THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 235316. December 01, 2021
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI (NOW CITY OF MAKATI), Petitioner, v. MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG (NOW CITY OF TAGUIG), Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
ROSARIO, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Resolution dated March 8, 2017 and the Resolution dated October 3, 2017 (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions) of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 98377.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Municipality, now City of Taguig and against all defendants, as follows:SO ORDERED.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
- Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation consisting of Parcels 3 and 4, Psu-2031, is confirmed part of the territory of the plaintiff City of Taguig;cralawlawlibrary
- Proclamation No. 2475, Series of 1986 and [Proclamation] No. 518, Series of 1990 are hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and INVALID, insofar as they altered boundaries and diminished the areas of territorial jurisdiction of the City of Taguig without the benefit of a plebiscite as required in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
- Making the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 2, 1994 issued by this Court, explicitly referring to Parcels 3 and 4, Psu-2031 comprising Fort Bonifacio, be made PERMANENT, to wit:
a) Enjoining defendants Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Director of Land Management Bureau, from disposing of, executing deeds of conveyances over, issuing titles, over the lots covered by Proclamation Nos. 2475 and 518; and b) Enjoining defendant Municipality, now City of Makati, from exercising jurisdiction over, making improvements on, or otherwise treating as part of its territory, Parcels 3 and 4, Psu-2031 comprising Fort Bonifacio.- Ordering defendants to pay the cost of the suit.
Relative to respondent City of Taguig's Motion for Clarification filed on May 22, 2013 and by way of clarification, the phrase "for being unnecessary and/or premature" appearing in the dispositive portion of the April 30, 2013 Resolution, means that the filing of the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 98377 now pending with the Sixth Division of this Court has rendered the petition for annulment of judgment in the above-entitled case moot and academic, hence, unnecessary.Construing the above Resolution as a "denial of relief sought," Taguig filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari25 before this Court, questioning the CA Resolutions dated April 30, 2013 and July 25, 2013, and praying that these be modified by including a declaration that Makati is guilty of willful and deliberate forum shopping and that appropriate sanctions be imposed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court GRANTS the instant appeal, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the assailed decision and order rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 153 dated 08 July 2011 and 19 December 2011 respectively and RENDERS a new Decision as follows:With regard to the issue of forum shopping, the CA deferred to the ruling of the CA Former Seventh (7th ) Division in its Resolution dated April 30, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No. 120495, pertinently holding, to wit:
1) Dismissing the Complaint of Taguig for lack of merit and confirming that the Disputed Area comprising of the EMBO Barangays and Inner Fort Barangays (Barangay Post Proper Northside and Barangay Post Proper Southside) in Fort Bonifacio are within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City; 2) Lifting the injunction issued by the lower court against Makati; 3) Declaring Presidential Proclamation Nos. 2475 and 518 as constitutional and valid; 4) Ordering Taguig to immediately cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction within the disputed area and return the same to Makati; and 5) Ordering Taguig to pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.27cralawredlibrary
However, said issue has been resolved by this Court's Seventh (7th ) Division in a Resolution dated 30 April 2013 rejecting the ground of forum shopping as basis for dismissal of Makati's petition for annulment of judgment, hence the issue of forum shopping has been rendered moot.Aggrieved, on September 3, 2013, Taguig filed, among others, its Motion for Reconsideration28 assailing the Decision dated July 30, 2013. This was opposed by Makati in an Opposition29 dated October 21, 2013. We note that, per the records of the case, Taguig's Motion for Reconsideration was never resolved.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated April 30, 2013 and July 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals Seventh Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 120495 are MODIFIED. Respondent City of Makati is declared to have engaged in forum shopping in simultaneously pursuing a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the Court of Appeals and a Motion for Reconsideration before Branch 153 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, and later, an Appeal before the Court of Appeals.Pursuant to the above Decision, Taguig filed in the Territorial Dispute Case a Motion to Dismiss for Forum Shopping,32 raising the following grounds:
We find respondent City of Makati, through its counsels Atty. Pio Kenneth I. Dasal, Atty. Glenda Isabel L. Biason, and Atty. Gwyn Gareth T. Mariano, GUILTY of direct contempt, and FINE Atty. Pio Kenneth I. Dasal, Atty. Glenda Isabel L. Biason and Atty. Gwyn Gareth T. Mariano P2,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.31chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a) | The Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC Pasig and the Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the CA should be dismissed considering that Makati engaged in willful and deliberate forum shopping; |
b) | Through this appeal, the acts of willful and deliberate forum shopping by Makati were continued and perpetuated; |
c) | Considering that the Supreme Court ruled that Makati engaged in willful and deliberate forum shopping, the penalty should be summary dismissal of the petition; |
d) | Considering that the Supreme Court ruled that Makati engaged in willful and deliberate forum shopping, the RTC Decision had already attained finality. Consequently, as an effect of a final and executory judgment, it is as if this petition was not filed before the CA. |
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:Thus, even if the ruling of the Court is silent as to a particular matter - in this case, the dismissal of Makati's appeal - for as long as said matter was within the issues raised in the case, it can be presumed, subject to evidence to the contrary, that the matter in question was already laid before the Court and passed upon by it.50 The Court considered it, but decided against it.
x x x x
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them[.]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated April 30, 2013 and July 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals Seventh Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 120495 are MODIFIED. Respondent City of Makati is declared to have engaged in forum shopping in simultaneously pursuing a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the Court of Appeals and a Motion for Reconsideration before Branch 153 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, and later, an Appeal before the Court of Appeals.In its motion to dismiss Makati's appeal before the CA, Taguig highlighted Our finding that Makati had committed forum shopping, and devoted many pages citing jurisprudence to the effect that the consequence of forum shopping is the dismissal of the cases filed simultaneously. While that usually holds true in other cases, the same cannot be applied to Makati's appeal.
We find respondent City of Makati through its counsels Atty. Pio Kenneth I. Dasal, Atty. Glenda Isabel L. Biason, and Atty. Gwyn Gareth T. Mariano, GUILTY of direct contempt, and FINE Atty. Pio Kenneth I. Dasal, Atty. Glenda Isabel L. Biason and Atty. Gwyn Gareth T. Mariano P2,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.
It is settled rule that 'the operative part in every decision is the dispositive portion or the fallo, and where there is conflict between the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement, ordering nothing.' We expounded on the underlying reason behind this rule in Republic v. Nolasco where, reiterating the earlier pronouncements made in Contreras v. Felix, we said:On this note, We hold that the CA overstepped its bounds and thus erred in dismissing the case based on forum shopping. But then again, We cannot blame the CA for deciding in the manner that it did as We are also aware of the sanctions that should have ordinarily been imposed in cases of forum shopping. However, We have already laid down our ruling on the forum shopping case involved herein, and the CA should have simply respected our decision and the resultant penalties imposed on Makati, which did not include the dismissal of its CA appeal in the Territorial Dispute Case.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryMore to the point is another well-recognized doctrine that the final judgment of the court as rendered in the judgment of the court irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision. "A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is the informal expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So, ... there is a distinction between the findings and conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. They amount to nothing more than an order for judgment, which must, of course, be distinguished from the judgment." (1 Freeman on Judgments, p. 6). At the root of the doctrine that the premises must yield to the conclusion is perhaps, side by side with the needs of writing finis to litigations, the recognition of the truth that "the trained intuition of the judge continually leads him to right results for which he is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal reasons." "It is an everyday experience of those who study judicial decisions that the results are usually sound, whether the reasoning from which the results purport to flow is sound or not." (The Theory of Judicial Decision, Pound, 36 Harv. Law Review, pp. 9, 51). It is not infrequent that the grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial decisions, lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision.Succinctly stated, 'where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision and the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body of the decision.' While the body of the decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity in the manner the court's reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations.
More emphatically, Light Rail Transit Authority v. Court of Appeals declares that 'it is the dispositive part of the judgment that actually settles and declares the rights and obligations of the parties, finally, definitively, and authoritatively, notwithstanding the existence of inconsistent statements in the body that may tend to confuse.' In this regard, it must be borne in mind 'that execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision; consequently, where the order of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the order has pro-tanto no validity.' (citations omitted)53chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.56chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryThe factual findings of the Court a quo and the CA are so diametrically opposed to each other that there is a need to revisit the respective evidence of the parties to come up with a judicious determination of Makati and Taguig's respective claims. The present controversy involves much public interest and its importance is not lost on both local government units. Their respective economic lifeblood is at stake, and it would be too simplistic and downright unfair if technicalities are allowed to decide their fate. If this Court is to afford justice to the constituents of the affected local government units, We must look deeper into the factual milieu involved herein and settle, once and for all, this long-running border dispute based on the merits of the case.
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers- which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.60chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryWhen a local government unit exercises powers outside the limits of its territorial jurisdiction, the acts are considered void for being ultra vires. Thus, in City of Tagaytay v. Guerrero,61 We censured the City of Tagaytay for levying taxes outside its territorial jurisdiction:
In this case, it is basic that before the City of Tagaytay may levy a certain property for sale due to tax delinquency, the subject property should be under its territorial jurisdiction. The city officials are expected to know such basic principle of law. The failure of the city officials of Tagaytay to verify if the property is within its jurisdiction before levying taxes on the same constitutes gross negligence.62chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryWhen disputes in territorial boundaries are not resolved on the merits, more serious problems might possibly arise, affecting the operations of the local government units concerned and ultimately, bringing untold misery on their constituents. One possible predicament would relate to the payment of taxes, such as what transpired in the case of Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. v. City of Pasig.63 Therein, Sta. Lucia was caught in the middle of a boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta, Rizal and Pasig City. It was paying real property taxes to Cainta when Pasig filed a collection suit against it also for real property taxes.64chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We agree that Pateros indeed committed a procedural infraction. It is clear that the issue raised by Pateros to the CA involves the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the case. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law; it is conferred by the Constitution or by law. Consequently, issues which deal with the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a case are pure questions of law. As Pateros' appeal solely involves a question of law, it should have directly taken its appeal to this. Court by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not an ordinary appeal with the CA under Rule 41. The CA did not err in holding that Pateros pursued the wrong mode of appeal.Indeed, even Congress reposed on the courts the duty to settle boundary disputes, such as in the present Petition. In the instant controversy, the charters of Makati and Taguig contain similarly worded provisos mandating the resolution of boundary disputes by the appropriate agency or forum, which in this case is the courts. In particular, Section 2 of the Charter of the City of Makati67 provides:
However, in the interest of justice and in order to write finis to this controversy, we opt to relax the rules. Our ruling in Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara III and Christine S. Dayrit v. People of the Philippines and Daisy Afable provides us with ample justification, viz.:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryWhile it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of the dockets of the courts is a laudable objective, it nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial justice.Given the circumstances surrounding the instant case, we find sufficient reason to relax the rules. x x x66chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
In those rare cases to which we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant is given the full opportunity for a just and proper disposition of his cause.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, we have consistently held that rules must not be applied so rigidly as to override substantial justice.
SECTION 2. The City of Makati. - The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Tagig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Tagig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.Section 2 of the Charter of the City of Taguig68 likewise states:
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis supplied.)
SECTION 2. The City of Taguig. - The Municipality of Taguig is hereby converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Taguig, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Taguig in the Metropolitan Manila area over which it has jurisdiction, bounded on the north by the City of Makati; on the northeast by the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Pateros; on the east by Laguna de Bay and the Municipality of Taytay; on the southeast by Laguna de Bay; on the south by the City of Muntinlupa; on the southwest by the City of Muntinlupa and the Municipality of Parañaque; on the west by Pasay City and the Municipality of Parañaque; and on the northwest by the City of Makati.In Mariano v. Commission on Elections,69 We took judicial notice of the fact that Congress refrained from delineating by metes and bounds Makati's territory to give way for the courts to settle its existing boundary dispute with Taguig:
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Taguig and the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis supplied.)
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to a co-equal department of government, the legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes.It would thus be an abdication of Our duty if We would not look into all facets of the present dispute in coming up with a judicious adjudication of Makati and Taguig's conflicting factual claims. We have to resolve, with finality, the territorial dispute that has gripped both cities for decades, bearing in mind the best interest of the constituents of the affected government units. This resolution should not be based on the operation of some procedural rules, but rather on the merit of the causes of action and defenses presented by Makati and Taguig on behalf of their respective citizens.
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts.70chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 68. General authority of (Governor-General) President of the Philippines to fix boundaries and make new subdivisions. - The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) National Assembly of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When any action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.The 1935 Constitution did nothing to change this paradigm. It was only with the advent of the 1973 Constitution that the requirement of plebiscite was introduced. Thus, under Article XI, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution, "[n]o province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines.
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as unconstitutional for not having been ratified by the residents of the city in a plebiscite. This contention is untenable. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on June 21, 1969.74chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryConversely, any substantial alteration in territorial boundaries from the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution to the present, to be valid, must be approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected thereby.
As held in Pelaez v. Auditor General, the power of provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is "of an administrative nature - involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities." It is a power "to fix common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities." It is thus limited to implementing the law creating a municipality. It is obvious that any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but its amendment. If, therefore, Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as basis for opposing the claim of Sinacaban.Similarly, in Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte v. Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte,76 We ruled:
A[s] the law creating a municipality fixes its boundaries, settlement of boundary disputes between municipalities is facilitated by carrying into effect the law that created them.The problem in this case is that at no point in the charters of both Makati and Taguig were their territorial limits expressed in metes and bounds.
Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but its amendment, which only the Congress can do.
SECTION 1. (a) The pueblos of the Philippine Islands shall be recognized as municipal corporations with the same boundaries as now existing de jure or de facto, upon organization under the provisions of this Act.By virtue of Act No. 137,78 Makati and Taguig were incorporated into the newly created Province of Rizal.
(b) This Act shall not apply to the city of Manila, for which special legislation shall be enacted.
(c) This Act shall not apply to the settlement of non-Christian tribes, for which special legislation shall be enacted.
SECTION 2. (a) Pueblos incorporated under this Act shall be designated as municipalities (municipios), and shall be known respectively by the names heretofore adopted. Under such names they may sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with, acquire and hold real and personal property for the general interests of the municipality, and exercise all the powers hereinafter conferred upon them.
(b) All property and property rights vested in any pueblo under its former organization shall continue to be vested in the same municipality after its incorporation under this Act.
a) | Certified true copy of a 1891 document titled "Cuaderno Suppletorio del Registro de Anotaciones de Titulos de Propriedad de Terrenos Espedidos por la Direccion General de Administracion Civil"94 (Cuaderno Suppletorio) or Spanish book of registry of real properties, obtained from the National Archives of the Philippines. The Cuaderno Suppletorio was translated by Professor Emmanuel Luis A. Romanillos (Prof. Romanillos), a professor of foreign languages at the University of the Philippines Diliman; |
b) | The Spanish contract of sale95 over Hacienda Maricaban, which was also translated by Prof. Romanillos. This document allegedly contained a clear description of the entire Hacienda Maricaban and depicted which portions of the Hacienda fell under the jurisdictions of San Pedro Macati, Pasig, Taguig, Pateros, Parañaque, and Malibay; and |
c) | A certified true copy of the Map of Fort William McKinley Military Reservation (General Order No. 104 October 3rd 1902), obtained by Engr. Almeda from the United States National Archives.96chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary |
The authenticity of Psu-2031 as a map of Fort McKinley is reinforced by the testimony of Henry Abonitalla (Abonitalla) of the Office of the Regional Technical Director for Lands of the DENR. Abonitalla testified that Exhibit "AAA," the updated version of Psu-2031, was the map of Fort McKinley or Fort Bonifacio in the records of the DENR-NCR, to wit:106chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ATTY. CORVERA: Q- Now, in the subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum, we requested that you bring a copy of the original map of Fort William McKinley and to bring a certified true copy thereof, did you bring that, Mr. Witness? A- I was able to bring the original copy of the Plan... ATTY. CORVERA: Psu 2031 A- Map of Military Reservation of Fort McKinley under Psu No. 2031. ATTY. CORVERA: Witness producing the print copy, which is found in the Records of the Land Registration Authority. A- And also the Petition of Zoilo Castrillo dated November 9, 1955. Q- Now, apart from this original print copy of Psu-2031, do you recall having issued a certified true copy of the same? A Yes, sir. Q- I am showing to you this copy of Psu-2031 map of Fort William Reservation Fort William McKinley. A- Yes, sir. This is my signature. ATTY. CORVERA: We request that the document which is a certified true copy identified by the witness be marked as Exhibit "XX", your Honor. COURT: Mark it ATTY. CORVERA: And the signature identified by the witness below certifying its correctness be marked as Exhibit "XX-1". COURT: Mark it. ATTY. CORVERA: We would like also to request the counsel to compare the certified true copy, which was produced and identified by the witness with the original print copy found in the records of the Land Registration Authority. The map is too aged, Your Honor and full of tapes. Psu-2031, Map of Military Reservation (Fort William MacKinley [sic]). ATTY. MARIANO: We stipulate, your Honor. COURT: This Fort MacKinley (sic) is now the Fort Bonifacio? ATTY. CORVERA: Yes, your Honor. It used to be US Military Reservation. COURT: What is your pleasure counsel? ATTY. MARIANO: We stipulate, your Honor that the attached true copy appears to be a faithful reproduction of the print copy map brought by the witness.
Furthermore, several government issuances covering the former Hacienda Maricaban, promulgated prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, mentioned or used Psu-2031 as their basis. These issuances include:
ATTY. CORVERA: We are offering this witness to testify on behalf of the Chief of the Technical Records Section, Ms. Judith Poblete and he has been authorized by the said chief to bring the 6riginal copy of Psu 2031 for comparison with the certified true copy previously issued by Judith Poblete and also to testify on the contents thereof, your Honor. COURT: Any comment? ATTY. MARIANO: Your Honor, we have no comment on the offer but we would like to make of record that this is the second time that the witness has been called to the witness stand. ATTY. CORVERA: Yes, your Honor, that's why we manifested that the witness will be testifying under the same oath. COURT: Manifestation noted. ATTY. CORVERA: With the kind permission of the Honorable Court. COURT: Proceed. DIRECT EXAMINATION ON THE WITNESS, MR. HENRY ABONITALLA BY ARTURO CORVERA. ATTY. CORVERA: Q- Mr. Witness, are you here in court by virtue of any subpoena that you received? WITNESS: A- Yes, sir. Q Who authorized you to appear. A- There was an Order given by the Director, sir. Q- When you say "director", what is the name of this director? A- Arturo Fadriquela. Officer-in-Charge, Regional Technical director (sic) for Lands, Department of Environment and Natural Resources-National Capital Region, sir. ATTY. CORVERA: Q- And there was a subpoena issued to Judith Poblete, chief (sic) Technical Records Section regarding the map of military reservation of Fort Bonifacio formerly Fort William McKinley Psu 2031, did you bring the original of the said map. A- Yes, sir. ATTY. CORVERA: Witness producing the original copy of the said map Psu-2031, your Honor. COURT: Manifestation noted. ATTY. CORVERA: Q- Now, there is a certified true copy of the said map which was marked during the last hearing as Exhibit "AA", will you tell the Court of this certified true copy was issued by your office at the DENR-NCR? WITNESS: A- Yes, sir. Q- Do you recognize the signatures appearing in the certification? A- Yes, sir. Q- And, will you please tell the Court who signed the Certification? WITNESS: A- Judith Poblete, Chief Technical Records Section and Ignacio Almira, Jr. Chief Regional Survey Division sir. ATTY. CORVERA: Q- Who are these persons that you mentioned, this Judith Poblete? A- She is our section chief, sir. Q Land Survey Record Section? A- Yes, sir. Q And to what section do you belong? A- Survey and Land Records, sir. ATTY. CORVERA: Q- And is that under the Land Survey Section? WITNESS: A- Yes, sir. Q- What about Ignacio R. Almira, Jr., who is he in the DENR-NCR? A- Chief of Survey Division, sir. Q- Would you examine the signatures of these persons you identified and tell the Court if these are the signatures of Poblete and Almira? A- Yes, sir. ATTY. CORVERA: Q- What is the relation of this certified true copy to the original map you produced before this Court? WITNESS: A: It is a reproduction copy, sir. Q- In layman's term, it is the certified true copy of the original? A- Yes, sir. ATTY. CORVERA: May we ask counsel to compare the original map produced by the witness with the certified true copy previously marked as Exhibit "AAA". ATTY. MARIANO: We stipulate, your Honor that the document marked as Exhibit "AAA", is a faithful reproduction of the original brought by the witness. COURT: Manifestation noted.
a) Proclamation No. 423, issued on July 12, 1957;cralawlawlibraryIf Psu-2031 is spurious and fake, as Makati would have Us believe, it would not have been referenced in various government issuances. However, the fact that several government documents mentioned or used it as their basis lends credence to Taguig's claim that its preparation has been duly sanctioned and approved by the authorities.
b) Proclamation No. 81, issued on February 12, 1963;cralawlawlibrary
c) Proclamation No. 246, issued on May 26, 1964;cralawlawlibrary
d) Proclamation No. 461, issued on September 29, 1965;cralawlawlibrary
e) Proclamation No. 462, issued on September 29, 1965;cralawlawlibrary
f) Proclamation No. 481, issued on October 27, 1965;cralawlawlibrary
g) Proclamation No. 192, issued on April 4, 1967;cralawlawlibrary
h) Proclamation No. 208, issued on May 28, 1967;cralawlawlibrary
i) Proclamation No. 469, issued on September 30, 1968;cralawlawlibrary
j) Proclamation No. 653, issued on February 13, 1970;cralawlawlibrary
k) Proclamation No. 684, issued on April 20, 1970;cralawlawlibrary
l) Proclamation No. 1041, issued on June 29, 1970; and
m) Proclamation No. 1217, issued on January 3, 1973.
Abonitalla's testimony is corroborated by the cadastral surveys of Makati and Taguig.
ATTY. CORVERA: Q- Now, Mr. witness, you stated in your previous testimony as a witness that you are a Geodetic Engineer by profession, is that right? WITNESS: A- Yes, sir. Q- As a Geodetic Engineer, would you be able to read or interpret this map of military reservation of Fort Bonifacio? WITNESS: A- What am I going to read? Q- Would you be able to read what is contained in the map? A- All I can say, sir, is that this map represents the boundary of Psu 2031 of Fort William McKinley, now Fort Bonifacio. Q- When you say boundary, boundary of what, Mr. Witness, between what place? A- Kabuuan ng apat na parsela ng Fort Bonifacio, sir. ATTY. CORVERA: Q- Would you please point out where is Parcel 1? WITNESS: A- Here, sir. INTERPRETER: Witness is pointing to a portion which is part of Barrio Maricaban. ATTY. CORVERA: Q- Is there any description in the portion that you pointed as Parcel 1, is there a designation in the map? WITNESS: A- There is, sir Barrio of Maricaban and Barrio of Maubon. ATTY. CORVERA: We request, your Honor that the portion identified by the witness as Barrio Maricaban and Barrio Maubon be bracketed and marked as Exhibit "AAA-1", your Honor. COURT: Mark it. ATTY. CORVERA: Q- What about Parcel 2 which you mentioned earlier, where is this located? WITNESS: A- Here, sir. INTERPRETER: Witness pointed to the word Parcel "2", appearing in the map. ATTY. CORVERA: May we request that the words "Parcel 2", be encircled and marked as Exhibit "AAA-2", you Honor. COURT: Mark it. ATTY. CORVERA: What about Parcel 3? WITNESS: A- Here, sir. ATTY. CORVERA: Witness is pointing the words "Parcel 3", appearing on the right portion of the map and we request that the same be marked as Exhibit "AAA-3", your Honor. COURT: Mark it. ATTY. CORVERA: Q- And the last, Parcel 4 where is it located? WITNESS: A- Here, sir. ATTY. CORVERA: Witness is pointing the words "Parcel 4" printed on the right portion of the map, your Honor. COURT: Manifestation noted. ATTY. CORVERA: And may we request that the same be bracketed and marked as Exhibit "AAA-4", your Honor. COURT: Mark it. ATTY. CORVERA: In this map, will you point out also the respective municipalities where these parcels that you identified are located. ATTY. MARIANO: Objection, your Honor, no basis, your Honor. ATTY. CORVERA: In this map? ATTY. MARIANO: The witness only stated that the map is only a boundary of fort (sic) Bonifacio, there was no mentioned (sic) that there are municipalities, your Honor. ATTY. CORVERA: If he knows and if he has seen the map, that's the question, your Honor. Q- Is it designated in the map the municipalities that is covered by this parcels that you identified? COURT: Witness may answer. WITNESS: A- Yes, there is indicated here, sir. ATTY. CORVERA: Q- Will you point out where in that map? WITNESS: A- At the bottom there states the word "Municipality of Taguig". ATTY. CORVERA: May we request that the words "Municipality of Taguig" across parcels 3 and 4 be bracketed and marked as Exhibit "AAA-5", your Honor. COURT: Mark it. ATTY. CORVERA: Q- Will you please also tell us the boundary of this Fort Bonifacio Parcels 3 and 4 of fort Bonifacio, where is the boundary between Fort Bonifacio on the left side and the City of Makati? WITNESS: A- I cannot pinpoint because there is no plotting in the boundaries, sir. ATTY. CORVERA: Q- There is a portion here marked Guadalupe Estate property of Kompanya Agrikola de Ultarama, would you know what municipality or city does it covered? A- The Guadalupe Estate is outside Psu 2031, sir. Q What municipalities are inside Psu 2031? WITNESS: A- As appearing in the map, municipality of Pasig, Municipality of Pasay, sir. ATTY. CORVERA: Q- What else? A- Here in the South, Municipality of Taguig, sir. Q- What is the municipality adjacent to Fort Bonifacio? A- Will you please clarify the question, sir if it is in the east, on the west, or in the North, or south, sir. Q- On the west there are areas with a label "Damarinas Villages, Forbes Park, what municipality are these areas located? WITNESS: A- Based on the plan it is stated as to which municipality the be1ong, sir. But if you are going to research Makati Cadastral survey, it is within Makati, sir. Q- In this map, there is also a label Municipal boundary, will you please go over this and tell us- what is that boundary of? A- There is a municipal boundary but it is not identified in the map, sir. Q- In what map are these boundaries identified? WITNESS: A-Boundaries of Cadastral survey and Index of Cadastral map, sir. ATTY. CORVERA: That would be all, your Honor.
SECTION 503. Sale of liquor near posts and camps prohibited. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section hereof, no license shall be granted by a municipal council or other local or provincial authority for the sale of any intoxicating liquors, beer, or wine, at any place or on any premises situated within a distance of two miles of land now used or hereafter to be used by the United States for military purposes at Camp Stotsenburg, in the municipality of Mabalacat, Province of Pampanga; Camp Morrison, municipality of Salomague, Province of !locos Sur; Camp Jossman, municipality of Guimaras, Province of Iloilo; Camp Gregg, municipality of Bayambang, Province of Pangasinan; in or near the municipality of Los Banos, Province of Laguna; in or near the municipality of Iligan, Province of Lanao; in or near the municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas; in or near the municipality of Legaspi, Province of Albay; in or near the municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon; in or near the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas; at Fort William McKinley, near Macati, Province of Rizal; or within a distance of one and one-half miles of land used or to be used by the United States for military purposes at Camp Wallace, in the municipality of San Fernando, Province of La Union; at Pasay barracks, municipality of Pasay, Province of Rizal; in or near the municipality of Naga, Province of Camarines Sur; in or near the municipality of Lucena, Province of Tayabas; in or near the municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna; on the Isand of Talim, Laguna de Bay, or within a distance of three miles of the Island of Malahi, reserved for military purposes in the Laguna de Bay; or within a distance of one mile of land used by the United States for military purposes at Santa Mesa in the City of Manila; or within distance of three-quarters of a mile of land used by the United States for military purposes near the town of Calbayog, in the Province of Samar. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)What is most distinctive in this provision is that the other military camps were described as either "in" or "in or near" municipalities. However, for Fort McKinley in particular, the law specifically stated that it was located "near Macati, Province of Rizal."
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, CARLOS P. GARCIA, President of the Philippines, do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, subject to private rights, if any there be, and other conditions stated hereunder the following parcels of the public domain, situated in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City, Island of Luzon, and more particularly described as follows:Notable is the mention of Parcel 4, which was described as being bounded on the north by the Guadalupe Estate. Again, Fort McKinley was deemed to be outside Makati's territory.xxx xxx xxx
PARCEL 4 - A parcel of land (Parcel 4 as shown on the plan Psu 2031) situated in Fort Wm McKinley, bounded on the N. by Guadalupe Estate and Pasig River; on the E. by Pateros River; on the S. by Parcel 3, Psu 2031. Beginning at point marked "1" on the plan, beginning S. 36 deg. 32' E., 5629 meters from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Maricaban x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
a) | Proclamation No. 246, issued by President Diosdado P. Macapagal (President Macapagal) on May 26, 1964, wherein Fort McKinley was described as situated within Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, and Pasay. |
b) | On September 29, 1965, President Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 461, which excluded a parcel of land from Fort Bonifacio and declared the same as the AFP Officers' Village. The excluded portion is said to be located in Taguig, Parañaque, and Pasay. Additionally, Fort Bonifacio was described therein as situated in Taguig, Parañaque, and Pasay. |
c) | Proclamation No. 481, issued by President Macapagal on October 27, 1965, described Fort Bonifacio as being situated in Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Pateros, and Pasay. |
d) | By virtue of Proclamation No. 208, issued on May 28, 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) reserved portions of Fort Bonifacio as the proposed site for the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Again, Fort Bonifacio was described as situated within Pasig, Taguig Parañaque, and Pasay. |
e) | On January 3, 1973, under Proclamation No. 1217, certain portions of the AFP Enlisted Men's Village Reservation said to be situated in Taguig was declared by President Marcos as the site of Maharlika Village and was opened for disposition. |
f) | In Proclamation No. 2476, issued on January 7, 1986 by President Marcos, a portion of Fort Bonifacio identified as Barangays Lower Bicutan Upper Bicutan, and Signal Village, all within Taguig, was declared open for disposition. Fort Bonifacio was said to be situated in Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, and Pasay. |
g) | On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172, which described Pasig, Taguig, Pateros, Parañaque, and Pasay as the location of Fort Bonifacio. |
a) | In Proclamation No. 1041, issued on June 29, 1972, Fort Bonifacio was said to be situated in Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Makati and Pasay. |
b) | In Proclamation No. 2165, issued on February 22, 1982 by President Marcos, certain portion of Fort Bonifacio, described as situated in Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Pasay, reserved a parcel of land located in Makati to serve as the basis for the National Cartography Authority. Notably, the proclamation seems to contradict itself in that Fort Bonifacio was described to be situated in Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, and Pasay but the reserved area for the National Cartography Authority was simultaneously located in Makati. |
c) | The assailed Proclamation No. 2475, s. of 1986 likewise included Makati as one of the locations of Fort Bonifacio. |
A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator-material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people in the political units directly affected. x x x Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them-direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people's representatives. x x xTaguig claims that Presidential Proclamation Nos. 2475, s. 1986, and 518, s. 1990 violate this constitutional guarantee when they altered Taguig's boundaries without complying with the plebiscite requirement.
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a caseThe theory of constitutional avoidance is underpinned by the democratic character of constitutional interpretation. This Court, while being the final arbiter of actual cases and controversies, does not possess the exclusive competence to read and interpret the organic law. Indubitably, We share this power and duty with the other branches of government and the people themselves. Accordingly, We exercise the power of judicial review only in petitions that present narrowly framed and well-defined constitutional issues, sufficient to decide an actual case:
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
5: that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality. (Emphasis supplied.)
The basic democratic foundation of our constitutional order necessarily means that all organs of government, and even the People, read the fundamental law and are guided by it. When competing viable interpretations arise, a justiciable controversy may ensue requiring judicial intervention in order to arrive with finality at which interpretation shall be sustained. To remain true to its democratic moorings, however, judicial involvement must remain guided by a framework or deference and constitutional avoidance. This same principle underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to refrain from issuing advisory opinions. Specifically as regards this Court, only constitutional issues that are narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be entertained.122chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryIn addition, the principle of constitutional avoidance is anchored on the requisites of judicial review. In particular, it is underscored by the requirement that the issue of constitutionality be the very lis mota of the case. In ParconSong v. Parcon,123 We explained:
Before this Court may determine the constitutionality of a government act, the requisites for judicial review must be satisfied. In In Re: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement:In the present case, We can resolve, as We have resolved, the boundary dispute without resorting to constitutional adjudication of the assailed proclamations.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryThe power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review before this court may take cognizance of the case. The requisites are:The fourth requisite is relevant here. Courts are obligated to presume that the acts of Congress are valid, unless the contrary is clearly shown. Thus, courts avoid resolving the constitutionality of a law if the case can be ruled on other grounds. The question of constitutionality will only be passed upon if it is indispensable to the resolution of the case, but it cannot be raised collaterally. x x x (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;cralawlawlibrary
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;cralawlawlibrary
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Endnotes:
1 Rollo, pp. 151-191.
2 Rollo, pp. 1323-1335.
3 Article XI, Section 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
4 Article X, Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
5 Rollo, pp. 1372-1403.
6 Id. at 1408-1431.
7 Id. at 2249-2254.
8 Id. at 157-160; 2992-3000.
9 Id. at 1457-1477.
10 Id. at 1477.
11 Id. at 1478-1523.
12 Id. at 1524-1543.
13 Id. at 1567-1580.
14 Id. at 1581-1582.
15 Id. at 1583-1666.
16 Id. at 1824-1833.
17 Id. at 1549-1556.
18 Id. at 1557-1559. This Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Marlene B. Gonzales-Sison and Leoncia Real-Dimagiba.
19 Rollo (G.R. No. 208393), pp. 25-34.
20 Rollo, pp. 1834-1841. This Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Marlene B. Gonzales-Sison and Leoncia Real-Dimagiba.
21 Rollo (G.R. No. 208393), pp. 66-78.
22 Rollo, pp. 1560-1562. This Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Marlene B. Gonzales-Sison and Leoncia Real-Dimagiba.
23 Rollo (G.R. No. 208393), pp. 85-87.
24 Rollo, pp. 1564-1565. This Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Marlene B. Gonzales-Sison and Leoncia Real-Dimagiba.
25 Rollo (G.R. No. 208393), pp. 100-130.
26 Rollo, pp. 217-253. This Decision was penned by Associate Justice Marlene B. Gonzales-Sison, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Edwin D. Sorongon.
27 Id. at 252.
28 Id. at 1842-2000.
29 Id. at 2001-2070.
30 G.R. No. 208393, 787 Phil. 367-402 (2018); penned by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, with the concurrence of Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza.
31 Id. at 79-80.
32 Id. at 2100-2126.
33 City of Makati v. Municipality (now City) of Taguig, 578 Phil. 773-784 (2008).
34 Rollo, p. 198.
35 Id. at 2160-2185.
36 Supra note 30.
37 Id. at 199.
38 Id. at 193-209.
39 Supra note 30.
40 Rollo, pp. 254-266.
41 Id. at 174.
42 Id. at 175.
43 Id. at 176.
44 Id. at 177.
45 Id. at 178.
46 Id. at 2216-2314.
47 Id. at 2262-2263.
48 Id. at 2982-3014.
49 Id. at 2983-2984.
50 HGL Development Corp. vs. Hon. Penuela, 786 Phil. 329, 366-367 (2016).
51 G.R. No. 249307, August 27, 2020.
52 515 Phil. 494 (2006).
53 Id. at 501-503.
54 Malixi v. Baltazar, 821 Phil. 423, 452 (2017).
55 269 Phil. 225 (1990).
56 Id. at 232.
57 799 Phil. 575 (2016).
58 Id. at 581.
59 312 Phil. 259 (1995).
60 Id. at 267.
61 City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero, 616 Phil. 28 (2009).
62 Id. at 57.
63 667 Phil. 171 (2011).
64 Id. at 176.
65 Municipality of Pateros v. Court of Appeals, 607 Phil. 104 (2009).
66 Id. at 114-115.
67 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7854, July 19, 1994.
68 REPUBLIC ACT No. 8487, February 11, 1998.
69 312 Phil. 259 (1995).
70 Id. at 261.
71 Pelaez v. Auditor General, 122 Phil. 965 (1965).
72 Mendenilla v. Onandia, 115 Phil. 534 (1962).
73 184 Phil. 597 (1980).
74 Id. at 608.
75 Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz, Jr., G.R. No. 105746, December 2, 1996, 333 Phil. 1-19.
76 Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte v. Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte, 570 Phil. 395-420 (2008).
77 Act No. 82, January 31, 1901.
78 June 11, 1901.
79 Executive Order 20, s. of 1908; Executive Order No. 36 s. of 1909; and Executive Order No. 108, s. of 1918.
80 Act No. 2390, Changing the Names of Certain Municipalities, Townships and Barrios, February 28, 1914.
81 Creating the Metropolitan Manila and the Metropolitan Manila Commission and for Other Purposes, November 7, 1975.
82 Republic Act No. 7854, July 19, 1994.
83 Republic Act No. 8487, February 11, 1998.
84 Spouses Garcia v. Northern Islands Co., Inc., G.R. No. 226495, February 5, 2020.
85 Supreme Transliner Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 692-700 (2001).
86 Caranto v. Caranto, G.R. No. 202889, March 2, 2020.
87 Tan, Jr. v. Hosana, 780 Phil. 258-272 (2016).
88 BP Oil and Chemicals International Philippines, Inc. v. Total Distribution & Logistics Systems, Inc., 805 Phil. 244-246 (2017).
89 RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Section 34.
90 RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Section 1.
91 See Indonesia v. Malaysia, Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, p. 682, para. 135.
92 Barangay Sangalang v. Barangay Maguihan, G.R. No. 159792, December 23, 2009, 623 Phil. 711-729.
93 Exhibit "C".
94 Exhibit "21".
95 Exhibit "22".
96 Exhibit 64.
97 Professor Romanillos's translation of the Decreto No. 1368 was marked as Exhibit "42".
98 Exhibit "24".
99 RULES OF COURT, Rule 128, Section 3.
100 RULES OF COURT, Rule 128, Section 4.
101 RULES OF COURT, Rule 128, Section 3.
102 Martires v. Heirs of Somera, G.R. No. 210789 December 3, 2018.
103 Franco v. People, 780 Phil. 36-54 (2016).
104 Records, Vol. XIV, pp. 60-81.
105 TSN, April 3, 2009, pp. 10-15.
106 TSN, June 19, 2009, pp. 4-13.
107 See, e.g., Spouses Modesta v. Urbina, G.R. No. 189859, October 18, 2010, 647 Phil. 706-728; Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. Nos. 156951 & 173408, September 22, 2006, 534 Phil. 8-34; Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay City v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati, G.R. No. 81564, 90176, April 26, 1990, 263 Phil. 568-584; and De la Cruz v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-27759, April 17, 1970, 143 Phil. 230-236.
108 Rollo, p. 157. CA rollo, pp. 2517-2518.
109 Id.
110 TSN, June 19, 2009, pp. 13-25.
111 Exhibit "H".
112 Exhibit "Q".
113 Exhibit "A".
114 Exhibit "l" or the Barangay Boundary and Section Index Map MCAD 571-D.
115 Municipality of Isabel, Leyte v. Municipality of Merida, Leyte, G.R. No. 216092, December 9, 2020.
116 RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Section 1.
117 Id.
118 CONSTITUTION, Article X, Section 10.
119 G.R. No. L-17803, June 30, 1962.
120 Palencia v. People, G.R. No. 219560, July 1, 2020.
121 460 Phil. 830-1126 (2003).
122 Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General, G.R. No. 217910, September 3, 2019, citing David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016.
123 G.R. No. 199582, July 7, 2020.
124 Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 228 Phil. 42-102 (1986).cralawredlibrary