1. TESTATE OF INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS; POWER OF PROBATE COURT TO PASS UPON TITLE TO PROPERTY; EXCEPTIONS. — As a general rule, a question as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings, except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. When, however, the interested parties are all heirs, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon, the reason being that questions of collation or of advancement are generally inevitably involved therein which are proper matters to be passed upon in the due course of administration. In the instant case, the interested parties are all heirs of the deceased. Since the question of ownership of "La Joyeria El Diamante" and "La Agencia El Diamante" has, by motion, been submitted by the widow herself, she cannot thereafter be permitted to complain if the court, after examination of the evidence presented by both parties, adjudges the question against her.

2. ID.; APPEAL FROM A RESOLUTION OF THE PROBATE COURT. — Notice of the resolution of September 2, 1941, was served upon the parties on September 3, 1941. In the dispositive part of this resolution ordering certain properties to be included in the inventory, there was absolutely no declaration in connection with "La Joyeria El Diamante" and "La Agencia El Diamante." For this reason, on September 11, 1941, A. M. filed her motion for reconsideration, which was denied on the ground that in the resolution, in a paragraph immediately preceding the dispositive part, there is an express statement to the effect that "La Joyeria El Diamante" and "La Agencia El Diamante" did not belong to the conjugal partnership of the deceased and the petitioner, which statement could be considered as a sufficient disposition of the question regarding the properties. Practically, by this order, the paragraph therein mentioned was made a portion of the dispositive part contained in the resolution, and, therefore, it was only after this order was issued that there was a judgment regarding the two properties, from which the petitioner could appeal. The parties were notified of such order on September 24, 1941. From this date to October 8, 1941, when petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration, 14 days had elapsed. When, therefore, the probate court on October 18, 1941 denied the motion filed by the petitioner declaring that its resolution of September 2, 1941, had become final, only 14 days of the 30-day period for perfecting an appeal had elapsed. Consequently, petitioner had still 16 days within which to perfect her appeal.

Petitioner, Andrea Cordova Vda. de Mañalac, in her capacity as heir of her deceased husband, Laureano Mañalac, and administratrix of his estate, filed on September 10, 1940, a petition in the probate court, praying that the properties "La Joyeria El Diamante" and "La Agencia El Diamante" be among the others enumerated therein, included in the inventory of his estate. Respondents Ana Mañalac and Laureano Mañalac, jr., heirs of the deceased, opposed the petition, and on September 2, 1941, the probate court, after hearing, issued its resolution declaring, among others, that the properties aforementioned do not pertain to the conjugal partnership of the deceased and the petitioner. Notice of this resolution was served upon the parties on the following day, September 3, 1941. Ana Mañalac moved on September 11, 1941, for reconsideration praying that said declaration be included in the dispositive part of the resolution, but on September 23, 1941, the court denied the motion on the ground that the declaration may in itself be considered as part of the dispositive portion of the resolution. Parties were notified of this order of denial on September 24, 1941. On October 8, 1941, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the resolution of September 2, 1941, and the order of September 23, 1941 praying that the finding of the probate court as to the ownership of "La Joyeria El Diamante and "La Agencia El Diamante" be omitted, as any finding to such effect was beyond its probate jurisdiction. On October 18, 1941, respondent court denied this motion for reconsideration upon the ground that, as petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration did not partake of the nature of a motion for new trial, it did not suspend the running of the period for the perfection of an appeal and that, the resolution of the court of September 2, 1941, had already become final and could not thus be modified. Parties were notified of this denial on October 21, 1941. Petitioner thereupon instituted the present certiorari proceeding, praying that the finding of the probate court in its resolution of September 2 and September 23, 1941, regarding the ownership of the properties "La Joyeria El Diamante" and "La Agencia El Diamante," be declared null and void because in excess of its jurisdiction; otherwise, that said resolution of September 2, 1941, be declared not final.

We hold that the resolution of September 2, 1941, is valid, the probate court having jurisdiction to render the same. As a general rule, a question as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings (Bauermann v. Casas, 10 Phil., 386; Devesa v. Arbes, 13 Phil., 273; Franco v. O’Brien, 13 Phil. 359; De los Santos v. Jarra, 15 Phil., 147; Guzman v. Anog, 37 Phil., 61; Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil., 664; Santiago v. Court of First Instance, 55 Phil., 62; Adapon v. Maralit, 40 Off. Gaz., 6th Sup., 84; Pascual v. Pascual, G. R. No. 48140, May 4, 1942), except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action (Garcia v. Garcia, 40 Off. Gaz., 1st Sup., 65; Marcelino v. Antonio, 40 Off. Gaz., 8th Sup., 221; Guingguing v. Abuton, 48 Phil., 144, 147) . When, however, the interested parties are all heirs, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon, the reason being that questions of collation or of advancement are generally inevitably involved therein which are proper matters to be passed upon in the due course of administration (Pascual v. Pascual, G. R. No. 48140, May 4, 1942; Guingguing v. Abuton, 48 Phil., 144, 147; Rule 91, section 2, Rules of Court).

In the instant case, the interested parties are all heirs of the deceased. Since the question of ownership of "La Joyeria El Diamante" and "La Agencia El Diamante" has, by motion, been submitted by the widow herself, she cannot thereafter be permitted to complain if the court, after examination of the evidence presented by both parties, adjudges the question against her.

Petitioner prays that the resolution of the probate court if adjudged to be valid be declared not to be final so that an appeal may still be interposed therefrom. In the ordinary procedure, a prayer of this kind is not proper in a certiorari proceeding before this Court. Notwithstanding the order of the probate court of October 18, 1941, declaring its resolution aforementioned to have become final, petitioner should have perfected her appeal within the time provided by the Rules of Court, and if her appeal be dismissed she may apply here for a writ of mandamus. We are not inclined, however, to require her to follow this procedure under the circumstances of the case since she is here on a like proceeding and we may very well pass upon the question by her raised to avoid further litigation and in the interest of prompt administration of justice.

It should be observed that notice of the resolution of September 2, 1941, was served upon the parties on September 3, 1941. In the dispositive part of this resolution ordering certain properties to be included in the inventory, there was absolutely no declaration in connection with "La Joyeria El Diamante" and "La Agencia El Diamante." For this reason, on September 11, 1941, Ana Mañalac filed her motion for reconsideration, which was denied on the ground that in the resolution, in a paragraph immediately preceding the dispositive part, there is an express statement to the effect that "La Joyeria El Diamante" and "La Agencia El Diamante" did not belong to the conjugal partnership of the deceased and the petitioner, which statement could be considered as a sufficient disposition of the question regarding said properties. Practically, by this order, the paragraph therein mentioned was made a portion of the dispositive part contained in the resolution, and, therefore, it was only after this order was issued that there was a judgment regarding the two properties, from which the petitioner could appeal. The parties were notified of such order on September 24, 1941. From this date to October 8, 1941, when petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration, 14 days had elapsed. When, therefore, the probate court on October 18, 1941 denied the motion filed by the petitioner declaring that its resolution of September 2, 1941, had become final, only 14 days of the 30-day period for perfecting an appeal had elapsed. The days following the order of October 18, 1941 cannot be counted against petitioner’s right to appeal since such order may be treated as a virtual refusal to allow her appeal. Consequently, petitioner had still 16 days within which to perfect her appeal.

The resolution of the probate court of September 2, 1941, is accordingly hereby held to be valid but has not yet become final thereby permitting petitioner, if she so desires, to appeal therefrom within 16 days after this judgment has become final. Without costs.

Yulo, C.J., Ozaeta and Bocobo, JJ., concur.



PARAS, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

This case involves a simple question of procedure. In the testate proceedings of the deceased Laureano Mañalac, Case No. 53544 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the petitioner, as heiress, filed a motion praying that, among other properties, the jewelry business "El Diamante" be included in the inventory. The motion was opposed by the respondent Ana Mañalac, and after several hearings during which evidence was presented, the respondent Judge promulgated his resolution of September 2, 1941, reading in part as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Andrea Cordova, conyuge superstite del finado Laureano Mañalac, Sr., alega que la joyeria y la agencia de empeños ’El Diamante’ eran de la sociedad de gananciales mencionada.

"Por su parte, Ana Mañalac, una de los hijos del finado, contiende que la joyeria y agencia de empeños ’El Diamante’ nunca pertenecieron a la citada sociedad de gananciales; que fueron de la sociedad colectiva ’Mañalac Brothers’; que por la muerte de uno de sus dueños, Nicolas Mañalac, su