THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 242506-10. September 14, 2022
LUIS RAMON P. LORENZO, Petitioner, v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (SIXTH DIVISION) AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. Nos. 242590-94]
ARTHUR CUA YAP, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (SIXTH DIVISION) AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
D E C I S I O N
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court are consolidated1 Petitions2 for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the August 9, 2018 and September 25, 2018 Resolutions3 of the Sandiganbayan Sixth Division (Sandiganbayan) in Criminal Case Nos. SB-18-CRM-0288 to 0292 (subject criminal cases). Tue assailed Resolutions denied the Motions to Quash Informations filed by petitioners Luis Ramon P. Lorenzo (Lorenzo) and Arthur C. Yap (Yap).
The subject criminal cases stemmed from the alleged anomalous procurement of various quantities of fertilizer (granular urea) from the Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (Philphos) for the Luzon regions in 2003.4 At the time material to these cases, Lorenzo was the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and Yap was the Administrator of the National Food Authority (NFA).
On 04 July 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused LUIS P. LORENZO, JR. and ARTHUR C. YAP, both public officers with salary grade 30, being then the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Administrator of the National Food Authority (NFA), respectively, while in the performance of their official functions and in grave abuse thereof, acting with evident bad faith, manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence, conspiring with one another and with co-accused TOMAS A. GUIBANI, Representative of the Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (Philphos), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally cause undue injury to the government and/or give unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to Philphos, by (a) directing the Regional Bids and Awards Committees (RBACs) of NFA Regions 1 to 5 and the National Capital Region (NCR) to conduct procurement of their fertilizer requirements through the negotiated mode in violation of the general rule on competitive bidding prescribed under Section 10 of Republic Act 9184; (b) issuing a guideline that the opening of the bids for the Luzon-wide procurement of fertilizers shall be simultaneously done at the NFA Central Office in Manila; and (c) amending the original guideline allowing only those suppliers with depots within and/or adjacent to the procuring NFA Region to participate as bidders, which issuances and directives were issued to ensure the award to Manilabased Philphos of the Php595,636.37 procurement contract for the supply of 1,300 bags of fertilizers to NFA-NCR to the damage and prejudice of the government.The other four Informations were similarly worded except for (a) the date and place of the commission of the crime, (b) the NFA region involved, (c) the amount of the contract, and (d) the quantity of fertilizers.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CONTRARY TO LAW.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The national government, through the Department of Agriculture (DA) allotted Four Hundred Thirty[-]Two Million Pesos (PhP432M) for the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani (GMA) Rice Program in 2003.The regions in the Luzon-wide procurement of fertilizers were as follows: NFA Region I (Ilocos Region), NFA Region II (Cagayan Valley), NFA Region III (Central Luzon), NFA Region IV (CALABARZON and MIMAROPA), NFA Region V (Bicol Region), and National Capital Region (NCR). The Ombudsman found several irregularities in the procurement of fertilizers in the said regions. Mainly, the grounds relied upon by the Ombudsman were the absence of public bidding and other acts allegedly showing manifest partiality towards Philphos.
In a Memorandum dated 30 April 2003, respondent DA Secretary [Lorenzo] authorized the National Food Authority (NFA) to enter into contracts for the procurement of fertilizers intended for the wet season (May to October 2003).
Thus, on May 13, 2003 the DA and the NFA entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to jointly implement the fertilizer component of the GMA Rice Program for the government.
Two Hundred Million Pesos (PhP200M) was transferred by the DA to the NFA Central Office, which in turn, released PhP151,981,640.00 to its Regional Field Units (RFUs) all over the country. The NFA Regional and Provincial Offices in Luzon received a total allocation of PhP108,885,979, but actual fund releases amounted only to PhP105,608,679.00 x x x.
x x x x
The PhP105,608,679.00 actual disbursement was utilized for the procurement of fertilizers (PhP74,701,400.00) arid certified seeds (PhP23,437,139.00) and other administrative expenses (PhP7,470,140.00) related thereto.8 (Emphasis supplied)
In cases where the advertisements or invitations for bids were issued after the effectivity of the Act but before the effectivity of this IRR-A, procuring entities may continue adopting the procurement procedures, rules and regulations provided in E.O. 40 and its IRR, P.D. 1594 and its IRR, R.A. 7160 and its IRR, or other applicable laws, as the case may be.23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Lorenzo also brought to fore the previous rulings by the Ombudsman in similar cases involving the same parties and factual backdrop where the charges against him and his co-respondents were dismissed. In this regard, Yap invoked the exception to the general rule that only allegations within the four comers of an information should be considered in resolving a motion to quash based on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense.24chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.From the foregoing guidelines, the Court finds that Lorenzo and Yap's right to speedy disposition of cases was violated by the Ombudsman's inordinate delay in concluding the preliminary investigation.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay.
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.
An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay.
Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be invoked.
In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.45chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
For its part, respondent People counters that in determining whether there was inordinate delay, the period of the fact-finding investigation should be excluded.48 Hence, the period should be counted from November 11, 2013 when the Complaint was filed by the FIO before the Ombudsman.49chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
DATE ACTION TAKENOctober 30, 2003 Action Slip of former PAMO Assistant Ombudsman x x x requesting the assignment of a CPL reference numberNovember 3, 2003 CRD Form 1, CPL-C-03-2519 was assigned to the records, for its return to PAMONovember 13, 2003 1st Indorsement returning the records of CPL-C-03-2519 to PAMOMay 18, 2009 Case Referral Slip assigning CPL-C-03-2519 to an Investigator-On-Case for fact-finding investigationNovember 8, 2011 Case Referral Slip re-assigning CPL-C-03-2519 to an Investigator-On-Case for fact-finding investigation
The records of the case failed to indicate the action taken between the period of November, 2003 to May 18, 2009.47 (Emphasis supplied)
As seen from the foregoing, it took almost four years from the filing of the Complaint until the approval of the Joint Resolution finding probable cause against petitioners, and another year to resolve the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by Yap.
November 11, 2013 Complaint filed by the FIO before the OmbudsmanNovember 28, 2013 The Ombudsman issued the Order to file Counter-Affidavit.June 23, 2014 Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit filed by the FIOJuly 14, 2014 The Ombudsman issued the Order to file Counter-Affidavit on the Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit.November 10, 2014 Yap filed his Counter-Affidavit.52July 31, 2017 The Ombudsman approved the Joint Resolution dated July 25, 2017 finding probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.September 11, 2017 Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by YapJanuary 15, 2018 The Ombudsman approved the October 23, 2017 Joint Order denying Yap's Motion for Partial Reconsideration.53April 20, 2018 The Ombudsman filed the five Informations against Lorenzo and Yap before the Sandiganbayan.
Section 7. Commencement of Preliminary Investigation. – Without prejudice to the Procedure in Criminal Cases prescribed under Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07, as amended, a preliminary investigation is deemed to commence whenever a verified complaint, grievance or request for assistance is assigned a case docket number under any of the following instances:In the instant case, the entire preliminary investigation spanned more than four years, counted from the filing of the Complaint on November 11, 2013 until January 15, 2018, when the Ombudsman approved the October 23, 2017 Joint Order denying Yap's Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Joint Resolution finding probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Whether the Court applies the 10-day period provided in Javier and Catamco, or the more generous periods of 12 to 24 months under A.O. 1, the conclusion is the same — that the Ombudsman exceeded the specified period provided for preliminary investigations. Consequently, in light of the guidelines in Cagang, the burden of proof to show that petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated shifts to the prosecution, which must establish that the delay was reasonable and justified by proving the following: 1) that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; 2) that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and 3) that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.60chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryIn all instances, the complaint, grievance or request for assistance with an assigned case docket number shall be considered as pending for purposes of issuing an Ombudsman clearance.
(a) Upon referral by an Ombudsman case evaluator to the preliminary investigation units/offices of the Office of the Ombudsman, after determining that the verified complaint, grievance or request for assistance is sufficient in form and substance and establishes the existence of a prima facie case against the respondent/s; or (b) At any time before the lapse of the period for the conduct of a fact-finding investigation whenever the results thereof support a finding of prima facie case.
Section 8. Period for the conduct of Preliminary Investigation. — Unless otherwise provided for in a separate issuance, such as an Office Order creating a special panel of investigators/prosecutors and prescribing the period for completion of the preliminary investigation, the proceedings therein shall not exceed twelve (12) months for simple cases or twenty-four months (24) months for complex cases, subject to the following considerations:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarySection 9. Termination of Preliminary Investigation. — A preliminary investigation shall be deemed terminated when the resolution of the complaint, including any motion for reconsideration filed in relation to the result thereof, as recommended by the Ombudsman investigator/prosecutor and their immediate supervisors, is approved by the Ombudsman or the Overall Deputy Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor/Deputy Ombudsman concerned. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
(a) The complexity of the case shall be determined on the basis of factors such as, but not limited to, the number of respondents, the number of offenses charged, the volume of documents, the geographical coverage, and the amount of public funds involved. (b) Any delay incurred in the proceedings, whenever attributable to the respondent, shall suspend the running of the period for purposes of completing the preliminary investigation. (c) The period herein prescribed may be extended by written authority of the Ombudsman, or the Overall Deputy Ombudsman/Special Prosecutor/Deputy Ombudsman concerned for justifiable reasons, which extension shall not exceed one-(1) year.
x x x [t]he case against petitioner, which was part of the so-called "Fertilizer Scam," was not the only case being investigated by the OMB, as numerous complaints against alleged erring government officials and employees are continuously being filed with and investigated by the OMB. Hence, any perceived delay attendant to the resolution of the case against petitioner was reasonable and normal in the ordinary processes of justice.62chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryThe Court recognizes that there are constraints in the Ombudsman's resources, thereby impeding its capacity to timely carry out its mandate amidst the increasing caseload, which Cagang refers to as institutional delay. Nevertheless, this in itself does not justify the belated resolution of the preliminary investigation against an accused. As when parties request for additional time to comply with the court's directive, or for the admission of a belatedly filed pleading, the Court does not accept the solitary explanation of heavy workload on the part of the party's counsel.63chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Court understands that the instant case is part of the so called "Fertilizer Fund Scam" cases. However, this does not mean that the case is highly complex that requires a serious amount of time. Records show that the instant case involves only one transaction: the procurement of fertilizer that was paid in two tranches. There is also no allegation that respondents here conspired with other government officials involved in the other Fertilizer Fund Scam cases elsewhere in the country. Further, there are only seven respondents. To add, the OMB was in effect assisted by the COA in the latter's issuance of the NOD. In fact, it was the primary basis of the Task Force's filing of the complaint. Likewise, there was no showing that the records of this case were voluminous that would necessitate a number of years for the conduct of review.In this case, in studying the propriety of petitioners' resort to negotiated procurement, the prosecution had to scrutinize only one issuance, i.e., the April 30, 2003 Memorandum Order issued by Lorenzo. Furthermore, the questioned issuances by Yap in implementing said Memorandum were not numerous enough as to be regarded as voluminous. Evidently, apart from bare assertions, there is a dearth of evidence from the prosecution to show clear proof of the peculiar circumstances of this case as to justify the delay.
In the cases of Javier v. Sandiganbayan and Catamco v. Sandiganbayan (Catamco), which also involve the "Fertilizer Fund Scam," the OMB also posited the same arguments of complexity and voluminous records. The Court, in ruling that there was inordinate delay, disregarded the OMB's arguments absent proof as regards the assertions. Similarly in the instant case, the OMB did not show proof of complexity and volume that would make the delay inevitable and justified.66 (Emphasis supplied)
x x x Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.68 (Emphasis supplied)Cagang further cites the following pronouncements in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan69 (Coscolluela) in explaining prejudice to the accused:
Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual.70 (Emphasis supplied)Indeed, the Court has recognized that "inordinate delay places the accused in a protracted period of uncertainty which may cause anxiety, suspicion, or even hostility."71 Yap himself states in his Petition that while he is not imprisoned, his right to travel is impaired, and he experiences anxiety "especially since he is being brought to trial for acts that actually benefitted the government."72 He also underscores that he is incurring legal fees to defend himself.73chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners' duty to follow up on the prosecution of their case. Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it. As pronounced in the case of Barker v. Wingo:Accordingly, petitioners' failure to prod the Ombudsman to perform its positive duty and mandate should not, as it simply cannot, be deemed as acquiescence to an unjustified delay. It is the Ombudsman which is mandated by no less than the Constitution,82 as enforced by The Ombudsman Act of 1989,83 to act promptly on complaints filed before it against public officials and government employees. Verily, mere inaction on the part of the accused, without more, does not qualify as an intelligent waiver of their constitutionally guaranteed right to the speedy disposition of cases.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryA defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.81chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On 04 July 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused LUIS P. LORENZO, JR. and ARTHUR C. YAP, both public officers with salary grade 30, being then the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Administrator of the National Food Authority (NFA), respectively, while in the performance of their official functions and in grave abuse thereof, acting with evident bad faith, manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence, conspiring with one another and with co-accused TOMAS A. GUIBANI, Representative of the Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (Philphos), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally cause undue injury to the government and/or give unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to Philphos, by (a) directing the Regional Bids and Awards Committees (RBACs) of NFA Regions 1 to 5 and the National Capital Region (NCR) to conduct procurement of their fertilizer requirements through the negotiated mode in violation of the general rule on competitive bidding prescribed under Section 10 of Republic Act 9184; (b) issuing a guideline that the opening of the bids for the Luzon-wide procurement of fertilizers shall be simultaneously done at the NFA Central Office in Manila; and (c) amending the original guideline allowing only those suppliers with depots within and/or adjacent to the procuring NFA Region to participate as bidders, which issuances and directives were issued to ensure the award to Manilabased Philphos of the Php595,636.37 procurement contract for the supply of 1,300 bags of fertilizers to NFA-NCR, to the damage and prejudice of the government.As earlier mentioned, the other four Informations were similarly worded except for (a) the date and place of the commission of the crime, (b) the NFA region involved, (c) the amount of the contract, and (d) the quantity of fertilizers.90chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CONTRARY TO LAW.89chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The [O]ffice of the Solicitor General does not deny that the Beloncios had been committed to jail by order of competent authorities of the American forces of liberation. The record fails to show any motion for reconsideration by the provincial fiscal disputing the admissions attributed to him in the court's decision. Hence[,] we are justified, in assuming, that such representations had been made. Consequently[,] when the defense urged that the facts charged did not constitute an offense, invoking not only the allegations of the information but also the admissions made by the fiscal. the trial judge rightly sustained the motion. Because the Beloncios had been placed by competent authority of the United States military forces in the official custody of defendants, who were public officials entrusted with the detention of prisoners, they could not very well be turned loose without a countermand. The fiscal should have mentioned other subsequent circumstances, if any, establishing defendants' duty (which they failed to fulfill) to release the Beloncios.Here, petitioners argue that the exception to the general rule applies because the evidence aliunde sought to be considered in their motions to quash were admitted by the prosecution. Lorenzo submits:
It must be noted that the section of the rule (sec. 2[a], Rule 113) permitting a motion to quash on the ground that "the facts charged do not constitute an offense" omits reference to the facts detailed "in the information." Other sections of the same rule would imply that the issue is restricted to those alleged in the information (see secs. 9 and 10, Rule 113). Prima facie, the "facts charged" are those described in the complaint, but they may be amplified or qualified by others appearing to be additional circumstances, upon admissions made by the people's representative, which admissions could anyway be submitted by him as amendments to the same information. It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in the consideration of the motion the parties and the judge were precluded from considering facts which the fiscal admitted to be true, simply because they were not described in the complaint. Of course, it may be added that upon similar motions the court and the fiscal are not required to go beyond the averments of the information, nor is the latter to be inveigled into a premature and risky revelation of his evidence. But we see no reason to prohibit the fiscal from making, in all candor, admissions of undeniable facts, because the principle can never be sufficiently reiterated that such official's role is to see that justice is done: not that all accused are convicted, but that the guilty are justly punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit the court from considering those admissions, and deciding accordingly, in the interest of a speedy administration of justice.98 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x that on the basis of the very comment/opposition of the prosecution, contrary to the ruling of the court [a quo], the evidence [aliunde] introduced by the petitioner was not really objected to by the prosecution but was actually admitted as a common allegation in the three (3) complaints filed by the Office of the Ombudsman relative to the questioned procurement of fertilizers in the areas of Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. The prosecution[,] by admitting and/or not denying the three (3) resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman even clarified and tried to harmonize the three (3) resolutions by arguing that the Office of the Ombudsman did not really [revoke, repeal, abrogate, and then reinstate] its own rulings and the perceived flip-flopping rulings were merely brought about by the fact that since the allegations and pieces of evidence in the three complaints differ from one another, necessarily, the factual and legal findings in the three Resolutions would also vary. However, the prosecution did not deny the fact that while indeed allegations and pieces of evidence may vary in the three complaints covering the procurement of fertilizers in the Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao areas, there is only one April 30, 2003 Memorandum Order issued by the petitioner. Consequently, such fact was deemed admitted and uncontroverted especially so that the prosecution even categorically admitted the same as a common allegation. Thus, whether it will be the Luzon, Visayas or Mindanao procurement that will be questioned, it will always refer to the same April 30, 2003 Memorandum Order of the petitioner the propriety of the issuance thereof was already found and declared by the same Ombudsman as valid and legal in its July 24, 2015 Resolution x x x and May 2, 2018 Resolution x x x.99 (Emphasis supplied)Similarly, Yap argues that the evidence sought to be considered in his motion to quash, while not alleged in the Information, were admitted or not denied by the prosecution.100 According to him, undeniable facts appearing on the records of the case and not susceptible of contradiction should have been considered by the Sandiganbayan in resolving his motion to quash.101chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. The informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial.Here, respondent People maintains that the exception to the hypothetical admission rule cannot be applied because the prosecution opposed the extraneous facts introduced during the motion to quash stage. According to respondent People, petitioners' proposition "is belied by the Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Quash filed by the prosecution thereto, its vehement objections[,] and controverting facts which were raised to oppose the presentation of extrinsic evidence by the petitioner."105 The Sandiganbayan sided with respondent People when it ruled that:
The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash under this particular ground is whether or not the facts asseverated if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in the law. In this examination, matters aliunde are not considered. However, inquiry into facts outside the information may be allowed where the prosecution does not object to the presentation thereof. In the early case of People v. Navarro, we held:
x x x x
It should be stressed, however, that for a case to fall under the exception, it is essential that there be no objection from the prosecution. Thus, the above rule does not apply where the prosecution objected to the presentation of extraneous facts and even opposed the motion to quash.104 (Emphasis supplied)
Irrefragably, the Prosecution is up in arms against the presentation of evidence aliunde and the precipitate dismissal of this case. Conformably with the Supreme Court's ruling in Valencia, this Court finds the accused's position to be untenable, to begin with, and conforms to the Prosecution's Opposition.106chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryAs will be shown below, a careful review of the parties' submissions as well as the relevant jurisprudence leads to the conclusion that favors petitioners' position — that is, what is applicable here is the exception to the general rule against admission of evidence aliunde in a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations in the Information do not constitute an offense.
We concur. To attain the substantial ends of justice, procedural technicalities must be dispensed with, and the court rules must be interpreted so as to give them the resiliency demanded by the circumstances of the case. Court rules must give way to judicial liberalism and legal progress. The law embodied in them must grow and develop. Even the calcareous shells of the large phylum of mollusks, notwithstanding their rocky hardness and apparent fixity, grow in answer to the evolutionary requirements of biological laws.It is under this prism that the Court analyzes the relevant jurisprudence applying the doctrine in Navarro.
Prosecution's statements belong to a class of evidence of the highest order in behalf of the accused. It is based on the same principle upon which estoppel is established, and from which the ad hominem argument in logic derives its force.108 (Emphasis supplied)
The first error imputed to the trial court is its consideration of facts not alleged in the information. The facts, however, are apparent from the record and these facts are not denied by the provincial fiscal. Though they may not constitute admissions on the part of the fiscal, they certainly fall within the spirit and principle contained in People vs. Navarro, 75 Phil., 516. We find no difference between facts merely admitted and undeniable facts appearing on the record of a case. If one is allowed, there is no reason for denying admission of the other. As the facts are clear and not susceptible of contradiction, it would be idle ceremony to return the case to the trial court for trial at which the same facts of record will have to be introduced. It seems more in accord with expediency for us to overlook the technical irregularity that the trial court is claimed to have committed, which irregularity we do not here admit to exist because it was sanctioned by us in the case of Navarro, supra, and proceed to determine the validity of the order of the court on the basis of the facts found in the record, rather than remand the case to the trial court. The claim that the court acted improperly in the consideration of the motion to quash must be dismissed.110 (Emphasis supplied)In People v. Rodriguez111 (Rodriguez), the Court also allowed the quashal of the Information on the basis of evidence aliunde in support of the accused's claim of double jeopardy. The fiscal therein filed an opposition to the motion to quash, arguing that the question raised is a matter of defense which the accused may present during the trial on the merits. In upholding the order to quash the Information, the Court ruled that:
The claim of the prosecution that the trial court erred in not holding that the ground on which the motion to quash is based is a matter of defense which the appellee should establish at the trial of the case on the merits is also of no avail, it appearing that the fact concerning the inclusion of the same firearm in the crime of rebellion as well as its presentation as evidence therein has been brought out by the defense in his petition to quash and that fact was not disputed by the prosecution.112 (Emphasis supplied)Similarly, in People v. De la Rosa113 (De la Rosa), the Court upheld the quashing of the Information on the basis of evidence aliunde despite the opposition of the prosecution. Therein, the prosecutor admitted certain facts and participated in the hearings where both parties presented documentary and testimonial evidence. Thereafter, the court a quo found that, in light of the admitted facts as they emerged after the hearing, the allegation in the amended Information did not constitute an offense. In affirming the order of the court a quo, the Court ruled as follows:
It is true that on the basis of the allegations of the amended information, standing alone, an offense is charged. But from admissions made by the prosecution, and the evidence presented, as even the prosecution asked the court to be permitted to present such evidence in its Motion to Reopen Consideration of the Motion to Quash of March 21, 1969, the respondent court found justification in quashing the information, as he issued the order complained of on June 14, 1971.In Lopez v. Sandiganbayan115 (Lopez), the Court had another occasion to rule that the facts admitted by the prosecution are an exception to the rule that evidence aliunde may not be considered in a motion to quash. The Court ruled as such even if the prosecution opposed to the same:
The question to be resolved is whether the respondent court committed a reversible error in issuing the afore-mentioned order.
As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. However, as held in the case of People vs. Navarro, 75 Phil. 516, additional facts not alleged in the information, but admitted or not denied by the prosecution may be invoked in support of the motion to quash. Former Chief Justice Moran supports this theory.
x x x x
Indeed, where in the hearing on a motion to quash predicated on the ground that the allegations of the information do not charge an offense, facts have been brought out by evidence presented by both parties which destroy the prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof, as is implicit in the nature of the ground of the motion to quash, it would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and still give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to support possible conviction, and hold the accused to what would clearly appear to be a merely vexatious and expensive trial, on her part, and a wasteful expense of precious time on the part of the court, as well as of the prosecution.114 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
We uphold the submission that the factual defenses of petitioner are matters within the concept of mandatory judicial notice. While it is true that, as pontificated by the Court a quo, factual defenses on the part of the accused are evidentiary matters which may be presented only during trial on the merits, the facts alleged by the accused are facts admitted, whether directly or impliedly, in pleadings of the prosecution and in the reports of the Provincial Prosecutor of Davao Oriental and Graft Investigator Gay Maggie Balajadia. Consequently, the disposition of the matter in the questioned Resolution which states that "The nature, scope and legal consequences of the inculpatory allegations in the Amended Information, with respect to accused-movant, remains (sic) to be ascertained during the trial," is not at all correct.As can be gleaned from the cases applying Navarro, the mere objection of the prosecution from the introduction of evidence aliunde in a motion to quash does not operate to ipso facto prevent the court from applying the exception to the general rule. Verily, in Lancanan, Rodriguez, De la Rosa, and Lopez, the court still granted the motion to quash after considering extraneous facts presented by the accused — notwithstanding the opposition from the prosecution.
Judicial notice may be taken of petitioner's oath taking before the Regional Trial Court Judge of Mati, Davao Oriental, the Hon. Roque A. Agton, as evidenced by a certification from the Records Officer of the office of the Provincial Governor. The oath taking partakes of an official act, while the certification is an official act of an official of the Executive Department of the government.
We had the occasion to make rulings on a similar issue. In People vs. Navarro & Atienza, 75 Phil. 516, for example, x x x.
Reiterating Navarro, this Court ruled in People vs. De la Rosa, 98 SCRA 191, that:
x x x x
And in Milo vs. Salanga, 152 SCRA 113, We likewise ruled that:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryThis is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. Matters of defense cannot be proved during the hearing of such a motion, except where the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability, prescription and former jeopardy. In the case of U.S. v. Perez, this Court held that a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not only different but diametrically opposed to those alleged in the complaint. This rule admits of only one exception and that is when the facts are admitted by the prosecution. (Milo v. Salanga, supra, at 121).Since the prosecution has admitted the fact that petitioner was not yet the Municipal Mayor on or about December 10, 1987 and that Petitioner Mayor Lopez became the Municipal Mayor only after the date of the commission of the offense charged, such an admission constitutes as a judicial admission which is binding upon the prosecution.116 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This Office finds no probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.Two years later, the Ombudsman issued its July 25, 2017 Resolution in the instant case involving the Luzon regions, which found probable cause against petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
x x x x
The second element is wanting.
x x x x
There is nothing in the 30 April 2003 Memorandum that shows that it was issued by respondent Lorenzo, then DA Secretary, for the purpose of giving favor to Philphos. Said Memorandum merely states the reason for the alternative method, i.e., to ensure the timely distribution of fertilizers to the farmer-beneficiaries for the wet season (May to October 2003) under the GMA Rice Program.
It bears stressing that the assailed procurement in this case transpired before the 08 October 2003 effectivity of the [IRR-A] of the Government Procurement Act. NFA Region VII RBAC sent out the Invitations to Bid on 06 June 2003 and on 20 June 2003 while NFA Region VIII RBAC sent out the Invitations to Bid on 04 June 2003. Further, the Region VII contract was awarded on 27 June 2003 while the Region VII Contract was awarded on 14 July 2003. Thusly, this Office finds the applicability of EO 40 pursuant to Section 77 of the IRR-A of the Government Procurement Act which provides that "[I]n cases where the advertisements or invitations for bids were issued after the effectivity of the Act but before the effectivity of this IRR-A, procuring entities may continue adopting the procurement procedures, rules and regulations provided in E.O. 40 and its IRR, P.D. 1594 and its IRR, R.A. 7166 and its IRR, or other applicable laws, as the case may be."
Section 2 of EO 40 still requires, as a general rule, the conduct of public bidding in all government procurement. However, the first paragraph of Section 35 thereof provides:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryAlternative Methods. When justified by extraordinary conditions as provided in this Executive Order and its IRR, and subject to the prior approval of the head of the agency in the interest of economy and efficiency, the agency head, upon the recommendation of the BAC, may adopt alternative methods of procurement.While Section 35.1 of its IRR states:
chanroblesvirtuallawlibraryIn the interest of economy and efficiency, the agency concerned may adopt the following alternative methods of procurement after the Head of Agency concerned or his duly authorized representative has approved the use of the same, upon recommendation of the BAC, as indicated in the bidding documents.From said provisions, while public bidding is the standard, resort to alternative methods of procurement is not entirely prohibited. Extraordinary conditions, as well as efficient and economic grounds, may warrant an adoption of an alternative method of procurement.
The alternative mode of negotiated procurement was directed by respondent Lorenzo in order to coincide with the planting period, taking into consideration the wet season from May to October 2003. The assessment of respondent Lorenzo that there was urgency for the procurement of the fertilizers is well within his ambit of authority and discretion. It also appears to be in consonance with paragraph (c) of Section 35.1.5 of IRR of EO 40, which provides:Negotiated Procurement for Goods may be employed by agencies only in the following cases:Respondent Yap, as then NFA Administrator, was prompted by the 30 April 2003 Memorandum to issue directives relative to the procurement. In turn, the other respondents acted pursuant to said authority and directives. Mere compliance by respondents Yap x x x with the 30 April 2003 Memorandum does not establish manifest partiality, evident bad faith and inexcusable negligence on their part. With the directive of the DA Secretary in conducting the alternative method of negotiated procurement, which is presumed to be valid at the time of its issuance, the other respondents were left with no other option but to follow the same. They cannot thus be said to have deliberately intended to award the contracts to Philphos.
x x x x
c) Whenever the goods are to be used in connection with a project or activity which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to public service; and
x x x x
Furthermore, the records show that Philphos was not the only distributor invited to submit price quotations. x x x
The sending out of invitations to other suppliers and distributors negates any showing of partiality.120 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A second look at the case records shows that there was no "no performance bond policy." The guidelines dated 23 June 2003 x x x issued by Yap still required a performance bond. It merely dispensed with the bid bond for all bidders. Clearly, said issuance cannot be considered as showing manifest partiality in favor of Philphos.In refusing to recognize the issuances by the Ombudsman in the Visayas and Mindanao cases, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the reliance on matters aliunde is misplaced because the "factual milieu, including the adminicle of evidence, in said cases is not on all fours with the present case."123 Following the ruling in Valencia, the Sandiganbayan also harped on the opposition by the prosecution to justify its refusal to consider the evidence aliunde. Further, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the "disposition in one case does not inevitably and necessarily govern the resolution of the other, albeit related, cases."124 According to the Sandiganbayan, "the evidentiary value, if any, of past resolutions of the Office of Ombudsman vis a vis this case may be threshed out during the adjudication on the merits."125chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Second, the procurement subject of the present case transpired before the 8 October 2003 effectivity of the [IRR-A] of the Government Procurement Act (R.A. No. 9184). Pertinently, Section 77 of IRR-A provides that "in cases where the advertisements or invitations for bids were issued after the effectivity of the Act but before the effectivity of this IRRA, procuring entities may continue adopting the procurement procedures, rules and regulations provided in E.O. 40 and its IRR x x x or other applicable laws, as the case may be."
Paragraph (c) of Section 35.1.5 of the IRR of E.O. 40, the rule applicable during the subject procurement, allows negotiated procurement of goods "whenever the goods are to be used in connection with a project or activity which cannot be delayed without causing detriment to public service." Relevantly, the 30 April 2003 Memorandum of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture [Lorenzo] authorized Yap to enter into a negotiated procurement of the fertilizers for its timely distribution to the farmers in time for the wet season of May to October 2003. Yap followed and implemented the aforementioned directive of the DA Secretary. There is nothing manifestly wrong or damaging in following the said directive that was aimed at a timely distribution of the fertilizers to the farmers. Neither does obedience to it constitute bad judgment or conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. Consequently, Yap may not be said to have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence. Absent one element of the crime of violation of Section 3 (e), probable cause to indict Yap therefor does not lie.
At all events, in OMB-C-C-14-0064 [regarding the Visayas case] — a kindred fertilizer procurement case involving the same guidelines/issuances by Yap — a similar finding of absence of the element of manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence against Yap was made.122 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x Lorenzo's reliance on the findings in the Visayas and Mindanao cases is erroneous. At the outset, it must be highlighted that the present cases, the Visayas and the Mindanao cases were not based on one and the same complaint. The basis for the present cases is the Complaint dated July 23, 2013 of x x x the Office of the Ombudsman. As the allegations and pieces of evidence obtaining in the Complaint for the present cases differ from those in the Visayas and the Mindanao cases, necessarily the factual and legal findings in the three Resolutions vary even if they may have common allegations, i.e., the April 30, 2003 Memorandum. Therefore, it is incorrect for Lorenzo to conclude that the Office of the Ombudsman has revoked, repealed, abrogated and then reinstated its own ruling in the present cases and in the Visayas and Mindanao cases.126 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Evidently, the prosecution did not deny the findings of the Ombudsman in the Visayas and Mindanao cases and even admitted that they have common allegations with the instant case, i.e., the April 30, 2003 Memorandum issued by Lorenzo. Following Lancanan, the facts are apparent from the record and are not denied by the prosecution; though they may not constitute admissions on the part of the prosecution, they still fall within the spirit and principle of the ruling in Navarro, as there should be no difference between facts merely admitted and undeniable facts appearing on the record of the case.127chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Mere surmises and unsupported conclusions do not establish that the contracts were unfavorable to the government. On the other hand, at the time of the perfection of the assailed contracts in 2003, it appears that the amount of PhP480.00 per bag for the required fertilizers for Region VII and PhP485.00 per bag for Region VIII offered by Philphos were much lower than the prevailing average prices of PhP542.00 per bag for Region VII and PhP550.88 for Region VIII during said year.138chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryThese findings by the Ombudsman in the Visayas case are similar to the findings of the Ombudsman in the instant case in its discussion on the absence of probable cause for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, to wit:
There is no adequate showing that the government was grossly disadvantaged when the fertilizers were purchased from Philphos. For one, there is no evidence, much less any allegation, that the fertilizers were overpriced. Based on the data of the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics and the DA Field Operators Office, the average price of fertilizers in 2003 was pegged at PhP537.90/bag which is even higher than the prices offered by Philphos which ranged from PhP469 to PhP480.00.Clearly, the aforementioned findings of the Ombudsman had already cast serious doubt as to the presence of the elements of the crime in this case, which should have prompted the Sandiganbayan to consider the same. Echoing De la Rosa:
Second, the warehouse stock receipts prove that the amount of fertilizers contracted and paid for were delivered to the concerned NFA regions. There is also no allegation that any portion of said goods was defective or substandard.
With regard to the COA findings that some of the fertilizers were also given to non-masterlisted farmer-beneficiaries, more so to deceased farmers, non-farmers and/or those already living abroad, the same cannot conclusively establish that the government was grossly or manifestly disadvantaged. In fact, the COA simply reminded the DA to update its master list of farmer-beneficiaries.139 (Emphasis supplied)
x x x where in the hearing on a motion to quash predicated on the ground that the allegations of the information do not charge an offense, facts have been brought out by evidence presented by both parties which destroy the prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof, as is implicit in the nature of the ground of the motion to quash, it would be pure technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and still give due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to support possible conviction, and hold the accused to what would clearly appear to be a merely vexatious and expensive trial, on her part, and a wasteful expense of precious time on the part of the court, as well as of the prosecution.140chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryIn sum, the Court finds that the Sandiganbayan committed grievous error in refusing to consider the evidence aliunde presented by petitioners in their motions to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Moreover, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners' motions to quash despite the prosecutions' failure to provide sufficient justification for the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. Consequently, the cases against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for violation of petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases.
Endnotes:
1 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242590-94), p. 301, per Court Resolution dated September 23, 2019.
2 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242506-10), pp. 3-53 and Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242590-94), pp. 3-53.
3 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242590-94), pp. 56-83.
4 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242590-94), p. 6.
5 Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019: "(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions."
6 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242506-10), p. 166.
7 Id. at 167.
8 Id. at 106-108.
9 Id. at 133.
10 Id. at 134.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 102-148.
13 Id. at 135-136.
14 Id. at 136-137.
15 Id. at 138.
16 Id. at 142. Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 punishes the act of "entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby."
17 Id. at 145. Section 65(b)(4) of R.A. 9184 considers it punishable: "[w]hen a bidder, by himself or in connivance with others, employ schemes which tend to restrain the natural rivalry of the parties or operates to stifle or suppress competition and thus produce a result disadvantageous to the public."
18 Id. at 153.
19 Id. at 149-156.
20 Id. at 165.
21 Id. at 167.
22 Id. at 171.
23 Id. at 171.
24 Id. at 172.
25 Id. at 173.
26 Id. at 75.
27 Id. at 165-179; penned by Associate Justice Kevin Narce B. Vivero and concurred in by Associate Justices Sarah Jane T. Fernandez and Maryann E. Corpus-Mañalac.
28 Id. at 170.
29 Id. at 171.
30 Id. at 172.
31 Id. at 175-176.
32 Id. at 176-177.
33 Id. at 206-218.
34 Id. at 3-53.
35 Id. at 24-25.
36 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242590-94), pp. 3-53.
37 Id. at 21-22.
38 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242506-10), p. 309.
39 Id.
40 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242506-10), pp. 438-461; and Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242590-94), pp. 457-476.
41 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242506-10), pp. 443-444; and Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242590-94), p. 462.
42 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242506-10), pp. 1072-1104; and Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242590-94), pp. 487-502.
43 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242590-94), p. 301.
44 837 Phil. 815 (2018).
45 Id. at 880-882.
46 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242506-10), p. 37.
47 Id. at 306.
48 Id. at 452.
49 Id. at 455.
50 Supra note 43, at 868.
51 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242506-10), p. 455.
52 Id. at 120. N.B. Lorenzo failed to file his counter-affidavit. See id. at 132. Also, there is no complete record of when all the respondents filed their Counter-Affidavits in the case before the Ombudsman. Thus, the Court focuses on the date when Yap filed his counter-affidavit.
53 Id. at 155-156.
54 G.R. 237997, June 10, 2020, accessed at .
55 G.R. 243560-62, July 28, 2020, accessed at .
56 G.R. Nos. 236177-210, February 3, 2021, accessed at .
57 Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2020, "Prescribing the Periods in the Conduct of Investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman" (August 15, 2020).
58 A.O. 1, s. 2020, Section 3.
59 Id.
60 Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 56.
61 383 Phil. 897 (2000).
62 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242506-10), p. 453.
63 Perez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 245862, November 3, 2020, accessed at .
64 Id.
65 G.R. No. 239878, February 28, 2022, accessed at .
66 Id.
67 484 Phil. 899 (2004).
68 Id. at 918.
69 714 Phil. 55 (2013).
70 Id. at 65.
71 People v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 65.
72 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242590-94), p. 46.
73 Id.
74 People v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 65.
75 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242590-94), p. 45.
76 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242506-10), pp. 42-43.
77 Magante v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 836 Phil. 1109, 1139 (2018).
78 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242590-94), pp. 67-68.
79 Id. at 68.
80 Perez v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 65.
81 Id.
82 CONSTITUTION Art. XI, Sec. 12.
83 R.A. 6770, "An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for Other Purposes," Sec. 13.
84 People v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 65.
85 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 14(2).
86 People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 769 Phil. 378, 387 (2015).
87 Spouses Tayamen v. People, G.R. No. 246986, April 28, 2021, accessed at .
88 Jacinto v. Sandiganbayan, 258-A Phil. 20, 26 (1989).
89 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242506-10), p. 166.
90 Id. at 167.
91 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242506-10), pp. 94 and 161.
92 Id. at 142.
93 Antone v. Beronilla, 652 Phil. 151, 165 (2010).
94 Id.
95 Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 621, 634 (1997).
96 75 Phil. 516 (1945).
97 Id. at 517.
98 Id.
99 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242506-10), p. 27.
100 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242590-94), p. 23.
101 Id. at 25.
102 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242506-10), p. 445.
103 477 Phil. 103 (2004).
104 Id. at 112-113.
105 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242506-10), p. 446.
106 Id. at 211.
107 Valencia v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 103, at 115.
108 People v. Navarro, supra note 96, at 519-520.
109 95 Phil. 375 (1954).
110 Id. at 377.
111 107 Phil. 659 (1960).
112 Id. at 663.
113 187 Phil. 118 (1980).
114 Id. at 122-126.
115 319 Phil. 387 (1995).
116 Id. at 386-398.
117 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242506-10), p. 10.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 84-101.
120 Id. at 94-98.
121 Id. at 157-163.
122 Id. at 160-162.
123 Id. at 172.
124 Id. at 211.
125 Id. at 213.
126 Id. at 26.
127 People v. Lancanan, supra note 109, at 377.
128 Rollo (G.R. Nos. 242506-10), p. 171.
129 Id. at 96.
130 Id. at 96-97.
131 See id. at 161.
132 Id. at 172-173.
133 Id. at 97.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 161.
136 Id. at 100.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 99.
139 Id. at 142-143.
140 People v. Dela Rosa, supra note 113 at 126.cralawredlibrary