1. COURTS; JURISDICTION OF MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA TO TRY CASES OF QUALIFIED THEFT. — That the municipal cout of the City of Manila has jurisdiction to try cases of qualified theft, as long as the amount invovled does not exceed P200, is a question which has been settled in the affirmative in several cases, because it is the value of the property stolen, and not the punishment that may be meted out, that has been made the basis of jurisdiction.

2. ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF WITNESS CONCERNING VALUE OF STOLEN PROPERTY NOT BINDING UPON COURTS. — Petitioner-appellant contends that, as there is evidnce that the value of the property stolen could have been P240, and not P40, as alleged in the information, the respondent municipal court had no jurisdiction to try and decide this case. As petitioner-appellant was convicted of the crime of qualified theft, as charged, the respondent court impliedly and evidently found that the value of the stolen property was P40, as alleged in the informationm after considering the facts and circumstances of the case, using its own discretion (U. S. v. Galanco, 11 Phil., 575), as the testimony given by the witness concerning the value of the stolen property is not binding upon the courts.

3. CERTIORARI; FINDING AS TO VALUE OF STOLEN PROPERTY, MORE PROPERLY REVIEWABLE IN APPEAL. — The finding of the respondent municipal court that the value of the stolen proeprty was P40, and not P240 as testified to by a witness for the prosecution, is more properly reviewable in an appeal than in a certiorari proceeding.

4. HABEAS CORPUS; AUTHORITY OF MUNICIPAL COURT TO ISSUE BENCH WARRANT. — The respondent municipal court has authority, under the provisions of section 2469 of the Revised Administrative Code, to issue a bench warrant for the petitioner’s failure to appear before said court for the reading of the sentence rendered against him.

5. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR, MOOT. — The matter at issue in the habeas corpus case has become moot question by reason of the promulgation of the judgment rendered by the respondent court, finding the petitioner- appellant guilty of the crime charged against him, and petitioner’s appeal from said decision. The sole purpose of issuing the writ would be to establish a principle to govern similar cases in the future. But courts exist to decide only actual controversies, not to give opinions upon abstract propositions.

6. ID.; REMEDY NOT PROPER WHEN THERE IS RIGHT OF APPEAL. — If petitioner-appellant believes that the judgment of conviction rendered against him by the respondent court is erroneous, he has a perfect right to appeal from said decision, and that hehas actually done in the instant case. And it is a well established rule in this jurisdiction that the remedy of habeas corpus cannot be legally and properly invoked, when the right of appeal exists (Cowper v. DAde, 29 Phil., 222; Abanilla v. Villas, 56 Phil., 481; Paguntalan v. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil., 141, 144); because the main purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not the petitioner is legally detained (Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil., 36; Quintos v. Director of Prisons, 55 Phil., 304); and because habeas corpus cannot be properly invoked to correct alleged errors committed by a trial court, which had jurisdiction of the persons and the subject matter unless, such errors made the judgment absolutely void (Andres v. Wolfe, 5 Phil., 60; U. S. v. Jayme, 24 Phil., 90).

In the above-entitled cases for certiorari and habeas corpus, the pertinent facts, as disclosed by the record, are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The petitioner-appellant had been originally accused, on May 17, 1945, in the municipal court of the City of Manila, of the crime of qualified theft of eight (8) cases of storage batteries of the total value of P40. Said petitioner had been released on bail since May 15, 1945.

2. At the trial of the case, a witness for the prosecution testified that the value of said storage batteries, which were not produced in court, could have been P240, and not P40, as alleged in the information.

3. Upon the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, counsel for petitioner moved to quash the information, on the gorund of lack of jurisdiction over the offense of qualified theft of property valued at P240, which motion was denied by the respondent judge of the municipal court. Petitioner declined to submit any evidence in his behalf.

4. On May 31, 1945, petitioner filed an omnibus motion containing all his objections to the proceedings of the municipal court, which motion was also denied.

5. On June 4, 1945, the respondent judge of the municipal court issued an order requiring petitioner to appear before him on June 9, 1945, for the promulgation of the sentence, which order, according to petitioner, was never received by him.

6. On June 8, 1945, appellant filed for a petition for certiorari and a writ of preliminary injunction, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, against the respondent municipal judge.

7. On June 9, 1945, the respondent judge of the municipal court, issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, who had changed his place of residence; and on June 12, 1945, said respondent judge also issued a bench warrant, ordering his arrest, for his failure to appear for the reading of the sentence, on June 9, 1945; and by virtue of said warrant, herein petitioner was arrested on June 19, 1945.

8. On June 15, 1945, the Honorable Mamerto Roxas, presiding judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance of Manila, denied said motion for a writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition for certiorari; and on June 26, 1945, petitioner filed his notice of appeal, his motion for reconsideration having been denied.

9. On June 19, 1945, the judgment of conviction was promulgated, finding herein petitioner guilty of the crime of qualified theft of eight (8) cases of storage batteries of the value of P40, as alleged in the information, although, according to a witness for the prosecution, the value of said storage batteries, which were not produced in court, could have been P240; and on June 20, 1945, he also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, alleging that his detention by virtue of said bench warrant was unlawful, while proceedings in the certiorari case were still pending.

10. On June 22, 1945, the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila denied said petition for habeas corpus; and on the same day petitioner filed his notice of appeal, in the habeas corpus case.

11. On June 26, 1945, petitioner filed his notice of appeal to the Court of Firrst Instance of the City of Manila, from the judgment of conviction, rendered against him by the respondent judge of the municipal court of the City of Manila, sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, for the crime of qualified theft of said storage batteries of the value of P40, as alleged in the information, although their value could have been P240, as testified to by a witness for the prosecution, and at the same time filed the corresponding appeal bond. Said appealed case has been docketed as criminal case No. 70893 of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila.

The questions raised by petitioner-appellant’s assignments of errors may be conveniently reduced to three.

The first question submitted for our decision is whether or not, under existing law, the municipal court of the City of Manila has jurisdiction to try cases of qualified theft, when the value of the property alleged to have been stolen is P40, or does not exceed P200.

Under our law, the municipal court of the City of Manila has jurisdiction to try theft cases, as long as the amount involved does not exceed P200 (Adm. Code, sec. 2468, as amende by Com. Act no. 361). but petitioner contends that, as the offense imputed to petitioner is that of qualified theft, for which the penalty is very much higher than that for simple theft, the municipal court of the City of Manila has no jurisdiction to try this case, although the amount involved is only P40.

That the municipal court of the City of Manila has jurisdiction to try cases of qualified theft, as long as the amount involved does not exceed P200, is a question which has been settled, in the affirmative by this Court, in several cases, because it is the value of the property stolen, and not the punishment that may be meted out, that has been made the basis of jurisdiction (People v. De Leon, 49 Phil., 437; People v. Kaw Liong, 57 Phil., 839, 841, 842; People v. Acha, 40 Off. Gaz., 2d Supp. No. 5, p. 252; People v. Del Mundo, SC — G. R. No. 46531, Oct. 18, 1939; People v. San Juan, 40 Off. Gaz., 6th Supp. No. 10, p. 48). (See also 2 Moran, Rules of Court, pp. 763, 764.) .

Petitioner-appellant also contends that, as there is evidence that the value of the property stolen could have been P240, and not P40, as alleged in the information, the municipal court of the City of Manila had no jurisdiction to try and decide this case.

As already stated, the respondent municipal judge found herein petitioner-appellant guilty of the crime of qualified theft, as charged, impliedly and evidently finding that the value of the stolen property was P40, as alleged in the information, after considering the facts and circumstances of the case, using its own discretion (U. S. v. Galanco, 11 Phil., 575); as the testimony given by the witness concerning the value of the stolen property is not binding upon the courts.

Furthermore, said finding made by the respondent municipal judge is more properly reviewable in an appeal than in a certiorari petition.

The last question raised by petitioner-appellant is the allegedly illegality of the bench warrant issued by the respondent judge of the municipal court of the City of Manila, on June 12, 1945, for his failure to appear before said court, on June 9, 1945, for the reading of the sentence rendered against him. Said bench warrant was executed on June 19, 1945, and petitioner-appellant was arrested and brought before said court, which promulgated its decision on that same date; and from which decision petitioner has duly appealed.

That the respondent judge of the municipal court of the City of Manila has authority to issue such a bench warrant is clearly shown by the provisions of section 2469 of the Revised Administrative Code.

But the matter at issue in the habeas corpus case has become a moot question, by reason of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction rendered by said respondent judge, finding herein petitioner-appellant guilty of the crime charged against him, and petitioner’s appeal from said decision.

The sole purpose of issuing the writ would be to establish a principle to govern similar cases in the future. But courts exist to decide only actual controversies, not to give opinions upon abstract propositions (Garduño v. Diaz, 46 Phil., 472; DAis v. Garduño, 49 Phil., 165).

If petitioner-appellant believes that the judgment of conviction rendered against him by the respondent judge of the municipal court of the City of Manila is erroneous, he has a perfect right to appeal from said decision, and that he has actually done in the instant case. And it is a well established rule in this jurisdiction that the remedy of habeas corpus cannot be legally and properly invoked, when the right of appeal exists (Cowper v. Dade, 29 Phil., 222; Abanilla v. Villas, 56 Phil., 481; Paguntalan v. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil., 140, 144); because the main purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not the petitioner is legally detained (Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil., 36; Quintos v. Director of Prisons, 55 Phil., 304); and that habeas corpus cannot be properly invoked to correct alleged errors committed by the trial court, which had jurisdiction of the person and the subject-matter, unless such errors made the judgment absolutely void (Andres v. Wolfe, 5 Phil., 60; U.S. v. Jayme, 24 Phil., 90).

In view of the legal doctrines above set forth, it is unnecessary for us to consider the other questions raised by petitioner-appellant; and the judgments appealed from, dismissing the petitions for certiorari and habeas corpus, are, therefore, affirmed with costs against petitioner-appellant in both instances. It is so ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, Feria and Pablo, JJ., concur.



PERFECTO, M., concurrente y disidente:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(No. L-4)

Tenemos bajo nuestra consideracion una apelacion interpuesta contra una orden del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila, denegando la solicitud de habeas corpus presentada por el apelante.

El apelante relata que el 12 de mayo, 1945, fue arrestado y detenido por el sargento Robert Cooper sin que esta estuviera provisto de mandamiento de arresto; que el dia siguiente presto una fianza para su inmediata libertad por la suma de P500; que el mayo 17, 1945, se presento querella contra el en el Juzgado Municipal de Manila por el delito de hurto cualificado de ocho baterias por valor de P40; que la causa fue vista el 25 de mayo, 1945, en donde el sargento Cooper testifico que el valor de las baterias hurtadas asciende a P240; que en el acto el apelante pidio el sobreseimiento de la querella sobre el fundamento de que, habiendose probado que el efecto hurtado importa P240, el asunto no era de la jurisdiccion del Juzgado Municipal, mocion que fue denegada; que el 4 de junio, 1945, el Juzgado cito al apelante para comparecer el 9 de junio, para la promulgacion de la sentencia (el apelante y su abogado no fueron notificados de la citacion, aunque su abogado se entero de la misma al examinar el expediente el 7 de junio); que el 8 de junio, 1945, el apelante presento un recurso de avocacion contra el Juzgado Municipal, con peticion de interdicto prohibitorio preliminar que nunca fue concedido; que el 9 de junio se ordeno al Juez Guillermo Cabrera, del Juzgado Municipal, que conteste la solicitud de avocacion, y en el mismo dia dicho Juez recurrido expidio una orden para el arresto del apelante, en vista de que el apelante se traslado a otra residencia sin dar el n