SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 222557. September 29, 2021
ENGR. JUAN B. BERCES, Petitioner, v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND THE MAYOR OF TABACO CITY, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GAERLAN, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, assailing the Resolutions dated May 28, 20142 and January 20, 20163 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 131772.
ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Engr. Juan Berces, Department Head of the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) is found culpable of the offense of "GRAVE MISCONDUCT" punishable under Section 52 (A-3 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service URACCS) and is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with the administrative disabilities of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification for [sic] reemployment in the government service.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryAggrieved, petitioner interposed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Engr. Juan B. Berces is PARTLY GRANTED. The Order dated February 13, 2012 issued by Mayor Cielo Krisel Lagman-Luistro is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Berces is found guilty of Simple Misconduct only and meted the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the service. Berces should thus be reinstated in the service without payment of backwages.13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryDissatisfied, Mayor Lagman-Luistro filed a Motion for Reconsideration14 with the CSC, praying that it reinstate petitioner's original penalty of dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of Mayor Cielo Krisel Lagman-Luistro is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Decision No. 13-0159 dated February 14, 2013 issued by Civil Service Commission (CSC), Quezon City, partly granting the appeal of Juan B. Berces, Department Head, City Planning and Development Office, City Government of Tabaco, Albay, is hereby VACATED. Consequently, the Order dated February 13, 2012 issued by Mayor Cielo Krisel [Lagman]-Luistro finding Juan B. Berces guilty of Grave Misconduct and meting him the penalty of dismissal is AFFIRMED. The accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office and bar from taking civil service examinations are deemed imposed.Resolute in his conviction that he was wrongly found guilty of grave misconduct, petitioner filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari19 with the CA.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman, Commission on Audit, Government Service Insurance System, Integrated Records Management Office, this Commission, and Civil Service Commission-National Capital Region.18chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The urgent motion for leave to declare or consider former Tabaco City Mayor Krisel Lagman-Luistro as the real private respondent is NOTED without action in view of herein dismissal.Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in the second assailed Resolution dated January 20, 2016.
SO ORDERED.23chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be explained below.Time and again the Court has reminded members of the bench and bar that the special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal.33 As the Court declared in Butuan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals:34chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari."The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court — on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact — a mistake of judgment — appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declare are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioner's timely filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a judgment or final order.32 (Citations omitted)
A party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availability of the special civil action of certiorari. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. (Citations omitted)Nevertheless, there have been instances when the Court has relaxed this rule. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.35 After all, the acceptance of a petition for certiorari, as well as the grant of due course thereto is, in general, addressed to the sound discretion of the court.36chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
All things considered, however, we do not agree in the conclusion of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner's Petition based on a procedural faux pax. While a petition for certiorari is dismissible for being the wrong remedy, there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.Similarly, in Department of Education v. Cuanan,39 two separate administrative cases for Sexual Harassment and Conduct Unbecoming a Public Officer were filed against Godofredo G. Cuanan (Cuanan), who was then Principal of Lawang Kupang Elementary School in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. Following an investigation, the Regional Director found Cuanan guilty as charged, recommending his forced resignation without prejudice to benefits. The Secretary of the Department of Education (DepEd) affirmed these findings.
In Sebastian v. Morales, we ruled that rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure, thus:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary[C]onsidering that the petitioner has presented a good cause for the proper and just determination of his case, the appellate court should have relaxed the stringent application of technical rules of procedure and yielded to consideration of substantial justice.38 (Citations omitted)
The remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file a petition for review thereof under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from notice of the resolution. Recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. As will be shown forthwith, exception (c) applies to the present case.In the case at bar, the CA's outright dismissal of petitioner's petition for certiorari was improper. Because petitioner's 15-year tenure in the government service was at stake, the appellate court should have decided the case on the merits. Moreover, as discussed below, CSC Resolution No. 1301575 is null and void, thereby warranting petitioner's recourse to the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
Furthermore, while a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari, immediate recourse to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is warranted where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceeding was ex parte or one in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object. These exceptions find application to Cuanan's petition for certiorari in the CA.40 (Citations omitted)
Mayor Lagman-Luistro's motion for reconsideration of CSC Decision No. 130159 dated February 14, 2013 was validly withdrawn by her successor, Mayor Demetriou |
SEC. 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer. - When a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his successor, if within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such time as may be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to be heard.When a public officer ceases to hold his or her office, the successor to such office enjoys the prerogative of continuing or withdrawing from any action that may have been instituted by his or her predecessor.
It is clear from the above Rule that when petitioner ceased to be mayor of Santiago City, the action may be continued and maintained by his successor, Mayor Amelita Navarro, if there is substantial need to do so.A similar set of facts obtains in the instant case.
Mayor Navarro, however, found no substantial need to continue and maintain the action of her predecessor in light of the CSC Resolution declaring that respondents' services were illegally terminated by former Mayor Jose Miranda. In fact, she filed with the Court of Appeals a "Motion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration" (lodged by petitioner). She likewise reinstated all the respondents to their respective positions and approved the payment of their salaries.42chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Accordingly, CSC Decision No. 130159 dated February 14, 2013 had already attained finality; CSC Resolution No. 1301575 dated July 15, 2013 is void |
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who exercise the power of adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle, must immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts, but extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been conferred.46chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryA final judgment is no longer subject to change or revision,47 regardless of any claim that it is erroneous.48 It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and whether made by the highest court of the land.49 Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.50chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While petitioner's act does not constitute misconduct as defined by civil service laws, the finding of simple misconduct against him stands |
Section 5. Penalties. Officials and employees who consume intoxicating liquor and other alcoholic beverages during office hours outside the afore-mentioned instances where consumption is allowed, as well as those reporting for work while under the influence of alcohol, shall be liable for Simple Misconduct and shall be imposed the penalties provided under existing rules, as follows:
The resolution, however, is inapplicable to the factual antecedents of the case considering that petitioner and his companions drank liquor outside office hours, albeit the same was done inside their own office.1st Offense - Suspension 1 month, 1 day to 6 months
2nd Offense - Dismissal
Endnotes:
1 Rollo, pp. 9-34.
2 Id. at 35-38. Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro with Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (now a retired Member of this Court) and Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios concurring.
3 Id. at 97-98.
4 CA rollo, p. 304.
5 Id. at 299-301.
6 Id. at 296. Subject: REITERATION OF THE PROHIBITION AGAINST SMOKING, DRINKING OF LIQUOR AND PEDDLING OF GOODS, FOODSTUFF AND SERVICES INSIDE THE CITY HALL.
7 Id. at 297. Subject: Power Cost Cutting Measure.
8 Id. at 305-309.
9 Id. at 302-303.
10 Id. at 310-319.
11 Id. at 45.
12 Id. at 45-49. Penned by Commissioner Robert S. Martinez and concurred in by Chairperson Francisco T. Duque III.
13 Id. at 49.
14 Id. at 51-85.
15 Id. at 41.
16 Id. at 42.
17 Id. at 34-40. Penned by Commissioner Robert S. Martinez and concurred in by Chairperson Francisco T. Duque III and Commissioner Nieves L. Osorio.
18 Id. at 40.
19 Id. at 3-31.
20 Id. at 124-137.
21 Id. at 321-330.
22 Id. at 394-399.
23 Rollo, p. 37.
24 Id. at 73-86.
25 Id. at 136-172.
26 Tuazon, Jr. v. Godoy, 442 Phil. 130, 136 (2002).
27 Section 70. Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. - A party may elevate a decision of the Commission before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.
28 Punongbayan-Visitacion v. People, 823 Phil. 212, 220 (2018).
29 G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. v. Tiara Commercial Corporation, 820 Phil. 235, 248 (2017).
30 Butuan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals (Mindanao Station), 808 Phil. 443, 451 (2017).
31 479 Phil. 768 (2004).
32 Id. at 779-782.
33 Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, 575 Phil. 384, 399 (2008).
34 Supra note 30 at 451.
35 Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, 471 Phil. 670, 684 (2004).
36 Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 570 Phil. 188, 193 (2008).
37 573 Phil. 472 (2008).
38 Id. at 488-489.
39 594 Phil. 451 (2008).
40 Id. at 459-460.
41 449 Phil. 285 (2003).
42 Id. at 293.
43 Social Security System v. Isip, 549 Phil. 112, 116 (2007).
44 Philippine Savings Bank v. Papa, 823 Phil. 725, 736 (2018).
45 582 Phil. 357 (2008).
46 Id. at 366-367.
47 Id. at 366.
48 825 Phil. 30, 38 (2018).
49 Nacuray v. National Labor Relations Commission, 336 Phil. 749, 757-758 (1997).
50 Vargas v. Cajucom, 761 Phil. 43, 54 (2015).
51 Sabio v. Field Investigation Office, 825 Phil. 848, 858 (2018).
52 Ganzon v. Arlos, 720 Phil. 104, 113 (2013).
53 Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas v. Castro, 759 Phil. 68, 79 (2015).
54 Office of the Ombudsman v. Mallari, 749 Phil. 224, 249 (2014).
55 Bagaoisan v. Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, G.R. No. 242005, June 26, 2019.
56 Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, 508 Phil. 569, 579 (2005).
57 Recto-Sambajon v. Public Attorney's Office, 817 Phil. 879, 892 (2017).
58 Villanueva v. Reodique, G.R. Nos. 221647 & 222003, November 27, 2018.
59 Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas v. Castro, supra note 53 at 79.
60 Civil Service Commission v. Catacutan, G.R. Nos. 224651 & 224656, July 3, 2019.cralawredlibrary