law School.
142 Fr. Dacanay is a Doctor of Canon Law and Judge of the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila.
143 Rollo, pp. 567-570. November 5, 2019 Resolution.
144 Id. at 849-921, Memorandum for Petitioner, and pp. 691-721 Memorandum for Respondent.
145 Id. at 591-681.
146 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
147 310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
148 Id. at 28-34. Petition.
149 629 Phil. 157 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
150 Rollo, pp. 882-883 and 876-877, Memorandum for Petitioner.
151 Id. at 890. Memorandum for Petitioner.
152 Id. at 893.
153 Id. at 895.
154 Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente, 807 Phil. 31 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]; Mendoza v. Republic, 698 Phil. 241 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division]; Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, 642 Phil. 602 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division]; Ting v. Velez-Ting, 601 Phil. 676 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
155 Rollo, p. 899. Memorandum for Petitioner.
156 Id. at 899-900.
157 Id. at 900.
158 Id. at 900-903.
159 836 Phil. 1266 (201 8) [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division].
160 Rollo, pp. 902-903. Memorandum for Petitioner.
161 Id. at 903-904.
162 Id. at 904-912.
163 Id. at 466-468, Comment, and pp. 702-712, Memorandum for Respondent.
164 FAMILY CODE, art. 55(5) provides:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
....
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent[.]
165 Rollo, pp. 466-468, Comment, and pp. 708-709, Memorandum for Respondent.
166 Id. at 712-713, Memorandum for Respondent.
167 Id. at 714.
168 397 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
169 612 Phil. 1061, 1078 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
170 Rollo, pp. 714-715. Memorandum for Respondent.
171 Id. at 715-716.
172 Id. at 716.
173 Id. at 472, Comment, and 716-718, Memorandum for Respondent.
174 310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
175 Id. at 36.
176 Id., citing Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994. See also Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 677 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
177 Id. at 40.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 39.
180 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
181 Id. at 676-679. The eighth guideline on the certification from the Solicitor General briefly stating his or her reasons for agreeing or opposing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity has been dispensed with under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Re: Proposed Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriage). See Padilla Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, 612 Phil. 1061, 1078 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Navales v. Navales, 578 Phil. 826, 839 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Tongol v. Tongol, 562 Phil. 725, 735 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 358 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division); Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, 484 Phil. 396, 410 (2004) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
182 Navales v. Navales, 578 Phil. 826 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Narvarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, 549 Phil. 632 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Tongol v. Tongol, 562 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, 545 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division]; Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division]; Republic v. Iyay, 507 Phil. 485 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division]; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004 [Per J. Corona, Third Division]; Ancheta v. Ancheta, 468 Phil. 900 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division]; Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175 (2002) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Pesca v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713 (2001) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division]; Republic v. Dagdag, 404 Phil. 249 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
183 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
184 Another case where the parties successfully obtained a decree of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity was Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 294 (1997) [Per J. Torres, Jr., Second Division]. However, Chi Ming Tsoi was not decided under the Molina guidelines. This Court had yet to promulgate Molina when Chi Ming Tsoi was decided. In Chi Ming Tsoi, this Court ruled that "[a party's] refusal [to consummate his or her marriage] is ... psychological incapacity," procreation being "the basic end of marriage."
185 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
186 Id. at 669.
187 Id. at 695-696.
188 750 Phil. 482 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division].
189 Id. at 499-500.
190 334 Phil. 294 (1997) [Per J. Torres, Jr., Second Division].
191 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
192 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
193 750 Phil. 482 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division].
194 606 Phil. 177 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-de Castro, First Division].
195 607 Phil. 1 (2009) [Per J. Corona, Special First Division].
196 642 Phil. 602 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
197 665 Phil. 693 (2011) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
198 807 Phil. 31 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
199 G.R. No. 210518, April 18, 2018 [Per J. Reyes, Jr. Second Division].
200 G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018 [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division].
201 As of date, the following are the cases on psychological incapacity resolved via a signed decision or signed resolution by this Court. Simundac-Keppel v. Keppel, G.R. No. 202039, August 14, 2019, [Per C.J. Bersamin, First Division]; Eliscupidez v. Eliscupidez, G.R. No. 226907, July 22, 2019, [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; Cahapisan-Santiago v. Santiago, G.R. No. 241144, June 26, 2019, [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]; Cortez v. Correz, G.R. No. 224638, April 10, 2019, [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; Go-Yu v. Yu, G.R. No. 230443, April 3, 2019, [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; Republic v. Deang, G.R. No. 236279, March 25, 2019, [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]; Republic v. Tecag, G.R. No. 229272, November 19, 2018, [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]; Republic v. Mola Cruz, G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018, [Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division]; Republic v. Javier, 830 Phil. 213 (2018) [Per J. Reyes, Jr. Second Division]; Espina-Dan v. Dan, 829 Phil. 605 (2018) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division]; Republic v. Tobora-Tionglico, 823 Phil. 672 (2018) [Per J. Tijam, First Division]; Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz, 820 Phil. 62 (2017) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division]; Bakunawa III v. Bakunawa, 816 Phil. 649 (2017) [Per J. Reyes, J., Third Division]; Garlet v. Garlet, 815 Phil. 268 (2017) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division]; Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente, 807 Phil. 31 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]; Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, 805 Phil. 978 (2017) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division]; Castillo v. Republic, 805 Phil. 209 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division]; Matudan v. Republic, 799 Phil. 449 (2016) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division]; Republic v. Pangasinan, 792 Phil. 808 (2016) [Per J. Velasco, Jr. Third Division]; Republic v. Spouses Romero, 781 Phil. 737 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division]; Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, 754 Phil. 158 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]; Viñas v. Parel-Viñas, 751 Phil. 762 (2015) [Per J. Reyes, Third Division]; Kalaw v. Fernandez, 750 Phil. 482 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division]; Republic v. De Gracia, 726 Phil. 502 (2014) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]; Republic v. Encelan, 701 Phil. 192 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Mendoza v. Republic and Mendoza, 698 Phil. 241 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division]; Republic v. The Hon. Court of Appeals (Ninth Division) and De Quintos, Jr., 698 Phil. 257 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division]; Republic v. Galang, 665 Phil. 658 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Third Division]; Ochosa v. Alana and Republic, 655 Phil. 512 (2011) [Per J. Leonardo-de Castro, First Division]; Yambao v. Republic and Yambao, 655 Phil. 346 (2011) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division]; Marable v. Marable, 654 Phil. 528 (2011) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division]; Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviador, 652 Phil. 49 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division]; Baccay v. Baccay and Republic, 0651 Phil. 68 (2010) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., Third Division]; Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, 642 Phil. 602 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division]; Taring v. Taring and Republic, 640 Phil. 434 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division]; Ligeralde v. Patalinghug, 632 Phil. 326 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division]; Suazo v. Suazo, 629 Phil. 157 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Paz v. Paz, 627 Phil. 1 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division]; Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, 625 Phil. 407 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division]; Aspillaga v. Aspillaga, 619 Phil. 434 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, 612 Phil. 1061 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Najera v. Najera, 609 Phil. 316 (2009) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division]; Halili v. Santos-Halili, 607 Phil. 1 (2009) [Per J. Corona, Special First Division]; So v. Valera, 606 Phil. 309 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Azcueta v. Republic, 606 Phil. 177 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division]; Ting v. Velez-Ting, 601 Phil. 676 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division]; Ngo-Te v. Yu Te, 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division]; Navales v. Navales, 578 Phil. 826 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilia-Navarro, 549 Phil. 632 (2007) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Tongol v. Tongol, 562 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, 545 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division]; Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division]; Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division]; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004 [Per J. Corona, Third Division]; Dedel v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 226 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division]; Pesca v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713 (2001) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division]; Republic v. Dagdag, 404 Phil. 249 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919 (1999) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division]; Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc]; Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 294 (1997) [Per J. Torres, Jr., Second Division]; and Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
202 CONST., art. XV, sec. 2 provides:
SECTION 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
203 See Republic v. Deang, G.R. No. 236279, March 25, 2019 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]; Republic v. Tecag, G.R. No. 229272, November 19, 2018 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]; Republic v. Tobora-Tionglico, G.R. No. 21860, January 11, 2018 [Per J. Tijam, First Division]; Republic v. Spouses Romero, 781 Phil. 737 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division]; Republic v. De Gracia, 726 Phil. 502 (2014) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division]; Republic v. Pangasinan, G.R. No. 214077, August 10, 2016 [Per J. Velasco, Jr. Third Division]; Republic v. Encelan, 701 Phil. 192 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Republic v. Court of Appeals and De Quintos, Jr., 698 Phil. 258 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division]; Republic v. Galang, 665 Phil. 658 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Third Division]; Navales v. Navales, 578 Phil. 826 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Tongol v. Tongol, 562 Phil. 725 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, 472 Phil. 807 (2004) [Per J. Corona, Third Division]; Republic v. Dagdag, 404 Phil. 249 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; Republic v. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485 (2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division]; Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
204 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664-693 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
205 Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
206 See Spouses Manalo v. Roldan-Confesor, 290 Phil. 311 (1992) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
207 43 Phil. 438 (1922) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc], cited in J. Perlas-Bernabe, Concurring Opinion, p. 34.
208 Id. at 43-58.
209 Alcantara-Daus v. Spouses De Leon, 452 Phil. 92 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division], cited in J. Perlas-Bernabe's Concurring Opinion, p. 34.
210 See Yap v. Lagtapon, 803 Phil. 652 (2017) [Per J. Caguioa, First Division], cited in J. Perlas-Bernabe's Concurring Opinion, p. 34.
211 See Spouses Espinoza v. Spouses Mayandoc, 812 Phil. 95 (2017), cited in J. Perlas-Bernabe's Concurring Opinion, p. 35.
212 See Sepe v. Heirs of Kilang, G.R. No. 199766, April 10, 2019, [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division], cited in J. Perlas-Bernabe's Concurring Opinion, p. 35.
213 Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 371 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
214 Ngo-Te v. Yu Te, 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
215 Id. at 698-699 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
216 750 Phil. 482, 501 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division].
217 Id. at 501.
218 CONST., art. II, sec. 12.
219 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, 754 Phil. 158, 203-204 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
220 Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21-49 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
221 Id. at 40.
222 Id. at 30. One of the earlier drafts of Article 36 read as follows:
Article 36. — ...
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
223 Id. at 35.
224 Id. at 34.
225 Amicus Curiae Brief of Dean Estrada-Claudio, p. 1.
226 Id. at 6.
227 397 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
228 Id. at 850.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 See Eliscupidez v. Eliscupidez, G.R. No. 226907, July 22, 2019, 909 SCRA 607, 222 [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].
232 Amicus Curiae Brief of Dean Sylvia Estrada-Claudio, p. 2.
233 See B. VAN DER KOLK, M.D., THE BODY KEEPS THE SCORE, BRAIN, MIND, AND BODY IN THE HEALING OF TRAUMA (2014).
234 Amicus Curiae Brief of Dean Estrada-Claudio, p. 4.
235 Id. at 4.
236 Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 33 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
237 J. M. V. Lopez, Concurring Opinion, p. 4.
238 Id. at 5.
239 Id.
240 J. Perlas-Bernabe, Concurring Opinion, p. 26.
241 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664, 678 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 J. Perlas-Bernabe, Concurring Opinion, p. 32.
245 Id. at 26.
246 CONST., art. XV, sec. 2.
247 See Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 411 (2003) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
248 J. Perlas-Bernabe, Concurring Opinon, p. 3.
249 M.A.C. Dizon, Psychological Incapacity and the Canon Law on Marriage: An Exegesis on the Psychological Element of Matrimonial Consent, 75 P.L.J. 365 (2000).
250 Id. at 367.
251 Id. at 367-368.
252 Id. at 368.
253 FAMILY CODE, art. 1.
254 This guideline only applies to spouses married under Catholic rites.
255 See J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in In Re: Letter of Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Bldg. in Q.C., 806 Phil. 786 (2017) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
256 Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
257 See Code of Canon Law, available at <https://www.vatican.va/archive/cod-juris-canonici/eng/documents/cic_lib4-cann998-1165_en.html#TITLE_VII> (last accessed on April 1, 2021).
258 Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 354 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
259 Id. at 371.
260 M.A.C. Dizon, Psychological incapacity and the Canon Law on Marriage: An Exegesis on the Psychological Element of Matrimonial Consent, 75 P.L.J. 365 (2000).
261 Id. at 366.
262 Id. at 369.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 376.
266 Id. at 372.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 374.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 376-377.
273 Id. at 377.
274 Rollo, pp. 315-316.
275 Id. at 286-288.
276 Original Transcript of Stenographic Notes, p. 1287.
277 Rollo, p. 84.
278 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 20.
279 Tortona v. Gregorio, 823 Phil. 980 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
280 RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 49.
281 See V.C. RAMIREZ, THE LAW ON MARRIAGE 181 (3rd ed., 2011).
282 823 Phil. 980 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
283 Id. at 993.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 987.
286 Id. at 988-989.
287 Id. at 989.
288 Id. at 994.
289 Id. at 995.
290 Id. citing Borguilla v. Court of Appeals, 231 Phil. 9 (1987) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
291 54 App. D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923) cited in Tortona v. Gregorio, 823 Phil. 980 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
292 Tortona v. Gregorio, 823 Phil. 980, 1001 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
293 Id.
294 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993) cited in Tortona v. Gregario, 823 Phil. 980 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
295 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993).
296 Id.
297 Id. at 583.
298 Id. at 583-584.
299 Id. at 584.
300 Id. at 586-589.
301 Id. at 588 as cited in Tortona v. Gregorio, 823 Phil. 980 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
302 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
303 Id. at 591.
304 Id. at 595-596.
305 Id. at 595.
306 Id.
307 Id. at 598.
308 V.C. RAMIREZ, THE LAW ON MARRIAGE 181 (3rd ed., 2011).
309 Rollo, p. 283. Judicial Affidavit.
310 Id. at 284.
311 See B.J. SADOCK, M.D. AND V.A. SADOCK, M.D. KAPLAN & SADOCK'S SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE/CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 229-245 (9th ed., 2003).
312 Id. at 229.
313 Rollo, p. 85, Court of Appeals Decision.
314 Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]. See also V.C. RAMIREZ, JR., THE LAW ON MARRIAGE 170-172 (3rd ed., 2011), where a clinical psychologist explained how a personal examination of one spouse is sufficient to evaluate "the psychological capacity to contract marriage of the other spouse." Through projection, identification, and introjection, a spouse "would reveal the interpersonal relations between the spouses... [and] the characteristics each spouse has acquired from the other." The expert would then "distinguish which of the characteristics are not acquired and, therefore, inherent, and which are acquired and therefore, not inherent."
315 Id. at 850.
316 Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
317 Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
318 FAMILY CODE, art. 55(5) provides:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
....
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent[.]
319 FAMILY CODE, art. 63(1).
320 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Dean Sta. Maria, pp. 19-20.
321 Rollo, p. 99. RTC Decision.
322 Id. at 288. Judicial Affidavit.
323 Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1299-1304 (1996) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].
324 Id. at 1295.
325 328 Phil. 1289 (1996) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].
326 Id. at 1296.
327 FAMILY CODE, art. 37 provides:
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
328 FAMILY CODE, art. 38 provides:
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse.
329 Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1297 (1996) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].
330 Id.
331 Rollo, pp. 268-271.
332 Id. at 268.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 272.
335 718 Phil. 274 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
336 Id. at 283.
337 Rollo, p. 274.
338 Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto, 500 Phil. 226 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
339 Id.
340 Id. at 246.
341 Id. at 250.
342 Ma. Samantha was born in 1996. See rollo, p. 73, Court of Appeals Decision.
343 FAMILy CODE, art. 234, as amended by Republic Act No. 6809 (1989), provides:
Article 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years.
344 FAMILY CODE, art. 236, as amended by Republic Act No. 6809 (1989), provides:
Article 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
I concur. The petition should be granted. Thus, the marriage between petitioner Rosanna L. Tan-Andal (petitioner) and respondent Mario Victor M. Andal (respondent) should be declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code (Article 36).1
Prefatorily, it should be pointed out that, throughout the course of these proceedings, the Court was impelled to revisit the existing legal framework pertaining to the application of Article 36. As a result, the ponencia had aptly modified the guidelines laid down in Republic v. Molina (Molina),2 which is the landmark ruling on psychological cases.
For my part, I tender this Concurring Opinion to explain my own views on the Molina guidelines as well as the various legal nuances attendant to the subject. Among others, it will be herein discussed that, contrary to the concept of psychological incapacity under Canon 10953 of the New Code of Canon Law from which Article 36 was lifted by its framers — the Molina guidelines had inaccurately characterized "psychological incapacity" as a mental illness or a serious personality disorder. In the same vein, Molina further constrained Article 36's application by requiring that it be "medically or clinically identified,"4 "sufficiently proven by experts,"5 and "medically or clinically permanent or incurable,"6 which requirements go above and beyond the intent of the said framers. Accordingly, the legal understanding of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, which are the jurisprudential requisites that determine psychological incapacity, should be refined.
The Family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.At this juncture, it is apt to clarify that the integration of Canon 1095 into civil law does not violate the principle of separation of Church and State. As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Memorandum,10 it should be borne in mind that the sacrament of marriage itself is rooted in religious practice and beliefs but has now attained secular status by being integrated in the laws of the land.11 Given the marriage's inherent religious historical roots, it is thus natural for the Code Committee to have lifted a part of Article 36 from the New Code of Canon Law.12Article 35. — The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:On subparagraph (7), which [was] lifted from the Canon Law, x x x
x x x x
Article 36. — x x x
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
x x x x
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which reads:Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.9 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
At this point, Justice Puno remarked that, since there have been church annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should now reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.Ultimately, Article 36 has its own unique civil law application; as such, the separation of Church and State is preserved.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, arc they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.18 (emphasis supplied)
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problems of church annulments of marriage on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for declaration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:However, despite the Code Committee's resolve to establish an "acceptable alternative to divorce," as well as a bridging mechanism to reconcile church annulments with civil law, the Court's guidelines in Molina unduly restricted Article 36's application by not only prescribing additional requirements which were not intended by its framers, but more significantly, propagated an inaccurate understanding of psychological incapacity as a mental illness or serious personality disorder.(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.21 (emphases supplied)
[Judge Diy] cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.25However, proceeding from these requisites, the Court, in Santos, went on to equate psychological incapacity to "no less than a mental incapacity" or "the most serious cases of personality disorders:"
"[P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. x x x26 (emphases supplied)This characterization of psychological incapacity as a mental illness or serious personality disorder is the controlling perception of psychological incapacity up until today. This perception is, however, inaccurate as will be discussed later in this discourse.
Justice [Eduardo] Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to devoid it of vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.28Meanwhile, none of the cited canon law articles in Santos limited the concept of psychological incapacity to mental illness or serious personality disorder. In fact, in these articles, it was even recognized that "psychological causes can be of an infinite variety"29 and that "[s]ome [and not all] psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect x x x."30
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of [Santos], still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court[,] in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.40Proceeding from this context, among others, the Court deemed it fit "to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36."
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.42 (emphases supplied)Complementary thereto, the fourth Molina guideline prescribes that "[s]uch incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable,"43 while the fifth Molina guideline mandates that the "illness must be grave enough" such that "there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure,"44 viz.:
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.It should be mentioned that the second Molina guideline would be later relaxed by the Court insofar as the requirement that psychological incapacity must be proven by experts. In Marcos v. Marcos,46 it was held that "[p]sychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented x x x [and to this end] [t]here is no requirement x x x that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration."47
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.45 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.55 (emphases supplied)The criticism of Molina's rigidity notwithstanding, the Court, in Ngo Te, clarified that "we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case."56 The Court "simply declare[d] that x x x there is [a] need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36."57 Accordingly, the Court "reiterate[d] x x x the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts."58 "[C]ourts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."59
As the nomenclature suggests, the Molina guidelines only serve as a guide in determining the existence of psychological incapacity. The Molina guidelines are not meant to "straightjacket all petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage." To stress, actions for declaration of nullity filed under Article 36 should be resolved "on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of Church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since [Article 36] was taken from Canon Law."62 (emphasis and underscoring in the original)In this regard, the Court would often emphasize the fact that the framers were "not unanimous on the meaning [of psychological incapacity]," and "in the end x x x decided to adopt the provision 'with less specificity than expected' in order to have the law 'allow some resiliency in its application.'" As observed in the 2015 case of Kalaw v. Fernandez:63
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the provision "with less specificity than expected" in order to have the law "allow some resiliency in its application." Illustrative of the "less specificity than expected" has been the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.64 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)In my humble opinion, however, an overemphasis on the "resiliency" of Article 36's application leaves much to be desired in terms of establishing jurisprudential uniformity and consistency when applying such an inherently vague legal term. This may even perhaps, provide an unwarranted license for a largely ad hoc, and even subjective, approach to psychological incapacity, oftentimes resorted to in order to liberalize its application. Indeed, it is observed that while the Court, in Molina, conservatively carved out strict conditions to rein in Article 36's application back when it was still a novel codal provision, the Court's mindset now has shifted towards a more libertarian posture. Notably, the OSG in this case has drastically shifted its tone towards Article 36's liberalization in the name of preserving personal autonomy, which is a far cry from its comment in Molina where it called Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world:"
While the State has a legitimate interest in marriages, the Molina guidelines and their rigid application in all nullity cases under Article 36 have limited the chance of couples to sever their marital bond by forcing them to stay in hopeless and problematic marriages. Thus, said guidelines restrict the liberty and personal autonomy of married persons to be free from a marriage where one is psychologically incapacitated to assume marital obligations.While the Court should remain ever-cognizant of practical realities with respect to prevailing social conditions, it must remain faithful to the intent of the lawmakers, else it treads the dangerous waters of judicial legislation. The predicament, however, is that even the lawmakers' intent behind Article 36 is largely shrouded in ambiguity, and sometimes even inconsistency. This notwithstanding, the Court must strive towards a fair and reasonable interpretation of the law, guided by the bedrock principles found in the Civil Code that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws"66 and that "[i]n case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail."67
x x x It is for these above reasons that the Molina guidelines should be revisited such that its application violates the right to liberty, personal autonomy and human dignity of Filipinos as it imposes a burden that unreasonably interferes with individual choices of intimate arrangements. It condemns those who may have made very human errors in choosing those with whom they should be intimate to a life of pain and suffering. For the courts to enforce this cruelty is the very antithesis of the freedoms embodied in the many provisions of our Constitution.65
Marriage is a covenant where a man and a woman, no longer two but one flesh help and sustain each other mutually by the intimate union of their whole persons and activities; as they become progressively more conscious of their unity, their human growth will become continuously more profound. Even if essential, the ius in corpus alone no longer constitutes the whole object of matrimonial consent; it is included in a total relationship which encompasses the person in the concrete living out of his existence. The personal character of the conjugal commitment results in the fact that its object is not a "thing" like a regular contract but rather that of two persons in their reciprocity: each partner commits himself to the other in his person and receives the other in all of his otherness in order to establish a community which respects the singularity and autonomy of each spouse. x x x.73 (emphasis supplied)In contrast to mere contractual consent, the act of consent in marriage involves not just the intellect and will of the spouses, but their whole personalities as well.74 Accordingly, since the interpersonal relationship between the spouses in the pursuit of the good of their persons is considered in Canon Law as essential to the validity of matrimonial consent, the inability or incapacity of a spouse to mutually give and accept the other for the purpose of being in a "partnership of the whole life," becomes a ground to declare the marriage null and void.75
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:Par. 1, Canon 1095: Lack of sufficient use of reason.1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.76
Lack of due discretion, under paragraph 2 of Canon 1095, is not so much the lack of capacity to contract, but rather the lack of capacity to bind oneself to the rights and obligations of marriage. The situation contemplated is one in which human acts in general are possible, but the special human act of binding oneself "maritally" is not possible because of some distortion of judgment or diminution of freedom relative to the particular act of marital consent. A person may give the appearance of enjoying the full use of his faculties, but is entirely conceivable that by reason of some psychic defect he may not be capable of assuming the obligations of marriage, even if he may have a notational conceptual understanding of them. The act of consenting to marriage must proceed by sufficient deliberation or critical judgment about the implications of such act. The person must realize that he does not only consent to a wedding, but more importantly makes a decision about his or her life and the life of the marriage partner. If there is a serious inability to evaluate critically the decision to marry in light of the consequent obligations and responsibilities, then the consent may well be invalid. This evaluation is governed by the person's "critical faculty" which is different from the mere intellectual apprehension of the situation. The critical faculty depends on the mature ability to grasp what the marital relationship entails. The person must be able to relate marriage as an abstract reality, i.e., what it theoretically involves, to his or her concrete situation. The critical faculty involves existential judgments. It depends on a person's emotional and psychological state and an appreciation of the lessons learned from life experiences. It also presupposes freedom from mental confusion, undue pressure, or fear in contemplating marriage. Matrimonial consent is derived from a combined action of cognitive, deliberative or critical and volitional faculties. One must know what is at stake; one must be capable of considering and evaluating the elements, properties, rights and obligations of marriage as well as one's own capacity to fulfill these obligations; and one must be free to want and choose this way of life with this or that particular person. Lack of due discretion of judgment does not deal too much with the cognitive powers of a person, but with his evaluative faculty, with his faculty to deliberate and judge. x x x85 (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)In this relation, it must be clarified that the knowledge or discernment of marriage, including its nature, rights, and obligations, goes beyond simple intellectual knowledge. The evaluation is actually governed by the person's critical faculty and not just mere intellectual apprehension of the situation. Hence, even if the intelligence is or appears to be intact, the will can be deficient in its own right, in the sense that the person may give the appearance of enjoying the full use of his faculties, but does not have the mature ability to grasp what the marital relationship entails.86
This incapacity consists in the defect of the object of matrimonial consent insofar as the contractant is incapable of giving and receiving the essential rights and obligations of marriage. In other words, it is connected to the impossibility of fulfilling that is, putting into effect the essential obligations of marriage, "because an obligation cannot be contracted by a person who is incapable of honoring it unless what is vowed or promised can be given through another person, which is not allowed in marriage." For the rule of law rooted in natural law itself clearly states the principle: "There is no obligation to the impossible" or "Nobody can be obliged to [do] the impossible."90 (emphases supplied)As above mentioned, considering the character of marriage as a special contract of personal union, the spouses are considered to be not only the subject of such contract but its object as well.91 This means that unlike in a regular contract, where the object is a tangible thing or service that is distinct from its subject, in a matrimonial contract, the subject is also the object because it is the spouses' giving and accepting of each other that establishes a marriage, which encompasses the whole complex of marital rights and obligations that arise from the conjugal partnership.92 Thus:
[I]f the will is inefficient in marriage, it does not produce the effects, namely it cannot establish the conjugal state.93 (emphasis supplied)In other words, the capacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage implies that each partner can accept the other, his or her presence and his or her lived reality as factors in a personal, ongoing evolution of growth and maturity.94 Thus, applying the foregoing precepts in terms of civil law. when a spouse is incapable of assuming the essential marital obligations, there is no viable object in a matrimonial contract, thereby making the marriage null and void. In contrast, when a spouse is mentally incapacitated, thereby precluding him or her from the possibility of performing any responsible human act at the time of consent (i.e., celebration), the defect lies in the consent of the subject, making only the marriage voidable.
E. Article 35. –The framers eventually dropped the concept of psychological incapacity being mental in nature and emphasized that psychological incapacity under Article 36 does not encompass the defects of the mental faculties vitiating consent. Thus, Justice Eduardo Caguioa clarified that "mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a specie of vice of consent." The renowned Justice further expressed that "psychological incapacity" refers to a lack of understanding of the effects of the marriage such that it is possible for one to give his consent validly to the marriage albeit without fully comprehending the responsibilities and obligations that are attendant to it, viz.:
The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
x x x x
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage [(pars. 1 and 2 of Canon 1095)] or was psychologically [(par. 3 of Canon 1095)] or mentally [(par. 1 of Canon 1095)] incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.98 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On subparagraph (7), which was lifted from the Canon Law, Justice [Jose J.B.L.] Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use" instead of "wanting in the sufficient use," but Justice Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:Further:That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration of nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.
Prof. Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, preferred to retain the word "mentally."
x x x x
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychologically or mentally incapacitated" – in the first one, there is vitiation of consent, while in the second one, there is no understanding of the effects of the marriage. He added that the first one would fall under insanity.99 (emphases supplied)
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defect-; in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.100 (emphasis supplied)Furthermore:
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a specie of vice of consent.
x x x xAlthough there are commentaries102 which mention that Article 36 was understood by some of the framers to be a fusion between paragraphs 2 (lack of due discretion) and 3 (psychological incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage), the prevailing understanding is that paragraph 3 is where Article 36 was lifted from. While Justice Eduardo Caguioa spoke of lack of understanding of the effects of the marriage (which closely resembles lack of due discretion under paragraph 2, Canon 1095), still, Article 36, as presented in its final form, remains faithful to the wording of paragraph 3 of Canon 1095:
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to devoid it of vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.101 (emphases supplied)
At any rate, as opined by other canonists, paragraphs 2 and 3 of Canon 1095 are not completely incompatible. Lack of due discretion by failing to critically appreciate the essential marital obligations may therefore result into one's failure to assume the essential marital obligations for psychological reasons. However, it is the result, as demonstrated by the actual experiences between the spouses, (rather than critical knowledge which is harder to determine as it is a state of mind), that reveal the true attendance of psychological incapacity in a particular situation. Ultimately, whether or not a person lacks or possesses due discretion, what remains significant is his or her ability to assume the essential marital obligations.
Canon 1095, paragraph 3 Final form of Article 36 Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (emphases supplied)
Psychological incapacity [can] be caused by the interpersonal dynamics of the couple rather by a specific partner's psychiatric disorder. As I have noted, psychological incapacity is not merely a personal predisposition or failing but one that is brought to the fore by a confluence of an individual's psychology as acted upon by environmental such as his or her partner[']s individual traits, experiences in the life of his or her family while growing up and the social and cultural context in which the couple are living their lives, the absence or presence of children and the choices of both the person and their partner make in life as a couple. In short, interlinked relationship variables such as compatibility, conviviality, companionship and mutual cooperation which are necessary to the capacity to fulfill spousal and familial obligations can he enhanced or completely abrogated by the subsequent actions and events of married life.114 (emphases supplied)The foregoing observations reinforce the Court's ruling in Marcos, which already held that the expert witness requirement (found in Molina's second guideline) need not be an indispensable condition for the determination of psychological incapacity. In fact, during the deliberations, Justice Eduardo Caguioa clarified that "psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be of help."115
Justice Puno remarked that, in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.On the other hand, some members posited that psychological incapacity is actually curable, stating that "even if the incapacity itself later becomes cured, the marriage still remains void:"
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for voidable marriages, while "psychological or mental incapacity" is a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.120 (emphasis supplied)
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of the marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.Despite these seemingly conflicting views, what remains clear is that the requirement of incurability was intended by the Code Committee to have a meaning that is different from its medical or clinical attribution:
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity becomes manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry.121 (emphases supplied)
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine.122 (emphasis supplied)This runs in stark contrast to the fourth Molina guideline which prescribes that "[s]uch incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable."123
It is often in the actual living of the conjugal life that the degree of insufficiency of reason becomes clear and manifests itself. It is, therefore, both logical and legitimate to back to the moment of commitment and characterize it by the evidence of the lived conjugal life which manifests itself in the immaturity of personality. The daily living out of marriage is only the progressive realization of the relationship and commitment given in the original consent. By examining the concrete actions of a person toward the other person, we can measure and appreciate his selfpresence and maturity of himself at the moment he or she originally gave matrimonial consent. In fact, only the experience of conjugal life of a person permits us to appreciate what his original matrimonial capacity at the moment of consent actually was.127That being said, the parameters of discovering psychological incapacity "at the time of the celebration, x x x even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization"129 ought to be refined. Accordingly, in handling cases of declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, judges must reconstruct the marital decision making process of an individual, just like inquisitive investigators. In particular, the judge must trace back and examine all the manifestations before and during the marriage to find out if such non-fulfillment relates to the intrinsic psychological makeup of the person relative to his or her specific partner, and not just some mere difficulty that ordinary spouses, at some point in time, are bound to go through. Accordingly, the judge must confirm that the non-fulfillment was not caused solely by any factor that emerged only during the marriage (e.g., a financial crisis or accident which altered the personality of the spouse only during the marriage and not merely reflective of his or her true psychological makeup at the time of celebration) but one which, in all reasonable likelihood, existed at the time the marriage was entered into. Overall, there must be recognition that psychological incapacity is not legal separation or divorce, but a defect in the object of consent at the time of celebration which makes the marriage null and void ab initio.
x x x x (emphases supplied)
It is common jurisprudence to evaluate the constraint which weighs on the decision to marry. In analogous manner, we can measure the lack of personal motivation and internal freedom in a decision to marry, starting from the lack of commitment in daily conjugal life through a sort of indifference toward the other and a rejection of his person. These concrete elements show, in certain cases, that the matrimonial consent was the result of circumstances and external factors or the result of uncontrollable impulse which invalidate the consent at the time it was made. "From their fruits you will know them."
On the other hand, the authenticity of a motivation can be seen by the transformation which it causes in the person by the personal interest which he or she takes in its realization, by the clear and firm effort he/she puts forward in the marriage by his/her action and conduct, by a serene joy which he/she experiences, by his or her discipline and renouncement of his/her own egoism for the sake of the beloved when that is necessary for the other party to grow and develop.
x x x x
In declaring that there is a third source of incapacity for validly contracting marriage, that is, the inability to assume an essential obligation, canonical jurisprudence and the new Code aim at those elements of proof which only the actual lived conjugal life can show. This is the novelty of the new Code.
This should be clearly understood. From the moment of consent, the marriage exists or it does not. It is consent and consent alone which makes a marriage. Nothing that finds its origin after marriage can in any way invalidate a valid marriage nor render it valid if it was invalid. But from the jurisprudence of the new Code, the attention of canonists has been brought to bear on the interpersonal relationship which the exchange of consent establishes and which, in one sense, ought to already be found in this exchange. It should be admitted that the actual living of conjugal life should be considered as the place where the anterior roots of the marriage emerge as well as the place where an anomaly of the personality is revealed because it is only in the lived conditions of marriage that such defect becomes evident. From there, signs can be recognized in their nature and importance. The inability to assume essential matrimonial obligations constitutes an incapacity to contract marriage validly: it impedes someone from being the adequate object of marriage and, in that sense, it reveals the impediment which results in an incapacity for giving consent.
This new attention to the "lived conjugal life" in order to discover the initial incapacity to consent to the marriage is not new. Canonists always had to investigate conjugal life to discover evidence of insanity, simulation, a forced consent, impotency, etc. These were all methods of proof which would illuminate the state of mind at the moment of consent: the lived conjugal life provided a confirmation of the original consent or its absence.128 (emphases supplied)
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.130 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)Based on the guideline above, it has been expressed that the essential marital obligations do not only pertain to that between the husband and wife, but further include "Articles 220, 221, and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children." For reference, Article 68 to 71 read as follows:
Article 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.As may be gleaned from the foregoing, Article 68 is the overarching provision which generally articulates the essential marital obligations of the spouses "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."131 Meanwhile, related to the obligation to live together is Article 69 which states the exemptions thereto (i.e., if the spouse should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption as determined by the court), provided that the exemptions are not compatible with the solidarity of the family. Finally, Articles 70 and 71 relate to the obligation to render mutual help and support by mandating that the spouses shall be jointly responsible for the family's support and that they shall manage the household together.
Article 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
Article 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties.
Article 71. The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.
Threshold of evidence should be clear and convincing evidence. |
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.141 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)Indeed, it is settled that "[t]he presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight."142
Section 9. Investigation Report of Public Prosecutor. – (1) Within one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.In requiring clear and convincing evidence, and by recognizing the prosecuting attorney/fiscal's mandated role "to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed," there are safeguards in place to ensure that marriages are not loosely and injudiciously declared null and void but rather, pronounced as such based on Article 36's true legal contemplation.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.
3.1. The requisite of gravity means that the alleged incapacity does not merely constitute a spouse's difficulty, neglect, refusal, or illwill to escape the marital bonds. Rather, there must be a genuine anomaly or incongruity in one's psychological makeup which renders him or her truly incapable of performing the essential marital obligations.4. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity belongs to the petitioner, who is required to establish his or her case by clear and convincing evidence.
3.2. The requisite of incurability means that there is an undeniable pattern of persisting failure of one to fulfill his or her duty as a present, loving, respectful, faithful, and supportive spouse whether absolutely or relatively to his or her specific partner.
3.3. The requisite of juridical antecedence, which is explicitly required by the phrase "at the time of the celebration of the marriage" under Article 36 of the Family Code, means that the incapacity is determined to exist during the time of celebration. In order to prove juridical antecedence, it is not required to prove that the alleged incapacity exists at the precise moment that the couple exchanged their "I dos"; rather, it is sufficient that the petitioner demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that the incapacity, in all reasonable likelihood, already exists at the time of the marriage's celebration.
3.4. Accordingly, the judge must reconstruct the marital decision-making process of an individual by considering the totality of factors before and during the marriage, and their interpersonal dynamics with each other. In this regard, the judge should: (a) trace back and examine all the manifestations before and during the marriage to find out if such non-fulfillment relates to the intrinsic psychological makeup of the person relative to his or her specific partner, and not just some mere difficulty that ordinary spouses, at some point in time, are bound to go through; and (b) confirm that the non-fulfillment was not caused solely by any factor that emerged only during the marriage but one which, in all reasonable likelihood, existed at the time the marriage was entered into.
In summary, there is a Partner Relational Problem (code V61.1), which is secondary to the psychopathology of [respondent] who gravely failed in providing his family the love, support, dignity, understanding and respect. He has the essential features of a personality disorder as per criteria set in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV).Clearly, there is an undeniable pattern of persisting failure on the part of respondent to fulfill his duty as a present, loving, respectful, faithful, and supportive spouse to petitioner. His failure to comply with his essential marital obligations, as primarily embraced under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code, is not merely a product of some difficulty, neglect, refusal, or ill-will to escape the marital bonds. Rather, as can be seen from their interpersonal dynamics before and during the marriage, such failure is rooted in a genuine anomaly in respondent's psychological makeup that renders him truly incapable of performing the essential marital obligations to petitioner. Based on the foregoing, respondent is psychologically incapacitated, and accordingly, the parties' marriage should be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. On this score, I therefore agree with the ponencia's consequent disposition on the subject lot and custody of their children, which I find no need to explain further.
x x x x
x x x [Respondent] has narcissistic-antisocial personality disorder. He exhibits chronic irresponsibility, impulsivity and lack of genuine remorse, lack of empathy and a sense of entitlement. x x x169
Endnotes:
1 As amended by Executive Order No. 227, entitled "AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 'FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES'" (July 17, 1987).
2 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
3 Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law (1983) reads:Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:(See Riga, Peter J. [1992] The Catholic View of Marriage in the New Code of Canon Law of 1983 and the Nullity of Marriage in Canon 1095, Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 516. See also </archive/cod-iuris-canonici/cic_index_en.html> [last visited February 22, 2021].
- who Jack the sufficient use of reason;
- who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties which are to be mutually given and accepted;
- who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony due to causes of a psychic nature. (emphasis supplied)
In Santos v. CA (310 Phil. 21 (1995]), citing Marriage in Canon Law, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc., (1986), pp. 129-130 (see footnote 9 therein), Canon 1095 was translated in English viz.:Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:4 Molina, supra at 677.
- who lack sufficient use of reason;
- who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
- who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (emphasis supplied)
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Santos, supra.
8 Id. at 37; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
9 Id. at 30, 37.
10 See Memorandum dated January 22, 2020; rollo, pp. 591-681.
11 Id. at 605.
12 Id. at 606.
13 806 Phil. 822 (2017).
14 Id. at 850.
15 Id. at 847.
16 See rollo, p. 612.
17 See Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. See also Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337, 354 (2006).
18 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee dated August 9, 1986, p. 10.
19 See Letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, written in behalf of the Code Committee, to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro, p. 2; emphasis supplied.
20 Id.; emphasis supplied.
21 Id. at 1-2.
22 Santos, supra note 3, at 27; emphasis supplied.
23 Id. at 30.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 39.
26 Id. at 40.
27 Id. at 37.
28 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee dated August 9, 1986, p. 10.
29 Santos, supra note 3, at 38.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 46-48.
32 Id. at 48; emphasis supplied.
33 Id. at 42-46.
34 Id. at 42.
35 Id. at 45; emphasis supplied.
36 Id. at 45-46; emphasis supplied.
37 Supra note 2.
38 Id. at 668; emphasis supplied.
39 Id.; emphasis supplied.
40 Id. at 668-669; emphases supplied.
41 Id. at 677; Emphases and underscoring supplied.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 677; emphasis supplied.
44 Id. at 678; emphases supplied.
45 Id. at 677-678.
46 397 Phil. 840 (2000).
47 Id. at 842.
48 CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Section 2.
49 Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 17.
50 Rollo, p. 624.
51 See cited jurisprudence in the OSG Memorandum; id. at 626.
52 598 Phil. 666 (2009).
53 Id. at 696; emphasis supplied.
54 Id. at 695-696.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 699.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 695; emphasis supplied.
60 See Santos-Gantan v. Gantan, G.R. No. 225193, October 14, 2020. See also Republic v. Mola Cruz, G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018 and Espina-Dan v. Dan, G.R. No. 209031, April 16, 2018.
61 See G.R. No. 212717, March 11, 2020.
62 Id.
63 750 Phil. 482 (2015).
64 Id. at 495-496.
65 Rollo, pp. 623-624.
66 CIVIL CODE, Article 9.
67 CIVIL CODE, Article 10.
68 Molina, supra note 2, at 683-684; emphasis supplied.
69 See Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando's Separate Concurring Opinion, p. 4; citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. SM Prime Holdings, 627 Phil. 581 (2010); underscoring supplied.
70 New Code of Canon Law, Canon 1057, Section 2.
71 See Persons Incompetent to Contract Marriage According to Canon 1095 by Fr. Augustine Mendonca <http://www.canonlawsocietyofindiaorg/research/persons-incompetent-to-contract-marriage/> (last visited February 23, 2021).
72 See Riga, Peter J. (1992) The Catholic View of Marriage in the New Code of Canon Law of 1983 and the Nullity of Marriage in Canon 1095, Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 518-519.
73 Id. at 519.
74 See Persons Incompetent to Contract Marriage According to Canon 1095 by Fr. Augustine Mendonca <http://www.canonlawsocietyofindia.org/research/persons-incompetent-to-contract-marriage/> (last visited February 23, 2021).
75 See Dizon, Michael Anthony C. (2000) Psychological Incapacity and the Canon Law on Marriage: An Exegesis on the Psychological Element of Matrimonial Consent, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 75, No. 2, p. 371.
76 As cited in Santos (supra note 3, at 37). To note, however, there are some sources that cited Canon 1095 as follows:Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:(See Riga, Peter J. [1992] The Catholic View of Marriage in the New Code of Canon Law of 1983 and the Nullity of Marriage in Canon 1095, Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 9, No.2, p. 516. See also </archive/cod-iuris-canonici/cic_index_en.html> [last visited February 22, 2021]).
- who lack the sufficient use of reason;
- who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties which are to be mutually given and accepted;
- who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony due to causes of a psychic nature.
77 See Persons Incompetent to Contract Marriage According to Canon 1095 by Fr. Augustine Mendonca <http://www.canonlawsocietyofindia.org/research/persons-incompetent-to-contract-marriage/> (last visited February 23, 2021).
78 See Dizon, Michael Anthony C. (2000) Psychological Incapacity and the Canon Law on Marriage: An Exegesis on the Psychological Element of Matrimonial Consent, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 75, No. 2, p. 374.
79 See id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 See New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, Commissioned by The Canon Law Society of America, Edited by John P. Beal, James A. Coriden, and Thomas J. Green (2000), p. 1299.
83 See Riga, Peter J. (1992) The Catholic View of Marriage in the New Code of Canon Law of 1983 and the Nullity of Marriage in Canon 1095, Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 9, No.2, p. 525; citing Graeca-Segovien, 13.11, #4, 105 Monitor Ecclesiasticus 31 (1979) (Judge Raad).
84 See Dizon, Michael Anthony C. (2000) Psychological Incapacity and the Canon Law on Marriage: An Exegesis on the Psychological Element of Matrimonial Consent, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 75, No. 2, p. 375.
85 Id. at 374-375.
86 See Riga, Peter J. (1992) The Catholic View of Marriage in the New Code of Canon Law of 1983 and the Nullity of Marriage in Canon 1095, Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 525-526. See also Dizon, Michael Anthony C. (2000) Psychological Incapacity and the Canon Law on Marriage: An Exegesis on the Psychological Element of Matrimonial Consent, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 75. No. 2, p. 374.
87 Id. at 530; emphases supplied.
88 See Persons Incompetent to Contract Marriage According to Canon 1095 by Fr. Augustine Mendonca <http://www.canonlawsocietyofindia.org/research/persons-incompetent-to-contract-marriage/> (last visited February 23, 2021).
89 See Dizon, Michael Anthony C. (2000) Psychological Incapacity and the Canon Law on Marriage: An Exegesis on the Psychological Element of Matrimonial Consent, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 75, No. 2, p. 377.
90 See Persons Incompetent to Contract Marriage According to Canon 1095 by Fr. Augustine Mendonca <http://www.canonlawsocietyofindia.org/research/persons-incompetent-to-contract-marriage/> (last visited February 23, 2021).
91 Riga, Peter J. (1992) The Catholic View of Marriage in the New Code of Canon Law of 1983 and the Nullity of Marriage in Canon 1095, Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 520.
92 See New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, Commissioned by The Canon Law Society of America, Edited by John P. Beal, James A. Coriden, and Thomas J. Green (2000), p. 1252.
93 Persons Incompetent to Contract Marriage According to Canon 1095 by Fr. Augustine Mendonca <(http://www.canonlawsocietyofindia.org/research/persons-incompetent-to-contract-marriage/)> (last visited February 23, 2021).
94 Riga, Peter J. (1992) The Catholic View of Marriage in the New Code of Canon Law of 1983 and the Nullity of Marriage in Canon 1095, Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 536.
95 Dizon, Michael Anthony C. (2000) Psychological Incapacity and the Canon Law on Marriage: An Exegesis on the Psychological Element of Matrimonial Consent, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 75, No. 2, p. 377.
96 New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, Commissioned by The Canon Law Society of America, Edited by John P. Beal, James A. Coriden, and Thomas J. Green (2000), p. 1300; emphases supplied.
97 See Persons Incompetent to Contract Marriage According to Canon 1095 by Fr. Augustine Mendonca <http://www.canonlawsocietyofindia.org/research/persons-incompetent-to-contract-marriage/> (last visited February 23, 2021).
98 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee dated July 26, 1986, pp. 5-6.
99 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee dated July 26, 1986, pp. 8-9.
100 Id. at 10.
101 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee dated August 9, 1986, pp. 9-10.
102 See Re-Examining the Concept of Psychological Incapacity; Towards a More Accurate Reflection of Legislative Intent by Maria Sophia Editha Cruz-Abrenica (Ateneo Law Journal, p. 627). See also Dizon, Michael Anthony C. (2000) Psychological Incapacity and the Canon Law on Marriage: An Exegesis on the Psychological Element of Matrimonial Consent, Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 75, No. 2, pp. 380-381.
103 See Riga, Peter J. (1992) The Catholic View of Marriage in the New Code of Canon Law of 1983 and the Nullity of Marriage in Canon 1095, Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 523.
104 Emphases and underscoring supplied.
105 Ponencia, p. 31.
106 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Dean Estrada-Claudio dated October 23, 2020, p. 4 (unpaginated in the rollo).
107 See opinion of Dr. Luz Casimiro-Querubin, Psychiatrist and Residents' Training Officer at the Medical City in the Re-Examining the Concept of Psychological Incapacity: Towards a More Accurate Reflection of Legislative Intent by Maria Sophia Editha Cruz-Abrenica, Ateneo Law Journal, p. 625.
108 Justice Lazaro-Javier's Concurring Opinion, p. 5.
109 <https://www.apa.org/support/about-apa#:-:text=How%20does%20the%20APA%20define,to%20care%20for%20the%20aged> (last visited February 23, 2021); emphasis supplied.
110 <https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/what-is-psychiatry-menu> (last visited February 23, 2021); emphasis supplied.
111 In particular, personality disorders are grouped into three (3) clusters: Cluster A is composed of the paranoid, the schizoid, and the schizotypal personality disorders; Cluster B is composed of the antisocial, the borderline, the histrionic and the narcissistic personality disorders; and Cluster C is composed of the avoidant, dependent, and the obsessive-compulsive personality disorders, as well as a category called personality disorders not otherwise specified such as passive-aggressive personality disorder, and depressive personality disorder. See Re-Examining the Concept of Psychological Incapacity: Towards a More Accurate Reflection of Legislative Intent by Maria Sophia Editha Cruz-Abrenica, Ateneo Law Journal, pp. 627-629.
112 See Justice Lazaro-Javier's Concurring Opinion, p. 6.
113 Santos, supra note 3, at 40.
114 Amicus Curiae Brief of Dean Estrada-Claudio, p. 2 (unpaginated in the rollo).
115 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee dated July 26, 1986, p. 13; emphasis supplied.
116 See rollo, pp. 677-678.
117 Molina, supra note 2, at 678; emphasis supplied,
118 Molina, supra note 2.
119 Id.
120 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee dated July 26, 1986, p. 9.
121 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee dated August 2, 1986, p. 4.
122 Id.
123 Molina, supra note 2, at 677; emphasis supplied.
124 Id. at 677-678.
125 Emphases supplied.
126 Riga, Peter J. (1992) The Catholic View of Marriage in the New Code of Canon Law of 1983 and the Nullity of Marriage in Canon 1095, Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 523.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 533-535.
129 FAMILY COURT, Article 36; emphasis supplied.
130 Molina, supra note 2, at 678.
131 Emphasis supplied.
132 Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate, and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means; (2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding; (3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship; (4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals; (5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests; (6) To demand from them respect and obedience; (7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and (8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.
133 Article 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
134 Article 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed fur general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent bas remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.
135 FAMILY CODE, Article I.
136 See Republic v. Mola Cruz, G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018; Republic v. Javier, G.R. No. 210518, April 18, 2018, 861 SCRA 682; Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente, Jr., 807 Phil. 31 (2017); Aurelio v. Aurelio, 665 Phil. 693 (2011); Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, 642 Phil. 602 (2010); Azcueta v. Republic, 606 Phil. 177 (2009); Ngo Te, supra note 52; and Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 17.
137 Spouses Manalo v. Roldan-Confesor, 290 Phil. 311, 323 (1992).
138 Supra note 17.
139 Id. at 359.
140 43 Phil. 43 (1922).
141 Id. at 56.
142 Alcantara v. Alcantara, 558 Phil. 192, 208 (2007).
143 See Sepe v. Heirs of Kilang, G.R. No. 199766, April 10, 2019, citing Spouses Santos v.Spouses Lumbao, 548 Phil. 332, 349 (2007).
144 452 Phil. 92 (2003).
145 803 Phil. 652 (2017).
146 812 Phil. 95 (2017).
147 Supra.
148 Emphasis supplied.
149 Issued March 15, 2003.
150 See rollo, p. 596
151 See ponencia, pp. 10-11.
152 See id. at 49.
153 See id. at 40.
154 Id. at 41; emphasis supplied. See also rollo, pp. 315-316.
155 See ponencia, p. 3.
156 See id.
157 See id. at 4.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See id. at 5.
161 See id.
162 See id.
163 See id.
164 See id. at 6.
165 See id. at 5-6.
166 See id. at 8-10.
167 See id. at 5-7.
168 See id. at 8.
169 Id. at 40-41.
170 See id. at 28-29.
171 See Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 17, 355.
172 See Ngo Te, supra note 52, at 698.
173 CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Section 2.
The
requirement of clear and convincing evidence is necessitated by the
State's policy to protect marriage as an inviolable social
institution |
ARTICLE 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.This provision echoes the State policy enshrined in Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, thus:
SECTION 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.To warrant the severance of what the Constitution characterizes as an inviolable social institution, mere preponderance of evidence, which is the standard of evidence required to nullify ordinary civil contracts, will not suffice. A higher standard must be required in recognition of the status of marriage as a special contract of permanent union that is protected by the Constitution. To afford the institution of marriage the necessary protection against arbitrary dissolution, clear and convincing evidence must therefore be required. In turn, evidence is clear and convincing if it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. It is indeterminate, being more than preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases.4
SECTION 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Psychological incapacity is a legal concept |
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.Based on the foregoing provision, psychological incapacity as a ground for the absolute nullity of marriage only has two textual requirements — first, that the afflicted spouse be incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, and second, that such incapacity be present at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Justice [Eduardo] Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychologically or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one there is vitiation of consent, while in the second one, there is no understanding of the effects of the marriage. He added that the first one would fall under insanity.The deliberations further clarify that the lack of understanding of one's marital obligations, to be a ground for nullity, must be shown to exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage, although its manifestations may become apparent later on.
x x x x
Prof. [Esteban] Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriage since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean [Fortunato Gupit, Jr.] added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
Justice [Eduardo] Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.6 (Emphasis supplied)
Justice [Ricardo Puno] observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice [Eduardo] Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychologieal incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of the marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.7 (Emphasis supplied)Based on the language of Article 36 and the spirit of the provision as reflected in the Joint Committee deliberations, therefore, the only indispensable requirements that must be established to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity are: (i) a lack of understanding of the effects of marriage that is of such gravity as to bring about the afflicted spouse's incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations provided in the Family Code; and (ii) the existence of such incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage. These essential marital obligations include the obligations of the spouses to one another (that is, those detailed under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code), and the obligations of the spouses as parents (that is, those detailed under Articles 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code) for, as aptly explained by the ponencia, the State affords protection to marriage in view of its role as the foundation of the family.8 Undoubtedly, a fruitful family life requires the fulfillment of the spouses' obligations not only as husband and wife, but also as parents.
On psychological incapacity, [Justice Flerida Ruth] Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice [Eduardo] Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is affected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice [Ricardo] Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.The foregoing distinction is confirmed by the fact that psychological incapacity and insanity are treated differently, i.e., the first is defined and governed by Article 36, whereas insanity is governed by Article 45(2) of the Family Code.
[Professor Esteban] Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice [Ricardo J Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.
[Justice Flerida Ruth] Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice [Leonor Ines] Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice [Eduardo] Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and, therefore, a psychiatrist will not be of help.
[Professor Esteban] Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice [J.B.L.] Reyes and Dean [Fortunato] Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage.10 (Emphasis supplied)
The Molina guidelines are
evidentiary guideposts, not rigid
requisites |
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.To be sure, the Molina guidelines only provide, with particularity: (i) who has the burden of establishing the existence of psychological incapacity (as in guideline 114 ); and, more importantly (ii) the factors which may be considered in determining the existence of psychological incapacity (as in guidelines 2, 3, 4, 5 and 715 ). It should be noted that these factors which are identified as relevant in the Molina guidelines merely echo those which were discussed in the course of the Joint Committee deliberations.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The Incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such Incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code In regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church—while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other—shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.13 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina x x x[.]Considering that the restrictive effect of the Molina guidelines stems not from the guidelines themselves, but rather, from their misapplication, I maintain that clarification, rather than abandonment, is the proper course of action.
x x x x
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court's membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice Oater Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and another three—including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero—took pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on 'all fours' with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the [Office of the Solicitor General's] exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.17 (Emphasis in the original)
The
totality of evidence on record clearly and convincingly establishes
Mario's psychological
incapacity |
The judicial determination of psychological incapacity must be based on the trial court's independent assessment of the totality of evidence on
record |
[Professor] Esteban [Bautista] stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriage since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean [Fortunato] Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.32 (Emphasis supplied)In this connection, I echo the following statement of Justice Teodoro R. Padilla — "[w]hile it is true that the broad term 'psychological incapacity' can open the doors to abuse by couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence."33 Further, it is apt to stress, as Joint Committee member Justice Eduardo Caguioa once did, that as with the interpretation of all other provisions of law, one cannot argue on the basis of abuse.34 Ultimately, the Joint Committee did not accord Article 36 a fixed definition to allow some resiliency in its application. As psychological incapacity rests on the attendant circumstances that are unique in each case, the Joint Committee deliberately left the determination of the existence of psychological incapacity to the trial courts.35 As stated by Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa:
x x x A code should not have so many definitions, because a definition straitjackets the concept and, therefore, many cases that should go under it are excluded by the definition. [That is] why we leave it up to the court to determine the meaning of psychological incapacity.36 (Italics omitted)To reiterate once more, each case must be decided by the judge on a case-to-case basis after evaluating the relevance, competence, and credibility of the various types of evidence presented. Accordingly, the alleged manifestations of psychological incapacity in each case must be assessed together with all other circumstances attendant therein. The Court therefore calls upon the presiding judges of the trial courts to take up the cudgels and assiduously perform their duty as gatekeepers against potential abuse, ensuring that declarations of absolute nullity of marriage are issued only in cases where psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 is judicially determined to exist. In turn, the trial court's determination must be based on its own assessment of the totality of evidence on record.
Endnotes:
1 G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
2 FAMILY CODE, Art. 1.
3 Ponencia, p. 27.
4 Dela Paz v. Republic, G.R. No. 195726, November 20, 2017, 845 SCRA 34, 46-47.
5 Incapacity is defined by Merriam-Webster as the "quality or state of being incapable." See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incapacity. In turn, incapable is defined as "lacking capacity, ability, or qualification for the purpose or end in view." See https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/incapable.
6 Minutes of the 148th Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, July 26, 1986, pp. 9-10.
7 Minutes of the 149th Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, August 2, 1986, p. 4.
8 See ponencia, p. 28.
9 See Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 31.
10 Minutes of the 148th Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, July 26, 1986, pp. 12-13.
11 See id. at 13.
12 See J. Padilla, Separate Statement in Republic v. Molina, supra note 1, at 214.
13 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 1, at 209-213.
14 That is, "[t]he burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity."
15 To restate: (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children; and (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
16 G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193.
17 Id. at 220-225.
18 On the Canon Law roots of Article 36, see Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero's Separate Opinion in Molina:With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.19 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9, at 35.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature) are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo—freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships. (J. Romero, Separate Opinion in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 1, at 217-218.)
20 As required by Articles 68 and 220 of the Family Code.
21 As required by Article 220 of the Family Code.
22 Ponencia, p. 11.
23 Id. at 41-42.
24 Id. at 12.
25 Id. at 8.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 13.
28 Id. at 11.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Yambao v. Republic, G.R. No. 184063, January 24, 2011, 640 SCRA 355, 367.
32 Minutes of the 148th Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, July 26, 1986, p, 10.
33 J. Padilla, Dissenting Opinion in Santos v, Court of Appeals, supra note 9, at 36-37.
34 Minutes of the 150th Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, August 9, 1986, p, 9.
35 See Amicus Brief of Dean Melencio S. Sta. Maria, p. 5, citing Joint Committee Member JuStice Eduardo P. Caguioa at the Senate Committee hearing on Women and Family Relations on February 3, 1988.
36 Id.
37 J. Caguioa, Dissenting Opinion in Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018, 862 SCRA 580, 653.
"Marriage is the coherent, stable category of relationships, activities, satisfactions and responsibilities which can be intelligently and reasonably chosen by a man together with a woman, and adopted as their demanding mutual commitment and common good, because its components respond and correspond fully reasonably to that complex of interlocking, complementary good reasons."2Is this an unwarranted assumption of Finnis? An unjustified a priorism? One thing is certain: It is what Finnis describes that people expect (better, hope!) when they enter into marriage. It is the very reason that marriage exists and, despite the twists and turns it has taken in human history, remains one of society's most reliable institutions. It is good phenomenology in the sense that it clarifies and reduces to the clarity of concepts the common experience of marriage. It is good philosophy because it takes the good of the individual and the common good in conjunction.
"For one thing the law cannot easily escape the need to adopt and apply a moral theory of marriage...The law therefore needs principles for resolving those conflicts, and such principles ultimately must rest in part on some understanding of the moral nature of marriage...If the law is to operate predictably and fairly, it needs to stay in some kind of contact with assumptions on which people base their beliefs."4All marriage rites with which I am familiar – and the earliest rites were of course religious rites, followed only by so-called civil marriages – whether expressly or tacitly left no doubt that marriage was a lasting union ending in death. This sentiment is summed up almost lyrically in the Catholic rite of marriage where the spouses recite the words:
"Grant us O Lord to be one heart and one soul from this day forward, for better or for worse, for richer or for poorer, in sickness and in health until death do us part."5Aside from the express Constitutional policy that recognizes the sanctity of family life – the latter being impossible without marriage – there is also the fact that no matter how long a couple in the Philippines may have been in cohabitation, they will always seek marriage to lend stability to their union. The moral persuasion of the people is that marriage is not some tentative arrangement or partnership but a life-long union. It is this moral persuasion that should go into our reading of the law, if law is to be the instrument of social cohesion that it should be.
"The second oldest component of the civil law tradition is the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church. This body of law and procedure was developed by the Church for its own governance and to regulate the rights and obligations of its communicants. Just as Roman civil law was the universal law of the temporal empire, directly associated with the authority of the emperor, so the canon law as the universal law of the spiritual domain, directly associated with the authority of the pope. Each had its own sphere of application and a separate set of courts existed for each: the civil courts for Roman civil law and the ecclesiastical courts for canon law. There was, however, a tendency toward overlapping jurisdiction, and before the Reformation it was common to find ecclesiastical courts exercising civil jurisdiction, particularly in family law and succession matters."8Mr. Justice Leonen remarks: "It is strange that the sensibilities of a particular religion are considered in the creation of state policy and the drafting of our laws."9 It would be stranger, indeed, if they did not, for as discussed above, laws such as those governing marriage must rest on some moral convictions about marriage and the facts both of history and our culture as a people is that in many ways, our beliefs have been shaped, contoured and orientated by Christianity. And that is not necessarily a bad thing. If anything, our society is what it is today because of those beliefs.
When the intent of the law is not apparent as worded, or when the application of the law would lead to absurdity or injustice, legislative history is all important. In such cases, courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the law, the deliberations during the enactment, as well as prior laws on the same subject matter to ascertain the true intent or spirit of the law.10Interestingly, a provision akin to Article 36 of our Family Code is found in Article 120 of the Italian Civil Code that makes a marriage susceptible to annulment where one of the parties is unable, even if only transitorily, "to intend or to will" the marriage at the time the marriage is contracted. As interestingly, the comment on this article mentions a "diminution of intellective or volitional capacities that impedes the party from a correct valuation of his own acts and that render him incapable or at least diminish his ability of self-determination."11
"It is not possible to identify all the possible ways in which a person might be unable to assume the essential obligations. Firstly, this is an area where jurisprudence is still developing, and so there is no definitive list of what obligations are deemed to be essential; secondly, the psychological sciences themselves, on which depend the identification and evaluation of the 'causes of a psychological nature', are also an area of development. Apart from conditions such as nymphomania or satyriasis which are fairly clear-cut in the way in which they affect capacity for particular obligations in marriage, most examples of invalidity under this section will be concerned with the more general capacity for a true conjugal relationship."12It is crucial to remember that in the instant case, the "psychological incapacity" plea entered into the picture only pursuant to Rosanna's position that she should have custody over Samantha. That Rosanna was convinced of the psychological incapacity of her husband, or simply wanted to have a monopoly of custody over Samantha, born out of an aversion for her husband is not settled.
Endnotes:
1 598 Phil. 666 (2009).
2 John Finnis, "The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some Philosophical and Historical Observations", American Journal of Jurisprudence, 42 (1998) 97-134.
3 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, Art. II, Sec. 12.
4 Carl E. Schneider, "Marriage, Morals, and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral Discourse", University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 1994, 503-585.
5 Catholic Rite of Marriage.
6 John Bell, et al., Principles of French Law, 2d Ed., Oxford University Press, 2008, 244.
7 J. Zekoll and M. Reimann, Introduction to German Law, 2d Ed., Kluwer International, 2005, 254.
8 John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition, Stanford University Press, 1985, 10-11.
9 Ponencia, p. 32.
10 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. SM Prime Holdings, 627 Phil. 581 (2010).
11 Rosanna Petrucci, Codice Civile, XII Edizione, Edizione Giuridiche Simone, 2008, 190.
12 Gerard Sheehy, et al., The Canon Law: Letter and Spirit, Geoffrey Chapman, 1995, 611-612.
The prototypical conception of psychological incapacity |
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.Therefore, the prototypical conception of psychological incapacity has depended on decisions of the Supreme Court.
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity....The standard of proof in a case under Article 36 is preponderance of evidence or balance of probabilities. The burden of proof is discharged by the Petitioner if he or she is able to prove his or her cause of action more likely than not.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision....
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage....
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex....
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.... In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.....
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts....
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.....
On the basis of the evidence on record, is it more likely or probable than not that:In terms of proving the existence of a clinically or medically identified personality disorder, a party is, in practice, though not in law, required to hire a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist. The same is true when it comes to proving the gravity, incurability or permanence, and juridical antecedence of the personality disorder. In practice, a lay person would be hard pressed to prove these elements of psychological incapacity. The lay person would be unable to identify the personality disorder involved, much less, medically or clinically identify as grave, incurable or permanent, and in existent on or before the marriage.
a. the essential marital obligations embraced in Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code have not been performed?
b. the individual responsible for the non-performance of the essential marital obligations embraced in Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code was the Respondent or the Petitioner or both of them?
c. the Respondent or the Petitioner or both of them are suffering from a personality disorder or personality disorders that have been medically or clinically identified?
d. the personality disorders of the Respondent or the Petitioner or both of them are grave, that is, the essential marital obligations under Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code have not been performed by the Respondent or the Petitioner or both of them on account of or due to his or her or their personality disorders, and that these duties have not been performed in a manner that is "clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage"?
e. the disorder or disorders of the Respondent or the Petitioner or both are medically or clinically permanent or incurable?
f. the grave and incurable personality disorders of the Respondent or the Petitioner or both of them have existed at "the time of the celebration" of their marriage or prior thereto?
.... [t]he Court therefore calls upon the presiding judges of the trial courts to take up the cudgels and assiduously perform their duty as gatekeepers against potential abuse, ensuring that declarations of absolute nullity of marriage are issued only in cases where psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 is judicially determined to exist[,]to be well meaning, albeit it does not totally reflect what is actually taking place in the overwhelming number of Article 36 petitions before our Family Courts.
It seems clear from this analysis that it is impossible at present to decide whether personality disorders are mental disorders or not, and that this will remain so until there is an agreed definition of mental disorder. It is also apparent that personality disorders are conceptually heterogeneous, that information about them is limited, and that existing knowledge is largely derived from unrepresentative clinical populations. The clinical literature on personality disorders – indeed, the basic concept of personality disorder – has few points of contact with the psychological literature on personality structure and development, and little is known of the cerebral mechanisms underlying personality traits. There is also a glaring need for a better classification of personality disorders and for more longterm follow-up studies of representative samples, derived from community rather than clinical populations, to answer basic questions about the extent, nature and time course of the handicaps associated with different types of personality disorder.In any event, a person with a personality disorder has trouble perceiving and relating to situations and people.4 This causes significant problems and limitations in relationships, social activities, work, and school.5
.... Although it is difficult to provide irrefutable arguments that personality disorders are mental disorders, it is equally difficult to argue with conviction that they are not. The fact that they have been included in the two most influential and widely used classifications of mental disorders (the ICD and the DSM) for the past half-century is difficult to disregard, whether or not one accepts the view that mental disorder is an ostensive concept. It could be argued, though, that the crucial issue is not whether personality disorder is embraced by any particular definition or concept of mental illness, but what kinds of considerations lead doctors to change their minds about assignations of illness, and in this context two issues loom large.
.... CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS
• Because the term mental illness has no agreed meaning it is impossible to decide with confidence whether or not personality disorders are mental illnesses.
• The historical reasons for regarding personality disorders as fundamentally different from illnesses are being undermined by both clinical and genetic evidence.
• The introduction of effective treatments would probably have a decisive influence on psychiatrists' attitudes.
• The way one perceives and interprets oneself, other people, and events;Additionally, as held by decisions of the Supreme Court, there ought to be a link between the factual behavioral manifestations and the supposed personality disorder. The link is the symptoms of the personality disorder or personality disorders clinically and medically identified. There must be a one-to-one correlation between the theoretical behavioral manifestations of the identified personality disorder and the actual behavioral manifestations observed from the spouse concerned. These actual behavioral manifestations must of course be proved by preponderant evidence, that is, the evidence prove that they exist more likely than not. Generally, the existence of this correlation establishes the GRAVITY of the personality disorder.
• The appropriateness of one's emotional responses;
• How well one functions when dealing with other people and in relationships; and
• Whether one can control one's impulses.9
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent's unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality.... It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.10The behavioral manifestations of an atypical or wild conduct may not at all be connected to a personality disorder but to mere difficulty, neglect, refusal, or ill will to perform marital or parental obligations.11
The behavioral manifestations of an atypical or wild conduct, if not at all connected to a personality disorder, may be linked to a spouse's mere difficulty, neglect, refusal or ill will to deal with the other spouse or to perform the former's marital and familial obligations.
ATYPICAL CONDUCT BEHAVORIAL MANIFESTATIONS PERSONALITY DISORDER/S Or: ATYPICAL CONDUCT BEHAVORIAL MANIFESTATIONS DIFFICULTY, NEGLECT, REFUSAL, ILL WILL
(i) | whether there is evidence of conduct of the spouses or one of them probably exhibiting difficulty, neglect, refusal, or ill will to perform marital and familial obligations, and |
(ii) | whether there is evidence that such conduct showing difficulty, neglect, refusal, or ill will to perform marital or parental obligations is established more likely than not to be the cause of the marital breakdown. |
The conception of psychological incapacity, according to the ponencia |
Respondent correctly declared to be psychologically incapacitated and the marriage correctly nullified on this ground – even under the prototypical doctrine on psychological incapacity |
The prototypical definition of psychological incapacity as inadequate to address dynamics of troubled and troubling marriages |
Remedy of psychological incapacity as actually practiced in trial courts |
Endnotes:
1 335 Phil. 664, 676-679 (1997).
2 Mayo Clinic, Personality Disorders, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/personalitydisorders/diagnosis-treatment/drc-20354468, last accessed on May 17, 2021.
3 R. E. Kendell, "The distinction between personality disorder and mental illness," The British Journal of Psychiatry, published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 January 2018, at https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/the-british-journal-of-psychiatry/article/distinction-betweenpersonality-disorder and-mental-illness/F4FC446AEB38B5704ED132245F86E93B, last accessed on May 19, 2021.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditionslpersonality-disorders/diagnosis-treatment/drc-20354468, last accessed on May 17, 2021.
10 Garlet v. Garlet, 815 Phi. 268-305 (2017).
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Office of the Court Administrator v. Floro, (Resolution) A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, August 11, 2006.
14 Inspired by the lyrics of the song "100% or Nothing" by Primal Scream.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Hannah Bahmanpour and Julie MacFarlane, What Court Staff Told Us: A Summary from the National Self-Represented Litigants Study 2011-2012, National Self Represented Litigants Project, 2014 CanLIIDocs 33186, <http://www.canlii.org/t/sjqf>, retrieved on 2019-08-12; see also Rose Voyvodic, Lawyers Meet the Social Context: Understanding Cultural Competence, 2006 84-3 Canadian Bar Review 563, 2006 CanLIIDocs 152, <http://www.canlii.org/t/2cgq>, retrieved on 2019-08-12; Western Centre for Research and Education on Violence Against Women and Children, Make It Our Business," at http://makeitourbusiness.ca/blog/what-does-it-mean-be-culturally-competent, last accessed May 15, 2021.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
x x x Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe Jove, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. x x x3 (Italics supplied.)In Santos, the Court observed that the absence of a clear-cut definition of "psychological incapacity" in the Family Code had not been an oversight on the part of the Family Code Revision Committee. Rather, the deliberate vagueness in the term itself was so designed in the law "as to allow some resiliency in its application."4
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:Since its promulgation in 1997, the Court has strictly applied the Molina guidelines in petitions for nullity under Article 36, which has more often than not resulted in the denial thereof for failure to prove that one or both spouses are psychologically incapacitated to comprehend and comply with their essential marital obligations.
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's" The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject to our law on evidence – what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church – while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other – shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.5 (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x Emilio may have engaged in an extra-marital affair, gambled, failed to support Cheryl and their son, is irritable and aggressive, and abandoned his family, while Cheryl may have married Emilio simply in obedience to her parents' decision and had the constant need for her parents' care and support. However, these acts, by themselves, do not prove that both parties are psychologically incapacitated as these may have been simply due to jealousy, emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or dire financial constraints. x x x Accordingly, it cannot be said that either party is suffering from a grave and serious psychological condition which rendered either of them incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage.7Notably, the Court in Deang had disregarded the testimony of the expert witness as regards the alleged psychological incapacity as the psychologist's findings were solely founded on the narrations of the respondent spouse arid her sister.8
x x x The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institution. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.This is not to say, however, that the Molina guidelines are truly unfounded and without any legal bases or flawed beyond repair. This, in fact, is a point that I refused to concede from the very beginning despite the number of valid concerns that have been raised, both in the past and in the present, as regards the impact of the Molina ruling in the disposition of psychological incapacity cases. In my view, the guidelines simply had to be revisited, refined, and updated to reflect what is already provided in pertinent laws and jurisprudence so as to avoid further confusion in its application by the bench and the bar.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample; safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.19 (Italics supplied.)
SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -Veritably, what Article 36 requires is only a showing of facts relating to manifestations or symptoms indicative of psychological incapacity and not necessarily a specific, incurable mental disorder that supposedly caused s1ich incapacity. At most, the presentation of expert testimony to prove that a person is suffering from an incurable mental illness may be deemed as compelling evidence in resolving the issue of psychological incapacity, but it should not be .considered an indispensable requirement for a petition under Article 36 to prosper.
x x x x
(d) What to allege. — A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. (Italics supplied.)
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.22It is for these reasons that I emphasize that psychological incapacity, as contemplated under Article 36, should be considered as a legal concept and not a medical one. Stated differently, psychological incapacity is a legal conclusion of the courts that is not, as it should not be, wholly dependent on the medical diagnosis of one or both spouses by an expert in the fields of psychology or psychiatry. To reiterate, it is still the totality of evidence that must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the essential marital obligations he or she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Endnotes:
1 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
2 310 Phil. 21 (1995).
3 Id. at 40.
4 Id. at 36.
5 Republic v. Molina, supra note 1 at 676-679.
6 G.R. No. 236279, March 25, 2019.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 466 Phil. 226 (2004).
10 Id. at 233.
11 627 Phil. 1 (2010).
12 See Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, et al., 754 Phil. 158, 200 (2015).
13 607 Phil. 1 (2009).
14 Id. at 6.
15 642 Phil. 602 (2010).
16 Id. at 632-633.
17 598 Phil. 666 (2009).
18 Id. at 669.
19 Id. at 695-698.
20 See Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000).
21 Id.
22 Ting v. Velez-Ting, 601 Phil. 676, 692 (2009), citing Rationale for the New Rules as submitted by the Committee on the Revision of Rules to the Supreme Court, November 11, 2002, p. 3, as cited in Sta. Maria, Jr., Court Procedures in Family Law Cases, 2007 ed., pp. 10-11. Italics in the original.
23 See Lavarez, et al. v. Guevarra, et al., 808 Phil. 247, 256 (2017).
24 See Republic v. Romero, 781 Phil. 737, 749 (2016).
Psychological incapacity is a legal concept, but its root cause can be a mental or personality disorder. |
x x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.The learned ponente also mentioned personality structure manifested through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family, and this aspect of personality fulfills the law's intent to limit psychological incapacity to "psychic causes".
The concepts of root cause and juridical antecedence should not be confused with childhood development. |
Lack of personal examination or interview of the psychologically incapacitated spouse does not invalidate the findings of the expert. |
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.In Dela Fuente v. Dela Fuente,15 the Court ruled that the psychologist's testimony, as corroborated by the petitioner, sufficiently proved that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity. In Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes,16 the Court reiterated that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychologist since marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.
Totality of evidence and the quantum of evidence required must be clarified. |
Endnotes:
1 G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 335 PHIL 664-693.
2 G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 310 PHIL 21-49.
3 Tani-Dela Fuente v. Dela Fuente, G.R. No. 188400, March 8, 2017, 807 PHIL 31-51.
4 The term "personality structure" can be found in hundreds of references in the field of psychology. See R. Christie and F. Lindeur, Annual Review of Psychology, 1963 14:1, 201-230.
5 As defined by the American Psychological Association (APA). See APA Dictionary.
6 The Freudian Theory of Personality.
7 Categories in the DSM-5 include anxiety disorders, bipolar and related disorders, depressive disorders, feeding and eating disorders, obsessive-compulsive and related disorders, and personality disorders.
8 Minutes of the Civil Code and Family Law Committee Meeting on July 26, 1986, p. 9.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the celebration of marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if he can already comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio.x x x x
Justice Puna and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity becomes manifest but later on, he was cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow to remarry.
9 World Health Organization. "Mental Disorders". Available at https://www.who.int/ (Last Accessed: January 20, 2021).
10 Amicus Curiae Brief of Dean Melencio S. Sta. Maria, pp. 11-12.
11 Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, Psychological Incapacity as a Ground to Dissolve Marriage, San Beda L.J. 41 (1994). According to J. Sempio-Diy, "the psychologically incapacitated person would not be disqualified from marrying again".
12 Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 598 PHIL 666-710.
13 G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 377 PHIL 919-933.
14 G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 397 PHIL 840-852.
15 Supra note 3.
16 G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010, 642 PHIL 602-634.
17 Supra note 14.
18 Supra note 12.
19 Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006, 529 PHIL 419-436.
20 Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
"Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the witness' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number."
21 Ogawa v. Menigishi, G.R. No. 193089, July 9, 2012, 690 PHIL 359-368.
22 See Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, G.R. No. 18081, March 3, 1922 and Avenido v. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014.
23 G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 519 PHIL 337-371.
24 G.R. No. 225193, October 14, 2020 (First Division).
25 54 App.D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
26 509 US 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993).
27 G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005, 499 PHIL 185-206.
28 According to the American Psychiatric Association, the new edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–5) is the product of more than 10 years of effort by hundreds of international experts in all aspects of mental health. Used by clinicians and researchers to diagnose and classify mental disorders, the criteria are concise and explicit, intended to facilitate an objective assessment of symptom presentations in a variety of clinical settings - inpatient, outpatient, partial hospital, consultation-liaison, clinical, private practice, and primary care. Available at https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/about-dsm (Last Accessed: January 8, 2021).
29 Antero Rosauro V. Arias, Jr., A Thematic Look at Selected Cases of Marital Nullity in the Philippines, IAFOR Journal of Psychology & the Behavioral Sciences Volume 2, Issue 3, Winter 2016. Available at: https://iafor.orgiarchives/journals/iafor-journal-of-psychology-and-the-behavioralsciences/10.22492.ijpbs.2.3.05.pdf (Last Accessed: January 10, 2021).
30 Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 166357, January 14, 2015.
31 American Psychiatric Association. What is Psychiatry? Available at: https://www.psychiatry.org/patientsfamilies/what-is-psychiatry-menu (Last Accessed: January 10, 2021).
32 Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen's Dissenting Opinion in Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016.
The State as the third party of a marriage. |
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
x x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. (Underscoring supplied)
A finding of psychological incapacity need not be grounded on a particular personality disorder alone. |
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.A plain reading of Article 36 of the Family Code provides two (2) distinct requirements, that: (1) the spouse is incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations and (2) such psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage, i.e., juridical antecedence. Thus, such incapacity must therefore be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage although the overt manifestations may emerge only after its celebration. It must be emphasized however, that juridical antecedence need not be grounded on a particular personality disorder.
Justice [Eduardo] Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent but the inability to give meaning to such consent. Focus was made on the inability or incapacity of a spouse to fulfill essential marital obligations due to psychological causes intrinsic to him or her, which he or she assumes as a result of the valid consent given at the time of marriage. It could then be said that the Code Committee emphasized the presence of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the spouse, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates him or her from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.16
x x x x
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge ..."Justice [Eduardo] Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphases supplied)
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:In fine, while psychological incapacity should contemplate grave psychological causes that render a spouse truly incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage, such category is broad enough to include personality disorders but at the same time, not solely limited to it. Further, from a practical point of view, I would venture to state that members of the Code Committee could have easily referred to psychological incapacity to pertain to a diagnosed personality disorder had that been their intention. First, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which is used by clinicians and researchers to diagnose and classify personality disorders, was already in existence during the Code Committee deliberations in 1986. Specifically its 3rd edition (DSM-III), was published in 1980.19 An innovation of the DSM-III from its predecessor was the inclusion of explicit diagnostic criteria and development of psychiatric interviews for research and clinical uses, among others.20 Thus, the members could have referred to personality disorders or referenced the application of diagnostic criteria with ease, considering the availability of a widely-accepted scientific standard. Second, the suggestion that a psychiatrist be invited to their deliberations would not have been readily struck down had the Code Committee truly intended that psychological incapacity to pertain to a spouse suffering from a personality disorder, a condition which would be better explained by an expert in the field, thus:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:... because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) ... (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.18 (Emphases supplied)
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. It would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.21 (Underscoring supplied)Again, focus was made on the inability of the spouse to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage rather than a scientific approach in understanding a psychological condition, if any. Lastly, I likewise consider significant the Code Committee's refusal to enumerate examples of psychological incapacity to avoid restricting the applicability of Article 36, thus:
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has, in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:The "less specificity than expected" refers to the Code Committee's omission to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited the applicability of the provision. It was held that the Code Committee desired that courts should interpret the provision on a case-tocase basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from the Canon Law.23The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.22 (Underscoring supplied)
Incurability should not be assessed from a medical standpoint. |
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.Moreover, in the Separate Opinion of Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in Molina, who was likewise a member of the Code Committee, she discloses:
x x x x
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity becomes manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry.25 (Underscoring supplied)
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.""As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and whatever is within the spirit of statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter."26 Thus, it being clear from the foregoing that the characterization that psychological incapacity should be incurable was intended by the Code Committee cannot be cursorily disregarded even if it is not a textual requirement under the law.
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry. (Underscoring supplied)
The personality structure of both spouses should be considered in determining psychological incapacity. |
[P]sychological incapacity is not merely a personal predisposition or failing but one that is brought to the fore by a confluence of an individual's psychology as acted upon by environmental (sic) such as his or her partners individual traits, experiences in the life of his or her family while growing up and the social and cultural context in which the couple are living their lives, the absence or presence of children and the choices both the person and their partner make in life as a couple. In short, interlinked relationship variables such as compatibility, conviviality, companionship and mutual cooperation which are necessary to the capacity to fulfill spousal and familial obligations can be enhanced or completely abrogated by the subsequent actions and events of married life.31 (Emphasis supplied)To clarify, this is not to state that the personality structure of the spouse alleged to be incapacitated only arose or developed in the course of the couple's marriage. Otherwise, this would be violative of the textual requirement of A1iicle 36 which clearly provides that the spouse should be psychologically incapacitated "at the time of the celebration." However, I agree with Dean Estrada-Claudio's proposition considering that the marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.32 In this manner, the cou1is may better evaluate whether there is truly a natal or supervening disabling factor in the alleged incapacitated spouse, which is not simply a reaction to the "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, and occasional emotional outbursts"33 of the other. To qualify as a basis to nullify a marriage, the incompatibility and incongruity of a couple's personality structures must be established such that the breakdown of their union 1s inevitable and irreparable.34
Psychological incapacity as required by Article 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may only emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.35In spite of the clarifications made by the ponencia as to how the Code Committee intended to construe psychological incapacity, to interpret incurability and how the Molina guidelines should be utilized i.e., evidentiary guideposts; it must be emphasized that these changes should not be taken as a more liberal approach in the application of the said guidelines. Rather, this Court is merely implementing Article 36 of the Family Code as originally intended by the members of the Code Committee. While these clarifications may not altogether ease the burden of nullifying marriages on the ground of psychological incapacity, at the minimum, it can deter the instances where petitions are dismissed primarily due to the failure to identify the root cause of such incapacity and confirm its incurability based on medical or clinical standards.
Endnotes:
1 Rollo, p. 81.
2 Id. at 84.
3 Id. at 85.
4 Id. at 86-87.
5 Santos-Gantan v. Gantan, G.R. No. 225193, October 14, 2020.
6 Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, 642 Phil. 602 (2010).
7 Manuel v. People, 512 Phil. 818 (2005).
8 Ponencia, p. 30.
9 Riguer v. Atty Mateo, 811 Phil. 538 (2017).
10 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Section 2.
11 CIVIL CODE, Article 220:
ARTICLE 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression. (Underscoring supplied)
12 Ponencia, p. 28.
13 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
14 Separate Opinion of Justice Caguioa, pp. 6-10.
15 310 Phil. 21 (1995).
16 Republic v. Molina, supra note 13.
17 Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, 598 Phil. 666 (2009).
18 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15.
19 See https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/history-of-the-dsm (last accessed on May 18, 2021).
20 Id.
21 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15, citing Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee.
22 Id.
23 Kalaw v. Fernandez, 750 Phil. 482 (2015).
24 Ponencia, p. 32.
25 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 15.
26 Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957), citing 82 C.J.S., 613.
27 Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337 (2006).
28 Kalaw v. Fernandez, supra note 23.
29 Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003.
SECTION 1. Scope. — This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
x x x x
(d) What to allege. — A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. (Underscoring supplied)
30 Suazo v. Suazo, 629 Phil. 157 (2010); Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000).
31 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Dean Sylvia Estrada-Claudio, M.D., Ph.D., p. 3.
32 Republic v. Molina, supra note 13.
33 Id.
34 Ponencia, p. 34.
35 Mallilin v. Jamesolamin, 754 Phil. 158 (2015).
36 Republic v. Dagdag, 404 Phil. 249 (2011).
37 Id.
38 Kalaw v. Fernandez, supra note 23.
39 Yambao v. Republic, 655 Phil. 346 (2011).
40 Supra note 31, at 2.
41 Neuropsychology is defined as the "science concerned with the integration of psychological observations on behavior and the mind with neurological observations on the brain and nervous system." See https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/neuropsychology (last accessed May 19, 2021).
42 Reflections of Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, p. 4.
43 Supra note 31, at 6.
44 Ponencia, p. 53.
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.4This Court's conservative treatment and interpretation of the foregoing provision was laid down almost 25 years ago in Santos v. Court of Appeals5 and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.6 The foregoing rulings would inadvertently produce stringent guidelines by which parties would be required to prove that their spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their marriage.
Endnotes:
1 Section 1, Article XV of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development."
2 Id. at Section 2, "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State."
3 Article I, Title I of the Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209.
4 As amended by E.O. No. 227.
5 310 Phil. 21 (1995).
6 355 Phil. 664 (1997).
7 Rollo, p. 99.
8 Ponencia, p. 51.
9 Article 176, E.O. No. 209.
10 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255. An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father, amending for the Purpose Article 176 of Executive Order No 709, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines."
11 R.A. No. 8972. An Act Providing for Benefits and Privileges to Solo Parents and their Children, Appropriating Funds therefor, and Other Purposes.
12 Ponencia, p. 31-32, citing the Amicus Curiae Brief of Dean Sylvia Estrada-Claudio.
13 See Republic v. Tobora-Tionglico, 823 Phil. 672 (2018).
14 See Cortez v. Cortez, G.R. No. 224638, April 10, 2019.
15 See Epina-Dan v. Dan, G.R. No. 209031, 829 Phil. 605 (2018).
LOPEZ, J.:
I concur in the result as astutely reached by the ponencia.
I also join the rest of my esteemed colleagues in their finding that the totality of evidence presented clearly points to the psychological incapacity of Mario to comply with his essential marital obligations. The marriage of the parties must necessarily be rendered null and void.
The State's efforts in zealously protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family1 is a constitutional mandate that must be underscored. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution the maintenance of which, the public is deeply interested.2 It is from this mandate that serves as the spring from which flows several provisions reflective of the State's desire to uphold and promote the sanctity of marriage. This pervasive view on marriage is an indelible part of culture and the human mindset. It has the peculiar capability to transcend borders and jurisdictions. As keenly observed by the United States Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges:3
From their beginning to their most recent age, the annals of human history reveal the transcendent importance of marriage. The lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity of all persons, without regard to their station in life. Marriage is sacred to those who life by their religions and offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm. Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.This Court, in its interpretation of the laws, recognizes that the State has surrounded marriage with the necessary safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity, and permanence for the reason that the security and stability of the State are largely dependent on it.4 Therefore, the institution of marriage, regardless of its religious and secular foundations, has never stood in isolation to the dynamic developments of the law. Its legal evolution is marked by the tension between continuity and change; it has managed to adapt to the generations' understanding of marriage while staying steadfast to the intent of the framers that it remains "legally inviolable," and must be protected from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
The centrality of marriage to the human condition makes it unsurprising that the institution has existed for millenia and across civilizations. x x x
A code should not have so many definitions, because a definition straight-jackets the concept and, therefore, many cases that should go under it are excluded by the definition, That's why we leave it up to the court to determine the meaning of psychological incapacity.7Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, also a member of the Joint Committee, emphasized on the rationale behind the members' desire to adopt the provision with less specificity, in order to "allow some resiliency in its application,"8 thus:
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.At its inception, the provision held much promise; woefully, jurisprudential developments reveal that it has achieved an almost rigid and mechanical application, thus, allowing this Court to unwittingly allow loveless marriages to remain, to the detriment of all parties involved. In their intention to protect the institution of marriage, the members of the Committee did not contemplate this to mean that parties must be forced to remain in a relationship that diminishes one's dignity and personhood. In the words of the ponencia in his dissent in Matudan v. Republic,9 "to force partners to stay in a loveless marriage, or a spouseless marriage... only erodes the foundation of the family."
The quantum of proof in marriages challenged by reason of psychological incapacity is now "clear and convincing evidence" |
ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression. (Emphasis ours)In Republic v. Duyot,12 as echoed in the 1922 case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,13 this Court has clarified that when it speaks of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Simply, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. Aside from state policy to protect marriage, the rationale for the presumption is that if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.14
Psychological incapacity as a legal and not a medical concept |
x x x There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. x x x.26Considering that psychological incapacity was erroneously thrust into the medical realm, jurisprudence proves that this Court has inadvertently given much premium to the findings of psychologists and psychiatrists, elevating their report to almost a sine qua non requirement in proving the absolute nullity of marriages. After all, the requirement in Molina that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be "medically or clinically identified" and "sufficiently proven by experts"27 somehow presupposes the need for an in-depth assessment from such experts. As the ponencia has aptly concluded, this requirement has perpetuated a practice wherein parties are constrained to pathologize each other and create unnecessary stigma if only to escape the clutches of an irreconcilable marriage.
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.Hence, the majority Decision adhered to assessing the totality of the evidence proffered, in ruling for the nullity of the marriage of the parties. Verily, the totality of evidence presented by Rosanna (petitioner), which consisted of her direct examination, the personal history handwritten by respondent while he was staying at the drug rehabilitation center, interviews from family members, along with the findings of an expert witness, clearly and convincingly proved that Mario's (respondent) "persistent failure to have himself rehabilitated, even bringing his child into a room where he did drugs, indicates a level of dysfunctionality that shows utter disregard not only of his obligations to his wife but to his child."38 To echo the principle elucidated in Espina-Dan v. Dan:39
x x x what is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage such that if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.Such adherence likewise allows the law to apply within practical realities and public policy considerations. Reliance on the totality of evidence facilitates access to justice, as those without the capacity to afford the costly fees of procuring a psychologist or psychiatrist can still hope to prove their already eroded marital bond as null and void; moreover, this Court cannot close its eyes to the near impossibility of compelling the supposedly psychologically incapacitated person to undergo tests to diagnose the presence of a grave and permanent malady tantamount to the deprivation of his or her awareness of the marital duties and responsibilities. Moving forward, courts are forewarned to avoid haphazardly ruling that conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the information from only one side constitutes hearsay evidence.
Psychological incapacity with respect to a specific spouse |
Endnotes:
1 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Section 2.
2 Tilar v. Tilar, 813 Phil. 734, 740 (2017).
3 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
4 Jimenez v. Republic of the Philippines, 109 Phil. 273, 276 (1960).
5 The provision states:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (n) (As amended by Executive Order Number 227 dated July 17, 1987).
6 See Decision, p. 22.
7 Congressional Hearing before the Senate Committee on Women and Family Relations, February 3, 1988, as cited in Sta. Maria, Persons and Family Relations Law (2004 ed.), p. 191.
8 Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 36 (1995).
9 799 Phil. 449, 481 (2016).
10 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
11 Id. at 676.
12 573 Phil. 553, 573 (2008).
13 43 Phil. 43, 56 (1922).
14 Id.
15 Gatan, et al. v. Vinarao, et al., 820 Phil. 257, 271 (2017).
16 Riano, Evidence, The Bar Lecture Series (2013 ed.), p. 142, citing Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., p. 227.
17 See Decision, p. 28.
18 Tan v. Hosana, 780 Phil. 258, 266 (2016).
19 BP Oil and Chemicals International Philippines, Inc. v. Total Distribution & Logistic Systems, Inc., 805 Phil. 244, 262 (2017).
20 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984).
21 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,432-433 (1979); Santosky v Kramer; 445 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
22 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 331-32; Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).
23 Riguer v. Atty. Mateo, 811 Phil. 538, 547 (2017).
24 See Decision, p. 34.
25 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8, at 39.
26 Id. at 40. (Emphasis ours).
27 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 10, at 677.
28 519 Phil. 337 (2006).
29 830 Phil. 213 (2018).
30 836 Phil. 1266 (2018).
31 512 Phil. 219 (2005).
32 Republic of the Philippines v. De Gracia, 726 Phil. 502, 513 (2014).
33 805 Phil. 209, 221 (2017).
34 598 Phil. 666, 699 (2009). (Citation omitted).
35 Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, 624 Phil. 603 (2010).
36 397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000).
37 601 Phil. 676, 691 (2009). (Emphasis ours).
38 See Decision, p. 48.
39 829 Phil. 605, 620-621 (2018). (Emphasis ours).
40 Decision, p. 32.
41 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8, at 39.
42 Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, et al., 805 Phil. 978, 993-994 (2017).
43 Epina-Dan v. Dan, supra note 38, at 623, citing Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 8, at 39.
44 Singson v. Singson, 823 Phil. 19, 38 (2018), citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 698 Phil. 257, 265 (2012).
45 Decision p. 34, citing J. Mario Lopez's Reflections.
46 Decision, p. 34.
47 Decision, p. 34, citing J. Perlas-Bernabe's Reflections.
48 Art. 68, Family Code.
49 Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, 484 Phil. 396, 411 (2004).
50 See Kalaw v. Fernandez, 750 Phil. 482, 514 (2015).cralawredlibrary