SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 193728. October 13, 2021
PATRIA C. GUTIERREZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
GAERLAN, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated November 8, 2010 filed by petitioner Mayor Patria C. Gutierrez (Mayor Gutierrez) assailing the Decision2 dated February 4, 2010, and the Resolution3 dated September 7, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, in the case entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Patria C. Gutierrez," docketed as Criminal Case No. 27814, convicting Mayor Gutierrez of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The factual antecedents
On April 6, 1996, the former Municipal Mayor of Tiwi, Albay, Naomi Corral (Mayor Corral), passed away. Shortly thereafter, Mayor Corral's husband, Dr. Bernardo Corral (Dr. Corral), began processing the application for the payment of Mayor Corral's gratuity pay. By July 10, 1996, a municipal clearance, which was signed by then Municipal Treasurer Corazon Pulvinar (Pulvinar) and Acting Mayor Vicente Tomas Vera III (Acting Mayor Vera), was issued in favor of Mayor Corral. On the same date, Acting Mayor Vera likewise issued a certification as to Mayor Corral's service record.4chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On July 11, 1996, Mayor Gutierrez assumed office as the Municipal Mayor of Tiwi, Albay. Upon her assumption of office, she received reports of irregularities concerning the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. This prompted Mayor Gutierrez to issue notices to Pulvinar, asking the latter to explain. Mayor Gutierrez likewise issued Office Order No. 16, directing Pulvinar to submit the municipality's financial reports.5 Notably, shortly after her assumption of office, an election contest was filed against Mayor Gutierrez. By the end of July 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legaspi City issued a Temporary Restraining Order against Mayor Gutierrez and installed then Vice Mayor Vera as Acting Mayor. Nevertheless, on October 15, 1996, Mayor Gutierrez won the election protest and re-assumed her position as Municipal Mayor.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Meanwhile, on August 8, 1996, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) finally approved Dr. Corral's claim for gratuity pay in the amount of P352,456,11. In view of the GSIS's approval of the said amount, the gratuity pay was included in the proposed annual budget of the Municipality of Tiwi for the year 1997 prepared by the Municipal Budget Officer Julia Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Such proposed budget was then approved by Mayor Gutierrez.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Relevantly, when Mayor Gutierrez re-assumed her post as Municipal Mayor, she continued to act on the reports of irregularities in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer.
On November 8, 1996, Mayor Gutierrez wrote to Atty. Veronica King (Atty. King), the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Finance, to request for Pulvinar's relief because of her continued absences.
On December 17, 1996, Mayor Gutierrez wrote to Landbank, Legaspi Branch, to question the bank's renewal of several placements of the Municipality of Tiwi from November 13-25, 1996, allegedly through Pulvinar, even though Pulvinar was on maternity leave during that time.
On January 2, 1997, Mayor Gutierrez again wrote to Atty. King, informing her about Pulvinar's cash advances in the amount of P2,342,486.92, and asking for the relief of Pulvinar as Municipal Treasurer. Thereafter, Mayor Gutierrez sent another letter dated January 13, 1997, recommending the filing of administrative charges against Pulvinar.
On January 5, 1997, Mayor Gutierrez wrote to the Office of the Ombudsman to complain about Pulvinar.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In response to the allegations against her, Pulvinar issued a letter of explanation dated February 12, 1997. In the said letter, Pulvinar stated that the unliquidated amount of P2,343,436.42 has already been reduced to P592,456.11 in view of her presentation of vouchers and liquidation papers. Supposedly, the remaining unliquidated amount of P592,456.11 represents the disbursement of gratuity pay for Mayor Corral, and the payment of attorney's fees in favor of Dr. Corral's counsel.9chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Because of the foregoing, as well as a Commission on Audit (COA) Audit Report for the year ending December 31, 1996, which indicated that payment of the gratuity pay has already been paid,10 Mayor Gutierrez sent a letter dated February 18, 1997, to the Municipal Budget Officer, Rodriguez, instructing her to delete the item of gratuity pay from the proposed annual budget. Nonetheless, Mayor Gutierrez stated that if legal basis was found for the payment of gratuity pay, the same can be passed through a supplemental budget.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On February 19, 1997, the Provincial Treasurer's Office found that Pulvinar's remaining unliquidated amount of P592,456.11 was covered by two separate vouchers, and therefore, considered as valid cash items or disbursements. Despite such finding, Mayor Gutierrez still instructed Municipal Budget Officer, Rodriguez, to withhold the release of gratuity pay until the claim for refund from the GSIS has been obtained.12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The following year, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed a re-alignment budget, which again, included the gratuity pay of Mayor Corral. Such re-alignment budget was then approved and signed by Mayor Gutierrez on August 8, 1998.13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Considering that payment of the gratuity pay has not yet been made after the lapse of several years, Dr. Corral, with the assistance of counsel, sent a demand letter dated September 15, 1998, to Mayor Gutierrez. In response, Mayor Gutierrez stated that no documents relating to the claim have been submitted to her office. However, on September 22, 1998, Dr. Corral replied to Mayor Gutierrez, stating that all required documents have already been submitted.14 Nonetheless, Dr. Corral informed Mayor Gutierrez that he is re-submitting the required documents.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On October 8, 1998, Bureau of Local Government Finance Legal Officer Glenn Sendon (Sendon) issued a Memorandum Report on the administrative complaint filed against Pulvinar. In the Memorandum Report, it was found that Pulvinar's unliquidated cash advances arose from her failure to prepare liquidation papers and update the records, which is contrary to auditing rules, but is not considered as malversation. Thus, it was recommended that Pulvinar suffer from a 15-day suspension.16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Unsatisfied with the penalty imposed against Pulvinar, Mayor Gutierrez continued filing reports against Pulvinar.
On January 13, 1999, Mayor Gutierrez wrote to the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF), requesting for an investigation against Pulvinar, as well as Atty. King.17 In her letter, Mayor Gutierrez stated that she did not authorize any payments for Mayor Corral's gratuity pay and attorney's fees. Moreover, according to Mayor Gutierrez, Atty. King's inaction on her reports against Pulvinar prompted Mayor Gutierrez to write to the DOF Secretary.
On March 18, 1999, Mayor Gutierrez again wrote to the DOF Secretary reiterating that an investigation should be made against Pulvinar and Atty. King. Mayor Gutierrez likewise stated that Dr. Corral has a pending claim for gratuity pay, and that he has filed a petition for mandamus for the payment of the same.18chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On April 13, 1999, Mayor Gutierrez wrote to the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, where she requested for the conduct of an investigation against Pulvinar because of the supposed anomalies and fraudulent activities she committed.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On May 28, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon dismissed the complaint filed against Pulvinar for lack of probable cause. The Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon likewise stated that the case filed against Pulvinar should be considered closed and terminated.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On July 9, 2003, the COA wrote to Mayor Gutierrez, stating that as of December 31, 2002, the gratuity pay of Mayor Corral to be paid to Dr. Corral, as well as the attorney's fees, remain outstanding.21 Moreover, the Municipal Accountant, Romulo Carino, likewise stated that the appropriated money for the payment of gratuity pay has not yet been released.22chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Criminal Case in the Sandiganbayan
Because of Mayor Gutierrez's unjustified refusal to pay the gratuity pay, Dr. Corral filed a case against Mayor Gutierrez before the Sandiganbayan, accusing Mayor Gutierrez of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, for allegedly causing undue injury to their family.23 The Information reads:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That, on or about 24 February 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, PATRIA C. GUTIERREZ, a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Tiwi, Albay, committing the crime herein charged in relation to and taking advantage of her official functions, and through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously refuse without just cause to release or pay the gratuity pay of the late Mayor NAOMI CORRAL in the amount of P352,456.11. Said accused knowing fully well that all the required documents for its release were submitted, thus causing undue injury to the complainant in the aforestated amount.During arraignment, Mayor Gutierrez pleaded not guilty.25 Meanwhile, during pre-trial, the following were stipulated:
CONTRARY TO LAW.24cralawredlibrary
Trial then ensued.
- That the accused Patria C. Gutierrez is a public officer being the Municipal Mayor of Tiwi, Albay in the year 1998;cralawlawlibrary
- That the private complainant, Bernardo M. Corral, is the husband of the late Naomi Corral, former municipal mayor of Tiwi, Albay;cralawlawlibrary
- That the deceased Naomi Corral died on April 6, 1996 and after which private complainant filed a request for gratuity pay of the former;cralawlawlibrary
- That on July 25, 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi, Albay passed Resolution No. 14-98 appropriating funds for the gratuity benefits of Naomi Corral; and
- That the accused approved Resolution No. 14-98, passed by the said Sangguniang Bayan which appropriated the payment for gratuity pay, to show her good faith.26
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds that the prosecution has successfully established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused PATRIA GUTIERREZ for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, and consequently, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby imposes upon her the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one month as minimum to nine years, one month and one day as maximum.In finding Mayor Gutierrez guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the Sandiganbayan first enumerated the elements of the crime charged:
She is further perpetually disqualified from holding public office.
SO ORDERED.28cralawredlibrary
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan stated that all the elements of the crime charged were duly proven by the prosecution.
- The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;cralawlawlibrary
- He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
- That his actions caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.29
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.The Instant Petition
SO ORDERED.34cralawredlibrary
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(E) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 WERE PROVEN.In fine, Mayor Gutierrez principally argued the following:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN BASING ITS CONVICTION ON ERRONEOUS AND UNFAIR INFERENCES AGAINST PETITIONER.35
In appeals from the Sandiganbayan decisions, only questions of law and not issues of fact may be raised. Issues on whether the prosecution evidence proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt; whether the presumption of innocence was properly accorded the accused; whether there was sufficient evidence to support a charge of conspiracy; or whether the defense of good faith was correctly appreciated are all, in varying degrees, questions of fact. As a rule, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive on this Court, subject to the following limited exceptions: 1] the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, and conjectures; 2] the inference made is manifestly mistaken; 3] there is grave abuse of discretion; 4.) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and 5] the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record. x x x.45 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)Here, Mayor Gutierrez's petition is anchored on the Sandiganbayan's supposed error in finding that the prosecution established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, this is a question of fact, which is outside the purview of a Rule 45 Petition.
In this case, there is no dispute as to the presence of the first element since Mayor Gutierrez was the Municipal Mayor of Tiwi, Albay at the time she committed the acts complained of.
- [T]he accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, juridical or official functions;cralawlawlibrary
- [H]e [or she] must have acted with manifest partiality, or evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and
- [H]is [or her] action caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his or her functions.46
As to the second element, it is worthy to stress that the law provides three modes of commission of the crime, namely, through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and/or "gross negligence." In Coloma, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the Court defined the foregoing terms as follows:Thus, to satisfy the second element, it must be established that the accused caused undue injury by manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property." x x xIn other words, there is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. On the other hand, "evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.48 (Citations omitted)
Undue injury in the context of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 should be equated with the civil law concept of "actual damage." Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3(e) cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established. Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury, or the giving of any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is required that the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.50 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)Therefore, to satisfy the third element for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the prosecution must establish that the complainant suffered from a specific and quantifiable injury which was caused by the accused.
Endnotes:
* On official leave.
** Per Special Order No. 2846 dated October 6, 2021.
1 Rollo, pp. 22-54.
2 Id. at 56-76; penned by Associate Justice Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos with Associate Justices Edilberto G. Sandoval and Samuel R. Martires concurring.
3 Id. at 78-84.
4 Id. at 25.
5 Id. at 25-26.
6 Id. at 26.
7 Id. at 26-27.
8 Id. at 27-28.
9 Id. at 28.
10 Id. at 29.
11 Id. at 28.
12 Id. at 29.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 30.
15 Id. at 68.
16 Id. at 30.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 30-31.
20 Id. at 31-32.
21 Id. at 32.
22 Id. at 64-65.
23 Id. at 32.
24 Id. at 56-57.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 57.
27 Id. at 56-76.
28 Id. at 74-75.
29 Id. at 69-70.
30 Id. at 70-74.
31 Id. at 78.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 78-84.
34 Id. at 83.
35 Id. at 36.
36 Id. at 37-38.
37 Id. at 39-41.
38 Id. at 41-42.
39 Id. at 42-44.
40 Id. at 44-45.
41 Id. at 46-47.
42 Id. at 150-167.
43 Miro v. Vda. de Erederos, 721 Phil. 772, 785 (2013); Diokno v. Hon. Cacdac, 553 Phil. 405, 428 (2007).
44 759 Phil. 156 (2015).
45 Id. at 170-171.
46 Martel v. People, G.R. Nos. 224720-23, February 2, 2021.
47 808 Phil. 586 (2017).
48 Id. at 593-594.
49 Tiongco v. People, G.R. Nos. 218709-10, November 14, 2018; Rivera v. People, 749 Phil. 124, 142 (2014); Coloma, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 744 Phil. 214, 231-232 (2014).
50 Rivera v. People, Id. at 148.cralawredlibrary